訳文：
アリスとボブ
2025年7月15日

原文：
The Anarchist and the Egoist in Love
ケリー・ヴィー（Kelly Vee）
2022年5月6日

アナキストによる全ての人たちの幸福への献身はエゴイストによる自己の幸福への献身とはどう和解できるか？和解の由来は政治でも宗教でも市場でもない、と私が提案する。アナキストとエゴイストは愛の中に和解を見つける。

愛は幅広い意味を持つ単語である。英語のただ一つの単語の中に含まれた全ての概念をそれぞれ表現する古代ギリシア語の単語が多かったことは不思議ではない。ただ少数の例をあげれば：恋愛のエロス、家族愛のストルゲー、友情愛のフィリア、そして人類愛のアガペー。ギリシア語の各単語は愛の種類の相違点を強調するが、それらの共通点の方が遥かに重要である。

真の愛は愛人が互いをただの手段として利用することなく、互いを目的として捉えることを必要とする。愛は愛する人または愛される人の従属を必要とせず、それを必要とすることができない。愛には従属も支配も存在しない。正しく理解されたエゴイズムとアナキズムはこの原則の最大限の適用である。アナキストかつエゴイストの愛には神や支配者が存在しない。その愛は尊厳、自律、そして自分と他人への敬意の上に築かれたものである。シモーヌ・ド・ボーヴォワール（Simone de Beauvoir）の言葉によれば、「本物の愛は二つの自由の相互認識の上に成り立たなければならない。従って、各愛人が自分かつ相手として自分を経験する。両者とも自分の超越を放棄せず、自分を損傷させない。一緒になって両者が価値観と目的を世界において明かす。」愛することにより、愛する相手の尊厳と自律を認め、支持しながら、私たちは本物の自分と自分の最も大切な価値観を肯定し、主張する。

愛は私たちの人間性の最大限の表現であるものの、「無私無欲」という名目で従属と自己否定を売る支配制度により汚染され、歪められた。これらの制度は、関与する全ての人に害を与えてしまう虚偽の愛を助長させる。愛は強要と階級のことではなく、自由と平等のことである。愛は自己否定のことではなく、自己実現のことである。愛を卑下する制度を理解し、それに抵抗し、それを克服することにより、私たちは真の愛を発見し、創造し、支持することができる。

愛を台無しにする制度の一つといえば、結婚が（男性ではなく）女性の人生の最高の目標であり、服従と従順が立派な「女性らしい」美徳であると教える家父長制的かつしばしば宗教的な統制制度である。キリスト教の伝統的な結婚の誓いにはしばしば夫を「愛して大切にする」だけではなく夫に「従う」という新婦の約束が含まれる。キリスト教の神学において、女性は男性の肋骨から創り上げられた。従って、女性は自分の固有の人でも目的でもない。エマ・ゴールドマン（Emma Goldman）の随筆『結婚と恋愛』（1914年）では、結婚と恋愛が正反対であると彼女が対照したことは不思議ではない。ゴールドマンにとって、恋愛は自由である一方で、結婚は支配である。宗教と国家に統制されている制度である結婚は、恋愛とは相入れない。彼女はこう述べた：

人生の全般にわたつて最も強く最も深い要素である恋愛、希望と歓喜と至楽の先駆者、あらゆる律法と因習の侮蔑者、人間運命の最も自由にして最も力強き型成者なる恋愛――かくの如く全てを圧倒する力がなんでかの国家と教会から生れた雑草の如き結婚と同意義であり得よう？¹

ゴールドマンは、男性が現れて自分を妻にしてくれるまで「生命と情熱とに充ち、健康で成熟した婦人」¹が自分の欲望を抑えるべきであるという考えを批判した。結婚後、女性は夫に頼り、自分の要求を満たすことができない従属の寄生者に降格される存在となる。夫婦関係は、愛し合う対等な者同士の結び付きよりも、主人と奴隷との関係には似ていた。片方の要求が相手の要求に従属するダイナミックは夫婦の両方にとって不健全である。

現在、妻が夫に従う約束を含む結婚の誓いは1914年に比べて遥かに稀である。しかし、過去のように現在も「一般の娘等は大抵幼少から結婚が彼女の最終目的であると語られる。だから彼女の訓練と教育とはその目的に向つて導かれなければならない。」¹つまり、結婚は建前としては（家父長制が許容する範囲内で）女性を完全な人にするものである。音楽であれ恋愛コメディであれ、自律と個性を犠牲にする愛という家父長制的な考えは大衆文化の中で持続し、文化が「ウォーク」になりつつも、自己犠牲的な愛という考えが頑固に生き続ける。

家父長制によるエロス（恋愛）の変態は、母性の一般的な見解におけるストルゲー（家族愛）に及ぶ。妊娠と出産が必要とする身体的犠牲を賛美する（または否定する）ことにより始まる。「出産の名言」をググれば、当然の出産天才であるスティーブン・ガスキン（Stephen Gaskin）のこの言葉「出産時に女性が直感的に体験できる賢明さと思いやりにより、女性は他の女性のための癒しと理解の源になりうる」のような多数の偽エンパワーメント名言集に迎えられるであろう。出産直前ではインスピレーションが役立つかもしれないと私が想像するが、社会が自己犠牲的な愛を賛美するからこそ出産がそれほど痛いのではないかと疑問に思わずにはいられない。なぜ「医学的に必要」とされない帝王切開が見下されるのか？なぜ多くの自称の妊娠中絶賛成活動家は妊娠と出産の身体的悪影響への懸念が妊娠中絶の検討に値しないとまだ考えるようなのか？「母の愛は全てに耐え抜く」と言われ、私たちがあんなに我がままになるとは？妊娠と出産は母親たちにとって親の愛の奥深さを示す初めての「機会」だから。父親たちにはそんな機会が無いでしょ。

世界一有名な母、処女マリアは従順と従属のため褒められる母性の無比の理想である。処女マリアの重要性は彼女が愛する人との関係に依存する。処女マリアの愛情深い犠牲が無ければ、彼女の息子による更に大きくて優れた愛情深い犠牲が不可能であった。処女マリアは息子の要求より自分の要求を決して優先しようとせず、同等に扱うことさえしなかった。これは全ての母親たちが志することになっている理想である。自分の要求を優先する母または妻は我がままであり、愛が求める道徳的義務に失敗している。ストルゲー（家族愛）は最高の形態に達するには身体的かつ心理的な自己犠牲を必要とすると言われている。

母と妻の家父長制的地位において自己犠牲的なエロスとストルゲーは認識しやすいが、フェミニストは「愛の罠」と私が呼ぶ概念からの影響を受けないわけではない。伝統的な道徳哲学の家父長制的な短所の一部に応えようとして、ケアの倫理はキャロル・ギリガン（Carol Gilligan）やネル・ノディングズ（Nel Noddings）などのフェミニストたちが展開した。正義と抽象的な義理かつ義務を強調する伝統的に男性的な道徳モデルとは対照的に、女性的なケアの倫理はケアと人間関係を最重要視する。ケアの倫理は思いやりと共感という伝統的に低く評価された「女性的な」美徳を適切に高めるが、私たちの道徳的義務の関係的性質を過剰強調するため不充分である。そうすることにより、ケアの倫理は気付かずに個人的道徳を外部の関係により課せられる他人の要求の支配下に置いてしまう。

プーカ²、カード³とデービオン⁴などの評論家が主張したとおり、ケアの倫理は、たとえば自分に被害と疎外が及ぶまで男性と子供の世話をする女性のこと、ケアの歴史的文脈そしてケアと愛の相互的な性質を考慮せずに、ケア行為の価値を無批判に高く置く傾向にある恐れがある。このように、ケアの倫理では、ケアを与える側は目的として捉えられるどころか、受ける側に提供できるものにより縛られ、ケアを受ける側との不公平な関係に置かれてしまう。愛を自己の発達に組み入れるよりも、ケアの倫理は自己を後からの思い付きに降格する。自己の内部ではなく外部に道徳を置く道徳規範は真に解放的でも真に愛情深くもない。ケアの倫理は「女性的な」愛とケアを「男性的な」論理と正義との対照的な関係に置くが、愛が自己実現の構成要素であると正しく認識すれば、愛と論理が一体であることがわかる。

愛の社会的劣化は家父長制から切り離せない。愛はしばしば「女性的な美徳」に降格され、それにより、歴史的には愛の変態は最も明白な仕方で女性に影響を及ぼした。この堕落した愛は昔から家父長制の道具となっていたが、愛が相互的なフィードバックループに陥っている可能性が高い：女性が従属すべきであり、愛が女性と関連していれば、当然ながら私たちは愛を従属と見なすことになる。愛を従属と見なす私たちの堕落した理想はエロスとストルゲーを遥かに超えて広がり、私たちによる人類愛であるアガペーの概念化の仕方を汚染する。歴史上、最も偉大な自己犠牲者は女性ではなかった。

「神はそのひとり子を賜ったほどに、この世を愛して下さった。それは御子を信じる者がひとりも滅びないで、永遠の命を得るためである。」（ヨハネによる福音書3章16節⁵）処女マリアは愛情深かったが、彼女の従順で母性的な愛はイエス・キリストの自己犠牲的なアガペーの高さに達することが無い。キリストの犠牲は愛の典型的な西洋概念の最重要物であり、あらゆる犠牲の中の犠牲である。これより偉大で信心深い愛が存在しない。物心ついた時よりずっと前に、キリストの犠牲は一般の人間がそれの真似を夢で見ることしかでなきない愛の究極の表現である、と私が日曜学校で教わった。彼の犠牲は全人類を救ったほど強力な愛であった。私は全人類を救うことを希望できることが無いが、宗教のためでなければ愛のために、殉教者になることによりキリストの足跡を辿って歩くことができる。「人がその友のために自分の命を捨てること、これよりも大きな愛はない。」（ヨハネによる福音書15章13節⁵）

このような普遍的な愛というキリスト教の概念は堕落する運命にあった。キリスト教の歴史が血だらけであることは何ら驚くことではなかろう。地球上の命の価値を下げる来世の約束に加え、神が自分の息子を犠牲にすることにより人類愛を表すことができれば、キリスト教徒が他人を犠牲にすることにより神への愛を表すことができると考えられることは難しくない。この精神は正義の戦争や聖戦というカトリック教の教義の中に明示された。12世紀、クレルヴォーのベルナール（Bernard of Clairvaux）はこう述べた：「キリストの騎士が死を与える時、キリストの利となり、死を遂げる時、自分の利となる。」8世紀後、ジョージ・バーナード・ショー（George Bernard Shaw）はその精神の不健全さについてはっきりと述べた：「自己犠牲は、恥知らずに他人を犠牲にすることを可能にする。」自己愛は人類愛の終わりではなく始まりである。

いつも同じ方法でとは限らないが、世界中のほとんどの宗教はこの理想を何らかの形で助長させる：個人の価値は社会の価値より低く、「公益」のための自己犠牲は長期的に、しばしば死後に、報われる。この態度は、社会が宗教から敬遠しつつも、愛と英雄的犠牲についての私たちの前提が充分に問題視されないままグローバルな文化に行き渡っている。やはり、『ハリー・ポッター』『マトリックス』『指輪物語』『スーパーマン』などのフィクションにおいて、キリストは何度も模擬されている英雄の型板である。実生活において、戦争はもう神聖な十字軍ではないが、実際に誰かの利益になったか否かにもかかわらず、兵士の死は今も英雄の究極行為として高く評価される。私たちはずっと以前からオスカー・ワイルド（Oscar Wilde）の賢明な言葉を心に留めるべきであった：「人がそれのために命を懸けたからとはいえ、それが必ずしも真実であるとは限らない。」

自己犠牲的な愛は愛の最も本物で深い形態であると広く不可避にさえ美化されている。この気持ち悪い嘘は反エゴイスト極まりなく、愛が正しく理解されれば愛にも反することがわかる。自己犠牲的な愛が相互的になるということは、相互破壊的になるということである。真の愛は自己犠牲を必要としない。自己犠牲的な愛は最良の場合ゼロ和ゲームであるが、真の愛は全くゼロ和ではない。真の愛は自己犠牲ではなく自己の絶頂である。

エゴイストは、私たちが人間として他人になることを体験することが全く不可能であることを認識する。自分の外で存在することが不可能であるため、他人の要求だけに基づいている道徳規範は破綻している。社会的、文化的と財政的な圧力はしばしば本当の自分でいることさえ困難にする。私たちは他人のために他人の期待に基づきしばしば真正性と個性を演じる。他人も同じことをするため、私たちが互いと本当の自分の両方からいっそう疎外されていく。そして時間と共に、この演技を現実からほどくことが困難になる。深い認識論的なレベルで自分を疑ってしまう。従って、エゴイストにとってのジレンマは、自分らしく生きる意味とは何かをはっきりしようとすることである。自分が失われていれば、ある人はどう自分を肯定し、主張することができるか？

言葉で言い尽くせない愛の美しさは直感から始まり、発見により深まる。愛することにより、私たちは最も本物の自分になる。愛することにより、自分が愛する人の中に秘められた真実を発見する。愛することにより、無くなったと思った自分も見つける。エゴイストのアイン・ランド（Ayn Rand）は恋愛（と恋愛の親愛な表現であると彼女が見なしたセックス）の利己心についてこう述べた：

恋愛は盲目と言われている。セックスは理性に影響されず、全ての賢者の権力を馬鹿にする。しかし、実際には、人の性選択はその人の基本的な確信の結果と総体である。ある人が感じる性的魅力について教えてくれれば、その人の人生哲学の全てを教えてあげる。その人が誰と寝るかを見せてくれれば、その人の自己評価を教えてあげる。無私無欲の美徳について教えられた堕落によらず、セックスはあらゆる行為の中の最も非常に利己的であり、自分の快楽以外の目的でできない行為——利他主義的慈善の精神でそれを演じることを想像してみよう！——自己卑下中には不可能で、自己歓喜しながら、欲求され、欲求されるに値する自信を持っている時だけ可能な行為である。心身とも自分を裸で立たせる行為であり、真の自我を価値基準として受け入れさせる行為である。その人は最も深い自分像を反映する人、身を任せることにより自尊心の体験——または見せかけ——を許してくれる人に、必ず惹かれる。…愛は自分の最高の価値観に対する自分の反応であり、それに他ならない。

自分が愛する人を尊重することにより、私たちは自分自身も尊重する。

ランドによるセックスと恋愛における利己心の賛美は、愛に一般に帰される気前の良く寛大な性質と正反対であるように見える。愛は「それ自身を充分完全に与へる」¹とゴールドマンが述べた。自分を大切にしながらどうやって充分完全に与えることができるか？利己心とこのような寛大な愛は本質的に相入れないのではないか？

私たちの言語は破綻している。私たちは、人間関係における「犠牲」について話す時、実際にはしばしば妥協を意味する。個人としてそれぞれの目標、要求と好みを持っている独立した人間であるため、親しい関係において相違が発生することが自然である。しかし、自分が愛する人と調和するよう、愛は自分の価値観の拡張、深化と再概念化をさせてくれる。私たちは相手の幸福を自分に組み入れ、相手も同じようにしてくれる。人間関係が必要とするこのような妥協は全く犠牲ではない。愛は私たちに、愛を含めて共有する価値観を適切に評価させ、どちらの目標、要求と好みが最も重要かを考えさせてくれる。愛は新しい要求と目標を導入し、他を満足させ、更に他を無関係または些細にする。このような見直しは犠牲または自己喪失ではなく、自己拡張である。

愛、思いやりと他人のケアはエゴイズムから切り離せないが、ほとんどの場合、互いに対抗させられる。2009年の演説では、たとえ完全なエゴイストの結論まで導き出さなくても、ダライ・ラマはこのアイディアに巡り会った：「愛と思いやりは人間の幸せの究極の源であり、これらの必要性は私たちの存在の根底にある。…思いやりの実践は非現実的な理想主義のただの兆しだけではなく、他人と自分の最善の利益を追求する最も効果的な方法である。私たちが——民族、集団または個人として——他人に依存すればするほど、その他人の幸福を確保することは自分にとってますます最善の利益になる。」愛が人間の幸せの究極の源であり、愛の必要性が私たちの存在の根底にあることについて彼は正しかったが、この必要性は他人への依存から発生せず、仮にそうであれば愛が手段になってしまう。愛は私たちそれぞれの中にある深い心理的な切望であり、良い人生の構成要素である。愛は本質的に満足感を与え、本質的な価値を持つ。自分らしく生きるには愛が必要となる。

愛はまさに「それ自身を充分完全に与へる」が、与えるものは諦めるものとは違う。愛することにより、私たちは本当の自分を再発見するだけではなく本当の自分を世界に明かす。愛することにより、存在すら知らなかった自己の部分を見つけ、危険と暴露を恐れて隠した他の部分を打ち明ける。真の本物の愛を経験しながら、自己を発見せず、自己を打ち明けないことが不可能である。愛することにより、私たちは最も本物の自分を再肯定し、再主張する。

愛人が互いの自律と尊厳を尊重し、互いを目的として認める時に限り、このような真の本物の愛を経験することが可能である。これらの価値観が充分に優先されない時、親密な関係において支配的、操作的または他の相互破壊的な行動が姿を現す。公的領域では、麻薬禁止や民主主義拡散のためのいわゆる「正義」の戦争のような家父長制的な政策を通して、同じ行動と態度が姿を現す。これらの行動と態度は自己発見と自己肯定を必要とする真正性への障壁である。ショーがこうも述べたとおり「自分を愛する人のために自分を犠牲にすることから始めれば、自分を犠牲にしてもらった人を憎むことに終える。」

幸いにも、その障壁を確実に壊せるのは愛だけかもしれない。特に親しい関係において、愛を演じても効果的ではない。誰かを真に愛する時、私たちは自分を厳しく見直し、矛盾をはっきりさせざるを得なくなる。愛は私たちが自分の価値観に従って生きていない時や自分の価値観が思ったより違う時を認めさせる。他の全ての物とは違い、親密の愛は相手の人生と心を観察する機会を与えてくれる。親密の愛は他人を理解する能力を拡張し、自分の人生のあらゆる側面ににじみ広がる。エロスとストルゲーの本当の意味が見つかると同時にアガペーも見つかる。人類を本当に愛する時、私たちは人間一人一人をただの手段ではなく目的として認めるようになる。本物の愛と本物の人生は表裏一体である。

愛において、エゴイズムとアナキズムの間の重複は明らかになるだけではなく、不可避にもなる。アナキストの自由、尊厳と自律はエゴイストの実現、自己発見と真正性から切り離せない。真の愛はこれらの価値観が衝突しないことを明らかにし、その価値観が本当に繁盛するには互いを必要とする。アナキストかつエゴイストの両方ではない愛は愛であるとは言い難い。

私自身の愛し愛される経験は共有型成長、自己発見と自己肯定の道となっている。私と相手はしたいから愛し合っている。互いの人生を豊富にし、利他的にではなく利己的に互いのプロジェクトを支える。どちらか片方が得すれば、両方が得する。一緒にする妥協と選択は全く犠牲ではなく、一緒にかつ互いに見つけた共有価値観の肯定であり、私と相手を強めてくれる。私と相手の愛は共有の真正性であり、共有の開きであり、共有の実現である。このような愛を経験することにより、私は可能であると思ったよりも自分を理解するようになった。可能であると思ったよりも他人を理解するようになった。愛し愛されることにより、私は今までより自分をもっと与えることができていて、何も諦めていない。それが相互的であると信じている。私と相手の愛は二人のエゴイズムである。

私の夫のコーリー・マッシミーノ（Cory Massimino）に本稿を捧げます。

By Vishal Wilde. Original: A UBI Can Create Economic Freedom And Social Justice, published on April 20, 2017. Translated into Burmese by Hein Htet Kyaw.

Universal Basic Income (လူတိုင်းအတွက် အခြေခံ အများသုံးဝင်ငွေ သဘောတရား) အကြောင်း ပြောဆိုနေကြသူများ ပိုများလာသောကြောင့် လွတ်လပ်မှုနှင့် တရားမျှတမှုကို ပံ့ပိုးပေးခြင်း ရှိ၊ မရှိ စဉ်းစားရန် အရေးကြီးပါသည်။ မတူညီသော နိုင်ငံရေးအမြင်များမှ လူများသည် UBI အား ဇော်ဂျီဆေးသဖွယ် အမွှန်းတင်ကြသော်လည်း သူ့တွင်လည်း ငြင်းခုံစရာ ပြဿနာကြီးကြီးမားမားရှိသည်။ စာရေးသူသည် UBI အား  သဘောတူရန် ပြင်းပြင်းထန်ထန်ငြင်းဆန်ခဲ့ဖူးသော်လည်း ယခုအခါ UBI oည် စီးပွားရေး၊ လူမှုရေးနှင့် နိုင်ငံရေး လွတ်လပ်ခွင့်တို့နှင့်ပတ်သတ်လျှင် ကောင်းမွန်စွာ လုပ်ဆောင်နိုင်မည်ဟု ယုံကြည်မိသည်။

အလုပ်သမားဈေးကွက်မှ လွတ်လပ်မှုရရှိခြင်း

လူများအနေဖြင့် ၎င်းတို့၏ ကိုယ်ပိုင်လုပ်ခလစာသတ်မှတ်ခွင့်၊ ညှိနှိုင်းခွင့်နှင့် အလုပ်ပြောင်းပိုင်ခွင့်တို့ရှိသည့် အလုပ်သမားများအကြောင်း မကြာခဏပြောလေ့ရှိသော်လည်း အလုပ်အကိုင်ဈေးကွက်မှ လုံးဝထွက်ခွာရန် ၎င်းတို့၏လွတ်လပ်မှုနှင့်ပတ်သက်လျှင် ဆွေးနွေးမှုမှာ နည်းပါးလှသည်။ အလုပ်လုပ်ခွင့်မှာ တွေးသင့်သည်မှန်သော်လည်း၊ ရှင်သန်ရေးအတွက် စနစ်အတွင်း ပိတ်မမိနေဖို့ အခွင့်အရေးမှာလည်း စဉ်းစားသင့်သော အချက်ဖြစ်သည်။ ဓနရှင်များကိုသာ အဓိကအကျိုးပြုသော လုပ်ငန်းခွင်များတွင် လူများကို အဘယ်ကြောင့် အတင်းအကြပ် ခိုင်းစေရမည်နည်း? အသိအမှတ်ပြုခံရခြင်းတို့ ကင်းဝေးသော (ဝါ) ဆုလာဘ်တို့မရှိသော သမားရိုးကျ အခကြေးငွေရသည့် လခစားအလုပ်များအပြင် အခြားအရေးကြီးသော အလုပ်များစွာ ရှိပါသည်။ လူ့အဖွဲ့အစည်းတွင် နေထိုင်ရန် မည်သူမျှ အတင်းအကြပ် ခိုင်းစေခြင်း မပြုဟု အချို့က စောဒကတက်ကြသော်လည်း လက်တွေ့တွင် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် အလုပ်မလုပ်လျှင် မရှင်သန်နိုင်သော လူ့အဖွဲ့အစည်းအတွင်း မွေးဖွားလာကာ ၎င်းကို မှီခိုအားထားရပြီး ၎င်းမှ လွတ်မြောက်ရန်မှာ မယုံနိုင်လောက်အောင် ခက်ခဲသည်။

ဤသဘောအရ C4SS ရှိ Chris Shaw ၏ အောက်ပါတင်ပြချက်ကို ကျွန်ုပ်သဘောတူပါသည်။

Universal Basic Income (UBI) သည် အလကားရသော ငွေသက်သက်မျှသာဟု လူအချို့က ထင်မြင်ကြသော်လည်း ထိုအမြင်သည် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏စီးပွားရေး အမှန်တကယ်အလုပ်လုပ်ပုံကို နားလည်မှုလွဲနေသည်ဟု ဆိုချင်သည်။ စျေးကွက်များစွာသည် အမှန်တကယ် မလွတ်လပ်ကြ။ ၎င်းစျေးကွက်များအား အချို့သောအုပ်စုများမှ ၎င်းတို့၏ ကိုယ်ကျိုးစီးပွားအတွက် ခြယ်လှယ်ထားသည်။ UBI သည်  စီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းများနှင့် အခွင့်အလမ်းများကို အစိုးရ၏ ဝင်ရောက်စွက်ဖက်ခြင်းမရှိဘဲ ပိုမိုလွတ်လပ်စွာ ဖန်တီးပေးခြင်းဖြင့် အလုပ်သမားများနှင့် စွန့်ဦးတီထွင်သူများကို ကူညီပေးနိုင်ပါသည်။ ပိုမိုလွတ်လပ်ပြီး တရားမျှတသော စီးပွားရေးဆီသို့ ခြေလှမ်းတစ်ခု ဖြစ်လာမည်ဖြစ်သည်။

မိမိကျွမ်းကျင်ရာ အလုပ်ခွဲခြားလုပ်ကိုင်ခြင်းအား ဆန့်ကျင်ခြင်း

Karl Marx နှင့် ပိုမိုသဘောတူသည်ဖြစ်စေ၊ Adam Smith နှင့် ပိုမိုသဘောတူသည်ဖြစ်စေ ရှင်းရှင်းလင်းလင်း သိရမည့် အချက်မှာ ခေတ်မီစီးပွားရေးများသည် အလုပ်အား အထူးပြုအခန်းကဏ္ဍများအဖြစ် ပိုင်းခြားခြင်းအပေါ် ကြီးကြီးမားမားမှီခိုနေရပါသည်။ လူ့အဖွဲ့အစည်းတိုင်းနီးပါးတွင် လူများကို အသက်မွေးဝမ်းကြောင်းပြုရန်အတွက် သီးခြားအလုပ်များနှင့် စက်မှုလုပ်ငန်းများကို အာရုံစိုက်ရန် (မကြာခဏ လိုအပ်သည်) ဟု တိုက်တွန်း အားပေးကြသည်။

အကယ်၍ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် သီးခြားအလုပ်တစ်ခုကို အာရုံစိုက်ပြီး မြင့်မားသောအဆင့်တွင် မလုပ်ဆောင်ပါပဲ ရွက်ကြမ်းရေကျိုမျှဖြင့်  စနစ်၏ တစ်စိတ်တစ်ပိုင်းဖြစ်လာပါက ကျွန်ုပ်တို့သည် အခြားသူများထက် ဝင်ငွေနည်းနိုင်သည် (ခြွင်းချက်အချို့ရှိသော်လည်း)။ Universal Basic Income (UBI) ဖြင့် လူများသည် မိမိကျွမ်းကျင်ရာ အလုပ်ခွဲခြားလုပ်ကိုင်ရန်အတွက်သာ ရှင်သန်ရသည် မဟုတ်တော့ပါပဲ ၊ ၎င်းသည် Karl Marx မှ alienation ဟု သုံးနှုန်းခေါ်ဝေါ်ခဲ့သော “ကင်းကွားခြင်း”  (အလုပ်နှင့် ဘဝနှင့် အဆက်ပြတ်သွားသည့် ခံစားချက်ကို) များစွာ လျှော့ချနိုင်မည်ဖြစ်သည်။

ဆန်းသစ်တီထွင်မှု၊ စွန့်ဦးတီထွင်မှုနှင့် အသိပညာ-မျိုးဆက်

လူများစွာသည် ၎င်းတို့၏ကိုယ်ပိုင်စီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းကို စတင်ရန် သို့မဟုတ် ထုတ်ကုန်အသစ်များဖန်တီးရန် အာရုံမစိုက်သည်မှာ အသက်မွေးဝမ်းကျောင်းပြုရန်အတွက် အချိန်ပြည့်အလုပ်လုပ်နေကြရသောကြောင့်ဖြစ်သည်။ သူတို့၏ လုပ်ငန်းခွင်အတွင်း ကြိုးစားအားထုတ်ရမှုကြောင့် ၎င်းတို့၏ ဆန်းသစ်တီထွင်မှု၊ စွန့်ဦးတီထွင်မှုနှင့် အသိပညာစွမ်းအင်တို့ ကျဆင်းလာကြပြီး တီထွင်ဖန်တီးတွေးမှုတို့ အတွက် ခက်ခဲမှုဖြစ်ပေါ်စေပါသည်။ Universal Basic Income (UBI) ဖြင့် လူများသည် ရှင်သန်မှု၏ ဖိစီးမှုမရှိဘဲ စွန့်ဦးတီထွင်မှုကို စူးစမ်းလေ့လာနိုင်စေကာ ပိုမိုသက်တောင့်သက်သာရှိပြီး ဆန်းသစ်သောအလုပ်ပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ကို ရရှိစေမည်ဖြစ်သည်။

Universal Basic Income (UBI) သည် တန်ဖိုးကြီးပြီး အကုန်အကျများသည်ဟု လူအချို့က ပြောကြသည်။ ဘောဂဗေဒတွင် ထုတ်လုပ်မှု၏ အဓိက အစိတ်အပိုင်း လေးခုမှာ မြေယာ၊ ငွေ၊ စီးပွားရေး ဖန်တီးမှုနှင့် အလုပ်ဖြစ်သည်။ မြေယာ၊ ငွေနှင့် အလုပ်သမားတို့သည် အခြားဖြေရှင်းနည်းများ လိုအပ်နေသော်လည်း UBI သည် လူများကို စီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းစတင်ရန် အခွင့်အလမ်းပိုပေးကာ ၎င်းတို့ကို ငွေပိုရရန် ကူညီပေးသည်။ ဝင်ငွေများ တိုးလာသည်နှင့်အမျှ ရန်ပုံငွေများ ပိုများလာကာ UBI ကို ပံ့ပိုးပေးနိုင်ပြီး လူများသည် ဆင်းရဲမွဲတေမှုမှ လွတ်မြောက်ကာ လူနေမှုအဆင့်အတန်းများ ဆက်လက်တိုးတက်နေသည့် သံသရာကို ဖန်တီးနိုင်မည်ဖြစ်သည်။

လူတို့ အသိပညာအသစ်များအား ဖန်တီး၊ မြှင့်တင်ပြီး အသုံးချသည့်အခါ ဆန်းသစ်တီထွင်မှုတို့ ဖြစ်ပေါ်လာကြသည်။ ယခုအချိန်တွင် အရေးကြီးဆုံး သုတေသနကို တက္ကသိုလ်များ သို့မဟုတ် ကုမ္ပဏီကြီးများတွင် ပြုလုပ်ရခြင်းမှာ ၎င်းတို့တွင် အန္တရာယ်များသော ပရောဂျက်များကို ပံ့ပိုးရန် ငွေရှိသောကြောင့် ဖြစ်သည်။ ပုံမှန်လူများသည် စူးစမ်းလိုစိတ် သို့မဟုတ် လက်တွေ့အသုံးချမှုအတွက် စိတ်ကူးသစ်များရှာဖွေရန် အပြည့်အဝအာရုံစိုက်နိုင်မည်မဟုတ်သည်မှာ ၎င်းတို့သည် အသက်မွေးဝမ်းကျောင်းပြုရန် လုပ်ဆောင်ရသောကြောင့်ဖြစ်သည်။

သုတေသနအဖွဲ့အစည်းများတွင်ပင် ရန်ပုံငွေနှင့် ထောက်ပံ့ကြေးများကို ဆွဲဆောင်သည့် လေ့လာမှုများကိုသာ ရာထူးတိုးခြင်း သို့မဟုတ် ရာထူးသက်တမ်းဖြင့် ဆုချီးမြှင့်သည်။ သုတေသီများသည် ငွေကြေးယူဆောင်လာသည့် အကြောင်းအရာများကို အာရုံစိုက်ရမည်ဖြစ်သောကြောင့် ဤစနစ်သည် စစ်မှန်သော ဉာဏလွတ်လပ်ခွင့်ကို ကန့်သတ်ထားသည်။ ရလဒ်အနေဖြင့် အထက်တန်းစားအဖွဲ့အစည်းငယ်တစ်စုသည် လူသားအသိပညာများစွာကို ထိန်းချုပ်ထားသည်။ Universal Basic Income (UBI) သည် လူသားများ၏ နားလည်မှုကို စူးစမ်းချဲ့ထွင်ရန် တက္ကသိုလ်ကြီးများ သို့မဟုတ် ကော်ပိုရေးရှင်းကြီးများတွင်သာမက လူတိုင်းလူတိုင်း၏ နေ့စဥ်ဘဝတွင်ပင် လူသားများ၏ နားလည်မှုကို စူးစမ်းချဲ့ထွင်ရန် လွတ်လပ်မှုကို ပေးစွမ်းမည်ဖြစ်သည်။

လူ့အဖွဲ့အစည်းရှိ ‘မိသားစုယူနစ် (နျူကလီးယားမိသားစု)’ ၏ အမြစ်တွယ်နေသော အထူးအခွင့်အရေးကို စိန်ခေါ်ခြင်း

“မိသားစု” တွေကို ဖယ်ရှားဖို့ ခေါ်ဆိုမှုတစ်ခုဟု ထင်ရသော်ငြား ၎င်းမှာ ကျွန်ုပ်၏ ဆိုလိုရင်းမဟုတ်ပါ။ ကျွန်ုပ်၏ ဆိုလိုရင်းမှာ The Republic တွင် ပလေတိုနှင့် ဆိုကရေးတီးတို့ ဆိုလိုခဲ့ကြသလို လူများတွင် မိသားစုနှောင်ကြိုးမရှိ၍ ရပ်ရွာအပေါ်သာ သစ္စာစောင့်သိသော လူ့အဖွဲ့အစည်းကို စိတ်ကူးကြည့်ခဲ့ကြသည့် သဘောမျိုး မဟုတ်။

ဝင်ငွေနည်းသူများကိုသာ ကူညီပေးသည့် လူမှုဖူလုံရေးအစီအစဉ်များနှင့် မတူဘဲ၊ Universal Basic Income (UBI) သည် မတူညီသောမိသားစုများကြားတွင်သာမက ၎င်းတို့အတွင်း၌လည်း ချမ်းသာသူနှင့် ဆင်းရဲသူကြား ကွာဟချက်ကို လျှော့ချပေးမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ ချမ်းသာသောအိမ်ထောင်စုရှိ တစ်စုံတစ်ဦးပင်လျှင် အခြားသူများကို ငွေကြေးအားကိုးရန် အဆင်မပြေဖြစ်နိုင်သည်။ UBI သည် လူတိုင်းအား ပိုမိုလွတ်လပ်စေမည်မှာ မလွဲဧကန်ပင်။

လူ့အဖွဲ့အစည်းသည် အချို့သော မိသားစုအမျိုးအစားများကို ဦးစားပေးသော အိမ်ထောင်ရေးဥပဒေများနှင့် ဇီဝစံနှုန်းများကဲ့သို့ စည်းမျဉ်းများနှင့် ဓလေ့ထုံးတမ်းများမှတစ်ဆင့် မိသားစုယူနစ်အပေါ် သစ္စာစောင့်သိမှုကို မြှင့်တင်ပေးပါသည်။ Universal Basic Income (UBI) သည် လူများအား မိသားစုအတွင်း နေထိုင်လိုသည်ဖြစ်စေ အမှီအခိုကင်းစွာ နေထိုင်လိုသည်ဖြစ်စေ ရွေးချယ်ရန် ပိုမိုလွတ်လပ်စေမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ လူတစ်ဦးသည် လူ့အဖွဲ့အစည်းအတွင်းရှိ အခွင့်အလမ်းများနှင့် ၎င်း၏ အခန်းကဏ္ဍအတွက် ၎င်းတို့မွေးဖွားလာခဲ့သည့် မိသားစုအပေါ်တွင် မှီခိုနေစရာမလိုတော့ပေ။

အလိုတူသော အခြေခံ အများသုံးဝင်ငွေ သဘောတရားသည် စံပြဖြေရှင်းချက်ဖြစ်

လက်ရှိ Universal Basic Income (UBI) အစီအစဉ်များတွင် အကြီးမားဆုံးပြဿနာမှာ ၎င်းတို့သည် အခွန်ထမ်းငွေကို အားကိုးသောကြောင့် လူများကို ၎င်းတို့အား ရန်ပုံငွေပေးရန် အတင်းအကြပ် ခိုင်းစေခြင်းပင်ဖြစ်သည်။ 2014 ခုနှစ်တွင် Ryan Calhoun သည် UBI သည် ဆင်းရဲသူများကို အမှန်တကယ်ကူညီခြင်းထက် ဆင်းရဲသူများကို ထိန်းချုပ်ရန် အခြားနည်းလမ်းတစ်ခုသာဖြစ်ကြောင်း C4SS အတွက် ဆောင်းပါးတစ်ပုဒ်ရေးသားခဲ့သည်။

ခေတ်မီအစိုးရမှ ထောက်ပံ့ထားသော ပရိုဂရမ်များအားလုံးသည် အတင်းအကြပ်အခွန်ကောက်ခံခြင်းအပေါ် အားကိုးသော်လည်း ဆန္ဒအလျောက် ထောက်ပံ့ထားသော Universal Basic Income (UBI) သည် ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်သော ရွေးချယ်မှုတစ်ခုဖြစ်သည်။ စိန်ခေါ်မှုမှာ ထိုသို့သောစနစ်အပေါ် ယုံကြည်မှုကို စီမံခန့်ခွဲရန်နှင့် တည်ဆောက်ရန် ယုံကြည်စိတ်ချရသော နည်းလမ်းများကို ရှာဖွေခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ အဆိုပါပြဿနာအား ဖြေရှင်းပြီးလျှင်ပင် လူတို့အား အမှန်တကယ် ပံ့ပိုးကူညီရန် ဆွဲဆောင်ဖို့မှာ အလှမ်းဝေးလှပါသေးသည်။

နိဂုံးချုပ် မှတ်ချက်များ

Universal Basic Income (UBI) သည် လက်ဝဲယိမ်းတွေးခေါ်သူများကြားတွင်သာမက လက်ယာဘက်တွင်ပါ ပိုမိုရေပန်းစားလာပါသည်။ စာရေးဆရာ၏မိတ်ဆွေတစ်ဦးက UBI အတွက် လက်ဝဲလစ်ဘာတေးရီးယန်းအထိုင်ကို တင်ပြသည့် Philippe van Parijs ၏ “လူတိုင်းအတွက် လွတ်လပ်မှု” ကိုဖတ်ရန် အကြံပြုခဲ့သည်။ ထိုစာအုပ်ကို မဖတ်ဖူးသည့်အချိန်အထိ UBI အပေါ် သူမယုံကြည်ကြောင်း သူငယ်ချင်းက ပြောသော်လည်း ၎င်းအားဖတ်ပြီးနောက် ယုံကြည်သွားခဲ့သည်၊ စာရေးသူမှာမူ မဖတ်ဖူးသေးပါ။

Universal Basic Income (UBI) ၏ ဖြစ်နိုင်ခြေရှိသော အကျိုးသက်ရောက်မှုများနှင့် ၎င်းနောက်ကွယ်ရှိ အယူအဆများကို ဆက်လက်ကြည့်ရှုရန် လိုအပ်ပါသည်။ ထို့ထက် ပိုအရေးကြီးသည်မှာ UBI သည် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ လွတ်လပ်မှုကို နားလည်မှုတွင် မည်ကဲ့သို့ အံဝင်ခွင်ကျဖြစ်မည်ကို ဆန်းစစ်သင့်သည်။ လွတ်လပ်မှုတွင် UBI နှင့် ဆန့်ကျင်မည့် ပုံသေ မပြောင်းလဲသော အဓိပ္ပါယ်ရှိပါသလား? သို့မဟုတ် UBI သည် လူ့အဖွဲ့အစည်းကို ပြန်လည်ပုံဖော်ရန် အလားအလာကြောင့် လူများစွာကြောက်ရွံ့သော လွတ်လပ်မှု၏ အရေးကြီးသော ကဏ္ဍများကို မီးမောင်းထိုးပြပါသလား? ဒုတိယအမြင်သည် ပိုမို ယထာဘူတကျသည်ဟု သုံးသပ်မိပါသည်။

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Reason’s Billy Binion took NYC mayoral candidate Zohran Mamdani’s recent comment that billionaires shouldn’t exist as an opportunity to trot out a moth-eaten — and remarkably unreflective even if it were original — apologetic for billionaires: 

I know it’s trendy to hate billionaires, but many didn’t get rich by accident. Jeff Bezos made goods cheaper & quickly accessible. Bill Gates put computers in homes. Sergey Brin gave the world a search engine that works. I could go on. So yes…they should exist.

This is closely related to another right-libertarian talking point, which is also dumb: “I’ve never seen a poor person give anyone a job.” It’s dumb because in every society in human history, the class that controls access to the means of production and subsistence, and hence controls access to productive work, is the class that provides whatever “jobs” exist.

Peter Bagge reduced the argument to even more cartoonish (pun intended) levels, with a comic in which the ghost of Adam Smith, overhearing Friedrich Engels’s claim that “the workers will run the factories themselves,” responds: “How will they repair, expand, and improve those factories? Doesn’t that take capital?” As though the machinery were actually constructed by the capitalists themselves out of bundles of cash, and not produced by other groups of workers acting on the material world. “Capital” is nothing but a socially constructed claim on the right to direct and allocate resources which were created by labor. And a socially constructed claim can be deconstructed, and another one constructed in its place. 

One might argue that because capitalists can keep the profits and bear the losses associated with the uses they put capital goods to, and because they are free to exchange those capital goods in a manner that leads to market prices for that capital, they have both better incentives to use that capital in a manner that creates value and greater knowledge of how to do so. 

But there’s a difference between markets in equity and markets in capital goods — a distinction Mises missed when he treated a stock market, or market in firm equity, as the defining criterion for rational calculation in the allocation of producer goods. Even in an economy of worker-controlled enterprises, the capital goods that one group of workers supplies to another can be priced, and the enterprise will still internalize the profits and loss. The workers’ incentive is to benefit themselves by increasing productivity or the attractiveness of their product, which they fully internalize themselves in the form of increased pay or shorter hours.

Bezos, Gates, and Brin didn’t actually make or do any of the things Binion credited them with. They controlled the flow of funds that enabled others to do them. Yeah, and guess what? In any society with class stratification, the economic ruling class controls the allocation and investment of resources in any economic system — that’s not an argument for their indispensability. As Paul Goodman once put it, “a system destroys its competitors by pre-empting the means and channels, and then proves that it is the only conceivable mode of operating.”

It’s precisely billionaires’ control over the funds which is the problem. In an economy where billionaires didn’t exist, institutional arrangements for allocating resources would be different. Binion’s argument is comparable to arguing that without feudal landlords, peasants would have no land. Holders of unearned wealth using it to hold the economy hostage is bad. It’s bad to have an economy where the owners of enormous piles of wealth are vested with the power to allocate resources, whether through direct investment or the issuance of credit. The myth that “capital” is something invested or lent from piles of wealth previously accumulated through “abstention,” rather than something various groups of producers constantly supply each other with on an ongoing basis, is the root of the problem. As Thomas Hodgskin wrote almost 200 years ago:

Betwixt him who produces food and him who produces clothing, betwixt him who makes instruments and him who uses them, in steps the capitalist, who neither makes nor uses them, and appropriates to himself the produce of both. With as niggard a hand as possible he transfers to each a part of the produce of the other, keeping to himself the large share. Gradually and successively has he insinuated himself betwixt them, expanding in bulk as he has been nourished by their increasingly productive labours, and separating them so widely from each other that neither can see whence that supply is drawn which each receives through the capitalist. While he despoils both, so completely does he exclude one from the view of the other that both believe they are indebted him for subsistence. 

Binion added:

“You can still be rich even if you’re not a billionaire!” Sure — and if you strip billions from someone like Jeff Bezos, he’ll invest less in building things that actually improve people’s lives. Amazon has done more for the average person than the government could dream of….

Reading this comment, you’d think we didn’t have an economy where, thanks to increasingly concentrated wealth and reduced mass purchasing power, the super-rich had more money than they could profitably invest in productive activities, and were turning instead to asset stripping and enshittification by vulture capital — including the enshittification of Amazon by Bezos himself. 

In a remarkable display of lack of imagination, Binion also said: “Fun fact: If you taxed every U.S. billionaire into oblivion — wiped out their entire net worths — you could fund the federal government for…less than a year.” 

But that’s begging the question. Taxation isn’t the only way to keep billionaires from existing. Binion assumes the accumulation of billionaire wealth is a natural, spontaneous, and inevitable process that can only be stopped by active state intervention to stop it — and not by simply removing the interventions that facilitate it in the first place. The overwhelming majority of billionaire wealth consists of unearned economic rents of one kind or another, extracted via artificial property rights, artificial scarcities, or entry barriers — not to mention direct subsidies, regulatory safe harbors against liability, etc. — enforced by the state. “Taxing billionaires out of existence” gets it ass-backward — they should never be able to accumulate that kind of wealth in the first place.

It’s amusing, by the way, that following the predictable Bluesky backlash against his comments, Binion joined the long list of center-right and right-wing people who decided to “seagull” Bluesky (i.e., fly in, make a loud noise, create a huge pile of shit, and then leave) by making deliberately controversial statements and then whining about the “echo chamber” when they get the controversy they asked for: 

Also the unhinged response to my original post is a good snapshot of why this site hasn’t taken off: it’s a small group of hyper-online, unhappy people screeching into the void. It doesn’t surprise me this place can’t build a viable user base. Some of yall really need to log off & go for a walk. 

This is typical of grifters like James Damore who deliberately get themselves “cancelled” as self-promotion.

I checked out quite a few of the people quote-posting or replying to Binion; most of them were pretty tame criticisms and valid counter-arguments — e.g.: 

 Basic failure of logic. 

“Some (arguably) good things were done by X; therefore, X should exist.” 

“Hitler made the Volkswagen; therefore, Hitler should exist.” 

“Stalin increased literacy rates in Russia; therefore, Stalin should exist.” 

Fallacy of incomplete evidence. 

Verdict: fail.

Another one: 

These people don’t realise that all Amazon has done is improve delivery of existing stuff ([Amazon Web Services] was new) but the idea was largely obvious and other companies were on their way to doing Public Cloud (AWS just did it very well first time round)

And given IP and “criminal contempt of business model” laws, Bezos is able to enclose basic technologies created by social intellect as a source of private rents. Because he controlled the investment funds to implement them, like feudal landlords controlled access to the land. 

If Binion experienced one hundredth of the reaction that people like Anita Sarkeesian, Sarah Jeong or Leslie Jones have received on X, he’d shrivel up like a raisin. His own unhinged reaction says a lot about the kind of right-libertarian echo chamber he must be used to. 

News flash, Billy: When you say stuff that lots of people disagree with, you hear back from them. If you want a bubble where you’re protected from disagreement, go back to your safe space on X.

What Does It Mean for the Middle East?

On May 12, 2025, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK) announced its dissolution after more than four decades of armed struggle against the Turkish government. This came on the heels of a call from imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan to disband the organization. On July 11, PKK fighters participated in a ceremony signifying disarmament. What will this mean for Kurdish movements for liberation and for the Middle East in general?

In the following analysis, a Kurdish feminist militant draws on over ten years of political and research engagement with the Kurdish liberation movement to explore these questions. Raised in Iran and based in the Kurdish diaspora, the author, Soma.r, has been in close contact with women participants and remains actively connected to the movement.

Introduction

A group of PKK fighters symbolically disarmed on July 11, 2025, in Jasna Cave, located in Iraq’s autonomous Kurdish region. The site carries deep historical and political significance: in 1923, it served as a refuge and command base during British colonial attacks. That same year, Jasna Cave became a clandestine printing site for Bangî Haq (“Call of Truth”), the first revolutionary Kurdish newspaper, founded by the journalist Ahmad Khwaja. This act wove together anti-colonial resistance, political struggle, and underground journalism.

A century later, the act of disarming here is not surrender—it is a political statement, echoing through layers of time. It draws a line between the past and the present, invoking memory as strategy. In choosing Jasna, the fighters remind us: revolutions may shift shape, but their roots run deep. Where empire once sought silence, Kurdish voices printed truth. Where arms are now laid down, new struggles may rise—rooted in the same earth, but shaped by new imaginaries.

This act gains further resonance in light of recent events. Just two days earlier, Abdullah Öcalan, the legendary PKK leader, reappeared in a video message—his first since 1999—calling for the end of armed struggle and urging a definitive shift toward democratic politics. This moment invites not merely commemoration, but interpretation: how does a guerrilla movement, once synonymous with armed resistance, perform political transformation through symbolic acts?

To understand the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)’s self-dissolution, we must bear in mind the breadth of its social base, which spans tens of millions. Since Öcalan’s imprisonment in 1999, the Kurdish movement in Turkey has grown beyond its guerrilla origins into a complex political project rooted in diverse urban and rural, secular and religious, Kurdish and non-Kurdish constituencies—though the proletariat remains central. It now operates through a hybrid structure combining an armed wing in Qandil with a wide civilian network involving unions, municipalities, legal parties, women’s organizations, media, and transnational solidarity platforms. Its political praxis is at once territorial and transnational, legal and clandestine, militarized and deeply social. Among the most transformative shifts has been the rise of the Kurdish women’s liberation movement (KWLM), which has repositioned gender emancipation as both a symbolic and strategic core. Across Öcalan’s letters, the Rojava project and KWLM’s expanding role are consistently upheld as the PKK’s most significant contemporary achievements.

In a significant development for the Kurdish political landscape, the PKK announced its dissolution following its 12th Congress. This decision was shaped by a series of dialogues initiated in October 2024, involving Abdullah Öcalan (via his nephew and the delegation of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party) and prompted by statements from Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli, a far-right, ultranationalist political party in Turkey. Öcalan emphasized the need for transitioning the Kurdish question from armed struggle to democratic politics, stating he had the capacity to lead this shift if the conditions allowed.

In response, the PKK began internal consultations and expressed readiness to convene a congress under Öcalan’s guidance. On February 27, 2025, Öcalan issued a formal “Call for Peace and a Democratic Society,” urging the PKK to end its armed activities and take responsibility for achieving a peaceful resolution. In response, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire on March 1. This was followed by the organization’s 12th Congress, where the decision to dissolve the PKK and end its armed campaign was formally adopted by the leadership of both the PKK and the Party of Free Women in Kurdistan (PAJK).¹

Öcalan’s strategic vision was more fully developed in the May 2025 issue (No. 521) of Serxwebûn, the PKK’s official monthly publication. This final issue featured the complete 20-page document Öcalan had submitted to the Congress, along with a four-point letter addressed to the delegates, outlining the political framework for the transition to a peaceful and democratic phase of the Kurdish movement. Announcing the end of its uninterrupted 44-year history, the magazine declared: “Everything is in place for a new and stronger beginning.”

In his April 27 letter, Abdullah Öcalan outlines a transformative vision for the post-PKK era centered on democratic nationhood, ecological and communal economics, and democratic modernity as an alternative to both the capitalist nation-state and real socialism. He proposes democratic society as the political program of the new era—one that does not aim to capture the state but to create autonomous, grassroots-based structures like communes. Within this framework, concepts such as democratic socialism, communalism, and regional confederalism become central to both Kurdish liberation and broader regional transformation. Öcalan calls this a new form of internationalism and urges all actors to take responsibility for materializing it, suggesting that success in Kurdistan could have ripple effects across Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran.² The texts in this issue—including speeches, resolutions, and congress documents—reflect an attempt to reconfigure the movement’s strategic horizon.

Öcalan’s recent call for dissolution is not without precedent, as the PKK has long oscillated between armed struggle and negotiation. However, this moment signals a more profound ideological shift: since 2004, the movement has restructured itself around “democratic confederalism” via the Kurdistan Democratic Communities Union (KCK)—an umbrella framework that includes the PKK but is conspicuously absent from the current dissolution plan.

The meaning of “dissolution” remains highly ambiguous. Does it signal the end of the PKK, a mere rebranding, or a tactical shift within a longer arc of political adaptation? More critically, what does dismantling a structure that has historically blurred armed resistance and grassroots mobilization mean for anti-state and anti-colonial struggles in the region?

Even within the PKK, interpretations vary. Zagros Hiwa, the Foreign Relations spokesperson of the KCK, stated on Sterk TV that the resolutions call for ending armed conflict—not disarmament—and questioned the feasibility of this, given the 100-meter proximity between Turkish soldiers and guerrillas. Others disagree. Amir Karimi, from the PKK’s Iran-Kurdistan branch, asserted, “Those who have fought and endured the most have the greatest right to speak about peace.” Meanwhile, the Speaker of the Turkish Parliament, Numan Kurtulmuş, framed the process as part of a national effort to resist imperialist fragmentation:

“Iraq and Syria have been fragmented, Lebanon has become ungovernable. Libya, Sudan, and Somalia have been divided. These countries have turned into battlefields fueled by tribal, ethnic, and religious divisions, and some have been dismantled through terrorist organizations. We could have passively waited like a ‘yellow cow’ for our turn to be broken apart, or Turks, Kurds, and all others could unite to defeat this imperialist agenda. We have chosen the latter path and are committed to moving forward together.”

Unsurprisingly, this call has generated division, uncertainty, and a wide spectrum of responses among Kurdish activists. Here, we will unpack these questions by analyzing the PKK’s historical evolution in relation to peace processes, and explore the broader implications of its dissolution for contemporary anti-state, anti-capitalist, and decolonial movements.

We will begin with a brief overview of how revolutionary violence emerged through armed struggle in the Kurdish movement, and how this trajectory became entangled with a series of failed peace initiatives that often reproduced new cycles of war. Then, we can turn to the core question: why did the PKK pursue unilateral disarmament? We will examine his decision in relation to shifting political dynamics at regional, national, and global levels. Finally, we will reflect on the stakes, uncertainties, and strategic calculations surrounding this move, concluding with a gendered reading that foregrounds the role of the Kurdish women’s liberation movement in shaping both the limits and possibilities of this process.

The Kurdish Ordeal of State Violence and Statelessness

As the PKK declared on May 12, 2025:

The PKK was born as a liberation movement against the policy of denial of the Kurdish people enshrined in the Treaty of Lausanne and the Turkish Constitution of 1924.

From a recognized imperial “nation,” Kurds became “ethnic minorities” in states that repressed, assimilated, and erased them. Despite being nearly 40 million strong—20% of Turkey’s population—Kurds remain the world’s largest stateless people, excluded from political and cultural recognition.

State repression has often taken genocidal forms: Iraq’s Anfal campaign (1987–1988) killed 180,000 Kurds; Syria’s 1960s denationalization policies left tens of thousands stateless; Iran frames military attacks on Kurdish regions as jihad; and Turkey long banned the words “Kurd” and “Kurdistan,” labeling Kurds as “mountain Turks.” The war between the PKK and the Turkish military alone has claimed over 40,000 lives, in a broader context of Kurdish conflicts that have killed more than 250,000 since the 1960s.

The Turkish Republic was built on the genocide of Armenians and the denial of Kurdish identity, both of which served to impose a homogenizing nationalist project. The PKK emerged in the 1970s in direct response to this exclusionary regime. Its opposition was not only military but cultural and political, as symbolized by Leyla Zana’s 1991 parliamentary oath (“I take this oath for the fraternity of the Turkish and Kurdish peoples”)—in Kurdish—for which she served ten years in prison.

Today, Turkish imperialism combines internal colonialism with regional neo-imperial expansion. Since 2016, Ankara has deployed proxy Islamist militias—like the “Syrian National Army” (SNA)—across northern Syria (Afrin, al-Bab, Azaz, Jarablus, Idlib). These militias allow Turkey to outsource warfare while advancing a neo-Ottomanist agenda of forced Arabization, Islamization, and demographic engineering. Promises of salaries up to $2500 attract youth surviving on mere tens of dollars, turning war into precarious employment.

Since 2015, Turkey has launched successive operations—Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, Peace Spring—occupying Kurdish areas, displacing populations, and enabling looting, mass violence, and ethno-political reengineering. Airstrikes in Iraq on Qandil and Sinjar have intensified, with little global response. This war model—privatized, precarious, and transnational—has extended to Libya (2019–2020), Azerbaijan (2020), Yemen, Niger, and Pakistan. Paramilitary networks linked to Turkish intelligence, like the Sultan Murad Brigade, operate from Kurdish villages such as Sinara near Afrin.

Turkey’s reach is also extraterritorial: in Europe, Kurdish activists are surveilled, extradited, or killed. Assassinations of key feminist figures like Sakine Cansız (Paris), Hevrîn Xelef (Syria), and Nagihan Akarsel (Iraq) reflect a gendered strategy of decapitating revolutionary leadership and stifling transnational feminist articulation. Turkish imperialism fuses Islamist militiafication, transnational war economies, and fragmented sovereignties, producing a deregulated violence in which market logics trump state interests.

This extraterritorial violence is not an isolated extension of state power, but a core mechanism of a broader geopolitical agenda. This aggressive projection of force is not merely opportunistic; it is part of a broader neo-Ottoman, neo-colonial project aimed at reasserting Turkish influence across its former imperial territories. Central to this vision is the integration of Kurdistan’s geography and resources into the emerging architecture of global trade—particularly through the Middle Corridor, discussed below.

Yet this violence has generated an equally transnational resistance. The PKK has politicized the Kurdish question, transforming a stateless population into an organized political subject. Led in large part by women, its project remains one of the few contemporary revolutionary visions centering social justice, pluralism, and radical critiques of power. Against statist, campist, or nationalist leftisms, which are predominantly shaped by vertical, militarist, and masculinist paradigms, the Kurdish movement—especially its feminist dimension—shifts the political from state-centric paradigms to embodied, localized, and solidaristic forms. Its slogan, Jin, Jiyan, Azadî (“Woman, Life, Freedom”), forged in decades of subaltern struggle, became a global cry during the Iranian uprising of 2022.

But this resistance was made possible by armed struggle. And that raises the key question: what becomes of the Kurdish revolutionary horizon with the announced dissolution of the PKK?

Peace as a Mask for War: The Recurring Betrayal of the Kurdish Movement

The repeated collapse of peace processes in Kurdistan reveals not a lack of Kurdish commitment but the entrenched refusal of regional states to recognize Kurdish rights. In Iran, the 1989 Vienna talks ended with the assassination of Kurdish leader Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou and his colleagues—an act replicated in the killing of his successor, Sadegh Sharafkandi, in Berlin in 1992. In Iraq, Baghdad’s breach of the 1970 Autonomy Agreement led to the genocidal Anfal campaign.

Turkey has followed a similar trajectory. While the Kurdish movement has consistently sought dialogue, Turkish state policy oscillates between short-lived peace gestures and systematic repression. President Özal’s early-1990s initiative died with him, and the decade that followed saw massive state violence, including torture, forced displacements, and cultural erasure. The 1999 capture of Abdullah Öcalan marked a shift: he called for a ceasefire and the PKK’s dissolution. Yet the state’s punitive response only deepened Kurdish mistrust.

Despite repression, the Kurdish movement transformed. By 2004, democratic confederalism emerged, rejecting nationalism in favor of grassroots pluralism. Armed resistance continued alongside legal-political strategies, culminating in the electoral gains of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi,HDP). But peace efforts, including the Oslo talks (2008–2011)³ and the İmralı Process (2013–2015), were sabotaged by the state. First, the leak of negotiations sparked a nationalist backlash in 2009; later, in 2015, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan abandoned the Dolmabahçe Memorandum in response to Kurdish advances in Syria, particularly the victory of the YPG and YPJ (the People’s Defense Units and Women’s Protection Units) in Kobanê. The collapse of the peace process triggered a brutal crackdown that displaced over 350,000 people and resulted in the deaths of around 1700 individuals, while also positioning Turkey among the world’s leading jailers of journalists. By August 2016, Erdoğan was denying that any negotiations had ever taken place. From this perspective, the Turkish government’s gestures toward peace negotiations have often signaled its preference for military operations, whether via war or coup.

For many Kurds, armed struggle has become an existential necessity against what they see as colonial domination precisely as result of this asymmetric conflict, which some describe as a “war against peace.” Inspired by Frantz Fanon, the PKK frames violence as strategic self-defense. While internal critiques question urban warfare and protracted militancy, broad Kurdish support persists, rooted in historical trauma and the failure of political avenues. The state’s persistent framing of Kurdish identity as a threat reinforces this impasse.

By 2025, any such horizon appeared more elusive than ever. But “all that is solid can melt into air.” As highlighted by Kurdish scholar Adnan Çelik and other voices within the movement, Öcalan’s message during the PKK’s 12th Congress, while unexpected, signaled a rupture: in contrast to his 2015 call for a “democratic opening,” the 2025 statement stripped away the ideological richness of previous appeals, omitting critiques of the nation-state, neoliberal capitalism, internal colonialism and patriarchy. While the initial statement portrays the PKK as a Cold War relic devoid of strategic or ideological legitimacy—calling for its disarmament without political concessions or recognition of Kurdish historical claims—this stance is partially revised in the April 27 letter, which devotes significant attention to the history of Kurdish repression by regional states and the PKK’s legacy of resistance.

Widely perceived as a unilateral capitulation, Öcalan’s shift provoked shock within the movement—with many interpreting it as a form of implicit humiliation and erasure of past sacrifices, according to Çelik. Yet rather than triggering collapse, it spurred both immediate organizational responses—such as a proposed dissolution congress—and an intense interpretive effort to preserve critical legacies. This moment signals a major strategic reconfiguration, shifting focus from the pursuit of a sociopolitical project to the management of militant heritage, memory, and political resilience amid a transformed geopolitical landscape.

Today, the Kurdish question remains structurally unresolved. Reconciliation is impossible so long as the Turkish state cycles between hollow peace offers and brutal repression. As the state clings to nationalist paradigms, the Kurdish movement continues to adapt—between insurgency and imagination, memory and resilience.

This tension between state denial and Kurdish endurance came into sharp focus in Erdoğan’s post-disarmament landmark speech on July 12, where he officially acknowledged that the Turkish state committed mass killings of Kurds, stripped them of their rights, and initiated this violence in places like Diyarbakır prison. He admitted to burning villages, criminalizing unidentified individuals, banning the Kurdish language, and denying mothers the right to speak Kurdish with their children. Delivered in the wake of the PKK’s symbolic disarmament, the speech, insisting on unity of Turks, Kurds, and Arabs, marks a shift from insurgency to reconciliation, serving as a state-orchestrated spectacle in which the Turkish state reasserts its sovereign power by controlling the narrative of both past violence and future order, positioning itself as the sole arbiter of memory, truth, and historical legitimacy. Framed as an act of closure, this moment instead consolidates state authority. The dissolution of the Kurdish armed struggle is not met with genuine political transformation, but with symbolic containment. What appears as peace is, in reality, a rebranding of domination, setting the stage for new forms of control under the guise of reconciliation.

Why the Dissolution?

In a letter dated April 25, 2025, Abdullah Öcalan articulated the rationale behind the proposed dissolution of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), framing it not as defeat but as a deliberate paradigm shift. He stressed that this process, far from an immediate disarmament demanded by the Turkish state, requires deep ideological critique, self-reflection, and a prolonged debate to reshape both personality and mentality. The PKK, founded to elevate Kurdish national consciousness and expose systemic oppression, now faces a phase in which the next step toward freedom must be built on democratic institutions, cultural renewal, and communalism⁴—transformations that the PKK as an armed hierarchical organization may no longer embody. It is within this trajectory that the dissolution must be understood: as the culmination of a theoretical break from the 20th-century nation-state model and its militarism, defined by systemic violence that has now “lost its justification (raison d’être).” Öcalan’s vision of democratic confederalism, grounded in local autonomy, gender equality, and ecological economy, signals a decisive break from the statist, militarized models of the past and a move toward a post-state societal project.

This ideological evolution, however, is neither sudden nor uncontroversial. Since the 1990s, the PKK has undergone significant internal transformation, confronting the collapse of socialism and the authoritarian tendencies inherent in statist paradigms. The movement’s survival has depended on adaptability and critical engagement, culminating in the Twelfth Congress’s decision to embrace dissolution as a radical reorientation rather than a capitulation. The letter emphasizes that a failure over two decades to fully integrate democratic, ecological, and feminist principles into organizational structures has precipitated this moment of decisive change.

Strategically, the Kurdish political presence has gained prominence across Turkey and the broader Middle East, particularly through women’s liberation initiatives and political advances in all four Kurdish regions. This progress challenges Turkey’s prior framing of the PKK as a mere terrorist entity. Presidential advisor Mehmet Uçum’s recent declaration that “Kurds are an essential component of the Turkish nation” signals an ideological recalibration at the state level.

In this situation, the dissolution of the PKK can be seen as a tactical move to remove obstacles to international recognition, especially of Kurdish structures in Rojava, where the “terrorist” label has served to justify Turkish military incursions. Disarmament aims to protect Rojava as an autonomous political project, ensuring its survival and legitimacy on regional and international stages. Reports suggest that a meeting between Abdullah Öcalan and Masoud Barzani (the longtime leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iraqi Kurdistan) may soon take place—a development that, above all, strengthens the hypothesis of an emerging Kurdish regional alliance aimed at reinforcing the stability of Rojava in the current geopolitical context.

Despite the diplomatic gains stemming from the role Kurdish forces played in the fight against ISIS, international support has remained inconsistent. Öcalan’s call for voluntary dissolution could be a preemptive strategy to avert total defeat amid growing military isolation. Since the collapse of the 2015 peace process, intensified Turkish military pressure—cross-border operations, drone warfare, and surveillance—has confined PKK operations primarily to Qandil, eroding its capacity within Turkey. Even the 12th PKK Congress, which was recently held, took place 12 years after the 11th Congress, primarily due to the lack of security and to military pressure from Turkey. The PKK addressed this issue in a letterreleased on May 4, addressed to the people and activists of the movement:

A retrospective look at the past two decades reveals the following: although the new paradigm was intended to facilitate deeper integration with society, in practice, it was the cadre members who experienced the greatest disconnection from it—even as the movement as a whole moved toward decriminalization. While the aim was to cultivate stronger organizational structures and promote communal and socialist modes of life, what actually emerged was a rise in individualism and materialism. It is evident that in our engagement with the masses, we failed to provide adequate education or foster the organization of a truly democratic society. In the military domain, we were unable to develop or implement effective training and organization for social self-defense. We remained, in the mountains, at the level of guerrilla units detached from society and completely encircled. This condition not only led to increased casualties but also weakened the political and propagandistic impact of our armed struggle. Gradually, our capacity for effective warfare became confined to a very limited geographical area.

Technological advancements, notably algorithmic warfare and real-time surveillance, have deepened this isolation, as NATO states prioritize relations with Ankara. Meanwhile, Kurdish autonomy in Syria is under threat from that regime’s centralization, and Turkish influence grows in northern Iraq with tacit local approval. These conditions have driven the PKK’s political center from armed struggle toward seeking civil and institutional legitimacy across the Kurdish region. The dissolution represents a symbolic disarmament and strategic relocation, shifting the Kurdish struggle into political and transnational arenas, where popular power is redefined outside the paradigm of military confrontation.

The decline in PKK recruitment and the failure to translate anti-ISIS alliances into lasting international support underscore the necessity of this strategic recalibration. Öcalan’s proposal is understood by supporters not as surrender but as a lucid adaptation to changed geopolitical and military realities, including the prospect of a temporary ceasefire in Qandil and Rojava.

According to many Kurdish analysts, Öcalan’s stance reflects his persistent opposition to Israel and his reluctance to see the Kurdish movement forced—out of strategic necessity—into a tactical or pragmatic alliance with it. This, they argue, is what drives his pursuit of preemptive political solutions aimed at avoiding such alignments. Other proponents of the Kurdish movement contend that the decision by Öcalan and the PKK was a strategic attempt to prevent Kurdistan from becoming the next Gaza of the Middle East. They argue that the PKK’s military constraints in the face of a highly technologized inter-state and international war apparatus—coupled with Turkey’s persistent campaign to annihilate Kurdistan and Rojava—necessitated a political recalibration. This shift, they suggest, is also informed by the waning material and symbolic power of global solidarity with the Kurdish cause, which remains significantly weaker than the widespread support mobilized for Palestinians. From this perspective, if Turkey were to enact a Gaza-like scenario against the Kurds, there would be little international capacity or will to intervene. With diminishing material means of resistance and the absence of comparable regional or international mobilization, Kurdish actors must adopt alternative strategies for survival. This decision is thus viewed not as a retreat, but as a calculated and pragmatic tactic to endure within an increasingly unlivable geopolitical context.

This strategic pivot cannot be understood without acknowledging the profound human toll of the conflict. Kurdish guerrillas, PKK cadres, and especially civilians are exhausted; the cumulative costs of the war have become unbearable. Thousands of young lives have been lost, entire cities destroyed, families fractured, bodies scarred, generations shaped by prison, exile, precarity, and stigma. This accumulation of suffering over more than forty years imbues the word “peace” with a new resonance: not as capitulation, but as a vital necessity—a breath long awaited after decades of suffocation.

From the Turkish state’s perspective, the dissolution aligns with a political strategy orchestrated by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who aims to extend his power beyond the constitutional limit of 2028. By presenting himself as the architect of a new peace process, Erdoğan hopes to win over parts of the Kurdish electorate while fracturing the opposition. Framed as reconciliation, the call to end armed struggle is, in reality, a maneuver to disrupt emerging alliances between Kurdish forces and progressive opposition currents. In 2019, the tactical support of Kurdish voters—notably via the HDP (now the Peoples’ Equality Party, DEM)—was crucial to the opposition’s victory in major cities like Istanbul and Ankara. This strategy seeks to isolate secular-nationalist factions within the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) from those open to dialogue with the Kurdish movement while maintaining a securitization discourse for domestic use. This electoral engineering rests on a dual calculation: weakening the joint mobilization of the opposition and deterring Kurdish forces from criticizing the regime too openly for fear of jeopardizing a potential peace.

In this complex configuration, the Kurdish movement finds itself in a position reminiscent of the 2013 Gezi Park protests. As then, any opening toward dialogue with the state paradoxically implies recognizing its legitimacy, even as it remains the primary object of contestation. This tension requires the Kurdish movement to adopt a balanced posture: to engage in peace efforts without dissolving into Turkish institutional politics or alienating broader social movements. The result is a form of strategic isolation, but it can also be an opportunity to construct an autonomous political space in which the Kurdish question can be articulated without weapons, yet without renunciation.

Meanwhile, Erdoğan continues to exploit the rhetoric of securitization, criminalizing Kurdish political figures and perpetuating the trope of the “internal enemy” to consolidate his conservative base. The contrast between ongoing repression and the conciliatory language of peace underscores the cynical nature of the initiative: it is not a genuine commitment to resolution but a tactical move cloaked in the guise of dialogue.

Both Erdoğan and the Turkish state as a whole seek to facilitate the integration of Kurdistan and its resources into contemporary capitalist markets through its disarmament. In a speech outlining the new 2025 process, Erdoğan openly articulated the capitalist objectives driving this initiative:

A Turkey free from terrorism will elevate the Turkish economy above all else. Once we achieve this goal, the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) will be the primary beneficiary. From this point forward, Turkey will compete in a new league.

Likewise, Turkish Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek stated that Turkey has spent nearly $1.8 trillion over the past five decades on the “fight against terrorism,” and ending the conflict could bring significant economic benefits to the country.

These economic imperatives, however, are not confined to domestic considerations alone. They are embedded in Turkey’s broader geopolitical ambitions. The so-called 2025 peace process between Turkey and the PKK is less a genuine step toward reconciliation than a geopolitical maneuver aimed at neutralizing Kurdish military, political, and economic power as a precondition for Turkey’s integration into neoliberal infrastructural capitalism. Central to this strategy is the realization of the “Middle Corridor,” a trans-Eurasian trade route connecting China to Europe via Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Turkey. This corridor positions Turkey as a logistical hub in global capitalist circulation. It is crucial to both China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, a multi-trillion-dollar project linking China with Europe, Africa, and the Middle East through land and sea routes) and the US-backed India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC, a competing infrastructure project aimed at securing Western geopolitical and commercial dominance).

More recently, this vision has been reinforced through the “Development Road” initiative—a $17 billion project spearheaded by Iraq, Turkey, and Gulf states, which links the Persian Gulf (via Iraq’s Grand Faw Port) to Europe through Turkish territory. The proposed route cuts directly through Turkey’s Kurdish-majority southeast, further amplifying the geopolitical stakes of Kurdish containment. In the aftermath of October 7 and the ongoing Israeli genocide of Palestinians, regional geopolitical alignments have been further destabilized—producing a new wave of strategic corridor politics in which Turkey’s logistical and diplomatic centrality has only intensified. Amid the collapse of traditional power balances in the Levant and Gulf, Turkey’s control over these infrastructural routes—particularly those that bypass Iranian and Syrian influence—has become even more indispensable to both Western and non-Western blocs.

But for Turkey to consolidate control over these routes, it must erase all subaltern or non-state actors, especially Kurdish forces. The disarmament of the PKK should therefore be read not as demilitarization but as the foreclosure of Kurdish armed struggle under a new regime of infrastructural securitization. With Iran’s “Shia corridor”(Tehran–Damascus–Beirut axis) neutralized, Assad toppled, and the axis of the PKK and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) severed under US and Israeli pressure, Kurdish actors have been structurally removed from regional power negotiations. With NATO’s tacit support, Turkey has carried out military campaigns and demographic reengineering to consolidate control over Kurdish regions. In this context, “peace” becomes a euphemism for capitalist pacification, with political reconciliation replaced by spatial and military containment to enable uninterrupted flows of capital, goods, and geopolitical influence across imperial corridors of extraction and control.

Erdogan’s endorsement of the PKK’s call for disarmament should be seen in the broader context of shifting Middle Eastern geopolitics and the evolving balance of power in the region. It also reflects Turkey’s strategic use of Kurdish dynamics to counter rivals such as Israel and Iran. A complex interplay of domestic and regional political calculations has pushed Turkey toward adopting this tactic. This is clearly articulated in a letter from the Central Committee of the PKK dated May 4:

The escalation of the Third World War in the Middle East, the outcomes of the Gaza conflict that began on October 7, 2023, the significant strikes by Hamas and Hezbollah against Israeli assaults, and the collapse of the Ba’ath regime in Syria—thereby extending the regional transformation to Iran and Turkey—have all played a pivotal role in bringing us to this stage. The fear and existential anxiety engendered within the Turkish state and the AKP-MHP government, combined with pressures for democratic change imposed internally by our movement and the Turkish people, and externally by the transnational capitalist system, constitute the primary factors motivating the [Devlet] Bahçeli administration and his well-known rhetoric and calls to action. Consequently, we have reached the current stage as a result of the aforementioned political and military developments.

The paradox is profound: a movement possessing considerable territorial and organizational strength is forced to reinvent itself precisely because that power makes it susceptible to algorithmic annihilation. Ultimately, Öcalan’s proposal invites a fundamental rethinking of revolutionary struggle in an era defined by drones, metadata, and total surveillance. It challenges the Kurdish movement to imagine a form of resistance that transcends armed confrontation, finding power in silence rather than gunfire.

From Guerrilla Warfare to Political Transition: Tensions, Hopes, Horizons

The announcement in February 2025 of the PKK’s potential armed disengagement raises profound questions about the conditions under which a protracted guerrilla struggle might transition into a political process, especially in a context marked by entrenched authoritarianism, repression, and ideological deadlocks. While some interpret this move as a sign of strategic and ideological reconfiguration, it remains deeply ambiguous. The Turkish government, framing the moment not as a “peace process” but as a “cleansing from terrorism process” (“Terörden arındırma süreci”), signals a punitive stance that departs from the conciliatory language of 2015, casting doubt on the possibility of a just and comprehensive resolution.

This presents several urgent questions. Can democratization in Turkey be defined as merely symbolic gestures—such as the conditional release of Abdullah Öcalan (and bringing him to parliament to call on the Kurds to withdraw from Qandil and embrace a peaceful political path) or limited cultural concessions—or must it entail far-reaching constitutional reforms, the mass release of political prisoners, and formal recognition of Kurdish collective rights, including regional autonomy and the right to Kurdish-language education? Would the reinstatement of annulled municipal mandates, the return of exiles, or a general amnesty suffice to convince the PKK that a viable political path has emerged? Many fear that Erdoğan might renege on his commitments once he has secured the political leverage he seeks, repeating the betrayal of the 2015 process and risking a return to conflict with the Kurdish movement in a position of fragmentation and weakened legitimacy.

Unlike other peace processes—such as those involving the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in Colombia, or Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain—the Turkish state has refused to engage in truth and reconciliation, constitutional restructuring, or genuine political recognition. In Colombia, for instance, disarmament was accompanied by restorative justice initiatives, often led by women and survivors of state violence. A similar potential lies within the Kurdish women’s movement, yet the Kurdish case remains exceptional in its systematic criminalization and denial of the existence of a political problem. At the same time, what distinguishes the PKK case from many other examples is that it has the support of a powerful and influential mass-based civil and political movement. The struggle has not been confined to the military sphere alone, but has also taken deep root in civilian and political arenas.

The decision of the PKK to engage in disarmament exposes internal contradictions. Despite being imprisoned since 1999, Öcalan remains the movement’s unchallenged authority, centralizing decision-making in a vertical structure that suppresses internal pluralism. His recent statement—“I can say that the opponents of the process have no value. They will fail”—epitomizes a model in which charismatic authority overshadows collective deliberation, generating a legitimacy crisis in which fighters and activists are expected to follow top-down directives without mechanisms for participatory decision-making. This centralization reproduces a depoliticized militant base and stifles the internal democratization needed for genuine transformation.

In the evolving landscape, some analysts highlight two developments that could mark preliminary steps toward disarmament and a transition to a democratic order. First, in a symbolic gesture, a group of guerrilla fighters, some of whom previously held leadership positions, publicly laid down their arms in the presence of the media, accompanied by a statement declaring:

We are ready to participate in democratic politics.

Second, the Turkish Parliament is anticipated to establish a body provisionally titled the “Commission for Social Peace and Democratic Transition,” tasked with formulating a legal and institutional framework to support disarmament and broader democratic reforms.

While these initiatives may initially unfold on a limited and symbolic scale, their proponents view them as indicators of mutual willingness to move forward in the peace process. Nonetheless, past experiences, such as the dispatch of three groups of guerrillas to the Turkish state between 2000 and 2007, underscore the persistent vulnerability of such efforts to repressive state policies and the enduring structural distrust that continues to hinder durable resolution. Neither the guerrilla fighters nor the PKK leadership appear to be naïve about the risks involved. They seem to be approaching the process with strategic caution and political foresight, deliberately preserving the option of returning to armed struggle if necessary. As Bese Hozat,⁵ Co-Chair of the KCK Executive Council, stated in an interview following the symbolic disarmament of 30 guerrilla fighters in Iraqi Kurdistan in July:

If we were to unconditionally comply with every demand made by the state, it would lead to the following outcome: other groups would be expected to do the same—destroy their weapons, return to Turkey, and surrender. If such an approach becomes the norm, the fate awaiting us and our comrades would be either imprisonment or death. But such a future is not one we accept. The Turkish state must understand this.

Still, some within the movement view this as an opportunity to transcend its hierarchical militarist Leninist legacy. A shift toward broader civilian participation and internal renewal could reposition the PKK within a wider democratic framework. The emergence of the DEM Party as a significant actor suggests the possibility of transforming a Kurdish nationalist formation into a pluralistic force capable of uniting Turkey’s broader democratic constituencies. Yet the risk of abandonment—by both the Turkish state and international supporters—looms large, making the promise of renewal contingent on structural reforms, not rhetorical accommodations.

A framework of transitional justice is crucial. Without acknowledging past atrocities—particularly during the 1990s and the brutal 2015–2016 period—any ceasefire will remain fragile. Truth, reparation, and the decolonization of national narratives are prerequisites for meaningful peace. Otherwise, Kurdish collective memory will continue to bear unhealed traumas that could reignite conflict.

The regional context renders disarmament precarious. Syria remains unstable, and the fragile ceasefire between Kurdish forces and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), following the recent Kurdish Unity Conference, appears increasingly uncertain. Turkey’s ongoing military campaigns against Kurdish positions in Iraq and Syria, including over 500 airstrikes on PKK-controlled zones in Iraqi Kurdistan in May 2025 alone, undermine the feasibility of a peace transition. Simultaneously, Ankara’s alleged back-channel offers—such as recognizing Kurdish autonomy in Syria in exchange for the dissolution of the PKK—remain vague and untrustworthy. A full-scale offensive on Rojava would threaten to collapse the civil and military architecture of the Kurdish project.

Within this transnational configuration, the PKK is not an isolated guerrilla force but part of a broader network established since 2002 through the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), which includes the PYD in Syria (2003), PJAK in Iran (2004), and the PÇDK in Iraq (2002). These sister organizations, while nominally autonomous, are ideologically aligned with Öcalan’s vision of democratic confederalism and are deeply embedded in their respective societies, particularly through women-led initiatives. The ambiguity of Öcalan’s disarmament call—whether it targets solely the Turkish wing of the PKK or extends to these allied entities—adds to the uncertainty. Some analysts suggest that cadres could be redeployed to other fronts, like PJAK or Rojava, rather than demobilized outright, raising the possibility of a tactical rather than strategic dissolution. Then, the fate of guerrilla forces in the Qandil mountains remains uncertain, as Ankara’s signals are ambiguous and often contradictory, blurring the line between rumor and reality. For example, AKP member Şamil Tayyar claimed that nearly 300 senior PKK members would be relocated to third countries such as South Africa and Norway, while approximately 4000 fighters would be gradually received at the border. Yet, beyond such unofficial remarks, what concrete steps—beyond rhetorical gestures—will the Turkish state actually take?

Domestically, Erdoğan’s suppression of the CHP—which has historically been a secular nationalist party complicit in anti-Kurdish policies—reveals the paradoxes within the Turkish opposition. For many Kurds, the CHP remains part of the problem rather than an alternative, complicating the formation of an inclusive democratic coalition. Meanwhile, internal tensions within the Kurdish movement, combined with Erdoğan’s autocratic consolidation, continue to fragment the political field, making a pluralistic political realignment uncertain.

Despite these challenges, the Kurdish movement demonstrates remarkable resilience and strategic adaptability. It continues to articulate a political vision that resists militarization while affirming the right to self-defense—aligning itself with global decolonial struggles. In Rojava, for example, the Autonomous Administration sustains a formidable security infrastructure, including the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), YPG-YPJ, and Asayish forces, estimated at over 80,000 members. In Rojhilat, the PJAK continues to organize opposition to the Iranian regime. These formations reflect a deeply rooted, transborder movement that cannot be reduced to a mere guerrilla phenomenon.

This material infrastructure suggests that even if the current process collapses, the PKK and its allies could pivot to a new, perhaps more fragmented and protracted, phase of resistance. Decades of asymmetric warfare, ideological consolidation, and social embedding have given the movement a capacity for survival unmatched by many revolutionary actors. Its legitimacy stems not just from military capacity, but from its cultivation of political consciousness, gender liberation, and grassroots autonomy.

At the heart of this hope lies a deeper ethical question. Is it not profoundly unjust—perhaps even cynical—to project our visions of radical democracy, anti-capitalism, feminist internationalism, and non-state anti-fascism onto a people already burdened by marginalization, repression, structural poverty, and relentless criminalization? Can we, in good faith, ask a geopolitically vulnerable and besieged people to carry, alone, the burden of our revolutionary utopias? How can a marginal revolutionary force—politically and militarily isolated, devoid of state or international backing—survive not only as an organization, but as a carrier of political vision and emancipatory practice? How can it preserve its ideals in an environment dominated by powerful states and imperial actors willing to annihilate it through massacres, ethnic cleansing, and systemic sexual violence? This critical juncture compels us to reconsider the very terms of our solidarity. How can we maintain a radical political stance in a global order increasingly dominated by militarization and authoritarianism, without falling into romantic abstraction or political resignation?

What remains at stake is not just the fate of an armed group, but the viability of a political project that has redefined the parameters of struggle in the Middle East. As the specter of renewed war looms amid unfulfilled promises and military escalation, the Kurdish movement continues to pose a universal question: how can a revolutionary force, stripped of statehood and facing overwhelming repression, preserve its emancipatory praxis without succumbing to erasure or compromise?

Rethinking Dissolution Through a Gender Lens

Long overshadowed by the PKK, the Kurdish women’s movement has emerged since the 1990s as a powerful ideological and organizational actor—what many describe as a “revolution within the revolution.” Initially marginalized within a militarized, male-dominated structure, Kurdish women militants turned this exclusion into a strategic opportunity by forming a dialectical and reciprocal alliance with PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. This relationship, far from patriarchal submission, allowed both parties to become political resources for each other: Öcalan instrumentalized the women’s movement to expand and reform the PKK, while women used his symbolic authority to center gender liberation within the Kurdish struggle.

Öcalan’s recognition of women as the “vanguard force of the revolution” was key to redefining leadership and legitimacy in a movement long shaped by virilism. He encouraged the creation of women’s parallel structures and supported jineolojî, a feminist epistemology theorized as central to his vision of democratic confederalism. In turn, Kurdish women legitimized his ideological leadership. They especially reaffirmed Öcalan’s call for a suspension of armed struggle after his capture in 1999—a moment of deep crisis for the PKK marked by mass defections in 2002–2004 (roughly 1500 fighters left the PKK amid ideological reorientation and internal struggles that culminated in a return to armed conflict in mid-2004). The women’s continued loyalty during this period was a strategic choice aimed at preserving ideological continuity amid fragmentation and repression.

Yet this loyalty had limits. Proposals for greater autonomy—such as the creation of a Kurdish Women’s Workers’ Party—were blocked by the PKK’s Central Committee, revealing persistent structural constraints. Still, the alliance held, particularly as Öcalan’s ideological turn in 2005 toward democratic confederalism placed gender equality at the core of a new political model. In 2012, Öcalan refused to meet a peace delegation without women’s movement representation, underscoring their indispensability. Symbolically, in 2013, women in Rojava announced the creation of the YPJ (Women’s Protection Units) on Öcalan’s birthday, reaffirming both their trust in his vision and their claim to autonomous militancy.

This paradox—building women’s political autonomy through a male leader—raises critical tensions. While Öcalan’s discourse promotes decentralization and demilitarization, his charismatic authority remains central. The movement’s feminist horizon is thus entangled with strategic dependence. Öcalan’s repeated calls for PKK disarmament, particularly in recent years, amplify this contradiction: they challenge the militarized masculinity long embedded in revolutionary struggle, yet they also provoke uncertainty about women’s influence within a de-armed political process.

Historically, armed resistance enabled Kurdish women to gain visibility, leadership, and legitimacy. Combat shattered gender taboos and created symbolic capital, even as it risked reproducing what some theorists call “adopted masculinity”—a replication of patriarchal norms under the guise of revolutionary equality. The current shift toward demilitarization, while opening space for community-based, non-hierarchical feminist practices, also threatens to dismantle the structures that protected and empowered women under conditions of state violence. This tension is central to debates about the future of the movement.

The potential dissolution of the PKK prompts urgent questions: Will the Kurdish women’s movement seize the moment to assert full autonomy? Will it develop a distinct feminist stance on this strategic shift? Does dissolution weaken or empower women within the Kurdish struggle? Disarmament could represent either a step toward feminist peace or a strategic vulnerability. Some militants advocate cautious, conditional demilitarization—contingent on institutional consolidation, international recognition, and guarantees for women’s rights as it entrenched masculine war mentalities, opening space for radical, community-based, non-hierarchical feminist practices. Historically rooted in masculinist ideals—where heroism, martyrdom, and military valor defined legitimacy—Kurdish revolutionary violence is now challenged by Öcalan’s call for demilitarization, which seeks to shift the movement toward a feminist horizon disentangled from militarized masculinity. But others warn that demilitarization could expose women to renewed patriarchal and state violence, especially if gains made by the YPJ or YJA-Star (the Free Women’s Units, Yekîneyên Jinên Azad ên Star), are not politically safeguarded.

Beyond armed struggle, Kurdish and Turkish women have long played vital roles in broader civil resistance and peace commitments. The Peace Mothers (Dayikên Aşîtîyê)—Kurdish mothers who lost children to the PKK–state conflict—became symbols of nonviolent resistance in the 1990s and 2000s. Campaigns like “Don’t Touch My Friend” (1990) and “Women Walk Together” mobilized grassroots networks to confront nationalism, racism, and war.⁶ In 2009, the Feminist Initiative for Peace (BİKG) brought women together across ethnic lines to demand demilitarization, social reconstruction, and inclusive peace processes. These movements demonstrated how women have transformed experiences of loss and marginalization into political agency.

In a letter dated May 30 from İmralı Prison to the Jineolojî Academy, Öcalan reaffirmed that women’s liberation is the true measure of socialism, calling it the foundation of his revolutionary struggle. He described jineolojî as an ongoing transformative project and women as potential leaders of peace and democracy in the Middle East. In fact, Öcalan relies on women to lead this transition, given women’s leading role in previous peace efforts in Kurdistan.

The choice of Bese Hozat—a long-time commander and co-chair of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) and a close comrade of Sakine Cansız, the iconic feminist PKK leader assassinated in Paris in 2013—as the central figure in the symbolic PKK disarmament ceremony on July 11 underscores the enduring centrality of women’s leadership in the Kurdish movement. Even at a transitional moment, this symbolic gesture reaffirms the movement’s ideological commitment to gender liberation and honors the legacy of revolutionary Kurdish feminism.

The challenge now lies in navigating the contradictions of demilitarization: balancing feminist ethics with the need for protection, autonomy with strategic alliances, and peacebuilding with political agency.

Any future peace process must center the lived realities and political visions of Kurdish women. Their role has not been peripheral but foundational—and it is their strategic decisions, not only Öcalan’s, that will shape the Kurdish movement’s next chapter.

Conclusion

From the perspective of supporters of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the potential dissolution of the organization should not be interpreted as the end of the Kurdish struggle, but rather as marking a new and as-yet undefined phase of resistance. While this perspective embodies a strategic optimism, it also demands careful reflection. Redefining resistance within such a complex context requires a nuanced understanding of its inherent limitations, contradictions, and risks. In other words, although this approach may open new avenues for the movement, it should not be accepted uncritically as a definitive solution without thorough analysis. Mechanisms for integrating the critical feedback of PKK members and activists—particularly the voices of female political prisoners—into this process are necessary to ensure its legitimacy.

The PKK faces a confluence of complex challenges, including intensified military and technological pressures as well as political constraints at both domestic and regional levels. These challenges severely limit the movement’s capacity to sustain armed struggle and achieve structural transformation. The shift toward civilian-led, legal forms of organization represents a significant strategic gamble. While this transition warrants serious consideration and experimentation, its success depends on the fulfillment of several critical conditions; absent these, failure or marginalization remains a substantial risk. Moreover, the tension between the state’s immediate pressures and the PKK’s long-term vision for a protracted political process raises questions about the viability and timing of this shift.

Should the political process once again be undermined by Erdoğan, the PKK is prepared to resume armed resistance, not out of desperation, but as a continuation of its enduring political logic grounded in collective dignity and self-determination. Nonetheless, such a resurgence would likely entail significant difficulties and costs, disproportionately borne by the Kurdish population.

Far from being merely a tactical actor, the Kurdish liberation movement embodies a broader political project that fundamentally disrupts prevailing notions of sovereignty and legitimacy across the region. Any substantive shift in its strategic orientation demands a grasp of the interplay between structural constraints, geopolitical risks, and asymmetrical power relations at the local, regional, and international levels. At best, the movement’s turn toward institutionalization could not only consolidate its political legitimacy but also open new avenues for intra-Kurdish reconciliation, particularly with long-standing rivals such as the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). This strategic realignment could potentially lay the groundwork for a transnational Kurdish political architecture—one more intelligible and diplomatically acceptable to international actors, especially Western powers that have historically marginalized Kurdish claims in favor of their strategic alignment with Ankara.

This ongoing redefinition of Kurdish resistance also confronts substantial internal challenges, including factional tensions and the imperative for political reconciliation, which must proceed in tandem with regional and global actors’ acceptance. Yet this process offers the potential to cultivate more inclusive and legitimate political structures.

Finally, the proposed transformation in the language and modalities of resistance—articulated by Abdullah Öcalan and PKK supporters—responds to the realities of contemporary technological surveillance and warfare. This challenges conventional militant resistance, emphasizing adaptability, resilience, and the re-articulation of power in novel, less visible forms.

Oleh: Hein Htet Kyaw. Teks aslinya berjudul “Myanmar: The Accidental Agora”. Diterjemahkan ke dalam Bahasa Indonesia oleh Ameyuri Ringo.

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Selama beberapa dekade, sistem ekonomi dan politik Myanmar sangat dipengaruhi oleh rezim totalitarian dan dominasi militer yang kuat. Sistem koperasi yang dikendalikan negara, yang dimulai pada tahun 1962 melalui kebijakan “Jalan Sosialisme Ala Burma”, kemudian beralih menjadi kediktatoran militer non-ideologis pada tahun 1990-an. Masa singkat perkembangan ekonomi berbasis pasar sempat berlangsung di bawah pemerintahan NLD (2015–2020). Namun, kudeta militer tahun 2021 kembali memberlakukan model ekonomi koperasi negara yang mengingatkan pada era BSPP di bawah rezim junta militer saat ini. Meski dihadapkan pada ancaman hukuman berat, pasar gelap secara historis tetap berjalan dan terus menjadi bentuk perlawanan sehari-hari rakyat terhadap sistem ekonomi yang dikontrol negara.

Sejak merdeka dari kolonialisme Inggris, Myanmar terus dilanda perang saudara. Pada tahun 1962, militer di bawah pimpinan Ne Win melakukan kudeta dan mendirikan negara sosialis satu partai melalui ideologi “Jalan Sosialisme Ala Burma”. Ideologi ini memadukan nasionalisme, budaya Buddha, dan Marxisme, serta menolak demokrasi sosial dan kapitalisme. Rezim BSPP menasionalisasi pendidikan dan layanan kesehatan, mengusir bantuan internasional, dan memaksa perusahaan minyak asing hengkang. Pembatasan perjalanan ke negara-negara Barat diberlakukan secara ketat, sementara hubungan dengan negara-negara sosialis diperkuat. Program nasionalisasi besar-besaran sejak 1963 membawa hampir seluruh industri besar bahkan usaha kecil di bawah kendali negara, dan ini sangat berdampak pada bisnis milik asing. Media massa juga turut dinasionalisasi dan penerbitan swasta dilarang.

Tahun 1988, protes massal menuntut demokrasi dan ekonomi pasar menentang kebijakan “Jalan Sosialisme Ala Burma”. Namun militer kembali campur tangan, dengan membentuk junta SLORC (Dewan Pemulihan Hukum dan Ketertiban Negara) yang membubarkan BSPP dan kemudian berganti nama menjadi SPDC (Dewan Perdamaian dan Pembangunan Negara). Meski secara resmi meninggalkan sosialisme, SLORC/SPDC tetap mempertahankan struktur negara otoriter, memperpanjang kekuasaan militer tanpa arah ideologi yang jelas hingga 2010. Karena terkena sanksi dari negara-negara Barat, rezim SPDC melarang kepemilikan mata uang asing seperti dolar AS dan mewajibkan penggunaan “sertifikat valuta asing” dengan nilai tukar yang ditetapkan oleh militer. Produk budaya asing seperti musik, film, dan buku dikenai pembatasan ketat. Misalnya, film Rambo (2008) dilarang karena menggambarkan militer Myanmar secara negatif. Musik protes tradisional (Thangyat) dan musisi hip-hop berisi kritik sosial disensor, dan konser diawasi secara ketat. Para seniman dan penulis akhirnya menyebarkan karya mereka melalui jalur pasar gelap, seperti pedagang kaki lima yang menjual lagu dan buku yang telah disensor. DVD resmi yang berlisensi sulit diakses masyarakat biasa dibandingkan dengan DVD bajakan murah yang dijual bebas di pasar gelap.

Akses internet kala itu menjadi kemewahan yang hanya dinikmati orang kaya. Masyarakat kelas pekerja mengandalkan warnet dengan koneksi buruk untuk berkomunikasi dengan keluarga di luar negeri melalui platform seperti VZO, Gtalk, Skype, dan MIRC. Film-film internasional populer biasanya diunduh oleh pemilik warnet, lalu digandakan secara ilegal ke dalam CD, DVD, atau VHS. Salinan bajakan ini dijual oleh pedagang kaki lima yang terus-menerus terancam ditangkap oleh petugas kota. Pemerintah menggunakan industri film dalam negeri sebagai alat propaganda, dengan mewajibkan setiap film resmi menampilkan slogan politik di awal. Di masa itu, para komedian memegang peranan penting dalam membangkitkan kesadaran politik publik dengan cara mengolok-olok kebijakan pemerintah secara jenaka. Rekaman pertunjukan mereka menyebar luas melalui pasar gelap, dan bisa disewa atau dibeli masyarakat. Untuk barang mewah seperti komputer dan aksesori IT, hanya beberapa distributor resmi yang memberikan garansi. Namun banyak pedagang lokal mengimpor barang-barang serupa secara ilegal dari Thailand dan China dengan menyuap petugas perbatasan. Mereka mencampur stok resmi dengan barang selundupan guna menghindari pajak kepada rezim militer dan meningkatkan keuntungan. Selain itu, sistem gaji berbasis tunai membuat kelas pekerja hampir tidak membayar pajak pendapatan. Pasokan listrik sangat terbatas; di pinggiran kota, pemadaman bergilir membuat listrik hanya menyala maksimal enam jam per hari. Padahal, infrastruktur bendungan cukup untuk memenuhi kebutuhan listrik dalam negeri. Namun, rezim militer lebih mengutamakan ekspor listrik ke China—mitra dagang utama mereka—sejalan dengan strategi isolasionis dan sikap anti-imperialis yang mereka anut. Rakyat secara luas menganggap kediktatoran militer sebagai rezim yang tidak sah dan tak pantas memerintah. Karena itu, penghindaran pajak dan aktivitas di pasar gelap dan abu-abu menjadi bentuk perlawanan dan upaya bertahan hidup secara ekonomi.

Antara 2010 hingga 2020, dunia mengalami banyak kemajuan dalam bidang ekonomi, akses listrik, dan infrastruktur. Namun, Myanmar justru mengalami kemunduran tajam setelah kudeta militer 2021. Masyarakat, demi merebut kembali kendali atas hidup mereka, membangun gerakan perlawanan yang berlandaskan demokrasi dan federalisme. Beberapa orang bahkan memilih mengundurkan diri dari pekerjaan di sektor publik sebagai bentuk dukungan terhadap Gerakan Pembangkangan Sipil (CDM). Rezim baru, Dewan Administrasi Negara (SAC), menyatakan niat untuk mengembalikan sistem koperasi negara. Setelah kudeta, SAC memberlakukan pemutusan internet secara nasional dan membatasi akses media sosial. Dukungan finansial untuk revolusi sebagian didorong oleh teknologi terdesentralisasi seperti blockchain dan mata uang kripto. Aset milik pendukung gerakan perlawanan atau CDM disita. Penangkapan para penukar mata uang asing menjadikan kepemilikan mata uang asing hampir ilegal, mengingatkan pada kebijakan sertifikat valuta asing (FEC) yang diterapkan SPDC di masa lalu. Situasi ini memunculkan rasa déjà vu yang tidak diinginkan, seolah-olah rakyat Myanmar terjebak lagi dalam masa kelam era BSPP dan SPDC.

Meningkatnya aktivitas pasar gelap dan abu-abu, seperti arus barang dan bantuan keuangan yang diselundupkan dari negara-negara tetangga seperti Thailand, menunjukkan adanya perlawanan ekonomi akar rumput yang semakin meluas. Meski tidak secara sadar mengikuti filosofi agorisme ala Samuel Edward Konkin III, gerakan ini secara nyata dan efektif mencerminkan prinsip-prinsip agorisme sebagai bentuk perlawanan yang lahir dari kebutuhan hidup sehari-hari.

Seluruh hasil publikasi didanai sepenuhnya oleh donasi. Jika kalian menyukai karya-karya kami, kalian dapat berkontribusi dengan berdonasi. Temukan petunjuk tentang cara melakukannya di halaman Dukung C4SS: https://c4ss.org/dukung-c4ss.

By Logan Marie Glitterbomb. Original: Taxation is Theft:An Anarchist Guide to Taxation, published on April 23, 2024. Translated into Burmese by Hein Htet Kyaw.

လက်ဝဲဝါဒီတော်တော်များများသည် “လူချမ်းသာများကို အခွန်ကောက်ပါ” ဟု ကြွေးကြော်လေ့ရှိကြပြီး လက်ဝဲစည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှု၏ အကျိုးရလဒ်အဖြစ် အချို့သော မင်းမဲ့ဝါဒီတို့ကပင်လျှင် ပြောဆိုလာကြသည်။ တစ်ဖက်တွင်လည်း “အခွန်အတုတ်သည် ခိုးမှု ” ဟူသော ဆောင်ပုဒ်သည် မင်းမဲ့ဝါဒီအခြေခံမူများနှင့် ပိုမိုကိုက်ညီသည်။ သို့ရာတွင် မင်းမဲ့ဝါဒီများစွာမှာ ၎င်း “ဆောင်ပုဒ်” အား လက်ယာလစ်ဘာတေးရီးယန်း (မူရင်းလစ်ဘရယ်) ဝါဒနှင့် ဆက်စပ်နေသောကြောင့် ရှောင်ရှားကြသည်။ အခွန်ငွေအများစုသည် စစ်တပ်နှင့် ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့အတွက် ရန်ပုံငွေဖြစ်ပြီး အနည်းငယ်မျှသာလျှင် လူမှုဖူလုံရေးစနစ်သို့ ရောက်လေ့ရှိသည်။ ယင်းကြောင့် မင်းမဲ့ဝါဒီများအနေဖြင့် နိုင်ငံတော်အား မည်သူက အခွန် ပေးချေနေသည်ဖြစ်စေ အဘယ်ကြောင့် ငွေပိုရစေလိုသနည်းဟု မေးခွန်းထုတ်နိုင်မည်ဖြစ်သည်။

“လူချမ်းသာများကို အခွန်ကောက်ခံခြင်း” သည် အများအားဖြင့် ဝင်ငွေခွန် သို့မဟုတ် ကော်ပိုရိတ်အခွန်များကို ဆိုလိုသည်။ လက်ယာလစ်ဘာတေးရီးယန်းအချို့နှင့် လက်ဝဲလစ်ဘာတေးရီးယန်းအချို့က (Negative Income Tax) အနုတ်လက္ခဏာဝင်ငွေခွန်ကို လူတိုင်းအတွက် ဖန်တီးထားခြင်းမဟုတ်သည့် အခြေခံဝင်ငွေစနစ်တစ်ခုအတွက် ရန်ပုံငွေရှာရန် နည်းလမ်းအဖြစ် ထောက်ခံကြသည်။ သို့သော်၊ ပုံမှန်ဝင်ငွေခွန် — ကို ဝင်ငွေအဆင့် — ဖြင့် ချိန်ညှိထားသော်လည်း ၎င်းတို့ကို နည်းလမ်း-စမ်းသပ်ထားသော အခြေခံဝင်ငွေစနစ်အတွက် လူများထံမှ တိုက်ရိုက်ငွေယူခြင်းကြောင့် ပြဿနာဖြစ်ရှိပြန်သည်။ ချမ်းသာသော ပုဂ္ဂိုလ်များသည် ၎င်းတို့ကိုယ်တိုင် အလုပ်လုပ်ခြင်းထက် အခြားသူများ၏ လုပ်အားမှ အကျိုးအမြတ်ရလေ့ရှိသော်လည်း အစိုးရအခွန်ကောက်ခံမှု တိုးမြှင့်ခြင်းသည် ထိုပြဿနာအပေါ် နောက်ထပ်အလွှာကို ပေါင်းထည့်ရုံမျှသာဖြစ်ပြီး မဖြေရှင်းနိုင်ပါ။ ခေါင်းပုံဖြတ်ခြင်းအဆင့်တစ်ခု ပိုလာခြင်းသက်သက်သာဖြစ်သည်။

ကော်ပိုရေးရှင်းများသည် ၎င်းတို့၏အခွန်များကို အမှန်တကယ်ပေးဆောင်ခြင်းမရှိကြပေ။ ၎င်းတို့ပေးဆောင်ရမည့်အခွန်ကို ကာမိစေရန် ဝယ်ယူသုံးစွဲသူများအား စျေးပိုကောက်ခြင်းဖြင့် နောက်ဆုံးတွင် လုပ်သာထုသည်သာလျှင် ခါးဆီးခံရစမြဲ။ ထိုသို့ မဟုတ်သော ကော်ပိုရေးရှင်းများသည်ပင်လျှင် အခွန်သက်သာသောနေရာအား ပြောင်းရွှေ့ပြီး လုပ်ငန်းအား ဆက်လက်ရှင်သန်စေကြသည်။ ထို “အရင်းအနှီး ပျံသန်းခြင်း”ဟု ခေါ်သော နည်းနာသည် အလုပ်လက်မဲ့ တိုးလာခြင်းကြောင့် အလုပ်သမားများကို ပိုမိုထိခိုက်စေပါသည်။

လုပ်ခလစာခွန်များသည် ဝင်ငွေခွန်နှင့် တူညီသော ပြဿနာများ ရှိသော်လည်း အလုပ်သမားများကို ပို၍ပင် ထိခိုက်စေပါသည်။ ဝင်ငွေခွန်သည် လုပ်ခလစာသာမကဘဲ မတူညီသော အရင်းအမြစ်များမှ ငွေကိုယူသော်လည်း လုပ်ခလစာအခွန်များသည် အလုပ်များနှင့် တိုက်ရိုက်ဆက်စပ်နေသည်။ ဆိုလိုသည်မှာ အလုပ်သမားများသည် လုပ်ခလစာ နည်းပါးစွာသာရရှိသည့်အပြင် ၎င်းတို့ ကိုယ်တိုင်ကိုယ်ကျ အသုံးမပြုနိုင်သော (အစိုးရ) အစီအစဥ်များအတွက် မကြာခဏ အခွန် ပေးဆောင်ရခြင်းကို ဆိုလိုသည်။

အရောင်းခွန်များသည် ၎င်းတို့၏ ၀င်ငွေဝေစုကို ပိုမိုသုံးစွဲသောကြောင့် ဝင်ငွေနည်းသူများကို ပိုမိုထိခိုက်စေပြီး ချမ်းသာသူများမှာမူ ငွေပိုစုကြသည်။ ယင်းကဲ့သို့ပင် အချို့သော ရှေးရိုးစွဲဝါဒီများသည် အခွန်အားလုံးကို အရောင်းခွန်တစ်ခုတည်းဖြင့် အစားထိုးကာ IRS ကို ဖယ်ရှားပစ်မည့် Flat Tax ကို ထောက်ခံကြသည်။ ၎င်းသည် အခွန်ကောက်ခံမှုကို ရိုးရှင်းစေပြီး အစားထိုးစီးပွားရေးများမှတစ်ဆင့် ရှောင်ရှားရန် ပိုမိုလွယ်ကူစေသော်လည်း လူများသည် ပုံမှန်စျေးကွက်ကို အားကိုးနေကြဆဲဖြစ်သည်။ ရလဒ်အနေဖြင့် မည်သည့်အခွန်တိုးမြှင့်မှုမဆို စျေးနှုန်းများတက်စေသော်လည်း လုပ်ခများကိုမူ မတိုးစေပါ။

Fair Tax သည် Gary Johnson နှင့် Tea Party လှုပ်ရှားမှု အပါအဝင် လစ်ဘာတေးရီးယန်းဝါဒီအချို့က ထောက်ခံအား‌ပေးကြသော အခွန်အစီအစဉ်တစ်ခုဖြစ်သည်။ ၎င်းသည် ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမှုအဆင့်တွင် သတ်မှတ်ထားသော universal basic income (UBI) ကို ပေးဆောင်စဉ်တွင် IRS အား အရောင်းခွန်ပြားဖြင့် အစားထိုးရန် ရည်ရွယ်ပါသည်။ ပုံမှန်အားဖြင့်၊ အရောင်းအခွန်များသည် ၎င်းတို့၏ ၀င်ငွေ၏ဝေစုကို ပိုမိုသုံးစွဲသောကြောင့် ဝင်ငွေနည်းသူများကို ပိုမိုထိခိုက်စေသော်လည်း ၎င်းကို UBI နှင့် ပေါင်းစပ်ခြင်းဖြင့် စနစ်အား တရားမျှတစေသည်။ ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးသူများသည် အခွန်ကြိုတင်ပေးဆောင်နိုင်သော်လည်း ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမှုမျဉ်းအောက်ရှိသူများသည် မူလပေးဆောင်သည်ထက် UBI မှတစ်ဆင့် ပိုမိုရရှိမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ ယင်းက ၎င်းတို့၏ အခွန်များကို ထိရောက်စွာ ပယ်ဖျက်ပြီး ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးမှုမျဉ်းအောက်၌ ရှိနေရန် လုံလောက်သော ၀င်ငွေကို ပေးစွမ်းနိုင်ပြီး ၎င်းသည် တရားမျှတသော အခွန်စနစ် ဖြစ်လာနိုင်ချေရှိသည်။

အရင်းအနှီးအမြတ်ခွန်များသည် စတော့များ၊ ငွေချေးစာချုပ်များ၊ အိမ်ခြံမြေနှင့် အဖိုးတန်သတ္တုများကဲ့သို့သော ပိုင်ဆိုင်မှုများကို ရောင်းချခြင်းမှ ရရှိသောအမြတ်အစွန်းများနှင့် သက်ဆိုင်ပါသည်။ ချမ်းသာသူများသည် ၎င်းတို့သည် ပိုမိုတန်ဖိုးရှိသော ပိုင်ဆိုင်မှုများကို ပိုင်ဆိုင်သောကြောင့် ဤအခွန်များကို မကြာခဏ ပေးဆောင်ကြသော်လည်း ၎င်းတို့၏ ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုများကို ကိုင်ဆောင်ထားခြင်းဖြင့် ပေးဆောင်ခြင်းကို နှောင့်နှေးခြင်း သို့မဟုတ် ရှောင်ရှားနိုင်သည်။ ရောင်းချသည့်အခါတွင် ဝင်ငွေနည်းသော ဝယ်သူများကို ထိခိုက်စေသည့် အခွန်ကို ကာမိစေရန် စျေးနှုန်းများ မြှင့်တင်နိုင်သည်။ ဤအခွန်များသည် ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးသော လူတစ်ဦးချင်းစီအတွက် ဆင်းရဲတွင်းနက်နေစေပြီး ရင်းနှီးမြုပ်နှံရန်နှင့် ၎င်းတို့၏ ကြွယ်ဝမှုကို မတိုးပွားစေပါ။

ကော်ပိုရေးရှင်းများသည် ၎င်းတို့၏ အစုရှယ်ယာရှင်များအား ပေးဆောင်သော အမြတ်ခွန်များနှင့်လည်း သက်ဆိုင်ပါသည်။ နေရာများစွာတွင် ဝင်ငွေခွန်ဥပဒေများအောက်တွင် အမြတ်ဝေစုများကို ဝင်ငွေခွန်ဥပဒေများအောက်တွင် အခွန်မဆောင်နိုင်သောကြောင့် အမြတ်ဝေစုများကို နှစ်ဆအခွန်ကောက်ခံခြင်းသို့ ဦးတည်စေသည်ဟု ဝေဖန်သူများက စောဒကတက်ကြသည်။

မြင့်မားသောအမြတ်ဝေစုအခွန်များသည် ပြဿနာသုံးခုကို ဖန်တီးပေးသည်ဟု Cato Institute မှ စောဒကတက်ဖူးသည်။ ပထမဦးစွာ၊ ၎င်းတို့သည် လက်ရှိအခွန်ဝန်ထုပ်ဝန်ပိုးများကို ပေါင်းထည့်သောကြောင့် စုဆောင်းခြင်းနှင့် ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံခြင်းကို တွန်းအားပေးကြသည်။ ဒုတိယ၊ ၎င်းတို့သည် ကော်ပိုရေးရှင်းများအား အစုရှယ်ယာများရောင်းချမည့်အစား ငွေချေးခြင်းအပေါ် ပိုမိုအားကိုးရန် တွန်းအားပေးကာ စီးပွားရေးကျဆင်းမှုများအတွင်း ၎င်းတို့ကို ဒေဝါလီခံနိုင်ခြေပိုများစေသည်။ တတိယအချက်မှာ ကုမ္ပဏီများသည် အစုရှယ်ယာရှင်များအား အမြတ်ဝေစုပေးဆောင်ရန် အလားအလာနည်းစေပြီး အမှုဆောင်အရာရှိများကို အမြတ်အစွန်းများထားရှိကာ အန္တရာယ်ရှိသော သို့မဟုတ် ထိရောက်မှုမရှိသော ပရောဂျက်များတွင် သုံးစွဲစေသည်။

ဤအခွန်များသည် ကော်ပိုရေးရှင်းများအနေဖြင့် အစုရှယ်ယာရှင်များအား အမြတ်အစွန်းများပေးဆောင်လိုစိတ် လျော့နည်းစေပြီး နေ့စဉ်ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံသူများအတွက် ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုအခွင့်အလမ်းများကို လျှော့ချပေးသောကြောင့် ဤအခွန်များသည် လူများအတွက် ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံရန် ပိုမိုခက်ခဲစေသည်။

Tobin Tax နှင့် Robin Hood Tax ကဲ့သို့သော ငွေကြေးလွှဲပြောင်းမှုအခွန်များသည် ရင်းနှီးမြုပ်နှံမှုကို ပိုမိုစျေးကြီးစေပြီး ဆင်းရဲသောရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံသူများကို အပြင်းထန်ဆုံးထိခိုက်စေသည်။ အဆိုပါအခွန်များသည် ငွေပေးငွေယူကုန်ကျစရိတ် နှစ်ဆဖြစ်နိုင်သည်ဟု အမေရိကန်ကုန်သည်ကြီးများအသင်းက ခန့်မှန်းထားသည်။ The Guardian မှ အစီရင်ခံတင်ပြသော လေ့လာမှုတစ်ခုအရ အခွန် 0.25% သည် အပြန်အလှန်ရန်ပုံငွေအမြတ်ဝေစုများကို 2% မှ 1.75% သို့ လျှော့ချပေးမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံသူများသည် ၎င်းတို့၏ပြန်အမ်းငွေကို ပြန်လည်ရရှိရန် စတော့စျေးနှုန်းများကို 12.5% ကျဆင်းစေကြောင်း တွေ့ရှိခဲ့သည်။ ချမ်းသာသော ရင်းနှီးမြုပ်နှံသူများသည် ကြီးကြီးမားမား ထိခိုက်မှု မရှိနိုင်သော်လည်း အထူးသဖြင့် r/WallStreetBets ကဲ့သို့သော အွန်လိုင်းကုန်သွယ်အသိုင်းအဝိုင်းများတွင် ဝင်ငွေနည်းသော ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံသူများသည် ပို၍ ဒုက္ခရောက်ကြမည်ဖြစ်သည်။

အခွန်စည်းကြပ်ခြင်းဆိုသည်မှာ ပြည်တွင်းထုတ်လုပ်မှုနှင့် စားသုံးမှုကို မြှင့်တင်ရန်အတွက် အစိုးရများအသုံးပြုသော သွင်းကုန်၊ တင်ပို့သည့် ကုန်ပစ္စည်းများအပေါ် အခွန်အခများဖြစ်သည်။ ပြည်တွင်းစီးပွားရေးကို ပံ့ပိုးပေးခြင်းသည် နိုင်ငံရေး၊ စီးပွားရေးနှင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆိုင်ရာ အကြောင်းပြချက်များအတွက် အကျိုးရှိနိုင်သော်လည်း အခွန်စည်းကြပ်မှုသည် စီးပွားရေးတစ်ခုလုံးကို ထိခိုက်စေသည်ဟု စီးပွားရေးပညာရှင်အများစုက သဘောတူကြသည်။ နာမည်ကျော် မာ့က်စ်ဝါဒီ တွေးခေါ်ရှင် Friedrich Engels ပင်လျှင် ကာကွယ်ရေးဝါဒကို ဆန့်ကျင်ပြီး ၎င်း၏ 1888 အက်ဆေး လွတ်လပ်သော ကုန်သွယ်မှုမေးခွန်း တွင် လွတ်လပ်စွာ ကုန်သွယ်မှုဖက်မှ ပါဝင်ငြင်းခုံခဲ့သည်။

အိမ်ခြံမြေ သို့မဟုတ် အမွေဆက်ခံခွန်ဟုလည်း ခေါ်သော လူသေမှုနှင့်ဆက်စပ်သော အခွန်များကို ကောင်းမွန်သောဘဏ္ဍာရေးအစီအစဉ်များဖြင့် မကြာခဏ ရှောင်ရှားနိုင်သည်။ သို့သော်လည်း ကြိုတင်စီစဉ်ထားခြင်းမရှိသော ငွေကြေးကျွမ်းကျင်မှု ချို့တဲ့သူများ၊ သို့မဟုတ် ကျွမ်းကျင်သူများ၏ အကူအညီကို မတတ်နိုင်သူများသည် ၎င်းတို့အား ပေးဆောင်ခြင်းဖြင့် အဆုံးသတ်ပါသည်။ သေးငယ်သော အမွေဆက်ခံမှုများသည် အများအားဖြင့် အခွန်ကင်းလွတ်သော်လည်း ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးသူများသည် ဤအခွန်များကို ရှောင်ရှားရန် ငွေကြေးဆိုင်ရာ ကိရိယာများကို သုံးစွဲခွင့်နည်းပါးသောကြောင့် ပိုမိုရုန်းကန်နေရပါသည်။ လယ်သမားငယ်များသည် အခြားစီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းများကဲ့သို့ ဝင်ငွေရရှိရန် ပိုမိုစျေးကြီးသော စက်ကိရိယာများ လိုအပ်သောကြောင့် လယ်သမားငယ်များသည် အထူးသဖြင့် ထိခိုက်နစ်နာရပြီး အချို့မှာ ၎င်းတို့၏လယ်မြေများကို အခွန်ကာမိစေရန် ရောင်းချခိုင်းခြင်း ဖြစ်သည်။ ဤအခွန်များကို စီးပွားပျက်ကပ်ကြီးအတွင်း ငွေအမြန်ရှာရန် မိတ်ဆက်ခဲ့သော်လည်း ချမ်းသာသူများသည် မသေဆုံးမီ ပိုင်ဆိုင်မှုများကို လွှဲပြောင်းခြင်းဖြင့် ၎င်းတို့ကို ရှောင်ရှားရန် နည်းလမ်းများကို ရှာဖွေခဲ့ကြသည်။ ယင်းက ပိုင်ဆိုင်မှုနည်းပါးသူများအပေါ် အခွန်ဝန်ထုပ်ဝန်ပိုးဖြစ်စေပြီး စနစ်သည် ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးသူများအတွက် တရားမျှတမှုဖြစ်စေသည်။

သွင်းကုန်၊ ရင်းနှီးမြုပ်နှံမှု သို့မဟုတ် စုဆောင်းငွေဖြစ်စေ ၎င်းတို့လျှောက်ထားသည့်အရာအားလုံးကို အခွန်များက တွန်းအားပေးသည်။ အပြစ်အခွန်အခများသည် အကျင့်စာရိတ္တကို ထိန်းချုပ်ရန် ကြိုးစားခြင်းဖြင့် ၎င်းတို့ကို လစ်ဘာတေးရီးယန်းဆန်လွန်းစေသည်။ အစိုးရများသည် ဆေးလိပ်၊ အရက်နှင့် တရားဝင် မူးယစ်ဆေးဝါးသုံးစွဲမှုအပြင် လောင်းကစား၊ ညစ်ညမ်းရုပ်ပုံစာပေနှင့် အမှိုက်အစားအစာများကို ကန့်သတ်ရန် ဤအခွန်များကို အသုံးပြုကြသည်။ သို့သော်၊ ဤအရာများကို အခွန်ကောက်ခံခြင်းသည် ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများ တိုးပွားစေနိုင်သည့် တရားမဝင်လောင်းကစား သို့မဟုတ် တရားမဝင်အရက်ရောင်းဝယ်ဖောက်ကားခြင်း ကဲ့သို့သော အခွန်မဆောင်ထားသော ဗားရှင်းများအတွက် မှောင်ခိုဈေးကွက်သို့ ဦးတည်သွားလေ့ရှိသည်။

အိမ်ခြံမြေအခွန်များသည် ပစ္စည်းတစ်ခု၏ စုစုပေါင်းတန်ဖိုးအပေါ် အခြေခံသော်လည်း လယ်သမားငယ်များနှင့် အငြိမ်းစားများကဲ့သို့ အဖိုးတန်ပစ္စည်းရှိသော်လည်း ဝင်ငွေနည်းသူများကို မတရားသဖြင့် ဝန်ထုပ်ဝန်ပိုးဖြစ်စေပါသည်။ ဤအခွန်များသည် လူတစ်ဦး၏ ပေးဆောင်နိုင်စွမ်းနှင့် အမြဲမကိုက်ညီပါ၊ ဆိုလိုသည်မှာ ၎င်းတို့သည် ၎င်းအခွန်တို့ကို တတ်နိုင်ရုံမျှဖြင့် ၎င်းတို့၏ ပိုင်ဆိုင်မှုများကို ရောင်းချရပေမည်။ အဆုံးတွင်၊ အိမ်ခြံမြေအခွန်များသည် လူတို့သည် ၎င်းတို့၏မြေယာကို အပြည့်အဝမပိုင်ဆိုင်ကြောင်း ဆိုလိုသည်မှာ အစိုးရက ၎င်းကို ထိန်းချုပ်ထားပြီး ပေးချေခြင်းကို ရပ်တန့်ပါက ၎င်းတို့၏ပိုင်ဆိုင်မှုများ ဆုံးရှုံးနိုင်သည်။

Geolibertarians များသည် အဆောက်အဦများ သို့မဟုတ် ပြုပြင်မွမ်းမံမှုများကို ထည့်သွင်းစဉ်းစားခြင်းမရှိဘဲ မြေကိုအခွန်ဆောင်သည့် မြေတန်ဖိုးအခွန်များကို ထောက်ခံကြသည်။ မြေယာပိုင်ဆိုင်မှုသည် အများအားဖြင့် လူတစ်ဦး၏ ကြွယ်ဝမှုကို ထင်ဟပ်နေသောကြောင့် ဤအခွန်သည် တိုးတက်နေပြီး အဆိုပြုချက်အများစုသည် လူတစ်ဦးအား မူလအိမ်မှ ကင်းလွတ်ခွင့်ပေးသောကြောင့် ဖြစ်သည်။ ၎င်းသည် “အပိုအိမ်ခြံမြေများကို အခွန်ကောက်ခံခြင်းဖြင့် စစ်မှန်သောအိမ်ပိုင်ဆိုင်ခွင့်ကို ရရှိစေပါသည်” ဟူသောအယူအဆမှာ မြေယာသည် လူတို့ဖန်တီးထားခြင်းမဟုတ်ဘဲ မျှဝေအရင်းအမြစ်ဖြစ်သောကြောင့် လူတိုင်းအတွက် အကျိုးရှိသင့်သည်ဟု ဆိုလိုရင်းဖြစ်သည်။ အမိုးအကာသည် မရှိမဖြစ်လိုအပ်သောကြောင့် လူများသည် အခွန်မပေးဘဲ ၎င်းတို့၏အိမ်အတွက် မြေများကို အသုံးပြုနိုင်သင့်သည်။ သို့ရာတွင် တစ်စုံတစ်ဦးသည် အပိုမြေကိုပိုင်ဆိုင်ပြီး အများသူငှာအသုံးပြုခြင်းမှ သိမ်းဆည်းထားပါက မြေတန်ဖိုးပေါ်မူတည်၍ အခွန်ပေးဆောင်ခြင်းဖြင့် ရပ်ရွာအား လျော်ကြေးပေးသင့်သည်။ အခြားအခွန်များနှင့်မတူဲ၊ ဤအခွန်သည် စီးပွားရေးတိုးတက်မှုကို မထိခိုက်စေဘဲ သို့မဟုတ် ထိရောက်မှုမရှိမှုများကို ဖန်တီးပေးကာ အခြားအခွန်အားလုံးကို မြေတန်ဖိုးအခွန်တစ်ခုတည်းဖြင့် အစားထိုးသင့်သည်ဟု အချို့က စောဒကတက်စေသည်။

မြေတန်ဖိုးအခွန်ကို ထောက်ခံသူအချို့သည် တူညီသောအကြောင်းပြချက်ဖြင့် ကာဗွန်အခွန်များကို ပြန်လည်ထောက်ခံကြပြီး ပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ကဲ့သို့ မျှဝေအရင်းအမြစ်များကို ထိခိုက်စေမှုအတွက် လူများက ပေးဆောင်သင့်သည်ဟု ယုံကြည်ကြသည်။ ယခင်က အစိုးရမူဝါဒများဖြင့် ဖုံးကွယ်ထားသည့် လေထုညစ်ညမ်းမှု၏ အမှန်တကယ်ကုန်ကျစရိတ်ကို ထုတ်လုပ်သူများနှင့် စားသုံးသူများကိုလည်း ရင်ဆိုင်စေခြင်းဖြင့် ကာဗွန်အခွန်များသည် ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးသူများကို အများဆုံးထိခိုက်စေနိုင်သည်။ ဤအခွန်များသည် သဘာဝဓာတ်ငွေ့နှင့် လျှပ်စစ်စျေးနှုန်းများကို မြှင့်တင်ပေးမည်ဖြစ်သော်လည်း ပြန်လည်ပြည့်ဖြိုးမြဲစွမ်းအင်နှင့် အများသူငှာ သယ်ယူပို့ဆောင်ရေးကဲ့သို့သော စျေးသက်သာပြီး ပိုမိုစိမ်းလန်းသော ရွေးချယ်မှုများဆီသို့ ၀ယ်လိုအားကို တွန်းအားပေးမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ ဤအပြောင်းအရွှေ့သည် လိုအပ်ပြီး ကာဗွန်-လေးလံသော ထုတ်ကုန်များကို ပိုမိုစျေးကြီးအောင်ပြုလုပ်ခြင်းသည် eco-friendly ရွေးချယ်မှုများကို အားပေးသည့်နည်းလမ်းဖြစ်ပါက ၎င်းသည် ထိုက်တန်ပါသည်။ ထုတ်လုပ်သူများသည် ၎င်းတို့၏ မက်လုံးများ မပြောင်းလဲပါက ပြောင်းလဲမည်မဟုတ်ပါ။

“ချမ်းသာသူများကို အခွန်ကောက်ခြင်းသည်” ဆင်းရဲသူများကိုသာ နာကျင်စေမည်။ ထိုအစား IRS နှင့် အခွန်အများစုကို ဖျက်သိမ်းရန် အာရုံစိုက်ပြီး မြေတန်ဖိုးနှင့် ကာဗွန်အခွန်များကိုသာ အခွန်အဖြစ် ဆက်လက်ထားရှိသင့်သည်။ မြင့်မားသောအခွန်အခများကို တွန်းအားပေးမည့်အစား ဆင်းရဲနွမ်းပါးသူများ အခွန်ရှောင်ရှားနိုင်ရန် နည်းလမ်းများကို ဖွင့်ပေးရမည်။ ရိုးရိုးရှင်းရှင်းနေထိုင်ခြင်း၊ ကွက်ကျော်ရိုက် အခွန်ရှောင်ခြင်း၊ အခွန်ဆိပ်များအသုံးပြုခြင်း၊ အမည်မသိ cryptocurrencies များအသုံးပြုခြင်း၊ တစ်ပတ်ရစ်စျေးဝယ်ခြင်းနှင့် အလွတ်သဘောစျေးကွက်များတွင်လည်ပတ်ခြင်းကဲ့သို့သောဗျူဟာများကို အသုံးပြုခြင်းဖြင့် အကျဉ်းထောင်များနှင့် စစ်တပ်ကို ရန်ပုံငွေထောက်ပံ့မှု နည်းစေမည်။ ထိုနည်းဖြင့် ၎င်းတို့၏ငွေများကို နိုင်ငံတော်လက်မှကာကွယ်ရန် ကူညီပေးနိုင်သည်။

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Di Frank Miroslav. Originale pubblicato il primo maggio 2025 con il titolo We Don’t Agree on Capitalism. Tradotto in italiano da Enrico Sanna.

Non un buon secolo per le teorie

Un fatto curioso nella storia dell’anarchismo e del marxismo è che, nonostante vecchie rivalità e conflitti, molti anarchici accettano Marx. Dovendo dare una definizione precisa del capitalismo, gli anarchici concordano con i marxisti più libertari.

Certi anarchici ammettono di buon grado questa coincidenza di opinioni, il fatto che frange marxiste libertarie come i consiliaristi e gli autonomisti siano quasi se non interamente anarchici. Altri ci vedono un approccio in malafede e sostengono erroneamente che il marxismo implica per forza la gestione statale dell’economia, o che i marxisti, che sono tali riguardo l’economia, non hanno mai accettato l’esistenza di nuove classi come i dirigenti e i professionisti.

Ma non tutti gli anarchici non marxisti sono così superficiali. Alcuni hanno analizzato a fondo il marxismo con critiche sofisticate. Anche qui, però, si trovano incoerenze. Il defunto David Graeber, ad esempio, sosteneva che “la competizione sul mercato non è quel tratto essenziale del capitalismo che credevano Marx e Engels” ma ammetteva anche che non c’è “necessariamente alcuna contraddizione tra anarchismo e marxismo”. Questa tendenza ad accettare il marxismo criticandone gli aspetti chiave è molto diffusa tra gli anarchici.

Un anarchico potrebbe essere fortemente critico verso il marxismo, ma l’assenza di teorie alternative fa sì che vi ricorra quando si trova a definire il capitalismo. Il marxismo è l’ipotesi nulla dell’anticapitalismo: la si accetta in assenza di confutazioni esplicite. Questa incoerenza, però, secondo me non è conseguenza del fatto che l’anarchismo è una forma di marxismo. Piuttosto possiamo dire che se il marxismo (oggi) domina tra gli anarchici è per via di contingenze del passato.

Quando Marx era ancora in vita, e nei decenni immediatamente successivi alla sua morte, il marxismo non era che una delle tante correnti del socialismo. In How to Change the World, Eric Hobsbawm come esempio dell’influenza di Marx cita Contemporary Socialism di John Rae, che, pubblicato l’anno dopo la morte di Marx, dedicava al marxismo solo uno dei suoi nove capitoli. E poi allora era ragionevole dubitare che il marxismo potesse diventare il fulcro dell’anticapitalismo. Agli inizi del Novecento la sua carica rivoluzionaria si esauriva sulla scia del riformismo dei partiti socialdemocratici di massa. Gran parte della sinistra rivoluzionaria, tra il 1900 e i primi anni Dieci, era associata al sindacalismo radicale, emerso in risposta al già citato conservatorismo delle socialdemocrazie dominate dai marxisti. Se singoli sindacalisti si ispiravano a Marx, il movimento in sé nelle sue basi teoriche era molto eterogeneo. Fu la guerra civile russa a mettere il marxismo al centro dell’anticapitalismo rivoluzionario.

A rendere attraente il marxismo era chiaramente l’apparente successo rivoluzionario dei bolscevichi. Nonostante l’immediata reazione contro la propaganda che esagerava il ruolo della disciplina bolscevica e delle teorie marxiste, fu indubbiamente il successo militare a stregare gli aspiranti rivoluzionari. E poi l’Unione Sovietica aveva un indubbio peso filosofico. Era uno stato che giustificava la propria esistenza appellandosi esplicitamente ad una filosofia moderna che sosteneva l’imminenza e l’auspicabilità di una rivoluzione mondiale. Si trattava di una novità mondiale, il marxismo doveva essere preso sul serio anche dalle forze più conservatrici. La conseguenza fu che l’URSS diffuse una filosofia marxista, raccolse, tradusse e divulgò massicciamente le opere marxiste a giustificazione delle proprie politiche, ma anche per fare proselitismo e indicare la via dottrinale ai partiti e agli stati allineati con Mosca. Conseguenza diretta fu la maggiore accessibilità delle opere marxiste rispetto a quelle di altre tradizioni socialiste. Questo spiega in parte perché il Manifesto Comunista, un best-seller assoluto paragonabile alla Bibbia o al Capitale, è uno dei libri più citati in sociologia. Ma non era solo un’imposizione di ideali dall’alto. Nel lungo termine anche le correnti marxiste di base contribuirono enormemente a formare l’anarchismo.

Prima della Prima Guerra Mondiale, la maggioranza degli intellettuali marxisti erano ricollegabili direttamente ai partiti socialisti. Insegnavano nelle scuole di partito o svolgevano attività giornalistica o di ricerca per conto del partito. Pertanto le loro opere si concentravano su temi pragmatici come lo sviluppo economico e le strategie da seguire. Dopo la guerra, questi intellettuali cominciarono ad allargare la portata dei loro studi includendo la critica sociale, l’analisi culturale e la speculazione filosofica.

Una delle ragioni del cambiamento era la linea di partito imposta dall’Unione Sovietica. Se volevano ottenere riconoscimento e sostegno da parte dell’Unione Sovietica, i partiti comunisti dovevano accettare una particolare linea politica e economica. Gli intellettuali marxisti organici ai partiti comunisti non potevano pertanto elaborare una loro linea di pensiero autonoma.

Contemporaneamente, sempre più persone colte di classe media cominciarono a interessarsi al marxismo, attirate dalla sua popolarità e dalla forte radicalizzazione iniziata con la Prima Guerra Mondiale. Si poteva scrivere del marxismo ed essere allo stesso tempo artisti o accademici ma fuori dal partito. Lontano dalle questioni sociali, ci si occupava principalmente di cultura e filosofia più che di movimenti sociali. La tendenza, dato l’aumento dei fondi durante la guerra fredda, si intensificò al crescere del mondo accademico. Molti marxisti estremizzati nel movimento studentesco portarono nel mondo accademico un corpus di conoscenze tale da contrastare i paradigmi tradizionali e influenzare la società grazie ai finanziamenti statali.

Ne derivarono diversi sviluppi positivi, come il fatto che alcuni marxisti riuscirono a spostare significativamente l’ago della bilancia in varie discipline, come la storiografia. Purtroppo l’ambito accademico produsse anche incentivi negativi a cui molti a sinistra non seppero resistere. Il risultato fu la nascita di feudi accademici, la chiusura degli ambiti disciplinari, una pletora di commenti extratestuali e identità professionali che scoraggiavano un attivismo sostanziale.

Co l’ascesa del marxismo si eclissò l’anarchismo. Il fallimento della Guerra Civile Spagnola fu dovuto in parte all’azione dell’Unione Sovietica che intendeva controllare i repubblicani. Seguì una diffusa persecuzione da parte degli stati in tutto il mondo, persecuzione che decimò il movimento. Comunità anarchiche un tempo vitali furono distrutte con spedizioni punitive e sollevamenti sociali. Libri anarchici si potevano trovare solo in certe librerie radicali o nell’usato.

Negli anni Cinquanta l’anarchismo era considerato ideologia morta. Comunità anarchiche italiane, greche e britanniche sopravvissero  ai torbidi della guerra, ma erano considerate fenomeni secondari rispetto al confronto tra socialisti e capitalismo. In un’epoca di stati (apparentemente) razionali, centralizzati e ad organizzazione gerarchica, e di imprese celebrate internazionalmente, era facile per i marxisti liquidare come irrilevante il movimento anarchico perché considerato economicamente arretrato e luddista.

Come afferma Eric Hobsbawm nel suo saggio Reflections on Anarchism, l’anarchismo non era solo un movimento rivoluzionario fallito, ma anche (presumibilmente) “pensato per fallire”. Anche chi aveva simpatie anarchiche nutriva qualche dubbio sulla sua fattibilità. Lo storiografo George Woodcock, che agli inizi degli anni Sessanta scrisse una delle più accademicamente influenti storie dell’anarchismo, arrivò alla conclusione che si trattasse di un’ideologia esaurita. Ma il movimento sopravvisse ai giudizi. Tra gli anni Sessanta e Settanta, partendo da un piccolo gruppo di attivisti anarchici dichiarati negli Stati Uniti e in Europa, cominciò una lenta ripresa.

Il marxismo prevalente allora tra gli attivisti era molto diverso da quello prevalente negli anni Trenta. La delegittimazione dei partiti comunisti ufficiali fu un fatto inevitabile dopo certe atrocità commesse dall’Unione Sovietica. Molti nella New Left però restavano marxisti. Il problema, dicevano, era una scorretta applicazione delle teorie. Fu così che molti a sinistra adottarono un marxismo fondamentalistico ritornando a Lenin, Trotsky, Mao e altri rivoluzionari alla ricerca di risposte chiare su come cambiare la loro società. Si trattava di organizzazioni fortemente settarie con scarso seguito: cambiare il mondo si rivelò molto più difficile di quanto non prevedessero le loro semplici teorie che promettevano la vittoria.

Fu questo il loro punto debole davanti ai grandi cambiamenti sociali. Molti di quelli che approdarono al marxismo lo fecero in un contesto di rivolta sociale che faceva presupporre un imminente cambiamento rivoluzionario. La svolta conservatrice degli anni Ottanta mandò in frantumi il presupposto e portò molti alla disillusione. La fiducia fu poi ulteriormente erosa dalle riforme e il conseguente collasso degli stati socialisti tra la fine degli anni Ottanta e l’inizio dei Novanta: molti marxisti della New Left avevano giustificato le proprie aspirazioni proprio sulla base del “successo” di Russia, Cina e altri paesi socialisti.

Data la prevalenza del marxismo, fu facile per gli anarchici dell’epoca rigettare i peggiori aspetti di un’ideologia divenuta realtà. Nonostante il rigetto, però, restavano sottili influenze nel campo delle idee. Citerò qui il caso di due importanti anarchici che negli anni Novanta definirono il centro di gravità dell’anarchismo e che in gioventù erano stati marxisti della New Left: John Zerzan e Murray Bookchin.

Bookchin, dopo aver rotto con il marxismo negli anni Cinquanta, assunse inizialmente un atteggiamento ostile. Il polemico Listen Marxist era una condanna del marxismo con cui cercava di respingere il tentativo di imporsi del movimento Students for a Democratic Society nel 1969, e invocava una “trascendenza” del marxismo dichiarando Marx ed Engels “centristi”. Più tardi Bookchin passò ad un apprezzamento più sfumato del marxismo, soprattutto dopo essersi avvicinato ai marxisti della Scuola di Francoforte con la loro critica della razionalità strumentale e della modernità. In seguito alla rottura con l’anarchismo, articolò la teoria del “comunalismo” contenente quello che lui considerava “il meglio dell’anarchismo e del marxismo”. Il suo ideale di federazione di comunità democratiche dirette in armonia con la natura è chiaramente in linea con varie aspirazioni marxiste libertarie.

Il caso di Zerzan è più complesso. A prima vista, il suo primitivismo sembra l’esatto opposto del marxismo: respinge la possibilità di una civiltà tecnologica più razionale che si serva dei frutti del capitalismo e al suo posto invoca il ritorno ad una forma arcaica di libertà. Come in altri casi, però, la sua critica della civiltà siede su una lettura tecnologicamente determinista di Marx e una critica variamente marxista della razionalità (ancora la Scuola di Francoforte!), arrivando alla conclusione che i requisiti sociali delle tecnologie complesse comportano sempre la schiavitù dell’uomo e la distruzione dell’ambiente (vedi anche l’influenza del marxismo sulla rivista primitivista Fifth Estate, per esempio).

A mio parere, il problema di queste articolazioni del pensiero anarchico non è l’influsso marxista. È invece il fatto che non cerchino neanche di affrontare questioni come il libero arbitrio, che secondo me dovrebbero essere al centro della teoria anarchica. Non sono il primo anarchico a notarlo, ma forse sono il primo a cercare di scrivere una teoria del capitalismo che ruota esplicitamente attorno a queste questioni.

L’assenza di chiare alternative teoriche dipende dalla contingenza e dagli sviluppi del discorso negli spazi anarchici. Nonostante le dimensioni contenute, l’anarchismo ha visto, a partire dagli anni Trenta, un consistente sviluppo concettuale in gran parte ignorato non solo dai marxisti ma anche dalla filosofia politica in generale. È deprimente il fatto che in gran parte ciò non sia stato reso accessibile.

Molte delle idee anarchiche attualmente sussistono in forma tacita intersoggettiva tra persone. Per afferrarle occorre vivere determinate situazioni, acquisire e condensare sufficienti informazioni attualmente disperse in una moltitudine di persone, pubblicazioni di settore, blog, social, testi di persone non anarchiche e così via. Tutto ciò rende inutilmente difficile diventare anarchici e impedisce il dialogo tra anarchici provenienti da contesti e situazioni diverse.

In parte ciò è il risultato del desiderio di accumulare capitale intellettuale o di preservare una certa unicità sottoculturale, grossomodo come il gergo marxista. Ma è anche conseguenza delle critiche primitiviste dell’alienazione tecnologica, che purtroppo tra gli anni Novanta e il primo decennio Duemila hanno tenuto lontano da internet molti anarchici. Molte sono le cose che non sono mai arrivate su internet.

L’atteggiamento cominciò a cambiare nel primo decennio Duemila grazie alla crescente diffusione di internet, al cambio generazionale e a importanti movimenti come Occupy che sfruttavano i social. Purtroppo, i fatti tumultuosi e la forte estremizzazione a sinistra a partire dal 2016 hanno spinto molti a fare da pompieri.

L’aspetto positivo è che la comunicazione diretta non è essenziale per l’anarchismo. Emma Goldman (per citarne una) avrebbe scritto circa duecentomila lettere in tutta la sua vita. Internet aiuta molto il dialogo, ma non è indispensabile.

Per tornare, gli (attuali) rapporti confusi con il mondo marxista non significano che il progetto anarchico è profondamente tarato, incoerente o nascostamente marxista. Piuttosto sono la conseguenza dell’attrazione gravitazionale filosofica e sociale che il marxismo ha esercitato sul pensiero anticapitalistico nel corso del Novecento, nonché dell’attuale processo di adattamento ai mutamenti prodotti dall’informatica. Si può uscirne, e io vorrei dare una spinta al processo.

Pertanto…

Serve una critica del capitalismo specificamente anarchica

Una cosa che vorrei far capire è che per noi anarchici il potere non è solo un male per chi lo subisce, ma spesso ha effetti deleteri anche sui dominatori. E per ragioni molto profonde.

Dominare e controllare significa anche dare istruzioni ai dominati. Per capire perché ciò crea problemi immediati, pensiamo a un algoritmo. Un algoritmo è un processo che, passo dopo passo, cerca di arrivare a un determinato risultato partendo da certe istruzioni iniziali. Se vuoi controllare qualcosa devi ridurne il potere decisionale ad un algoritmo definito da te.

E qui nascono i problemi. L’algoritmo opera valutando tutte le possibilità sulla base di una gamma di istruzioni inizialmente note. Ma se la gamma di istruzioni sfugge alla nostra capacità di valutare, noi non possiamo sapere con certezza se l’algoritmo funzionerà.

Anche i più ostinati sostenitori raramente pensano che il potere gerarchico debba essere perfetto. Ma anche con una certa tolleranza sui risultati, definire la gamma di istruzioni può essere un grosso problema.

La ragione sta nel rapporto tra causa ed effetto. Sistemi semplici reagiscono prevedibilmente alle istruzioni e sono affidabili anche nel lungo periodo. Questo perché hanno una struttura rigida, immutabile. I sistemi che hanno la capacità di rispondere all’ambiente e regolarsi da sé, ovvero che hanno caratteristiche normalmente associate al “libero arbitrio” (memoria, obiettivi, capacità di riflettere e così via) sono invece molto più imprevedibili. Questo perché al processo decisionale interno si aggiungono le istruzioni che provengono dall’ambiente e che influenzano il processo stesso.

Ma a dare problemi non sono solo i sistemi complessi. Anche processi apparentemente semplici contengono un’infinità di possibilità proprio perché possono essere utilizzate in modi diversi dal solito. Ad esempio, un mattone può essere usato in maniera ovvia, come materiale da costruzione, ma anche in maniera non ovvia, ad esempio piantando fiori nei fori, lanciandolo contro una finestra in segno di protesta, come oggetto di scena a teatro e così via. E anche le parti costituenti di un “oggetto” possono essere modificate in tantissimi modi: l’argilla di cui è fatto un mattone contiene silicio e alluminio che possono essere estratti e usati per qualcosa di affatto diverso.

Tolti i contesti più elementari, a monte di qualunque azione troviamo un numero enorme di variabili che non possono essere incorporate in un algoritmo predefinito che guidi l’agente. Fortunatamente, questo è un problema che singoli e associazioni hanno trovato il modo di governare, anche se solo in caso di programmazioni dal basso basate sull’interazione costante col mondo e con un riscontro continuo, non nel caso di direttive imposte dall’alto.

Il risultato non è perfetto, ma il punto non è la perfezione, il punto è raggiungere gli obiettivi. Questo modo propositivo di approcciarsi alla realtà è in contrasto col mantenimento di un controllo gerarchico. Un sistema basato su un algoritmo è prevedibile ma anche fragile davanti a fenomeni inattesi. Questo va a vantaggio dell’approccio libero. Qualsiasi persona con un certo grado di libertà può aggiornare non solo lo schema ma anche gli obiettivi, il che può significare la possibilità di ribellarsi contro chi controlla.

È proprio questo che rende strutturalmente irrazionale un’organizzazione gerarchica rigida. I dettati organizzativi ignorano o vietano soluzioni che appaiono “ovvie” a chi è a contatto diretto con un dato problema, perché una valutazione autonoma di tale problema può essere pericolosa e perché dall’opportunità può nascere l’insubordinazione. Il problema della comunicazione, poi, complica il tutto. In una comunicazione a due, soltanto una parte delle informazioni possono essere comunicate. Questo perché il canale comunicativo può veicolare solo una frazione delle informazioni contenute nel cervello.

Il limite è tanto più stretto quante più sono le persone coinvolte. Chiunque cerchi di tenere sotto controllo altri deve limitare o comprimere il flusso informativo per evitare il sovraccarico. Questa compressione comporta spesso una forte perdita di informazione, dovuta allo scarto enorme tra complessità del pensiero e capacità comunicativa di canali come il linguaggio. È possibile correggere errori, ma occorre che la persona confusa articoli le proprie confusioni e ne ottenga un chiarimento, il che richiede un lungo botta e risposta. Anche questo problema cresce al crescere delle dimensioni dell’organizzazione data la limitatezza del tempo occorrente per i chiarimenti.

Poniamo il caso in cui le direttive sono inesatte. Un superiore potrebbe teoricamente intervenire e fornire direttive corrette. Il fatto è che occorre tempo per inquadrare il problema e elaborare una soluzione, e quando finalmente le direttive corrette arrivano ai subordinati è troppo tardi.

Questi limiti propri delle strutture gerarchiche portano spesso i subordinati, in un sistema formalmente controllato, a ricavarsi spazi autonomi all’insaputa dei superiori. Spesso questa autonomia è fondamentale per il funzionamento del sistema, che così può ovviare ad imprevisti e incomprensioni. Pertanto i vertici si trovano a bilanciare il potere dando ai subordinati quella libertà che serve a rendere adattabile il sistema, ma non una libertà tale da rovesciare la struttura gerarchica. Si tratta di un problema che tutte le società gerarchiche note hanno dovuto affrontare, e che ancora oggi rappresenta un’occasione mancata di ribellione. L’opuscolo How to Fire Your Boss, spiega brevemente ai lavoratori come sfruttare queste irrazionalità sistemiche contro i capitalisti.

Una ragione in più a favore di un’ugualitarismo relazionale. Data  l’onerosità del controllo, spesso risulta più conveniente dare ai subordinati un certo grado di autonomia. Ciò porta le parti ad accordarsi un certo grado di fiducia: nonostante le differenze potenziali in termini di ricchezza, potere, intelligenza, stato sociale e altro, i vertici farebbero meglio a rispettare i subordinati in quanto l’autonomia dà a questi la capacità di imporre costi impercettibili che si accumulano col tempo.

Questa teoria della efficienza delle relazioni paritarie è in contrasto con la teoria marxiana della efficacia delle relazioni gerarchiche, che secondo Marx spiega la persistenza del capitalismo. Alla base della teoria marxiana, che spiega il dominio capitalista e l’estrazione di plusvalore con la persistenza delle differenze di classe, è la premessa secondo cui ciò che i singoli capitalisti fanno con il loro capitale è razionale ai fini dello sfruttamento dei lavoratori. In una società capitalista, il successo nel mercato si ottiene migliorando la produttività, battendo la concorrenza ed eliminando le configurazioni meno produttive.

Un modo per migliorare la produttività passa per la razionalizzazione dei processi produttivi e l’incorporazione nella macchina delle capacità del lavoratore. Così Marx ne Il Capitale:

Mediante la sua trasformazione in macchina automatica, il mezzo di lavoro si contrappone all’operaio durante lo stesso processo lavorativo quale capitale, quale lavoro morto che domina e succhia fino all’ultima goccia la forza – lavoro vivente. La scissione fra le potenze mentali del processo di produzione e il lavoro manuale, la trasformazione di quelle in poteri del capitale sul lavoro, si compie, come è già stato accennato prima, nella grande industria edificata sulla base delle macchine. L’abilità parziale dell’operaio meccanico individuale svuotato, scompare come un infimo accessorio dinanzi alla scienza, alle immani forze naturali e al lavoro sociale di massa, che sono incarnati nel sistema delle macchine e che con esso costituiscono il potere del «padrone» (master).

Questa razionalizzazione fa sì che più lavoratori stiano sotto il comando di un solo capitalista, il che accresce la produttività:

Non è possibile qui dare uno svolgimento delle leggi di questa centralizzazione dei capitali ossia dell’attrazione del capitale da parte del capitale. Basterà un breve cenno sui fatti. La lotta della concorrenza viene condotta rendendo più a buon mercato le merci. Il buon mercato delle merci dipende, caeteris paribus, dalla produttività del lavoro, ma questa a sua volta dipende dalla scala della produzione. I capitali più grossi sconfiggono perciò quelli minori. (enfasi mia)

Questa produttività è ciò che permette al capitalismo di dominare il mondo. Così nel Manifesto del Partito Comunista:

Col rapido miglioramento di tutti gli strumenti di produzione, con le comunicazioni infinitamente agevolate, la borghesia  trascina  nella  civiltà  anche  le  nazioni  più barbare.  I  tenui  prezzi  delle  sue  merci  sono  l’artiglieria pesante con cui essa abbatte tutte le muraglie cinesi, e con cui costringe a capitolare il più testardo odio dei barbari per lo straniero. Essa costringe tutte le nazioni ad adottare le forme della produzione borghese se non vogliono perire; le costringe a introdurre nei loro paesi la cosiddetta civiltà, cioè a farsi borghesi.

Ed è in questa produttività centralizzata che Marx vede la possibilità di superare il capitalismo. Nelle sue opere, Marx sottolinea costantemente l’apparente contraddizione tra la (presunta) razionalità aziendale e l’esterna “anarchia” del mondo dello scambio.

Nel terzo volume del Capitale spiega come l’emergere delle società per azioni abbia in parte socializzato la proprietà grazie a forme di proprietà diffusa. Marx parla esplicitamente di “abolizione del modo di produzione capitalista a partire dal suo interno”, abolizione di cui le società per azioni sono tecnicamente la prima pietra.

Io credo che sulla tendenza alla semplificazione Marx abbia visto giusto. Ma semplificazione non significa maggiore produttività. L’asserzione di Marx secondo cui processi produttivi possono essere creati razionalmente è storicamente dubbia e non solo. Si veda ad esempio David Noble che spiega come gli industriali americani avessero introdotto processi di automazione scarsamente produttivi che intensificavano il controllo sui lavoratori, oppure gli studi sociologici e antropologici sulle grandi aziende.

La rigidità può certamente aumentare la produttività, ma solo per scopi particolari. Il risultato inatteso potrebbe essere la riconfigurazione del processo e l’impossibilità di configurare il lavoro in modo da ampliarne i campi di applicazione. E questo è il punto, più o meno. Perché il sistema capitalista cerca di ottimizzare prima il controllo e poi la produttività. Gli stati e le grandi imprese sono in simbiosi tra loro, si passano ciò che serve a navigare in un mondo fatto di incertezze.

I capitalisti sono interessati a una tecnologia che rafforzi il proprio potere, che renda il lavoratore malleabile e controllabile, perché è così che si mantengono le economie di scala e la moderazione dei salari. Dal punto di vista della società si tratta di modi di procedere costosi e inefficienti per via delle tante esternalità negative. Dal punto di vista dello stato, invece, questo arrangiamento è preferibile perché la centralizzazione economica gli permette di realizzare meglio i propri scopi: è più facile avere a che fare con poche imprese di grosse dimensioni.

Ecco perché le grandi imprese ricevono un trattamento preferenziale da parte dello stato, il quale riconosce loro i diritti di proprietà di ciò che è stato ottenuto con l’esproprio o la guerra, rende difficile la vita di lavoratori autonomi e cooperative con costi alti o divieti, o ancora incentiva le infrastrutture dei trasporti, tanto per citarne qualcuna. Come spiega in dettaglio Kevin Carson, da secoli lo stato interviene a semplificare il contesto in cui operano le imprese. Il punto è far sì che l’intervento non sia risolutivo. Si lascia un margine di flessibilità, di ridondanza, perché il sistema si adatti. Non esiste una sistemazione statica che garantisca il potere, c’è un continuo adattamento a una realtà che cambia.

Un aspetto fondamentalmente positivo del capitalismo è la sostituibilità dei capitalisti. Capitalisti e aziende possono fare errori entro un certo margine, oltre il margine c’è la rimozione e la sostituzione. Si tratta di processi autofagici che riguardano le industrie in generale. Tecnologie distruttive possono uscire dal quadro giuridico e sconvolgere non solo le industrie esistenti ma anche le relazioni di potere. Chi vende tecnologia ha buone ragioni per integrarsi con lo stato per continuare a fare profitti. Man mano che si trovano campi di applicazione di una data tecnologia, cresce la tendenza ad appellarsi allo stato perché imponga barriere al suo utilizzo, prima che le strutture di potere ne siano intaccate.

Questi rimescolii li troviamo in quegli stati che cambiano pacificamente politici, partiti e anche ideologie grazie a procedure democratiche, senza precipitare nei disordini. In seguito è il capitalismo liberale a diluire il problema del controllo nella massa e facilitare il ricambio delle tecnologie e delle élite in maniera più efficiente rispetto alle società del passato. Pertanto le società capitaliste hanno maggiori capacità di adattamento di altri ordini sociali.

È stata questa capacità di adattamento a permettere la diffusione mondiale del capitalismo. Lo stato moderno è riuscito a sfruttare nuove tecniche e arrangiamenti sociali per sconfiggere le forze conservatrici. Mettere in pratica le novità, però, ha comportato forti disordini interni. La situazione è stata particolarmente difficile per gli ordinamenti meno flessibili, che spesso si bloccavano, collassavano o sfociavano nella rivoluzione.

(L’esempio schematico presentato qui, di un potere capitalista in relazione con un solo stato, è complicato da schemi geopolitici per cui i capitalisti intavolano rapporti con élite politiche di più stati in competizione tra loro. La questione è da approfondire, ma non credo che smentisca la relazione simbiotica tra stato e capitale delineata da me.)

Nonostante la maggiore flessibilità rispetto ad altri macrosistemi di dominio, il capitalismo resta strutturalmente conservatore: un ordine sociale più dinamico e sensibile renderebbe impossibile il genere di controllo imposto dal profitto capitalista. La prima conclusione è, banalmente, che le cose potrebbero andare meglio. Molte possibilità tecniche e organizzative latenti potrebbero venire alla luce e migliorare significativamente la realtà in molti ambiti, dalla produttività alla realizzazione di sé alla riduzione delle esternalità negative. Dovrebbe essere evidente ma lo dico comunque viste le scarse aspirazioni della sinistra attuale.

Questa critica del capitalismo, pur non promettendo un’alternativa di fondo, potrebbe fornire una generica strategia d’azione. Pochi anarchici hanno articolato la questione capitalismo a questi alti livelli; molti però conoscono queste dinamiche, almeno in parte, grazie alla pratica concreta e alle tradizioni teoriche. Da qui tutto un insieme di tattiche che sfruttano i limiti e gli aspetti negativi del capitalismo.

Le tattiche sono tante. Io personalmente approvo il percorso delineato da William Gillis:

• Insurrezione Atti di resistenza popolare attraverso azioni dirette che chiunque può fare.

• Sfruttamento Assalti specifici contestuali che richiedono conoscenze, capacità e presenza sul posto.

• Sviluppo Esplorare tattiche tecniche alternative e linee di condotta ignorate o scartate da altri.

• Contestazione Far pressione sulle istituzioni esistenti al fine di spostare l’ago della bilancia in proprio favore.

• Prefigurazione Testare, tramite applicazione pratica, nuove pratiche e tecniche alternative sociali e diffonderne l’uso.

• Erosione Rendere l’economia e la società più decentrata e reattiva.

Tratto comune è lo sfruttamento o il mantenimento di possibilità negate dalle strutture di potere. Queste possibilità aperte mi portano a quella che da tempo è considerata la differenza principale tra marxisti e anarchici: l’etica anarchica che motiva e guida l’azione dell’individuo. Il marxismo, per contro, tende a incanalare l’energia che viene dalla reazione in un’oppressione strutturale.

È opinione diffusa che etica e azione siano in conflitto, e non è un’opinione del tutto infondata. L’etica è solitamente interpretata come l’ordine di non fare certe cose. Ceteris paribus, limitare le scelte di qualcuno significa menomarlo rispetto a chi è meno solerte.

Sembrerebbe corretto. Hai poche probabilità di vincere contro un avversario pronto a fare ciò che per principio tu hai deciso di non fare. Ma se il conflitto ha luogo in un periodo di tempo più lungo o in un contesto aperto, conoscere i propri valori e le proprie aspirazioni aiuta. Quando si vuole di cambiare un sistema complesso è molto facile compiere azioni a prima vista efficaci ma che poi si rivelano controproducenti. Per un vero progresso occorre sbrogliare i fili del caso e trovare i punti nascosti su cui fare leva. La chiarezza d’intenti aiuta a eliminare i dati irrilevanti, chiarisce il campo d’azione e rende più facile capire cosa fare. Il punto non è agire in maniera perfetta ma cogliere le opportunità altrimenti invisibili e vedere le trappole nascoste.

Ciò che è valido dev’essere perseguito, e la fiducia reciproca permette una maggiore cooperazione dinamica. Se pensi che qualcuno condivide i tuoi obiettivi, hai ragione di credere che le sue azioni indipendenti andranno anche a tuo vantaggio. Questo è importantissimo quando si ha una certa gamma di possibilità. I limiti informativi imposti da un’organizzazione centralizzata escludono i percorsi molteplici. Un gruppo di persone libere, che non deve passare per un comitato centrale, può molto più efficacemente seguire una molteplicità di percorsi in un panorama mutevole di possibilità aperte, ma solo se c’è una vera convinzione.

Capisco chi vede in Marx un’etica implicita. Ma la ragione principale della sua popolarità tra i socialisti è l’amoralità dichiarata dei suoi ragionamenti. I partiti socialisti ottocenteschi si sentivano attirati da Marx perché offriva una soluzione alla mancanza di unità della classe lavoratrice. Le teorie marxiane erano rassicuranti: le divisioni sarebbero finalmente scomparse grazie allo sviluppo delle forze economiche. Il capitalismo, diceva la teoria, avrebbe dovuto semplificare il lavoro al punto che i singoli lavoratori sarebbero diventati intercambiabili, e avrebbe concentrato la proprietà fino rendere evidente chi fosse il nemico, pertanto spingendo i lavoratori ad unirsi in collettivi al fine di sopravvivere; e questo avrebbe dato loro la forza per uscire vittoriosi da una rivoluzione. Le varie correnti di interesse che marcavano la classe lavoratrice del tempo sarebbero state erose da semplici fattori economici lasciando in piedi l’interesse della maggioranza proletaria.

Niente di tutto ciò è accaduto. La classe lavoratrice ottocentesca era divisa per specializzazioni, regioni e settori industriali. La società non affondò nella miseria: alla fine dell’Ottocento nei paesi industrializzati la paga dei lavoratori cresceva e la classe media non si era ridotta come percentuale della popolazione. Tra i lavoratori esistevano simpatie ma niente che somigliasse all’unità di classe immaginata da Marx.

I fallimenti del marxismo vanno oltre le previsioni sbagliate sul corso del capitalismo. Non fu neanche in grado di vedere l’emergere di nuove dinamiche di potere all’interno dello stesso movimento socialista. All’interno di partiti e sindacati socialisti nacque una classe burocratica con interessi propri. Emerse come conseguenza delle limitate possibilità comunicative citate più su. Per quanto sostenessero di operare “nell’interesse dei lavoratori”, già alla fine dell’Ottocento i partiti socialisti si stavano allontanando progressivamente dalla democrazia diretta per andare verso la burocratizzazione e il potere rappresentativo che permetteva azioni su vasta scala. Cercarono allora di ingabbiare il naturale radicalismo dei lavoratori, spingendoli ad unirsi in associazioni che canalizzassero lo scontento e facilitassero i negoziati tra rappresentanti sindacali e capitalisti.

Ovviamente, i limiti informativi tagliavano la capacità delle parti di disciplinare i lavoratori. I sindacati si affermarono soprattutto perché i lavoratori erano frustrati dall’incapacità di agire direttamente. Inoltre il desiderio di mantenere la legittimità del partito (e la loro posizione al suo interno) portò i politici socialisti ad aprirsi alla collaborazione con lo stato. Il culmine fu la collaborazione dei partiti socialisti con i governi durante la Prima Guerra Mondiale. In importanti paesi industriali come la Francia e la Germania, il consenso dei socialisti, nonostante la loro fede internazionalista, fu indispensabile per approvare i fondi bellici e sopprimere l’opposizione popolare alla guerra.

La tendenza dei marxisti ad essere messi in un angolo dalle emergenti dinamiche di classe all’interno dei loro movimenti, conseguenza della centralizzazione che dura ancora oggi, fa capire che, anche nel migliore dei casi, dopo la rivoluzione riemergerebbero molto probabilmente le differenze di classe.

Le società astatuali egalitarie non si reggono su un’autorità centrale e non sono guidate democraticamente. Operano sulla base di una struttura frattale di pesi e contrappesi. Teoricamente, ognuno ha la capacità di imporre seri costi sugli altri. Questo sistema resiste molto meglio ad una presa del potere rispetto ad un’istituzione centralizzata.

Premessa di questi problemi sono i limiti essenziali che ho descritto all’inizio riguardo i processi decisionali algoritmici e la disparità nel tasso di trasferimento di informazioni tra singoli. L’emergere di relazioni di potere in grado di metastatizzarsi in uno stato impone non solo la riforma delle norme sulla proprietà ma anche cambiamenti culturali e tecnici.

Il compito è ben più difficile di quello imposto dal marxismo, non ultimo perché non deriva da un’opposizione diretta all’esistente. Certo l’uomo combatte il potere, lotta per una causa in cui crede e aiuta le persone a lui care. Ma se guardiamo alla storia dei movimenti popolari, vediamo che solo una minoranza delle persone coinvolte passa dalla lotta per questioni immediate a quella contro il potere in generale.

Per fortuna non dobbiamo cambiare tutto in una volta sola.

Il marxismo critica i cambiamenti progressivi denunciando soprattutto la fragilità delle riforme socialiste e la tendenza a farsi cooptare delle istituzioni dei lavoratori. Visti i fallimenti storici, molti arrivano alla conclusione che il cambiamento deve essere radicale e immediato, pena il ritorno graduale del capitalismo. Ma le tante cooptazioni non sono il risultato dell’infinita capacità di adattamento del capitalismo, bensì della fragilità dei mezzi impiegati dai socialisti.

Molti dei problemi del socialismo venivano dall’incapacità di riconoscere che i cambiamenti apparentemente positivi erano trappole che ingabbiavano il progresso. Il succitato conservatorismo del Partito Socialdemocratico Tedesco emerse solo con l’abrogazione delle leggi antisocialiste che lo dichiaravano fuorilegge. Fu allora che uomini di partito e sindacalisti si professionalizzarono, finendo per vedere nel partito un fine in sé, un’occasione per fare carriera, e non lo strumento di un cambiamento rivoluzionario.

Cambiamenti fragili, data la necessità di un continuo sostegno elettorale. I socialisti non monopolizzarono mai i voti della classe lavoratrice; anche i contatti con altre categorie furono instabili; e certe politiche normative e sociali richiedevano una crescita economica sostenuta. Il risultato fu che man mano che avvenivano grossi cambiamenti sociali e economici, la capacità di conquistare nuovi elettori e di attuare politiche positive andò scemando nel corso del Novecento e portò ad un calo significativo dei voti. Ma per ottenere cambiamenti non è indispensabile accedere alle leve di comando di un’istituzione centralizzata essenziale al funzionamento del capitalismo.

Per analizzare la tenuta dei cambiamenti incrementali, più che il conteggio degli iscritti o dei voti di un candidato socialista, sarebbe meglio valutare i costi che comporterebbe l’annullamento delle riforme. Ancora: molti miglioramenti e/o potenzialità sono attualmente impedite. Se dovessero realizzarsi e diventare parte di tutta l’infrastruttura, annullarle sarebbe difficile: eliminare parti critiche del sistema comporterebbe costi insostenibili.

Questi costi, inoltre, sarebbero amplificati da fattori sociali. Ci sono leggi o novità il cui gradimento sociale fa sì che qualsiasi tentativo di abrogazione diventi particolarmente oneroso in termini di risorse e/o perdita di credibilità. Altre volte è la mobilitazione di una minoranza sufficientemente motivata che, opponendosi apertamente all’abrogazione, impone costi insostenibili.

Per questo in alcuni casi il successo appare come una cooptazione da parte delle strutture di potere. Certo in passato ci sono state cooptazioni che hanno rafforzato il potere o neutralizzato i movimenti sociali. Ma ci sono anche vittorie parziali che sono state mantenute perché parzialmente cooptate (certi successi femministi e la crittografia avanzata ne sono un chiaro esempio).

La capacità di agire nella società è qualcosa che si può apprezzare. Possiamo dire significativamente che certe configurazioni sociali sono più vicine di altre a ciò che intendiamo noi. Occorre un approccio graduale vista la necessità di arrivare ad un vasto consenso. Mobilitare la gente per una causa specifica e concreta, come rovesciare un potere politico, lottare contro la discriminazione o lottare contro un’industria che sfrutta e distrugge è di per sé piuttosto difficile, ma è pur sempre molto più facile che lottare per questioni etiche.

Per questo quasi tutte le rivoluzioni e movimenti sociali dopo il successo si sono bloccate. Si può mobilitare la popolazione contro un particolare oppressore, ma una volta raggiunto lo scopo cade l’accordo sul seguito. Per le forze moderate è stato fatto abbastanza ed è meglio allearsi con i conservatori rimasti, mentre gli estremisti, in disaccordo sul futuro, languono. Si impone un nuovo equilibrio. Nonostante il ridimensionamento, però, ci sono ancora possibilità. Sia gli errori teorici che l’analisi anarchica del potere offrono un modesto ottimismo sul futuro: molte possibilità non sono state colte.

Allo stesso tempo, ci sono sconfitte che sono inevitabili. Le limitazioni algoritmiche che intralciano il potere intralciano anche la nostra capacità di modellare il futuro, così che gli sforzi volti a cambiare o a cercare un nuovo assetto sono di per sé pieni di rischi. Ironicamente, è proprio il concetto di inconoscibilità che, se da un lato è la nostra forza, dall’altro significa che il superamento del capitalismo è un processo complesso che probabilmente richiederà generazioni.

Conclusione

Questo è l’abbozzo di una critica anarchica del capitalismo, serve solo a evidenziare le principali differenze tra i marxisti e noi. Si può e si dovrebbe andare oltre, ma già questo dovrebbe bastare per capire le differenze di fondo. Voglio anche dire che questa non è una discussione accademica su semanticismi e capziosità. L’anarchismo e il marxismo sottolineano punti vulnerabili del capitalismo diversissimi tra loro, il che li porta a orientamenti strategici riguardo la realtà che sono parimenti diversi.

Se le economie di scala sono il fattore decisivo della lotta, un sostanziale cambiamento sociale può avvenire solo con una rivolta proletaria di dimensioni sufficienti. Tutto ciò che non contribuisce a rafforzare le istituzioni di classe e/o il “Partito” è una perdita di tempo. Se il capitalismo è piagato da inefficienze e potenziali punti deboli, è molto meglio cercare i punti in cui far leva perché così si può moltiplicare la forza come un movimento di massa e anche di più.

Ma questo metodo richiede dedizione. Analizzare bene la gamma di possibilità, soppesare i possibili percorsi per poi agire richiede molto sforzo ed è potenzialmente molto rischioso. Ci sono poche probabilità che chi non è motivato accetti l’impegno. Poche persone che agiscono secondo le proprie convinzioni possono sfruttare i punti deboli meglio di un’organizzazione di massa che spreca le proprie energie a mettere assieme persone prive di motivazione.

Soprattutto perché questo approccio non è incompatibile con i movimenti di massa. Che si sviluppano ugualmente, e che noi possiamo sostenere sviluppando e diffondendo strumenti, conoscenze e pratiche dal basso, piuttosto che cercando di instaurare un ascendente e dirigerli dall’alto.

Teoricamente e praticamente, molti anarchici e marxisti non rientrano perfettamente nelle rispettive categorie. Io credo che una maggiore coerenza non guasterebbe. Se vuoi davvero combattere il capitalismo razionalmente, devi essere disposto a rischiare e dedicare a quel fine molto tempo, energie e tutto il resto.

Vittima immediata di questa discrepanza è il concetto coerente di “Sinistra” intesa come opposizione al capitalismo (o altro). Io credo che il concetto di “Sinistra” sia ancora valido, ma si tratta di un fenomeno sociologico o sottoculturale storicamente contingente, non un blocco politico che può “riunirsi” attorno ad un insieme di valori o aspirazioni.

Credo che gli anarchici non dovrebbero identificarsi con la “Sinistra”, ma questo non significa che non ci sia possibilità di collaborazione e dialogo tra queste che sono due tradizioni di “Sinistra”. Credo anzi che una maggiore coscienza delle differenze debba portare ad un dialogo e una collaborazione più proficui, perché non basta appellarsi alla tradizione o ricordare i rischi della disunione per eliminare le differenze di fondo. Anarchici e marxisti sono in disaccordo sul capitalismo e questa è la realtà.

Le nostre traduzioni sono finanziate interamente da donazioni. Se vi piace quello che scriviamo, siete invitati a contribuire. Trovate le istruzioni su come fare nella pagina Sostieni C4SS: https://c4ss.org/sostieni-c4ss.

โดย เควิน คาร์สัน
เควิน คาร์สัน. บทความต้นฉบับ. When You Cross Pinochet With a Cyberpunk Dystopia… 9 พฤศจิกายน 2024. แปลเป็นภาษาไทยโดย Kin

คุณจะได้อะไร คำตอบคือ “เขตเสรีพิเศษขนาดย่อมๆ” (Special Little Freedom Zones)

นี่คือคำที่ลิซ โวล์ฟ จากนิตยสาร Reason ใช้เรียก “เมืองเฉพาะกิจ” (charter cities) หรือที่รู้จักกันอย่างเป็นทางการในชื่อ ZEDEs (เขตเพื่อการพัฒนาเศรษฐกิจและการจ้างงาน – Zones for Economic Development and Employment) ซึ่งถูกศาลฎีกาฮอนดูรัสตัดสินให้เป็นสิ่งผิดกฎหมายเมื่อเดือนกันยายนที่ผ่านมา (“No More Special Little Freedom Zones,” September 25) คำตัดสินดังกล่าวสั่งห้ามไม่ให้จัดตั้ง ZEDEs ขึ้นมาอีก ส่วนผลกระทบต่อ ZEDEs ที่มีอยู่เดิม เช่น Próspera, Ciudad Morazán และ Zede Orquidea ยังไม่ชัดเจนนัก

โวล์ฟอธิบายว่า เมืองเฉพาะกิจเหล่านี้คือ “เขตเศรษฐกิจพิเศษที่ยังอยู่ภายใต้กฎหมายอาญา แต่สามารถออกกฎหมายแพ่งของตนเองได้” และย้ำว่า “พวกเขาสามารถกำหนดกฎหมายและระเบียบของตนเองได้ โดยมักเลือกสร้างสภาพแวดล้อมที่เป็นมิตรต่อธุรกิจมากกว่า และมีภาษีที่ต่ำกว่า”

นิตยสาร Reason โดยเฉพาะไบรอัน โดเฮอร์ตี้ ซึ่งทำงานให้ Reason ยกย่อง “เขตเสรีพิเศษขนาดย่อมๆ” เหล่านี้มาตั้งแต่สมัยที่รัฐบาลฝ่ายขวา[ของฮอนดูรัส]ยึดอำนาจในปี 2009 โดเฮอร์ตี้อ้างอิงบทความของไบรอัน แคปแลน ที่เขียนให้กับมูลนิธิบิลล์และเมลินดา เกตส์ ว่า

“เมืองเฉพาะกิจเริ่มต้นจากที่ดินเปล่าๆ” เขาบอก “มันจะเติบโตได้ก็ต่อเมื่อมีแรงงานและนักลงทุนย้ายเข้ามาโดยสมัครใจ หากไม่มีใครเลือกย้ายเข้ามา พวกเขาก็ไม่ได้เสียอะไรมากไปตอนที่ยังไม่มีเมืองเฉพาะกิจ”

แต่เราควรพิจารณาสิ่งที่เรียกว่า “ที่ดินเปล่า” นั้นให้ดีๆ ลอเรน คาราซิก เขียนไว้ใน Foreign Policy ว่า  ฮอนดูรัสมีลักษณะเด่นเหมือนประเทศโลกที่สามทั้งหลาย นั่นคือการถือครองที่ดินมักเป็นแบบไม่ปกติหรือไม่เป็นทางการ กล่าวคือไม่มีการขึ้นทะเบียนทางกฎหมายหรือไม่ได้รับการรับรองโดยรัฐบาลกลาง

ออร์ติซกล่าวว่า เขาอาศัยอยู่บนที่ดินในชุมชนปลายา บลังกา (Playa Blanca) บนเกาะซาคาเต กรานเด (Zacate Grande) นอกชายฝั่งตะวันตกของฮอนดูรัสมานานหลายสิบปี ปัญหาคือเขาไม่มีเอกสารสิทธิในที่ดิน จึงไม่สามารถเรียกร้องสิทธิใดๆ ได้ สถานการณ์นี้เป็นเรื่องปกติ ตามรายงานของ USAID ในปี 2011 ประมาณร้อยละ 80 ของที่ดินเอกชนในประเทศนี้ไม่มีเอกสารสิทธิ หรือมีเอกสารสิทธิไม่ถูกต้อง

นักเขียนอย่างแอร์นันโด เดอ โซโต โต้แย้งว่า การขาดเอกสารสิทธิที่ถูกต้องตามกฎหมาย ตลอดจนการขาดความแน่นอนและคาดการณ์ได้ หรือขาดความสามารถในการคุ้มครองสิทธิ์ทางกฎหมายและการทำสัญญาซึ่งเป็นปัญหาติดพันกันมา คือสาเหตุสำคัญของความล้าหลังที่เป็นอยู่ เดอ โซโตมองว่าการทำให้ที่ดินที่ไม่มีเอกสารสิทธิกลายเป็นที่ดินที่มีเอกสารสิทธิถูกต้อง เป็นก้าวสำคัญสู่ความเจริญ

แต่ปีศาจซ่อนอยู่ในรายละเอียด การทำให้การถือครองที่ดินแบบจารีตประเพณีหรือแบบไม่เป็นทางการ กลายเป็นการถือครองที่ดินอย่างถูกต้องตามกฎหมายทำได้สองวิธี คือจากล่างขึ้นบน และจากบนลงล่าง ยกตัวอย่างเช่น การ “ปฏิรูปที่ดิน” ในอังกฤษศตวรรษที่ 17 หลังการฟื้นฟูราชวงศ์อังกฤษของพระเจ้าชาร์ลส์ที่ 2 ในกรณีนี้ คริสโตเฟอร์ ฮิลล์ เสนอไว้ว่า รัฐสภาอังกฤษอาจทำให้การถือครองที่ดินถูกกฎหมายโดยเริ่มจากล่างขึ้นบนได้ ด้วยการยกเลิกระบบศักดินาฟิวดัล ค่าธรรมเนียม รวมถึงค่าเช่าต่างๆ แล้วรับรองเกษตรกรผู้ทำกินในที่ดินผืนนั้นให้เป็นเจ้าของที่ดินตามกฎหมาย หรืออาจทำในทางตรงกันข้าม คือจากบนลงล่าง ด้วยการยกเลิกภาระผูกพันทางศักดินาของชนชั้นเจ้าที่ดิน พร้อมทั้งยกเลิกสิทธิตามประเพณีของชาวนาผู้เช่า แล้วเปลี่ยนเจ้าที่ดินเหล่านั้นให้กลายเป็นเจ้าของกรรมสิทธิ์เหนือที่ดินโดยสมบูรณ์ (fee simple owners) ในความหมายแบบทุนนิยมสมัยใหม่ ซึ่งมีผลทำให้เกษตรกรผู้ทำกินกลายเป็นเพียงผู้เช่าที่ไม่มีสิทธิถาวรใดๆ ในที่ดินอีกต่อไป ไม่น่าแปลกใจที่รัฐสภาซึ่งถูกครอบงำโดยชนชั้นเจ้าที่ดินและขุนนางเจ้าของที่ดินเลือกแนวทางหลัง ดังที่คริสโตเฟอร์ ฮิลล์กล่าวไว้ “ระบบศักดินาถูกยกเลิกเฉพาะด้านบน ไม่ใช่ด้านล่าง”

ที่น่าสนใจก็คือ ประธานาธิบดีมานูเอล เซลายา ผู้นำฝ่ายซ้ายซึ่งถูกโค่นอำนาจลงในการรัฐประหารปี 2009 เคยดำเนินโครงการปฏิรูปที่ดินซึ่งมีเป้าหมายเพื่อรับรองสิทธิในที่ดินตามจารีตของชาวนาที่ทำกินบนที่ดินผืนนั้น โดยจะมอบเอกสารสิทธิทางกฎหมายให้พวกเขาอย่างเป็นทางการ แต่นั่นไม่ใช่รูปแบบการจัดระเบียบที่ดินที่ชนชั้นเจ้าที่ดินของฮอนดูรัส ซึ่งคิดเหมือนๆ กับเจ้าที่ดินอังกฤษศตวรรษที่ 17 ต้องการเลยแม้แต่น้อย

ประธานาธิบดีแอร์นานเดซ ซึ่งขึ้นสู่อำนาจจากการรัฐประหารโค่นล้มเซลายา อนุมัติโครงการจัดตั้งเมืองเฉพาะกิจ และเมื่อชาวนา ซึ่งครอบครองที่ดินที่เหล่าพ่อค้านักเสี่ยงโชคของ ZEDE ต้องการ กลับไม่มีเอกสารสิทธิทางกฎหมายอย่างเป็นทางการ ที่ดินเหล่านั้นจึงสามารถถูกนับว่าเป็น “ที่ดินเปล่าๆ” คาราซิกอธิบายต่อว่า

เกาะซาคาเต กรานเด ซึ่งมีชาวนาเพียงไม่กี่ครอบครัวเท่านั้นที่มีเอกสารสิทธิในที่ดิน เป็นตัวอย่างชัดเจนของกระบวนการดังกล่าว แม้ในกฎหมาย ZEDE จะระบุว่า ผู้อยู่อาศัยที่ถูกเวนคืนที่ดินควรได้รับค่าชดเชย แต่ความเป็นจริงคือ ครอบครัวส่วนใหญ่บนเกาะนี้ไม่มีเอกสารทางกฎหมายที่จำเป็นในการเรียกร้องค่าชดเชย และเมื่อขาดทั้งทรัพยากรทางกฎหมายและการเงิน ชาวนาในซาคาเต กรานเด จึงไม่สามารถโต้แย้งการถูกขับไล่โดยอาศัยหลักฐานการอยู่อาศัยระยะยาวของตนได้

ดังนั้น ระหว่างที่นักเสรีนิยมใหม่ผู้สนับสนุนเมืองเฉพาะกิจเหล่านี้ พากันตีโพยตีพายถึง “สถาบันที่อ่อนแอ” และความจำเป็นในการมี “นิติรัฐ” บรรดาผู้ผลักดันโครงการ ZEDEs กลับฉวยโอกาสใช้ประโยชน์จากสถาบันอันอ่อนแอในการปล้นชิงทรัพยากรร่วมดูแล (commons) เพื่อประโยชน์ของตนเองและพวกพ้อง

ซ้ำร้าย แม้ว่าพื้นที่ที่มีประชากรหนาแน่นจะได้รับอนุญาตให้จัดประชามติว่าจะรวมเข้าเป็นส่วนหนึ่งของ ZEDE หรือไม่ แต่พื้นที่ที่มีประชากรเบาบาง เช่น หมู่บ้านชนบทที่อยู่ติดเขต ZEDE จะไม่ได้รับการคุ้มครองทางกฎหมายใดๆ จากการถูกผนวกรวมเข้าไปในเขตเหล่านั้นเลย

อีกแง่มุมหนึ่งของ ZEDEs ที่ดูไม่น่าไว้วางใจเลยก็คือ ในขณะที่โวล์ฟกล่าวว่าเมืองเฉพาะกิจสามารถสร้างกฎหมายแพ่งของ “พวกเขา” เองได้ คำว่า “พวกเขา” ที่ว่านี้ หมายถึงเฉพาะบรรดาบริษัทที่ตั้งอยู่ในเขตเฉพาะกิจ หรือก็คือบรรดา “นักลงทุน” ซึ่งมีสิทธิเลือกว่าตนจะอยู่ภายใต้ระบบกฎหมายแบบใด แม้ว่าคนส่วนใหญ่ที่อาศัยอยู่ภายใน “เมืองเฉพาะกิจ” เหล่านี้จะเป็นแรงงาน แต่ผู้ที่มีอำนาจทางการเมืองเพียงกลุ่มเดียวในการกำหนดกรอบกฎระเบียบและกฎหมายแพ่ง กลับเป็นเจ้าของกิจการ หรือก็คือเจ้าของทุน แต่เพียงฝ่ายเดียว

ดังนั้น เราจึงกำลังพูดกันถึง “ยูโทเปียแบบตลาดเสรี” ที่ได้รับอนุมัติโดยระบอบรัฐประหารฝ่ายขวา ซึ่งสร้างขึ้นบนที่ดินที่ขโมยมาจากชาวนา มี “สิทธิในทรัพย์สิน” ที่สร้างขึ้นจากการปล้นชิง และประชากรส่วนใหญ่ใช้ชีวิตภายใต้ระบบกฎหมายที่นายจ้างของพวกเขาเป็นผู้เดียวที่มีสิทธิส่งเสียง แน่นอนว่าสิ่งนี้อาจฟังดูเหมือนเป็น “เสรีภาพทางเศรษฐกิจ” สำหรับคนที่เชื่อในแนวคิดแบบฮอปเปี้ยน หรือคนที่มองว่าโลกใน Snow Crash คือโลกในฝัน แต่มันฟังดูเหมือนอย่างอื่นสำหรับพวกเราที่เหลือ

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…Disaster “Anarcho”-Capitalism Comes to Argentina

Argentina’s self-described “anarcho-capitalist” President, Javier Milei, has — to put it mildly — generated considerable enthusiasm on the libertarian right in the United States. Shortly after Milei’s election in December 2023, Reason’s Katarina Hall praised an omnibus bill successfully pushed through by “the libertarian president” for policies that would transition Argentina to a “deregulated, free market economy.” More recently, Marcos Falcone at Reason described “Javier Milei’s Buenos Aires” as “the city where libertarian history is happening,” although it “wasn’t obviously destined to become a beacon of liberty.” The treatment of Milei at other venues like Cato and Students for Liberty is consistently adulatory, focusing on his “libertarian” and “free market” accomplishments since entering office.

But even Hall’s laudatory piece mentioned, in passing, that the omnibus bill empowering Milei — the one with all those “libertarian” provisions — included a measure calling for

the declaration of “a public emergency in economic, financial, fiscal, pensions, defense, tariff, energy, health, administrative, and social matters until December 31, 2025.”  If approved, this would mean that Milei would have both the executive and legislative powers and would be able to decide on issues that are currently only regulated by Congress.

The bill also extends the government’s new anti-protest measures, increasing penalties to… up to five years for those who “direct, organize, or coordinate a meeting or demonstration that impedes, hinders or obstructs circulation.”

Let’s see… an executive with emergency powers ruling by decree. And draconian prison sentences for protestors who block streets. Sounds libertarian to me! I’m sure all the libertarians who consider the latter a reasonable response felt the same about the Open Up protesters in May 2020 who created a public disruption over their right to free refills at Cracker Barrel, or traffic shutdowns by the “Freedom Convoy” in 2022.

Leaving aside issues of due process, the substance of “free market” measures in the emergency decree, according to Hall, includes railroading through “privatization” of over twenty state industries —which will be free from the corruption that characterized virtually every previous “privatization” scheme, I’m sure.

Another economic provision in the decree is a restriction on the right to strike in the case of “important services” (in which workers must continue to perform at least half the normal amount of labor) or “critical services” (for which the required level is 75%). The former category includes “hospital suppliers; maritime, air, river, land, and underground transportation companies, continuous industrial activities (including steel and aluminum, chemical, and cement industries); the food industry; construction material providers; banking, hotel, and restaurant services.” The latter includes “public utilities, telecommunications, fuel transportation, and public primary schools.” It’s hard to think of anything that’s not covered.

In addition to unionized workers, another group whose economic liberties don’t count is the owners of worker cooperatives.

…the National Institute of Associativism and Social Economy (INAES) – the agency responsible for registering co-ops – had voted to suspend 11,000 co-ops for lack of documentation and other alleged non-compliance.

At the press conference [presidential spokesperson] Adorni called the worker cooperatives a “political black box” that was being eliminated, and implied large scale illegality in co-op registrations.

So stringent regulation, including “registration” of economic enterprises, is presumably consistent with a “free market” — so long as the enterprises are owned and controlled by workers rather than absentee shareholders.

Yet another freedom denied by this “anarcho-capitalist” is freedom of movement across borders:

Argentina’s right-wing President Javier Milei issued a decree on Wednesday curbing immigration to the South American nation, a move coinciding with the immigration restrictions put in place by the Trump administration….

Wednesday’s executive order tightens restrictions on citizenship, requiring immigrants to spend two uninterrupted years in Argentina or make a significant financial investment in the country to secure an Argentine passport.

Immigrants seeking permanent residency must show proof of income or “sufficient means” and have clean criminal records in their home countries.

The decree makes it much easier for the government to deport migrants who enter the country illegally, falsify their immigration documents or commit minor crimes in Argentina. Previously, authorities could only expel or deny entry to a foreigner with a conviction of more than three years.

The substance of his economic policy aside — such as it is — the “libertarian” Milei is also resorting to drastically authoritarian forms of governance, including crackdowns on critical media that will ring all too familiar to Americans living under the Trump administration. According to Discourse magazine:

[Decree 780/2024] grants the government sweeping oversight over media content under the guise of protecting public order and national security. It empowers authorities to monitor and penalize journalists for reporting that is deemed “subversive,” an ambiguously defined term that leaves ample room for subjective interpretation. Under the decree, headlines critical of the administration can be flagged as destabilizing or harmful, leading to fines, forced retractions or even criminal charges against journalists and media outlets….

From the outset, his government has vilified journalists, labeling them “enemies of the people” and subjecting them to relentless verbal and digital harassment. As Reporters Without Borders — a global organization dedicated to defending press freedom — recently highlighted, Milei and his officials have been involved in at least 52 documented instances of stigmatizing rhetoric in 2024 alone. These incidents range from verbal intimidation and public shaming to outright threats on social media.

These attacks are more than symbolic; they have created a climate of fear that inhibits critical reporting. For instance, journalists have faced physical violence, with 12 documented cases in 2024, some of which were carried out by police under a new security protocol designed to suppress public protests….

The decree, further, has “considerably restricted access to public information by expanding the exceptions under which the government can refrain from disseminating information and by requiring those requesting official information to register and identify themselves….”  

Milei is also ramping up the surveillance state; consider his recent initiative, the Artificial Intelligence Applied to Security Unit. Ostensibly designed to enhance public safety, this program employs AI to predict and prevent crime. In practice, it’s a blueprint for mass surveillance. Social media posts, private conversations and routine online activity now fall under the watchful eye of a state eager to label dissent as “potential threats.”

But it goes further, pursuing the goal — straight out of a cyberpunk dystopia — of predicting “future crimes”: the Unit

will use “machine-learning algorithms to analyse historical crime data to predict future crimes”. It is also expected to deploy facial recognition software to identify “wanted persons”, patrol social media, and analyse real-time security camera footage to detect suspicious activities.

As if that’s not bad enough, Milei’s ultra-authoritarian Security Minister Patricia Bullrich — Argentina’s Kristi Noem — has

visited El Salvador’s controversial Confinement Center for Terrorism (CECOT), probably seeking to replicate the model in her country, it was reported. Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele had told her he was open to giving Argentina any assistance it might need regarding security issues.

Milei also shares strong cultural affinities with right-wing authoritarians and ethnonationalists like Trump, Orban, and Bolsonaro — a fact which, along with his immigration controls, no doubt contributes to his popularity among paleos, Hoppeans, and the assorted racists and authoritarians of the Libertarian Party Mises Caucus. For example, he “suggests he’s an integral part of the ‘right-wing’ family by aligning himself politically with leaders like Trump and Bukele.” Echoing the most rancid circles of the alt-right, he rails against “woke” and “gender ideology,” has conducted mass-firings of transgender public sector workers, and is vocally anti-abortion. At Davos, he charged that “Neo-Marxists” — a term coined by paleocon William Lind, which is popular on the far right — “have managed to co-opt the common sense of the Western world and this they have achieved by appropriating the media, culture, universities, and also International organisations.” I guess we should take some comfort in the fact that he didn’t quite accuse them of “poisoning our blood.”

His affinities go beyond cultural, they are personal. His praise for Trump is quite enthusiastic; he and neo-fascist Italian Prime Minister Meloni were the only two foreign leaders on-stage at Trump’s inauguration. He also famously presented ambulatory dumpster fire Elon Musk with a chainsaw. And, nauseatingly, he compared his relationship with Trump and Musk to “touching heaven.”

Milei and his cronies are also apologists or denialists for the crimes against humanity committed during the Dirty War under the military junta.

Milei and some of his closest officials have sparked controversies by denying the crimes of the last dictatorship—the aftermath of which is still very much present in the society. During the campaign, the president denied that 30,000 people were disappeared during the dictatorship and referred to the crimes against humanity carried out by the military junta as “excesses” in the context of “a war.” Far from a conflict between warring sides, the dictatorship is referred to in Argentina as a period of state terror.

Milei’s vice president, Victoria Villarruel, has openly advocated for the rights of those who committed genocide.

So let’s look back and take stock. In substance, Milei’s “reforms” are only “libertarian” or “free market” in the neoliberal sense of pro-corporate. They reduce state restrictions on the economic power and freedom of large-scale capital owners, and strengthen their hand against labor. Labor — theoretically the owner of a co-equal “factor of production” — is in fact subject to onerous restrictions of its freedom to associate or withhold its service from the market, and to own business enterprises. If a government regulated corporate monopolies as stringently as Milei regulates labor’s right to organize, or imposed requirements for recognition of a corporation under traditional shareholder capitalist ownership as he has for cooperatives, the right-libertarian howls of outrage could be heard from the moon. 

His privatizations, likewise, are typical of previous Disaster Capitalist measures in Pinochet’s Chile, Yeltsin’s Russia, and the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. The typical pattern, according to Nicholas Hildyard, is for a country to invest enormous amounts of money developing a nationalized enterprise, at taxpayer expense, and spend even more to make it saleable, before it auctions it off at pennies on the dollar in a rigged bidding process by politically connected global investors. The first order of business of the newly “privatized” entity, of course, is asset stripping. And the “private” enterprise typically exists within a web of state protections to ensure it runs a profit.

The only “liberties” Milei is interested in expanding are those of billionaire investors, landlords, and white 20-something channers and cryptobros. To quote Cool Hand Luke: “Them pore ole bosses need all the help they can get.”

As for the authoritarian means by which Milei has railroaded these “libertarian” measures through, they’re also par for the course under Disaster Capitalism. Both Pinochet and Yeltsin assumed dictatorial power before implementing their “free market reforms,” and the CPA’s Paul Bremer imposed them on a defeated and occupied enemy. Unfortunately, the “libertarian” right’s love affair with Milei is part of a long tradition in some right-libertarian circles which Jesse Walker notes, of imposing “free markets” and “liberty” through an ideologically friendly dictatorship — in this trope, Milei is a sort of libertarian Prester John. Walker points out the bullshit entailed in the cliché that Pinochet was “politically authoritarian but economically liberal”:

The general wasn’t even consistent in his commitment to economic freedom: He helped bring on a recession by fixing the peso’s exchange rates; his regime’s record is littered with bailouts, corruption, and other forms of crony capitalism; and he regulated labor tightly. (Pinochet initially banned unions altogether, and after they were legalized he still outlawed sympathy strikes, prohibited voluntary closed-shop contracts, and restricted what issues could be covered when unions negotiated with employers. And then there was his tendency to lock up labor leaders.) Hayek didn’t defend those incursions on freedom, but there’s no sign he expressed any concern about them either.

In short, Javier Milei is a brutal authoritarian thug, comparable to other right-wing dictators and would-be dictators like Trump, Bolsonaro, Orban, Putin, Erdogan, Netanyahu, and Modi. Anyone shameless enough to hail him as a “libertarian” should choke on the words.

Por Hein Htet Kyaw. Artículo original: Myanmar: The Accidental Agora publicado el 10 de Julio, 2025. Traducido por Walruunäut.

Por décadas, tanto el sistema económico como el político de Birmania fueron moldeados gravemente por regímenes totalitarios y un ejército poderoso. El sistema de cooperativas controladas por el Estado, que inició con la “Vía birmana al socialismo” en 1963, acabó pasando a la dictadura militar no ideológica en la década de 1990. Bajo el gobierno de la LND se produjo un breve período de desarrollo orientado al mercado (2015-2020). Sin embargo, el golpe de Estado de 2021 reimpuso un modelo económico de cooperativas estatales que recuerda a la época del BSPP, bajo la actual junta militar. Pero, incluso bajo la amenaza de sanciones severas, el mercado negro funcionó históricamente —y continúa haciéndolo— como una persistente forma de resistencia diaria por parte de la población general contra el modelo económico estatal.

Asediada por la guerra civil desde su independencia del colonialismo británico, Birmania experimentó un golpe militar en 1962, dirigido por Ne Win, quien estableció un Estado socialista unipartidista e inició la “Vía birmana al socialismo”. Esta ideología mezcló nacionalismo, cultura budista y marxismo, rechazando a la socialdemocracia y al capitalismo. El régimen del BSPP nacionalizó la educación y la salud, expulsó la ayuda internacional y obligó a las petroleras extranjeras a marcharse. Restricciones de viaje estrictas fueron impuestas a las naciones occidentales, mientras que las relaciones internacionales con otros Estados socialistas fueron reforzadas. Un amplio programa de nacionalización que empezó en 1963 trajo a las grandes industrias, e incluso pequeños negocios, bajo control estatal, afectando desproporcionadamente a las empresas de propiedad extranjera. También se nacionalizaron los periódicos y se prohibieron las publicaciones privadas.

En 1988, protestas generalizadas contra la “Vía birmana al socialismo” del BSPP demandaron una economía de mercado y un sistema democrático. Sin embargo, el ejército intervino: con el SLORC (en inglés, State Law and Order Restoration Council), la junta militar tomó el poder y desmanteló el BSPP, más tarde renombrándose como el SPDC (por sus siglas en inglés, Consejo de Estado para la Paz y el Desarrollo). Incluso abandonando el socialismo, el SLORC/SPDC mantuvo la estructura de Estado autoritaria, efectivamente continuando un régimen militar sin ideología clara hasta 2010. Dado que también fue sancionado por el oeste, el régimen del SPDC había hecho cumplir una prohibición en poseer monedas extranjeras como el USD, ordenando el uso de “certificados de cambio de divisas” con tipos de cambio dictados por los militares. Productos culturales extranjeros, incluyendo música, películas y libros, enfrentaron severas restricciones; por ejemplo, la película Rambo (2008) fue prohibida por su representación negativa del ejército birmano. La música tradicional de protesta (Thangyat) y artistas de hip-hop con consciencia social también fueron censurados, y los conciertos fueron monitoreados de cerca. Consecuentemente, los artistas y escritores recurrieron a distribuir su trabajo a través de canales del mercado negro, con pequeños vendedores callejeros vendiendo canciones y libros censurados ilícitamente. Los DVDs oficialmente licenciados fueron menos accesibles para las personas ordinarias, comparados con aquellos DVDs baratos vendidos a través de vendedores en puestos del mercado negro.

El acceso al internet era un lujo primariamente disfrutado por los ricos. La ordinaria clase trabajadora dependía de visitas a los cibercafés locales, a menudo plagados de conexiones poco fiables, para comunicarse con la familia en el extranjero mediante plataformas como VZO, Gtalk, Skype y MIRC. Las películas populares internacionales fueron descargadas por los pocos con acceso a internet, típicamente los dueños de los cibercafés, y luego copiadas en CDs, DVDs y cintas VHS ilegalmente. Estas copias piratas fueron vendidas por vendedores callejeros que se arriesgaban constantemente a ser arrestados por los funcionarios municipales. El gobierno usó la industria cinematográfica nacional como un vehículo para la propaganda, demandando la inclusión de slogans políticos al inicio de cada película oficial. Durante esos tiempos, los comediantes jugaron un rol crucial en cultivar la consciencia política en el público mediante sus humorosas críticas de las deficiencias del gobierno; estos espectáculos cómicos fueron grabados y difundidos a través del mercado negro, permitiendo un acceso generalizado mediante alquiler o compra. Incluso para los productos de alta gama, como ordenadores y accesorios informáticos, sólo unos pocos distribuidores autorizados ofrecían garantías. Sin embargo, numerosos vendedores locales ilícitamente importaron los mismos bienes a precios significativamente más bajos desde Tailandia y China, sobornando a funcionarios de fronteras. Estos vendedores usualmente mezclaban las existencias legítimas con productos contrabandeados para minimizar los impuestos pagados al régimen militar y maximizar las ganancias. Además, el sistema salarial predominantemente monetario hacía que el impuesto sobre las ganancias fuera prácticamente inexistente para la clase trabajadora. Durante ese periodo, el suministro de electricidad era muy limitado; los suburbios experimentaban apagones rotativos que provocaban un máximo de seis horas de electricidad al día y aproximadamente dieciocho horas sin ella. A pesar de la infraestructura de presas suficiente para la generación de energía, el régimen militar gobernante priorizó exportar electricidad generada localmente a China, quien se mantuvo como su principal socio comercial internacional dada su estrategia aislacionista y postura antiimperialista. La población tenía una imagen profundamente negativa de la dictadura militar, percibiéndola como ilegítima e indigna para gobernar. Consecuentemente, la evasión fiscal generalizada y la participación en actividades del mercado negro y gris se convirtieron en formas predominantes de resistencia y autopreservación económica. Entre 2010 y 2020, el panorama mundial atestiguó notables transformaciones en la economía, el acceso a la electricidad y el avance de las infraestructuras.

Sin embargo, Birmania experimentó un duro revés tras el golpe militar de 2021. Dirigidos por el deseo de reclamar su agencia, la población formó un movimiento de resistencia basado en los principios de la democracia y el federalismo. Además, algunos individuos han dado el importante paso de dimitir de sus cargos en el gobierno o en el sector público en apoyo del Movimiento de Desobediencia Civil. Desde entonces, el ascendente Consejo de Administración del Estado (CAE) ha manifestado su intención de restablecer el sistema de cooperativas estatales. Subsecuentemente al golpe, el régimen del CAE ha enaltecido restrictivas medidas, incluyendo apagones de internet a nivel nacional y acceso restringido a las redes sociales. El apoyo financiero a la revolución es parcialmente facilitado a través de tecnologías descentralizadas, incluyendo blockchain y criptomonedas. Los bienes pertenecientes a las personas que apoyaban los esfuerzos de resistencia del Movimiento de Desobediencia Civil (MDC) fueron confiscados. Asimismo, el arresto de cambistas de divisas extranjeras ha convertido en cuasi ilegal la posesión de divisas, una política que recuerda a la introducción previa del Certificado de Cambio de Divisas por el Consejo de Estado para la Paz y el Desarrollo (SPDC). El escenario, en toda su extensión, desencadenó un sentimiento de déjà vu o una nostalgia inoportuna, que recuerdan a las épocas del Partido del Programa Socialista Birmano (BSPP) y del Consejo Estatal de Paz y Desarrollo (SPDC).

La creciente prevalencia de las actividades del mercado negro y gris, evidenciada por los flujos de bienes clandestinos y el apoyo financiero siendo contrabandeado desde países vecinos como Tailandia, subraya una floreciente resistencia económica de base. Este movimiento, nacido de la necesidad práctica más que de una adaptación consciente de la filosofía agorista de Samuel Edward Konkin III, irónicamente encarna sus principios de forma tangible e impactante.

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Por Kevin Carson. Artigo original: Fake Libertarians, Fake Leftists, and Real Fascists, de 23 de fevereiro de 2025. Traduzido para o português por p1x0.

Saludos amigues, soy p1x0, Tradutor & anarquiste de vila, interessado na superação do Estado das coisas como estão. Considere apoiar meu trabalho Clicando Aqui.

Um dia após Elon Musk fazer a infame saudação nazista “Sieg Heil” no discurso de posse, Thomas Lecaque — um professor de história especializado em violência religiosa — observou precisamente: “Elon Musk fez uma saudação nazista. Não há discussão, não existe margem para interpretações, isso não é uma controvérsia, há pessoas mentindo e pessoas falando a verdade.” Aqueles argumentando que ele não teria feito isso, ele continuou, “estão fazendo isso de má fé”.

Um dos agentes de má-fé mentindo sobre isso, previsivelmente, é Liz Wolf da Reason Magazine.

Elon Musk é muitas coisas, mas nazista não é uma delas… Elon Musk falou e fez um tipo de gesto bombástico, dizendo “Meu coração vai para você” e “É graças a você que o futuro da civilização está seguro,” não que qualquer eleição importe muito mas essa importou.

Obviamente as pessoas estão perdendo a porra da cabeça por conta disso…

“Elon Musk realmente fez um gesto nazista na Posse de Trump?” o New Republic pergunta. Hã, não. Ele não fez. E é quase insano que a mídia pareça estar se preparando para fazer essa coisa toda de novo — onde Trump, e qualquer aliado de Trump, é chamado de nazista de novo e de novo. Musk estava gesticulando loucamente o tempo todo, como ele faz quando está empolgado. E, veja… você está mentindo pra si mesmo se pensa que o padrão de comportamento de Musk é consistente com o de um nazista: etnonacionalismo não é um interesse dele, nem censura governalmental, nem a perseguição de inimigos políticos e jogá-los em campos. Se acalmem, caramba.

Vamos de fato olhar para o histórico. Musk há muito é obcecado com quedas nas taxas de natalidade, e o clichê do “genocídio branco” (isso é, “o genocídio de pessoas brancas na África do Sul”; que pessoas atacando estátuas de Robert E. Lee “absolutamente querem sua extinção”), acusando a administração Biden de facilitar a imigração por eles “os veem como futuros eleitores”, etc. Essa tendência culminou no seu endosso explícito da teoria da Grande Substituição. Jason Wilson, resume esta teoria no The Guardian:

A “grande substituição” é uma narrativa conspiratória racista que falsamente declara que há um esforço ativo, secreto, e em andamento para substituir populações brancas em países onde atualmente há maioria branca. Em muitas versões – como as ensaiadas nos manifestos de atiradores em Cristchurch, Nova Zelandia; El Paso, Texas; Buffalo, Nova York – a suposta substituição está sendo coordenadas pelo povo judeu.

Há um tuíte dele acusando “comunidades judias” de “promover… um dialético ódio contra pessoas brancas” e apoiando “horas de minorias… inundando seus países”, Musk respondeu: “Você falou a verdade”. Por acaso, o tuíte mostra que Musk leu isso pois havia sido retuítado pelo neonazista Nick Fuentes.

Musk também tuitou:

A ADL ataca injustamente a maioria da população do Ocidente, apesar da maioria da população do Ocidente apoiar o povo judeu e Israel.

Isso é porque eles não podem, por seus próprios princípios, criticar as minorias que são a principal ameaça.

No dia seguinte, Musk se envolveu em um tipo de sanduíche de tuítes perversos da extrema direita, que começaram com Jack Posobiec, que tuitou “Pessoas brancas são as únicas que supostamente devem odiar sua própria raça para serem consideradas pessoas boas”. Posobiec então, teve seu tuíte citado por Eva Vlaardingerbroek — que orgulhosamente diz na sua bio do Twitter ser a “escudeira da extrema direita” — adicionando o comentário “Todos podem ter orgulho de sua raça, exceto pessoas brancas, pois nós sofremos uma lavagem cerebral para acreditarmos que nossa história é de alguma forma ‘pior’ do que de outras raças”. Musk completou curtindo o tuíte dela.

Musk há muito também tem compartilhado memes do diagrama de Venn da extrema direita, com temas conspiracionistas e antissemitas. Por exemplo, ele compartilhou a citação — falsamente atribuída a Voltaire, mas que na verdade foi dita pelo neonazista Kelvin Alfred Strom — “Para descobrir quem te governa, simplesmente descubra quem você não tem permissão de criticar” (a resposta esperada, obviamente sendo, “judeus”). Ele defendeu neonazistas, por exemplo suspendendo as contas de qualquer um que tuitasse o nome real — Hans Kristian Graebener — do cartunista responsável por “Stonetoss.”

Recentemente, Musk brevemente usou um avatar em seu perfil do Twitter e o nome “Kekius Maximus” (tanto “Groyper” e “kek” sendo símbolos associados com trolls da alt right), e repetidamente saiu em defesa da AfD na Alemanha (“somente a AfD pode salvar a Alemanha”).

Em resumo, desde que Elon Musk começou a cair pelo buraco de coelho da extrema direita uns anos atrás, sua mente e suas conversas tem sido uma sopa de nada além de argumentos nazistas, de extrema direita, e temas adjacentes como genocídio branco e Grande Substituição, e suas principais atividades no Twitter tem sido fazer amizade com Posobiec, Cernovich, Ian Miles Cheong & companhia, e responder “preocupante!” a seus tuítes. E com relação ao seu “gesto bombástico” — que ele performou duas vezes — não poderia ser uma cópia mais exata da performance do mesmo gesto de Hitler se ele tivesse praticado em frente ao espelho por horas.

Em outras palavras, Liz, ninguém acredita em você — nem você mesma. Você sabe que está mentindo, e você sabe que sabemos disso. Não mije na nossa perna e nos diga que é chuva.

Eu disse mais cedo que os comentários de Wolfe eram previsíveis, pois nada disso é algo novo nem mesmo para ela ou para a Reason. A própria Wolfe, um ano atrás, se referiu à Presidente de Harvard, Claudine Gay, como uma “contratação de vagas afirmativas” — mais uma buzina racista do que um apito de cachorro.

Desde a eleição de Trump para seu primeiro mandato em 2016, Reason tem minimizado o autoritarismo de Trump e tem dedicado mais energia em desconsiderar e fazer comentários condescendentes sobre os medos das pessoas do que reportar o próprio Trump. Como Radley Balko eloquentemente declarou imediatamente após a eleição de 2016:

Você sabe que eu te amo, @reason, mas eu não estou entendendo sua página nesse momento. Muito deboche com a esquerda, repreendendo pessoas que estão assustadas e pintando a eleição de Trump como algo positivo. Mas só consigo ver um artigo alertando sobre os perigos que ele representa; bem agora, libertarianos deveriam estar voltando suas energias em limitar o poder. Outros que temem Trump deveriam ser aliados não alvos de piadas.

Após a eleição de 2020, Reason demitiu a escritora Shikha Sood Dalmia por — nas palavras de Andrew Kirell no Daily Beast — “falar alto e muito frequentemente contra o Presidente Donald Trump.” A próprio Dalmia, relatou em um post no Facebook:

Minhas opiniões, me disseram, não se alinhavam mais com as da organização. Defender meu trabalho frente a financiadores e acionistas me tornou um problema… Eu tenho uma posição anti-Trump que é irreditível, e aponto sem rodeios a suas tendências autoritárias. Que isso tenha deixado tantos libertarianos desconfortáveis, levanta todo tipo de perguntas interessantes sobre o estado do movimento pela liberdade.

Mesmo com um autoritário de extrema direita na Casa Branca, a revista supostamente libertária devotou a maior parte de sua ira a supostas ameaças da “cultura de cancelamento” e “multidões woke”, como fica evidenciado pelo destaque dado às histórias de guerra cultural de Robby Soave. Como Kirell aponta:

O afastamento da colunista acontece ao mesmo tempo em que a revista é pressionada por alguns libertarianos e ex-empregados… pelo que é percebido como um curioso posicionamento da revista na era Trump: de modo algum abertamente pró Tump, mas aparentemente muito mais focada em criticar, desconsiderar, ou ignorar as preocupações da esquerda sobre os impulsos autocráticos do presidente, ao invés de ativamente repudiar os abusos de seu governo — em seu lugar, há críticas a comunidades universitárias e rixas da cultura do cancelamento.

O próprio Balko retonou ao assunto em Dezembro de 2020, no contexto da demissão de Dalmia e da guerra aberta de Trump pela deslegitimação do resultado das eleições.

Logo após a eleição de 2016, eu apontei como era estranho que o perfil da Reason estava dominado por histórias que ridicularizavam a esquerda por ter medo do que estava por vir, ou artigos sobre como Trump na verdade talvez fosse bom para os libertarianos.

Agora, em 2020, nós temos um partido tão irritado com a eleição, que eles estão abertamente incentivando uma crise democrática. Esta é a página da Reason hoje. Há um artigo sobre tudo isso. Existem muitos mais sobre como Joe Biden é uma ameaça. E mais ridicularizando a esquerda.

… E devo dizer que tem pessoas lá que entenderam o suficientemente bem a ameaça dos últimos quatro anos, apesar da direção editorial geral da revista. Mas isso realmente destaca a decepção que tenho com meus colegas libertarianos em geral na era de Trump. Nós supostamente deveríamos ser os alarmistas. E com orgulho! Nós deveríamos ser os que reagem exageradamente quando o governo comete excessos… Me parece bizarro que a filosofia que quer abolir o FBI, CIA, DEA, BATF, e DHS (entre outros) não tenha nada a oferecer exceto desprezo quando outros pregam “cortar a verba da polícia”. A polícia jamais será abolida. Ainda assim, ao invés de aproveitar o impulso, forjar alianças, e converter isso numa reforma útil, muitos libertarianos menosprezam ativistas que defendem “desfinanciar” como algo nada prático, radical, idealista. Nós deveríamos ser radicais, pouco práticos, idealistas!

Grande parte disso é porque muitos libertarianos ainda enxergam a esquerda como uma ameaça maior do que a direita. Estou desconcertado por isso, dado nossos últimos quatro anos, e o que está acontecendo bem agora. Suponho que com exceção das regulamentações e (mais ou menos) das taxas, o trumpismo tem devorado todas as áreas em que libertarianos deveriam ter algum ponto em comum com a direita.

Parte disso provavelmente vem do fato de que libertarianos desprezam a política e as visões sorkineskas de governo… Mas nós precisamos notar que escolher simplesmente ignorar a política vem de uma posição de — ouso dizer — privilégio. Se você é DACA ou tem familiares sem documentos, ou viveu os últimos 20 anos sobre o DPS, você não pode simplesmente “viver uma vida apolítica”. Nós parecemos entender isso quando o dono de um pequeno negócio se preocupa com as políticas regulatórias de Biden. Nós parecemos bem menos capazes de empatia com pessoas protestando contra políticas racistas, ou abusos do ICE, ou a brutalidade do CBP. Essa administração pretende reduzir a zero o número de refugiados recebidos, usar militares contra manifestantes, e tem dito abertamente que qualquer eleição que Trump não vence é uma fraude… Entretanto tenho visto libertarianos — proeminentes —apoiando Trump e me dizendo pelos últimos dois anos que a verdadeira ameaça à liberdade é a Antifa, ou uma liderança do Black Lives Matter que uma vez disse ser marxista.

Como Balko disse em um comentário para o Daily Beast, as posições anteriores da revista “libertariana” contra censura eram “difíceis de se conciliar com demitir uma de suas próprias autoras por ser crítica demais ao homem mais poderoso do planeta”. Kireel adicionou, que também era difícil de conciliar as reclamações da Reason sobre “moralistas woke”que demitiram o editor de opiniões do NYT por ter dado plataforma a chamada de Tom Cotton para se usar tropas federais para reprimir protestos do Black Lives Matter. Enquanto isso, o queridinho da Reason, Robby Soave — aparentemente representado o que os investidores preferem à Shikha Dalmia — debocha das acusações sobre a saudação nazista de Musk e diminui quem se preocupa com tomadas de poder da direita como sendo “BlueAnon”. Pois, você sabe, a verdadeira ameaça para as nossas liberdade são professores de universidade que falam “Latinx” e a Klan sendo banida de campis. Se eu pareço ter dificuldade em suprimir meu descontentamento para com estas pessoas, é por que eu genuinamente as desprezo.

A virada à direta da Reason é em si parte de um fenômeno mais amplo, que piorou desde a ascensão do movimento paleolibertariano e do Hopperanismo nos anos 90, e culminou na tomada do Libertarian Party pela “Bancada Mises” da extrema direita (o Libertarian National Committee é chefiado por Angela McArdle, que — entre muitas outras coisas — parafraseou as 14 palavras e se referiu a negacionistas do Holocausto como “colegas na busca pela verdade”). O círculo de lideranças do Hoppeofascismo que McArdle representa inclui palhaços como Jeremy Kauffman, Joshua Smith (que clamou pelo cancelamento da 13 e da 19 emenda) e o Libertarian Party of New Hampshire afiliado ao Mises (que tuitou que qualquer um celebrando o Dez de Junho deveria ser deportado, e acusou a Rolling Stone de ser parte da “Catedral” por denunciar os delírios nacionalistas brancos e antivacina de Eric Clapton).

E, para que fique bem nítido, o problema não é apenas que libertarianos estão abandonando o dever libertário de denunciar e resistir ao autoritarismo do estado. Também há o sério problema das pessoas que se dizem de esquerda que dedicam mais energia em combater liberais e Democratas do que combatendo verdadeiros fascistas, e em alguns casos buscam pontos em comum com fascistas enquanto declaram a centro-esquerda como o principal inimigo. Há toda uma subcultura da Dirtbag Left, composta por pessoas como Glenn Greenwald, Jimmy Dore, e Matt Taibbi, que enxergam “liberais de merda” como seus principais inimigos e repetem argumentos como “o Russiagate foi um grande pastel de vento” ou que “Os revoltados do 6 de Janeiro era um bando de turistas barulhentos”, para irritar esses mesmo liberais. Zeeshan Aleem contrasta, no link anterior, a rapidez de “’Dore’ de descartar o grupo como vendidos enquanto mantém uma atitude bastante pacienciosa com a direita” exemplifica toda essa subcultura. Apesar dos comentários da boca para fora sobre “ambos os lados” sendo igualmente ruins, a resposta deles sobre qualquer um que critique os Democratas mais que o Trump em uma proporção de no mínimo 10-1 é os acusá-los de serem “TDS”. Essa “esquerda” — se você quiser chamá-los assim — são tankies, e punheteiros do Grayzone, cujos limites entre nazbols e duguinistas declarados é, na melhor das hipóteses, nebulosa.

Eles parecem estar fazendo um speedrun do Terceiro Período de Stalin em direção ao Pacto Ribbentrop-Molotov.

Em tempos de ressurgência de nacionalistas brancos da extrema direita e bilionários cleptocratas, e suas tentativas de impor seu autoritarismo, o primeiro dever dos libertarianos e esquerdistas — se eles sequer são dignos destes nomes — é resistir. Ao invés disso, muitos estão comemorando com autoritários e fazendo o que podem para atrapalhar a resistência.

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For decades, Myanmar’s economy and political system have been heavily shaped by totalitarian regimes and a powerful military. The state-controlled cooperative system initiated under the “Burmese Way to Socialism” in 1962 eventually transitioned to the non-ideological military dictatorship in the 1990s. A short-lived period of market-oriented development occurred under the NLD government (2015-2020). However, the 2021 coup reimposed a state-cooperative economic model reminiscent of the BSPP era under the current military junta. But, even under the threat of stringent penalties, the black market has historically functioned, and continues to function, as a persistent form of everyday resistance by the general populace against the state-controlled economic system.

Beset by civil war since its independence from British colonialism, Myanmar experienced a military coup in 1962 led by Ne Win, who established a one-party socialist state and initiated the “Burmese Way to Socialism.” This ideology blended nationalism, Buddhist culture, and Marxism, and rejected social democracy and capitalism. The BSPP regime nationalized education and healthcare, expelled international aid, and forced foreign oil companies to leave. Strict travel restrictions to Western nations were imposed, while ties with socialist states were strengthened. A sweeping nationalization program beginning in 1963 brought major industries and even small businesses under state control, disproportionately affecting foreign-owned enterprises. Newspapers were also nationalized and private publications banned. 

In 1988, widespread protests against the BSPP’s “Burmese Way to Socialism” demanded a market economy and democracy. However, the military intervened, with the SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council) military junta seizing power and dismantling the BSPP, later rebranding as the SPDC (State Peace and Development Council). While abandoning socialism, the SLORC/SPDC maintained the authoritarian state structure, effectively continuing military rule without clear ideology until 2010. Given that it was also sanctioned by the west, the SPDC regime enforced a ban on possessing foreign currencies like USD, mandating the use of “foreign exchange certificates” with exchange rates dictated by the military. Foreign cultural products, including music, movies, and books, faced severe restrictions; for instance, the film Rambo (2008) was prohibited due to its negative portrayal of the Myanmar military. Traditional protest music (Thangyat) and socially conscious hip-hop artists were also censored, and concerts were closely monitored. Consequently, artists and writers resorted to distributing their work through black market channels, with small street vendors selling songs and censored books illicitly. The officially licensed DVDs were less accessible to the ordinary people compared to those cheap DVDs being sold through black market stall vendors. 

Access to the internet was a luxury primarily enjoyed by the wealthy. Ordinary working-class individuals relied on visits to local internet cafes, often plagued by unreliable connections, to communicate with family abroad using platforms like VZO, Gtalk, Skype, and MIRC. Popular international films were downloaded by the few with internet access, typically internet cafe owners, and then illegally copied onto CDs, DVDs, and VHS tapes. These pirated copies were sold by street vendors who constantly risked arrest by city council officials. The government utilized the domestic film industry as a vehicle for propaganda, mandating the inclusion of political slogans at the start of every official film. During those times, the comedians played a crucial role in raising public political awareness by humorously critiquing the government’s shortcomings; these comedic performances were recorded and disseminated through the black market, allowing widespread access via rental or purchase. Even for high-end goods like computers and IT accessories, only a few authorized dealers offered warranties. However, numerous local vendors illicitly imported the same goods at significantly lower prices from Thailand and China by bribing border officials. These vendors often mixed legitimate stock with smuggled items to minimize taxes paid to the military regime and maximize profits. Furthermore, the predominantly cash-based salary system meant that income tax was virtually non-existent for the working class. During that period, electricity supply was severely limited, with suburbs experiencing rotational power outages resulting in a maximum of six hours of electricity per day and approximately eighteen hours without. Despite sufficient dam infrastructure for power generation, the ruling military regime prioritized exporting locally generated electricity to China, which remained their primary international trading partner given their isolationist strategy and anti-imperialist stance. The population held a deeply negative view of the military dictatorship, perceiving it as illegitimate and unworthy of governance. Consequently, widespread tax avoidance and engagement in black and grey market activities became prevalent forms of resistance and economic self-preservation. Between 2010 and 2020, the global landscape witnessed notable transformations in economics, electricity access, and infrastructure advancement. 

However, Myanmar experienced a stark reversal following the 2021 military coup. Driven by a desire to reclaim their agency, the populace has mounted a resistance movement based on the principles of democracy and federalism. Furthermore, some individuals have taken the significant step of resigning from government or public sector jobs in support of the Civil Disobedience Movement. The ascendant State Administration Council (SAC) has since articulated its intent to reinstate the state cooperative system. Subsequent to the coup, the SAC regime enacted restrictive measures, including nationwide internet blackouts and curtailed social media access. Financial support for the revolution is partly facilitated through decentralized technologies, including blockchain and cryptocurrency. Assets belonging to individuals supporting resistance efforts or the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) were confiscated. Moreover, the arrest of foreign currency exchangers has effectively rendered the possession of foreign currency quasi-illegal, a policy reminiscent of the State Peace and Development Council’s (SPDC) prior introduction of the Foreign Exchange Certificate (FEC). The whole scenario has triggered a sense of unwelcome déjà vu or nostalgia, reminiscent of the Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) and State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) eras. 

The increasing prevalence of black and grey market activities, evidenced by the clandestine flow of goods and financial support being smuggled from neighbouring countries like Thailand, underscores a burgeoning grassroots economic resistance. This movement, born out of practical necessity rather than a conscious adoption of Samuel Edward Konkin III agorist philosophy, ironically embodies its principles in a tangible and impactful manner.

Page one of the American history book is stained with blood. The first lines tell the story of genocide against the continent’s original peoples—a campaign of dispossession and dehumanization. Colonists didn’t just steal land; they stole names, cultures, and futures. This erasure set the tone for centuries to come.

The brutality continued with chattel slavery, the forced labor and subjugation that built the nation’s wealth. Turn a few more pages and you’ll find Japanese American internment camps, the redlining of Black communities, crushed labor movements, and the relentless expansion of arguably the most complex security state the world has ever seen. The story of the U.S. empire is not one of a nation suddenly threatened by authoritarianism. The American dream has always relied on violence, exclusion, and control.

American fascism didn’t descend a golden escalator. Just crack open the history book—if you’ve got the stomach for it. This nation was founded on blood, dispossession, and state-sanctioned terror. American exceptionalism was born of genocide, carried out by the so-called founding fathers and their successors in wave after wave of deliberate extermination. The Mystic Massacre, Sand Creek Massacre, and Sullivan Expedition weren’t isolated incidents—they were state policy. George Washington, lionized as a hero, ordered the destruction of Iroquois villages, burning crops and homes and leaving entire communities to starve and freeze.

The U.S. didn’t just use bullets and bayonets. The state deployed every tool: forced removals, reservations as open-air prisons, weaponized disease and starvation, and the systematic destruction of cultures through boarding schools and forced assimilation. The message was clear—conform or die. If that’s not fascism, what is?

They say genocide was America’s original sin, and chattel slavery was its business model. For centuries, the American economy ran on the backs of enslaved people, bought, sold, and brutalized as property. These atrocities didn’t happen in spite of the state—they were engineered by it. Laws defined people as property, stripping them of humanity and unleashing a regime of terror to keep them in line.

Every institution played a part. Congress wrote fugitive slave laws turning white Americans into bounty hunters. Slave patrols—the forerunners of modern policing—stalked the countryside, authorized to brutalize or kill. If enslaved people rebelled, they faced public execution and mass reprisals. The abolition of slavery didn’t end the terror. Jim Crow laws, lynch mobs, and chain gangs ensured white supremacy remained the law of the land—North, South, East, and West.

The state’s appetite for oppression didn’t stop with Indigenous people or African-Americans. Anyone who threatened the established order—radicals, immigrants, workers—became targets. The machinery of surveillance and suppression was running long before the NSA or Patriot Act. During the Red Scare, the state waged war on leftists and labor organizers. Decades later, COINTELPRO was initiated as the FBI’s secret war on Black liberation, antiwar groups, and socialists. The message was always the same: step out of line, and the full weight of the security apparatus will crush you.

None of this is ancient history. Legalized violence, mass incarceration, surveillance, and criminalized dissent are the backbone of the American state. The capacity for repression has only grown more sophisticated and totalizing. Enter Donald J. Trump. Liberals and the “Blue MAGA” crowd claim Trump is a rogue president who warped the system. In reality, Trump is the system’s most authentic creation. Strip away the spray tan and gold-plated bravado, and you have a man wielding the same tools the state has always held: repression, scapegoating, and the rabid pursuit of executive authority. Trump’s authoritarian populism isn’t a break from American tradition—it’s an acceleration of it, following a playbook written long before he took office.

From the moment Trump launched his campaign, he tapped into America’s deep well of grievance, encouraging violence, demonizing immigrants, and promising to use state power against enemies—real or imagined. His first 100 days were a master class in cruelty and chaos: mass deportations, family separations, crackdowns on protest, and open contempt for the rule of law. But these tools were forged by decades of bipartisan support: the imperial presidency, militarized borders, the surveillance state, and normalized executive overreach. Trump simply dropped the polite pretense.

If you listen to the “resistance,” you’d think America is locked in an epic battle for its soul. But look past the talk show monologues, hashtags, and strongly worded letters, and you’ll find a liberal establishment that’s less a bulwark against fascism and more a tool for normalizing it. The DNC and its media allies have mastered symbolic outrage—pink hats, sound bites, fundraising emails promising to “fight back.” For decades, the opposition has perfected the politics of the lesser evil, asking voters to choose between open cruelty and a more polished brand of polite violence.

With every election, the Overton window is dragged further right. The “acceptable” political spectrum narrows until the radical left is little more than a myth. Healthcare for all, a living wage, police abolition—ideas that once animated campaigns are now dismissed as utopian fantasies or, worse, Russian plots. The liberal idea of resistance is a return to “normalcy,” which for millions means the same old misery, wrapped in a blue ribbon. Meanwhile, the far right grows bolder, the left grows emptier, and the state’s capacity for unchecked brutality remains unrivaled. The liberal establishment’s greatest trick is convincing the public that voting for the “lesser evil” is the height of engagement. But the empire rolls on, unmoved by hashtags or hope.

If we’ve learned anything from the past decade, it’s that real resistance doesn’t come from “voting blue no matter who.” The idea that the state will reform itself out of existence is pure fantasy. The system can’t be fixed from within—it made the rules. If you think a kinder, gentler ruling class is interested in reversing centuries of oppression, it’s time to wake up.

Anarchists have always known the problem isn’t who holds the office, but that the office exists at all—and the sprawling apparatus of domination that surrounds it. Real resistance means rejecting the state and the rigid rules it imposes while ignoring them itself. It’s mutual aid networks feeding and sheltering those abandoned by all parties. It’s direct action disrupting pipelines, evicting ICE, and blocking deportations. Most of all, it means refusing the narrow limits of “lesser evil” choices. The system will not save us from itself—only we can do that.

So next time you see a Blue MAGA agent warning that Trump is turning America into Nazi Germany, remember: America was perfecting ethnic cleansing long before the Nazis. Removing Trump won’t fix the problem if the state remains.

โดย เคซีย์ วอเทอร์แมน
เคซีย์ วอเทอร์แมน. บทความต้นฉบับ. Pseudo-Libertarian Tech Bros. 13 พฤษภาคม 2025. แปลเป็นภาษาไทยโดย Kin

ทุกวันนี้เวลาพูดคำว่า “อิสรเสรีนิยม” (libertarian) คนมักจะนึกถึงอีลอน มัสก์, ปีเตอร์ ทีล และเทคโบรทั้งหลายที่พยายามอ้างตัวว่าเป็นอิสรเสรีนิยม อิสรเสรีนิยมมีชื่อเสียมากกว่าชื่อเสียงจากการที่คนเหล่านี้สนับสนุนโดนัลด์ ทรัมป์ และโดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งจากการที่อีลอน มัสก์ ทำเสมือนว่าตัวเองเป็นประธานาธิบดีโดยพฤตินัย ที่น่าเศร้าก็คือ ไม่มีใครเลยสักคนในนี้ที่เป็นอิสรเสรีนิยมจริงๆ

ชาวอิสรเสรีนิยมเชื่อในเสรีภาพในการพูด เสรีภาพในการรวมตัวกัน สิทธิ์ในทรัพย์สิน ความเท่าเทียมกันต่อหน้ากฎหมาย การไม่ใช้ความรุนแรง (เว้นแต่เพื่อปกป้องตัวเอง) เสรีภาพในการประกอบกิจการและเสรีภาพในการค้าขาย คุณอาจจะเห็นด้วยกับหลักการพวกนี้อยู่แล้วต่อให้ไม่ได้เรียกตัวเองว่าอิสรเสรีนิยม ตรงกันข้าม เทคโบรทั้งหลายไม่ได้เชื่อในหลักการเหล่านี้ พวกเขาเป็นเผด็จการหัวรุนแรงที่แค่ทำทีเหมือนว่ารักเสรีภาพ

เริ่มจากคนที่น่ารังเกียจที่สุดในกลุ่มนี้ อีลอน มัสก์ เห็นกันอยู่ตำตามานานก่อนที่เขาจะทำท่าวันทยหัตถ์แบบนาซี ว่ามัสก์แค่คอสเพลย์เป็นอิสรเสรีนิยม มักส์อ้างว่าตัวเองเป็น “ผู้ที่เชื่อในเสรีภาพในการพูดอย่างถึงที่สุด” แต่จุดยืนของเขากลับจำกัดอยู่เพียง[เสรีภาพในการพูดของ]กลุ่มเหยียดผิว พวกต่อต้านชาวยิว และพวกหัวรุนแรงฝ่ายขวา เขายินดีที่จะเซ็นเซอร์โพสต์ในทวิตเตอร์ตามคำร้องขอของรัฐบาลเผด็จการในตุรกี อินเดีย และประเทศอื่นๆ เขาระงับบัญชีนักข่าวที่รายงานข่าวที่เขาไม่ชอบ และลบ Community Notes ที่แฉว่าเขาพูดโกหก ในจีน บริษัทของมัสก์ฟ้องนักข่าวและลูกค้าในข้อหา “หมิ่นประมาท” เมื่อพวกเขาวิจารณ์คุณภาพของรถยนต์ที่ไม่ได้มาตรฐาน และเมื่อผู้ใช้ Reddit คนหนึ่งโพสต์เปิดเผยตัวลูกน้องสาย DOGE ของเขา มัสก์ถึงกับขอให้ซีอีโอของ Reddit ลบกระทู้นั้นด้วยตนเอง

มัสก์ยังไม่เชื่อในเสรีภาพในการรวมตัวกัน เมื่อผู้ลงโฆษณาพากันหนีออกจาก Twitter เพราะไม่ต้องการให้โฆษณาของตนไปอยู่ข้างโพสต์แนวนาซี มัสก์กลับฟ้องพวกเขาเพื่อบังคับให้กลับมาใช้แพลตฟอร์มของตัวเอง เขายังขู่จะฟ้องลูกค้าที่ซื้อ Cybertruck แล้วพยายามนำไปขายต่อ ซึ่งถือเป็นการละเมิดสิทธิ์ในทรัพย์สินอันเป็นหลักการสำคัญของอิสรเสรีนิยมอย่างโจ่งแจ้ง

อันที่จริง ทรัพย์สินมหาศาลของมัสก์สร้างขึ้นจากสัญญาและเงินอุดหนุนจากรัฐบาล เขายังเดินหน้าจัดหาสิ่งเหล่านี้ให้กับตัวเองมากขึ้นกว่าเดิมนับตั้งแต่รัฐบาลที่ชอบสร้างศัตรูของเขาขึ้นมามีอำนาจ ในตลาดเสรี มัสก์น่าจะล้มละลายไปแล้วเพราะมีคนไม่กี่คนที่อยากซื้อของที่เขาขาย

มัสก์ยังไม่เชื่อเรื่องความเท่าเทียม ทันทีที่เข้ารับตำแหน่ง เขาก็เดินหน้าลบข้อมูลเกี่ยวกับความสำเร็จของผู้หญิงและคนผิวสีออกจากเว็บไซต์ของรัฐบาล โดยเรียกสิ่งเหล่านั้นว่าโฆษณาชวนเชื่อของ “DEI” [ความหลากหลาย ความเสมอภาค และการมีส่วนร่วม] ซึ่งเป็นเพียงวิธีชี้เป้าล่อพวกหัวรุนแรงฝ่ายขวา อิสรเสรีนิยมทุกแขนง ไม่ว่าจะฝ่ายซ้าย ฝ่ายขวา สายกลาง หรือไม่เติมคำพ่วงท้าย ต่างเห็นพ้องต้องกันว่าการเหยียดเชื้อชาติขัดกับหลักการของอิสรเสรีนิยม

ปีเตอร์ ทีล หนึ่งในสมาชิกของเพย์พาลมาเฟีย (Paypal mafia) เป็นอิสรเสรีนิยมจอมปลอมอีกคนหนึ่ง ทีลลงทุนในบริษัทที่พึ่งพาสัญญาจากรัฐบาลเป็นหลัก หรือบางกรณีแทบจะพึ่งพาแต่รัฐเพียงอย่างเดียวด้วย ตัวอย่างที่อื้อฉาวที่สุดได้แก่ Palantir บริษัทที่ช่วยหน่วยงานบังคับใช้กฎหมายและหน่วยข่าวกรองสอดส่องประชาชนเป็นวงกว้าง, Anduril บริษัทผลิตอาวุธอัตโนมัติ และ SpaceX ของมัสก์เอง อเล็กซ์ คาร์ป ซีอีโอของ Palantir ถึงกับเฉลิมฉลองการเนรเทศหมู่ของรัฐบาลทรัมป์ เพราะทำให้เขาได้สัญญาจากรัฐบาลมากยิ่งขึ้น คาร์ปประกาศว่า “Palantir มาที่นี่เพื่อสร้างความเปลี่ยนแปลง และเพื่อข่มขวัญศัตรูของเราเมื่อจำเป็น และเพื่อฆ่าพวกนั้นในบางโอกาส”

ในปี 2013 ทีลออกเงินทุนจำนวน 10 ล้านดอลลาร์ให้กับคดีความของนักมวยปล้ำ ฮัลก์ โฮแกน ที่ฟ้องร้อง Gawker จนเป็นเหตุให้สื่อเจ้านั้นล้มละลาย ว่ากันว่าสาเหตุที่แท้จริงคือการที่ Gawker เคยเปิดเผยว่าทีลเป็นเกย์ในปี 2007 แต่สิ่งที่เขาโกรธยิ่งกว่าคือการที่เว็บไซต์นี้รายงานข่าวในแง่ลบเกี่ยวกับบริษัทและกิจกรรมทางการเมืองของตน (ทีลสนับสนุนกลุ่มต่อต้านผู้อพยพและกลุ่มปฏิเสธภาวะโลกร้อน) ล่าสุดในปี 2023 เขาเขียนคำนิยมให้กับหนังสือ The Origins of Woke ของริชาร์ด ฮานาเนีย โดยกล่าวว่า “DEI จะไม่มีวัน ‘d-i-e’ [ตาย] ด้วยคำพูดเพียงอย่างเดียว ฮานาเนียแสดงให้เห็นว่าเราจำเป็นต้องใช้การกระทำความรุนแรงของรัฐในการขับไล่ปีศาจแห่งความหลากหลาย” ทีลยังเป็นเหตุผลหลักให้เจดี แวนซ์ ชายที่น่ารังเกียจเป็นอย่างยิ่ง ก้าวขึ้นมาเป็นรองประธานาธิบดีแห่งสหรัฐอเมริกา

คนต่อไปคือนักร่วมลงทุนชื่อฉาวโฉ่อย่างมาร์ค แอนดรีสเซน ในบทความเรื่อง Techno-Optimist Manifesto แอนดรีสเซนยกย่องคุณงามความดีของตลาดเสรีและวิธีที่มันสร้างความมั่งคั่ง แต่เมื่อถึงเวลานำหลักการเหล่านั้นไปใช้จริง แอนดรีสเซนกลับกลายเป็นคนหน้าไหว้หลังหลอก แม้เขาจะอ้างว่าสนับสนุนการเพิ่มจำนวนที่อยู่อาศัย แต่ถึงเวลาจริงกลับต่อต้านการก่อสร้างอพาร์ตเมนต์แบบหลายครอบครัวในเมืองมหาเศรษฐีของตัวเองอย่างเอเธอร์ตันในแคลิฟอร์เนีย เขายังอ้างว่าสนับสนุนเสรีภาพในการพูด แต่กลับแสดงความเห็นว่า ผู้ลงโฆษณาที่แบนเว็บไซต์แนวนาซีของอีลอนควรถูกดำเนินคดีในข้อหา “สมคบกันจำกัดการค้า”

เช่นเดียวกับทีล แอนดรีสเซนลงทุนใน SpaceX, Anduril และบริษัทอื่นๆ ที่พึ่งพิงสัญญาจากรัฐบาล บริษัทของเขาลงทุนมหาศาลในคริปโตเคอร์เรนซี จึงไม่น่าแปลกใจที่เขาจะสนับสนุนโดนัลด์ ทรัมป์ ผู้ประกาศแผนคลังคริปโต “เชิงยุทธศาสตร์” โดยที่ “ยุทธศาสตร์” ในที่นี้ก็คือให้รัฐบาลซื้อและถือครอง Bitcoin และสินทรัพย์ดิจิทัลอื่นๆ เพื่อดันราคาขึ้นเท่านั้น

“อิสรเสรีนิยม” จอมปลอมคนสุดท้ายของเราในวันนี้คือ บาลาจี ศรีนิวาสัน อดีตหุ้นส่วนในบริษัทร่วมลงทุนของแอนดรีสเซน บาลาจีพูดจาภาษาอิสรเสรีนิยมเฉพาะเวลาตัวเองได้ประโยชน์ แต่เมื่อขุดลงลึกไปก็จะพบว่าเขาคือฟาสซิสต์ดีๆ นี่เอง กิล ดูราน จาก The New Republic เขียนบทความอธิบายรายละเอียดเกี่ยวกับแผนของบาลาจีที่จะกำจัด “ชาวสีน้ำเงิน” หรือคนที่ไม่ใช่ฝ่ายขวาจัดออกจากซานฟรานซิสโก เขาต้องการสร้างเผ่าพันธุ์ของ “กลุ่มสีเทา” (ซึ่งหมายถึงบรรดาเทคโบร) ที่จะครอบงำการเมืองในเมือง โดยร่วมมือกับพรรครีพับลิกันและติดสินบนตำรวจ ในเมืองฟาสซิสต์ของเขานั้น “ชาวสีน้ำเงิน” จะไม่มีที่ยืน นอกจากนี้ เขายังส่งอีเมลถึงเคอร์ติส ยาร์วิน ฝ่ายขวาจัดปฏิกิริยา แนะนำให้แฉตัวตนที่แท้จริงของนักข่าวที่รายงานข่าวที่ทั้งคู่ไม่พอใจ

บาลาจียังลงทุนใน Próspera เมืองกฎหมายพิเศษในฮอนดูรัส ซึ่งถูกโฆษณาว่าเป็น “เมืองอิสรเสรีนิยม” แต่แท้จริงกลับไม่มีอะไรที่อิสรเสรีนิยมเลย เอียน แมคดูกอลล์ และอิซาเบล ซิมป์สัน เขียนไว้ว่าผู้พัฒนาโครงการให้สัญญาเท็จกับชาวบ้าน แทรกแซงการเลือกตั้งในชุมชน และตั้งจุดตรวจเพื่อให้เจ้าหน้าที่รักษาความปลอดภัยส่วนตัวของพวกเขาคอยตรวจเอกสารของคนที่ผ่านไปมา ทั้งหมดนี้คือฟาสซิสต์ล้วนๆ และไม่มีทางที่อิสรเสรีนิยมที่มีหลักการจริงๆ คนใดจะสนับสนุนเรื่องไร้สาระพรรค์นี้

หากคุณอ่านงานของนักเขียนอิสรเสรีนิยมคลาสสิก เช่น เฟรเดอริก บาสเตีย, ฟรีดริช ฮาเย็ก, โรเดอริก ลอง และคนอื่นๆ คุณจะเห็นความตั้งใจจริงต่อหลักการที่กล่าวถึงในตอนต้น พวกเขายังเชื่อร่วมกันว่าสังคมเสรี (free society) จะช่วยเหลือคนยากไร้และคนที่อ่อนแอที่สุดของเราได้ กลับกัน พวกเทคโบรพยายามตั้งหน้าตั้งตานำคำว่า “อิสรเสรีนิยม” มาใช้เพื่อผลประโยชน์ส่วนตัว แต่ในใจลึกๆ พวกเขากลับขี้ขลาดเกินกว่าจะยอมรับว่าจริงๆ ตัวเองเป็นเพียงฟาสซิสต์

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Oleh: Anna Morgenstern. Teks aslinya berjudul “Paths to Liberation.” Diterjemahkan ke dalam Bahasa Indonesia oleh Ameyuri Ringo.

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Bagaimana jika mereka membangun pabrik dan tidak ada yang mau bekerja?

Di dalam gerakan anarkis, banyak orang tampak lebih terpaku pada tujuan akhir ketimbang memikirkan cara mencapainya. Hal ini bisa dimengerti. Kaum pendukung negara terus menuntut kita menjelaskan seperti apa rupa masyarakat tanpa negara. Sementara itu, mereka sendiri jarang mempertanyakan cara mencapai dunia yang mereka bayangkan. Kalau mereka sungguh peduli pada proses, mestinya mereka akan malu dengan program-program yang mereka dukung.

Tantangan-tantangan seperti ini sering kali memecah belah gerakan, melahirkan perdebatan yang menurut saya tidak perlu. Karena pada akhirnya, apa yang menentukan karakter seseorang bukanlah niatnya, tapi tindakannya. Meski ada banyak varian anarkisme dengan pemikiran dan pendekatannya masing-masing, saya kira kita bisa mengelompokkan strategi mereka dalam lima jalur besar. Mari kita telusuri satu per satu, melihat apa saja pendekatan yang mereka gunakan dan sejauh mana dampaknya.

Pertama adalah anarkis insureksionis, mereka yang melakukan aksi langsung dan konfrontasi sebagai jalan utama. Walau ragamnya banyak, sebagian besar dari mereka memposisikan diri sebagai anti-kapitalis revolusioner. Bentuk anarkisme ini sudah ada sejak lama, bahkan sejajar usianya dengan anarko-sindikalisme yang lahir dari gerakan buruh. Sayangnya, mereka kerap jadi sasaran kritik dari kalangan kiri lainnya, yang menurut saya lebih banyak disebabkan oleh domestikasi politik, banyak aktivis yang tadinya radikal kini sudah dijinakkan dan dikooptasi oleh kekuasaan.

Meskipun saya sendiri lebih condong pada pendekatan lain, saya tidak bisa mengabaikan pentingnya peran mereka. Ketika melihat foto-foto kerumunan rakyat di Yunani menyerbu polisi anti huru-hara, saya tidak bisa menahan semangat yang membuncah dalam dada. Para anarkis insureksionis memilih untuk menghadang sistem kapitalis tepat di titik-titik vitalnya, menyerang tempat-tempat di mana kekuasaan terpusat, dan merebut kembali ruang-ruang yang telah ditinggalkan atau bisa dengan mudah diambil alih untuk kepentingan bersama. Mereka bukan membangun hal baru dari awal, tetapi mengikis kekuasaan dengan menolak untuk menyuplai apapun bagi para kapitalis.

Kebutuhan dasar mereka, seperti makanan, tempat tinggal, dan pakaian biasanya diperoleh dari barang buangan, ruang kosong, dan properti yang tidak dimanfaatkan. Namun seiring revolusi berkembang, mereka akan berada dalam posisi untuk melakukan re-ekspopriasi atas nilai tukar nyata. Ini akan dianggap sebagai “pencurian” oleh para libertarian vulgar. Tapi menurut argumen para anarkis insureksioner, kaum kapitalis sudah terlebih dahulu mencuri kapasitas kita untuk memproduksi barang-barang tersebut. Ini tidak jauh berbeda dari merampok brankas tempat kantor pajak menyimpan hasil pajak yang dirampas secara paksa.

KJika dilihat dari sudut pandang materialisme dialektis, gerakan anarkis insureksioner bisa dilihat sebagai revolusi dari sub-proletariat yang terjadi di tengah revolusi proletariat yang belum tuntas. Karena itulah banyak Marxis pendukung negara melihat para anarkis insureksioner sebagai kekuatan kontra-revolusioner atau dengan kata lain, mereka terlalu radikal untuk saat ini. Tapi sejauh yang saya tahu, gerakan anarkis insureksioner, sejauh berhasil, justru memberikan banyak keuntungan bagi kelas pekerja. Pertama, mereka mengurangi “cadangan tentara penganggur”, sehingga mendorong kenaikan upah, karena pekerja memiliki alternatif yang layak untuk tidak tunduk. Kedua, mereka menarik barang dari peredaran, sehingga meningkatkan permintaan efektif. Hal ini memang bersifat inflasioner, tetapi juga memberikan dorongan kenaikan upah dari bawah. Di samping itu, mereka memberi kelegaan psikologis bagi lapisan bawah kelas pekerja dengan menawarkan alternatif nyata atas kondisi mereka, alternatif yang tidak tunduk, tetapi justru menantang dan penuh harga diri, bukan terasing melainkan penuh gairah.

Secara teoritik, tekanan gabungan ini terhadap para kapitalis akan menciptakan guncangan dan memperbesar kontradiksi-kontradiksi dalam sistem. Di beberapa tempat, kapitalisme akan runtuh atau dipaksa mundur. Di ruang-ruang kosong yang ditinggalkan ini, para anarkis insureksioner akan membangun cara hidup baru (entah bagaimana caranya), lalu melanjutkan ke tempat berikutnya.

Sejauh ini, gerakan anarkis insureksioner yang paling berhasil dalam waktu dekat adalah EZLN, Pasukan Zapatista dari Chiapas. Di banyak wilayah Oaxaca juga terdapat kantong-kantong keberhasilan yang signifikan, meskipun disertai perlawanan balik yang tidak sedikit.

Berikutnya adalah para anarkis filosofis. Mereka hadir dalam bentuk anarko-kapitalis maupun anarko-sosialis. Gagasan utama mereka adalah menghindari aktivisme politik secara langsung, dan lebih berfokus pada menyebarkan pemahaman luas tentang kebenaran dasar posisi mereka. Dalam teori, ini akan melemahkan kekuasaan dan legitimasi negara di seluruh lapisan masyarakat. Semakin sedikit orang yang terlibat dalam fungsi-fungsi negara, hingga pada akhirnya birokrat terakhir mematikan lampu kantor terakhir. Meskipun mereka jarang secara terbuka menganjurkan jalur-jalur lain, metode mereka sebenarnya membutuhkan keberadaan pendekatan lain juga, kalau tidak, pendekatan ini bisa memakan waktu ratusan tahun. Mereka cenderung paling pesimis soal kemungkinan anarkisme dalam jangka pendek. Banyak anarkis menggabungkan pendekatan filosofis ini dengan strategi lain, meskipun para anarkis insureksioner sering memandang pendekatan ini sebagai membuang-buang waktu.

Ada juga para “anarkis parlementer”. Kelompok ini pun ada dalam versi anarko-kapitalis dan anarko-sosialis. Mereka berusaha “bekerja dari dalam” untuk melemahkan negara lewat keterlibatan langsung dalam mekanisme politik: mencalonkan kandidat, memilih, mengagitasi hukum-hukum tertentu, dan sebagainya. Secara teori, dengan memberi tekanan pada negara, mereka berharap dapat memaksanya bertindak berlawanan dengan kehendak kelas penguasa, hingga akhirnya negara menjadi cukup lemah untuk dihapuskan.

Anarko-kapitalis yang menempuh jalan ini seringkali tak bisa dibedakan dari libertarian minarkis, kecuali dalam visi jangka panjang dan radikalisme tuntutan mereka. Anarko-sosialis dalam jalur ini pun mirip dengan sosial-demokrat Fabian. Kelemahan pendekatan ini adalah hasilnya: negara yang sangat kuat. Ketika kelompok kiri dan kanan radikal bersaing dalam parlemen, kebijakan ekonomi akan terkunci dalam bentuk kapitalisme ekonomi campuran, yaitu kondisi dimana kebebasan sipil meningkat dan militerisme menurun. Mirip seperti negara-negara Eropa Barat. Negara seperti ini akan runtuh juga pada akhirnya, tapi bisa sangat lama prosesnya.

Lalu ada anarko-sindikalis dan agoris. Meski berasal dari tradisi yang berbeda, kedua strategi ini sangat mirip dan dapat berdampingan, bahkan dengan anarkisme insureksioner. Keduanya bukan strategi revolusi politik, melainkan revolusi ekonomi, dan menggunakan kekerasan hanya sebagai pertahanan terakhir.

Anarko-sindikalisme, salah satu bentuk anarkisme tertua, berasal dari gerakan buruh abad ke-19. Tujuannya adalah menggunakan aksi langsung di tempat kerja untuk melumpuhkan kelas pemilik, sekaligus membangun bentuk produksi alternatif (sindikat) yang dimiliki oleh pekerja dan tidak berbasis laba. Karena pekerja menerima hasil kerja penuh mereka sendiri, tidak ada “laba” dalam arti konvensional. tidak ada pendapatan ekstra untuk pihak ketiga. Anarko-sindikalisme tidak melawan “kapitalisme” sebagai struktur besar, tetapi menghadapi kapitalis di dalam tempat kerja. IWW, meskipun tidak menyebut dirinya “anarkis”, adalah contoh model pendekatan ini. Mereka tidak mencoba merebut negara, tetapi menekannya dari luar sebagai kekuatan buruh.

Secara teoritik, para pengusaha akan terdorong mundur dan perlahan-lahan tergantikan, hingga kolektif buruh dapat mengendalikan alat produksi dan kemudian negara kehilangan fungsi dan kekuasaannya.

Buku Labor Struggle: A Free Market Model karya Kevin Carson banyak membahas pendekatan ini secara historis dan spekulatif.

Keunggulan strategi ini adalah sifatnya yang produktif dan langsung. Aksi langsung menghasilkan dampak nyata bagi kelas pekerja, yang memberdayakan mereka untuk bertindak lebih jauh. Kekurangannya: strategi ini sering menjadi sasaran kekerasan dari negara. Namun, dengan produksi yang semakin terdesentralisasi dan murah, metode ini makin relevan kembali dan juga makin menyerupai agorisme.

Agorisme adalah produksi kontra-ekonomi yang didasarkan pada filosofi anarkisme. Produksi ini dilakukan di luar pengawasan atau persetujuan negara, yaitu di pasar gelap atau abu-abu. Dalam satu sisi, agorisme bisa dilihat sebagai bentuk anarko-sindikalisme dalam bentuk lebih lepas. Perbedaannya adalah, agorisme bisa dilakukan oleh individu, pemilik usaha kecil, atau siapa pun. Tujuannya: beroperasi di luar jangkauan dan kontrol negara. Seperti kata James Joyce, strategi ini menuntut “penyembunyian, pengasingan, dan kelicikan”. Ini adalah aksi langsung yang produktif, tapi dilakukan di luar tempat kerja resmi.

Situs agorism.info punya banyak informasi soal strategi ini sebagai pendekatan ekonomi anarkis yang revolusioner.

Seiring berkembangnya strategi-strategi ini, kita bisa berharap pada munculnya titik temu antara anarko-sindikalisme dan agorisme. Serikat buruh informal dan asosiasi pekerja akan membangun unit produksi mereka sendiri yang tidak bergantung pada kapitalis dan beroperasi tanpa harus meminta izin kepada negara, atau biasa disebut sebagai firma agoris. Firma agoris dan sindikat bisa saling bertukar barang, jasa, dan bahan baku. Keduanya akan menarik sebagian besar tenaga kerja dari pasar kerja negara-kapitalis dan kemudian mendorong kenaikan upah. Keduanya juga memberi tekanan deflasi dengan menjual produk lebih murah dari perusahaan resmi yang harus menanggung pajak dan regulasi negara. Ini menekan perusahaan kapitalis-negara dari dua sisi: mereka harus membayar mahal untuk menumpas unit produksi liar ini, sambil menghadapi gelombang insureksi yang terus membesar. Sangat mungkin bahwa sebagian firma agoris dan sindikat akan menyumbangkan barang dan jasa untuk gerakan insureksioner— yang ditukar dengan tenaga kerja atau hasil produksi. Dalam skenario ini, gerakan insureksioner akan menjadi “pedang” gerakan anarkis, sementara agorisme dan anarko-sindikalisme menjadi “mata bajaknya”.

Kelima pendekatan ini bisa berdampingan dan saling mendukung, jika mereka bisa menyingkirkan perbedaan filosofi demi kepentingan strategis bersama. Mungkin ini terdengar seperti syarat besar sekarang, tetapi ketika negara, dalam kepanikannya, semakin menunjukkan wajah otoriternya, menyibak tangan besinya dari balik sarung tangan beludru, manfaat pragmatis dari kerja sama ini bisa jadi cukup kuat untuk menyatukan semua gerakan “aksi langsung” ini, setidaknya di wilayah pinggiran.

Seluruh hasil publikasi didanai sepenuhnya oleh donasi. Jika kalian menyukai karya-karya kami, kalian dapat berkontribusi dengan berdonasi. Temukan petunjuk tentang cara melakukannya di halaman Dukung C4SS: https://c4ss.org/dukung-c4ss.

Por Frank Miroslav. Artigo original: We don’t Agree on Capitalism, de 1 de maio de 2025. Traduzido para o português por p1x0.

Saludos amigues, soy p1x0, Tradutor & anarquiste de vila, interessado na superação do Estado das coisas como estão. Considere apoiar meu trabalho Clicando Aqui.

Um Século Ruim para o Pensamento

Uma coisa curiosa sobre a história do anarquismo e do marxismo é que, apesar do longo histórico de rivalidade e conflito entre nossas respectivas tradições, há uma aceitação implícita de Marx por parte de anarquistas. Quando os anarquistas são pressionados a explicarem o que exatamente é o capitalismo, o que muitos descrevem é inteiramente compatível com formas mais libertárias de marxismo.

Alguns anarquistas ficam felizes em admitir essa convergência, que correntes libertárias do marxismo como o comunismo conselhista ou o autonomismo são próximos ao, senão factualmente, anarquistas. Outros usam o argumento de má-fé e declaram falaciosamente que marxismo necessariamente implica em uma economia comandada pelo estado ou que marxistas jamais poderiam levar em consideração as novas classes como gerentes ou profissionais enquanto permanecem de fato marxistas na economia.

Mas nem toda crítica anarquista ao marxismo é assim tão rasa. Alguns propuseram críticas razoavelmente sofisticadas que cortam o marxismo de forma mais profunda. Entretanto, mesmo estas críticas podem ser inconsistentes em sua relação com o marxismo. Por exemplo, o falecido David Graeber dizia que “a competição no mercado não é, de fato,tão essencial à natureza do capitalismo quanto Marx e Engels pensavam” embora também admitisse que “não há necessariamente contradições entre anarquismo e comunismo”. Essa tendência, de ao mesmo tempo ser crítico de partes centrais do marxismo, e ainda assim aceitá-lo, é endêmica ao anarquismo.

Anarquistas podem discordar seriamente do marxismo, mas a falta de uma teoria alternativa significa que eles vão recorrer ao marxismo quando chamados a responder o que é o capitalismo. Marxismo é a hipótese nula do anticapitalismo e por isso, a menos que seja explicitamente rejeitada, as pessoas tendem a usá-la. Entretanto, não acredito que essa inconsistência seja consequência do anarquismo ser inconsistente ou uma forma de marxismo. Na verdade, a (atual) dominância do marxismo entre anarquistas é uma consequência de desdobramentos históricos.

Enquanto Marx estava vivo e nas décadas após sua morte, o marxismo era apenas uma corrente do socialismo entre inúmeras. Para um exemplo da influência de Marx, o historiador Eric Hobsbawm em How to Change the World cita o Contemporary Socialism, de John Rae, publicado um ano após a morte de Marx, que dedicou apenas um de seus nove capítulos a Marx. Além disso, era razoável duvidar que ele viria a ser o centro do anticapitalismo daí em diante. Seu potencial revolucionário estava enfraquecendo no começo do século 20 após partidos social-democratas de massa ao longo da Europa se moverem numa direção reformista. A massa da esquerda revolucionária nos anos 1900 e começo da década de 1910 estava ligada ao sindicalismo revolucionário, que emergiu explicitamente em resposta ao supracitado conservadorismo da social-democracia dominada pelo marxianismo. E por mais que alguns sindicalistas tenham se inspirado em Marx, o movimento era incrivelmente diverso em suas bases teóricas. Foi necessário a Guerra Civil Russa para tornar o marxismo o centro do anticapitalismo revolucionário.

A razão mais direta para o apelo marxista era que os Bolcheviques aparentemente haviam emplacado uma revolução. Por mais que as pessoas resistissem à propaganda que supervalorizava o papel da disciplina Bolchevique e da teoria marxista, sucesso militar tem um carisma inegável para aspirantes a revolucionários. Mas a União Soviética também tinha um peso filosófico. Era um estado que justificava sua existência apelando para uma filosofia sistemática moderna que explicitamente declarava que uma revolução global seria iminente e desejável. Isso era algo genuinamente novo no tabuleiro global e significava que o marxismo deveria ser levado a sério mesmo por forças mais conservadoras. Como consequência a URSS ativamente promoveu a filosofia marxista. Ela compilava, traduzia e produzia literatura marxista em massa para justificar suas políticas, para fazer proselitismo aos não convertidos e para estabelecer a doutrina dos partidos comunistas e estados que eram alinhados a Moscou. Uma consequência direta disso era o fato de que a literatura marxista era mais acessível do que outras tradições socialistas. Isso ajuda a explicar o motivo pelo qual O Manifesto Comunista é um dos livros mais citados nas ciências sociais. Entretanto, não foi um simples caso de imposição de ideias de cima para baixo. De fato, quando se trata de influenciar o anarquismo, correntes marxistas que vão das bases para o topo foram muito mais importantes no longo prazo.

Antes da Primeira Guerra Mundial, a maioria dos intelectuais marxistas estavam diretamente conectados a um partido socialista. Eles lecionavam em escolas do partido ou faziam jornalismo e pesquisa para o partido. O resultado foi que seus trabalhos eram focados em preocupações pragmáticas de desenvolvimentos econômicos ou estratégia. Entretanto, após a guerra, intelectuais marxistas passaram a expandir o escopo de suas investigações, participando de críticas sociais, análises culturais, e especulação filosófica.

Uma motivação para esta virada era a linha do partido que a União Soviética exigia. Para que partidos comunistas fossem reconhecidos e ganhassem apoio da União Soviética era necessário aceitar uma linha política e econômica específica. Intelectuais marxistas que eram parte de partidos comunistas que queriam ser criativos não podiam sê-lo nestes campos.

Isto veio junto com o crescimento do número de pessoas da classe média com interesses intelectuais se interessando pelo marxismo seguindo sua legitimação e uma ampla radicalização que surgiu com a Primeira Guerra Mundial. Era possível ser um escritor marxista, artista, ou acadêmico e ter uma carreira profissional desconectada do partido. Não estando envolvidos em movimentos sociais, essas figuras se focaram em questões culturais e filosóficas ao invés de questões práticas ligadas aos movimentos culturais. Essa tendência foi ampliada pelo crescimento da academia conforme os financiamentos aumentaram durante a Guerra Fria. Muitos marxistas radicalizados nos movimentos estudantis foram para academia para responder a paradigmas dominantes e influenciar toda a sociedade, enquanto também tomavam vantagem do financiamento estatal.

Alguns desdobramentos positivos vieram daí, com vários marxistas tendo impacto em várias disciplinas de forma significativa como no campo da história. Infelizmente, a academia apresentou vários incentivos negativos que foram irresistíveis para muitas pessoas de esquerda. O resultado foi que a criação de feudos acadêmicos, respeitando os limites das disciplinas, um sem-fim de metacomentários, e a adoção de identidades profissionais que desencorajaram um ativismo relevante.

Enquanto o marxismo estava em ascensão, o anarquismo estava em declínio. O fracasso da Guerra Civil Espanhola, acelerado em parte pelas ações da União Soviética em tentar controlar os Republicanos. Isso foi seguido de uma ampla perseguição estatal por todo o mundo. Assim nossos números diminuíram drasticamente. Comunidades anarquistas vibrantes foram destruídas por ataques e levantes sociais, enquanto nossa literatura podia ser encontrada somente em livrarias radicais isoladas ou sebos.

Nos anos 50, muitos a consideravam uma ideologia superada. Enquanto comunidades anarquistas na Itália, Grécia e Inglaterra sobreviveram à repressão e ao desalojo trazido pela guerra, elas eram consideradas meras curiosidades no real conflito entre o socialismo de estado e o capitalismo. Em uma época de (supostos) estados e corporações centralizados hierárquicos e racionais que agraciavam o mundo, era fácil para marxistas os descartarem como irrelevante dada a suposição de que o anarquismo seria sinônimo de ludismo e econômicas arcaicas.

Como Eric Hobsbawm disse sem rodeios em seu ensaio Reflections on Anarchism, o anarquismo não era apenas um movimento revolucionário que havia falhado, ele era (supostamente) “praticamente destinado a falhar”. Mas mesmo aqueles com simpatias pelo anarquismo tinham dúvidas sobre seu futuro. O historiador George Woodcok, que escreveu uma das mais academicamente influentes histórias do anarquismo no começo dos anos 60, concluiu sua história do anarquismo declarando-a como uma ideologia superada. Ainda assim o movimento anarquista provou ser mais resiliente que estas análises. Ele se recuperou lentamente nos anos 60 e 70, com uma minoria de ativistas nos EUA e na Europa se identificando como tais.

A forma de marxismo que era dominante entre ativistas na época era consideravelmente diferente da que havia sido popular nos anos 30. Partidos comunistas oficiais estavam deslegitimados após várias atrocidades cometidas pela União Soviética se tornarem inegáveis. Mas muitos na New Left insistiram no marxismo. O problema com estes estados era apenas que eles haviam aplicado incorretamente a teoria. E tantas pessoas de esquerda adotaram uma forma fundamentalista de marxismo, se voltando para Lenin, Trotsky, Mao, ou algum outro revolucionário em busca de respostas claras sobre como mudar a sociedade onde se encontravam. Estas organizações eram altamente sectárias, tinham problemas em aumentar seus números e mudar o mundo acabou sendo significativamente mais complicado do que as narrativas simples que prometiam vitórias.

Tudo isso os tornou frágeis frente a mudanças sociais mais abrangentes. Muitos que se voltaram para o marxismo fizeram em um contexto de levantes sociais que muitos acreditavam significar que a mudança revolucionária era iminente. A virada conservadora global dos anos 80 destruiu essa hipótese e viu muitos desistirem do projeto. A confiança foi ainda mais abalada pelo colapso e reforma dos estados socialistas no fim dos anos 80 e começo dos anos 90 como muitos marxistas na New Left justificaram suas aspirações apontando para o “sucesso” da Rússia, China, ou algum outro estado socialista.

Dada a dominância do marxismo, era fácil para anarquistas que surgiram neste período diferenciarem a si mesmos dos piores aspectos da ideologia com a qual eles tinham experiências pessoais. Mas apesar desta rejeição, influências mais sutis permaneceram no campo das ideias. Para dar um rápido exemplo sobre como este legado moldou ideias, eu quero focar brevemente em dois grandes anarquistas da América do Norte que foram marxistas na juventude, foram parte da New Left e definiram nitidamente centros de gravidade para o anarquismo nos anos 90: John Zerzan, and Murray Bookchin.

Após romper com o marxismo nos anos 50, Bookchin inicialmente era hostil a ele. Sua bem conhecida polêmica Listen Marxist foi uma denúncia contra o marxismo numa tentativa de resistir a tomada marxista do Students for a Democratic Society em 1969 onde ele chamou por uma “transcendência” do marxismo e declarou que Marx e Engels seriam “centralistas”. Entretanto, mais tarde em sua vida ele desenvolveu uma apreciação com mais nuances sobre o marxismo e suas críticas de racionalidade instrumental e a modernidade.

Após romper com o anarquismo para elaborar o “comunalismo”, ele era explícito sobre incorporar o que ele considerava “o melhor do anarquismo e do marxismo”. Sua visão de uma federação de comunidades de democracia direta racionalmente operando em harmonia com a natureza nitidamente está alinhada com várias aspirações do marxismo libertário.

Zerzan já é mais complicado. À primeira vista o primitivismo parece o polo oposto do marxismo, abertamente rejeitando a possibilidade de se utilizar os frutos do capitalismo para transcendermos para uma civilização mais tecnologicamente racional, para em seu lugar, advogar por um retorno para uma forma arcaica de liberdade. Ainda assim, ao formular sua crítica à civilização ele e outros se basearam nas leituras exageradas de determinismos tecnológicos de Marx, assim como críticas à racionalidade feitas por marxistas (de novo, a Escola de Frankfurt!), para argumentar que as necessidades sociais de tecnologias complexas sempre iriam escravizar a humanidade e expropriar o meio-ambiente (veja a influência marxista na publicação primitivista Fifth Estate, por exemplo).

Meu problema com estas articulações do anarquismo não é a influência do anarquismo, é que elas não dão conta de lidar com questões de agência, que penso eu, deveriam estar no centro da teoria anarquista. E por mais que eu dificilmente seja o primeiro a fazer esta conexão, pareço ser o primeiro a tentar escrever uma teoria do capitalismo que centre explicitamente estas questões.

A falha de uma alternativa teórica alternativa novamente tem a ver com circunstâncias e como discurso funciona nos espaços anarquistas. Apesar de nosso tamanho diminuto, o anarquismo tem visto desenvolvimentos conceituais desde os anos 30 que foram majoritariamente ignorados não apenas por marxistas mas pela filosofia política como um todo. Frustrantemente, a maioria destes materiais apenas não se tornou acessível.

Muito da inspiração anarquista existe presencialmente de forma subjetiva e tática entre as pessoas. Para entender isso é preciso que a pessoa se envolva com uma cena ou espaço para adquirir experiência o suficiente para costurar informações espalhadas entre várias pessoas, zines,posts de blogs, fios em redes sociais, textos de não-anarquistas, etc. Isso faz com que o, se tornar anarquista, seja algo desnecessariamente desafiador e chega a agir como uma barreira para o entendimento de anarquistas que vem de cenas e contextos diferentes!

Parte disso é resultado de um desejo de acumular capital intelectual ou preservar características únicas de subculturas, o equivalente anarquista aos marxistas que escrevem em teoriês; Mas também é uma consequência do alcance das críticas primitivistas da alienação tecnológica que infelizmente desencorajou muitos anarquistas a engajarem ou utilizarem a internet nos anos 90 e 2000. Muita coisa simplesmente nunca foi publicada online.

Essas atitudes passaram ao declínio na década de 2010 graças ao aumento da presença da internet, mudanças geracionais, e movimentos mais amplos que usaram as redes sociais como uma vantagem, como o Occupy. Infelizmente,a agitação e ampla radicalização das pessoas da esquerda desde 2016 significa que muitos têm estado ocupados apagando incêndios e recebendo pessoas para o trabalho.

Graças a tanta ênfase no imediato, comunicação cara-a-cara não é o mais essencial ao anarquismo. Emma Goldman(para nomear somente uma figura) escreveu aproximadamente duzentas mil cartas ao longo de sua vida. Certamente, as formas dominantes de comunicação na internet são péssimas em facilitar debates produtivos, mas elas não precisam ser assim para sempre.

Tudo isso para dizer que a (atual) confusão anarquista sobre nossa relação com o marxismo não é evidência de que o projeto anarquista é fundamentalmente falho, incoerente, ou secretamente marxista. Na verdade, é a consequência da gravidade filosófica e social que o marxismo exerceu sobre o anticapitalismo no século 20 e o contínuo processo de anarquistas se ajustarem aos fluxos forjados pela tecnologia da informação. Isso é algo do qual podemos nos recuperar e eu gostaria de acelerar o processo.

Portanto…

Uma há Muito Necessária Análise Anarquista do Capitalismo

Algo que eu gostaria que as pessoas entendessem sobre anarquistas é que nós não só acreditamos que a dominação tem efeitos ruins para a pessoa sendo dominada, mas que ela frequentemente tem efeitos subótimos para a pessoa que tem poder sobre a outra. Existem motivos bastante profundos que justificam essa hipótese.

Se você tem tanto poder sobre alguém que é capaz de controlá-lo, você deve dar as coordenadas para o que ele quiser realizar. Uma boa maneira de entender como isso imediatamente apresenta um problema é através da lente dos algoritmos. Um algoritmo é apenas um processo passo-a-passo para chegar a um fim específico dado determinados aportes. Então se você quer controlar alguma coisa, você quer ser capaz de reduzir os processos decisórios para um algoritmo que você definiu.

Isso imediatamente nos traz problemas. Se os aportes possíveis para um algoritmo podem ser descobertos a frente do tempo, é possível provar que o algoritmo trabalha avaliando todas as possibilidades. Mas se o campo de possibilidades supera vastamente o que avaliamos nós jamais poderemos saber com certeza se ele vai funcionar.

Agora, nem mesmo o mais ardente defensor das hierarquias diz que elas precisam ser perfeitas. Mas mesmo que rebaixemos nossas aspirações significativamente, nós ainda vamos encontrar o problema de mapear os aportes para corrigir as decisões a serem consideradas.

A razão pela qual traçamos a causa e o efeito. Objetos simples têm reações previsíveis a aportes e por isso podem ser modelados pelo futuro longínquo. Mas isso é porque esses objetos têm estruturas rígidas, estruturas imutáveis. Sistemas que são mais capazes de responder ao ambiente e se autotregular, que tem características que nós associamos com “agência” – memória, objetivos, a habilidade de refletir sobre as coisas, etc – são muito mais difíceis de se prever. Isso é porque você precisa modelar tanto os processos internos de tomadas de decisão, quanto os vários aportes de todo o ambiente que os influencia.

Mas não são apenas os caóticos sistemas complexos que apresentam problemas para essa abordagem. Mesmo objetos aparentemente simples contém imensas possibilidades precisamente por eles potencialmente poderem ser usados de formas novas pelos agentes. Por exemplo, um único tijolo pode ser usado de várias formas óbvias (a construção de algum tipo de estrutura), mas também incontáveis formas não óbvias (plantar flores em seus buracos, arremessá-lo numa janela durante uma manifestação, usá-lo como objeto de cena em uma performance, etc).

Além disso, as partes constituintes de um “objeto” podem potencialmente ser reconfiguradas de incontáveis formas, a argila que compõe o tijolo contém silicone e alumínio que podem ser extraídos e usados para outra coisa.

Fora dos contextos mais empobrecidos, diante de qualquer agente há um conjunto infinito de possibilidades que não podem ser totalmente avaliadas em um algoritmo previamente definido que possa perfeitamente guiar o agente. Felizmente este é um problema que pessoas e organismos no geral têm lidado há muito tempo. Mas isso é feito através das bases, via um engajamento constante com o mundo onde nossos modelos realmente estão sujeitos a um feedback constante, não através da imposição de uma série de diretivas vindas do topo.

Os resultados não são perfeitos. Mas tomadas de decisões perfeitas não são o ponto, o ponto é apenas fazer um trabalho bom o suficiente até que os objetivos do agente sejam alcançáveis. Entretanto, uma forma tão proativa de participação no mundo está em oposição com a manutenção das hierarquias do controle. Um sistema seguindo um algoritmo é previsível e portanto frágil diante fenômenos inesperados ou contabilizados. Assim, há valor na autonomia. Mas qualquer agente com algum nível de autonomia é capaz não só de atualizar seus modelos, mas também seus objetivos, que por sua vez podem o levará à se rebelar contra aqueles o controlando.

Isso é precisamente o que torna hierarquias estruturais estritas irracionais. Imposições organizacionais vão ignorar ou proibir soluções que são “óbvias” para aqueles que estão engajados diretamente com os problemas pois é difícil avaliá-los todos e as possibilidades não contabilizadas são potenciais caminhos para a resistência. Isso é expandido pelo problema da comunicação. Se você está conversando com uma pessoa, você pode mandar um número limitado de informação para ela. Isso se dá pois a largura de banda dos canais para informação dentro e fora do cérebro humano é uma fração do conteúdo informacional no cérebro humano.

Isso se torna uma limitação ainda maior conforme o número de pessoas envolvidas aumenta. Qualquer um tentando organizar outros precisa limitar ou comprimir o fluxo de informação que chega até si para não acabar sobrecarregado por ela. Essa compressão é frequentemente de baixa fidelidade e perde importantes nuances ao longo do caminho. Esta é uma consequência inerente da complexidade interna do cérebro contra a capacidade de carga dos canais de comunicação como a linguagem. Por mais que seja possível corrigir erros, isso exige que a pessoa que está confusa articule sua confusão e os tenha esclarecido, o que exige um fluxo de diálogo constante. Este problema aumenta conforme a organização aumenta em escala já que há um tempo limitado para a correção.

Então mesmo em situações onde o processo de tomada de decisão posto para um subordinado é insuficiente mas um superior poderia, em teoria, dar instruções corretas pode ser o caso de que o tempo necessário para que o superior entenda o suficientemente do problema para dar a solução correta signifique que o momento onde essa informação já tenha passado.

De fatos estes limites das hierarquias significa que subordinados frequentemente desenvolvem espaços informais de liberdade para si mesmos em sistemas formais de controle, pois seus superiores simplesmente não estão cientes do que está acontecendo. Além disso, essas liberdades são frequentemente essenciais para o sistema como um todo precisamente pois elas são como o sistema lida com o comportamento inesperado ou não contabilizado. E assim aqueles no topo das hierarquias encaram um ato de equilíbrio dando apenas liberdade o suficiente para seus subordinados para que o sistema seja capaz de se adaptarl, mas não o suficiente a ponto que eles possam efetivamente derrubar a hierarquia. Este é o problema perene que toda sociedade hierárquica na história teve que lidar, que permanece uma desprezada fonte de resistência até hoje (vide o panfleto da IWW, How to Fire Your Boss que detalha resumidamente várias formas que os trabalhadores podem usar essas irracionalidades sistêmicas em conflito com os capitalistas.)

Deste ponto, você consegue um argumento direto para um igualitarismo relacional. Uma vez que controlar um subordinado é tão exaustivo em muitas circunstâncias que acaba sendo menos taxativo dar a eles um grau de autonomia. Mas uma vez que você faça isso você introduz um grau de confiança entre as duas partes o que significa que mesmo que eles se diferenciem em capacidades (riqueza, poder, inteligência, status, etc.) a parte superior ainda tem motivos para tratar a outra com respeito pois autonomia dá ao inferior a capacidade de impor custos sutis que se acumulam ao longo do tempo.

Essa afirmação sobre a eficiência das relações igualitárias está em oposição às afirmações de Marx sobre a eficiência das relações hierárquicas que sustentam sua explicação sobre como o capitalismo se mantém. Central à concepção de Marx sobre como capitalistas extraem a mais valia, como as distinções de classe se mantém, e como capitalistas vieram a dominar o mundo é uma premissa que o que capitalistas individuais fazem com seu capital é racional no que se trata de explorar a força de trabalho. No capitalismo o sucesso no mercado é alcançado com processos produtivos mais eficientes e vencendo competidores e configurações menos eficientes são eliminadas.

Uma forma eficiente em que isso acontece é através da racionalização de processos de tal forma que a habilidade acaba corporificada na própria máquina. Conforme ele escreve em n’O Capital.

“Pelo meio de sua conversão em um autômato, o instrumento do trabalho confronta o trabalhador, durante o processo do trabalho, sob a forma do capital, do trabalho morto, que domina e seca, o poder do trabalho vivo. A separação dos poderes intelectuais de produção do trabalho manual, e a conversão destes poderes no poder do capital, é como já demonstramos, finalmente completo pela indústria moderna erigida na fundação do maquinário. A habilidade especial de cada operador individual insignificante desaparece como uma quantia infinitesimal diante da ciência, as gigantescas forças físicas e as massas do trabalho que são corporificadas nos mecanismos da fábrica e, junto deste mecanismo, compõem o poder do ‘mestre’”.

Essa racionalização permite que mais trabalhadores sob o comando de um único capitalista o que aumenta a eficiência geral:

“As leis desta centralização de capitais, ou da atração do capital pelo capital, não podem ser desenvolvidas aqui. Uma breve observação sobre uns poucos fatos já devem dar conta de responder. A batalha da competição é travada pelo barateamento de commodities. O barateamento das commodities exige, caeteris[sic] paribus, na produtividade do trabalho, e novamente na na escala da produção. Portanto, os capitalistas maiores vencem os menores. Therefore, the larger capitals beat the smaller.” [grifo nosso]

Essa eficiência é o que permite ao capitalismo dominar o mundo. Pelo Manifesto Comunista:

“A burguesia, pela rápida melhora de todos seus instrumentos de produção, pelos meios de comunicação imensamente facilitados, arrastam todas. mesmo as mais bárbaras, nações para a civilização. Os preços baratos das comodities são a artilharia pesada com a qual golpeiam todas as muralhas da China, com a qual forçam os bárbaros os bárbaros com imenso ódio de estrangeiros a capitular. Isso força todas as nações, sob as penas de extinção, a adotar o modelo burguês de produção; os força a introduzir o que chamam de civilização entre eles, issso é, que se tornem eles mesmos burgueses.”

É essa eficiência centralizada que ele vê como permitindo a possibilidade de um mundo além do capitalismo. Ao longo dos escritos de Marx constantemente aponta para a aparente contradição entre a (suposta) racionalidade dentro da firma e a “anarquia” fora do campo da troca.

No terceiro volume d’O Capital ele fala sobre como o surgimento de “sociedades anônimas” – o que hoje chamamos de “corporações” – socializou parcialmente a propriedade graças a formas difusas de propriedade que elas geram. Ele explicitamente declara que esta forma é “a abolição do modo de produção capitalista dentro do próprio modo de produção capitalista” e que estas seriam as suas bases técnicas.

Agora, eu não acredito que Marx está certo sobre a tendência em direção a simplicidade. A afirmação de Marx que você pode simples e racionalmente criar processos de produção não é só historicamente questionável. Por exemplo, veja o que diz David Noble sobre como fabricantes promoveram tecnologias ineficientes de automação que permitiram maior controle sobre os trabalhadores, mas nós também podemos apontar para a literatura sociológica e antropológica que observa grandes corporações.

Certamente, tamanha rigidez pode ser eficiente para fins específicos. Mas isso acontece às custas de potencialmente reconfigurar o processo de formas que também negue as ferramentas que permitiriam um escopo mais amplo de possíveis formas de se trabalhar. Mas este meio que é o ponto. Pois no sentido amplo a função do sistema capitalista é o controle e então a eficiência. Estados e grandes firmas hierárquicas têm uma relação simbiótica em que ambas oferecem algo de valor que o outro não tem quando se trata de navegar por um mundo incerto.

Os capitalistas naturalmente buscam a tecnologia de forma a reforçar o poder, porque é assim que eles tornam os trabalhadores mais fáceis de dirigir e controlar, o que permite certas economias de escala e também permite que eles reduzam os salários. Da perspectiva da sociedade como um todo isso é ineficiente e custoso na forma de várias externalidades negativas. Mas da perspectiva do estado, este arranjo é preferível pois centralização econômica permite ao estado melhor alcançar seus objetivos com um número menor de grandes firmas que podem ser mais facilmente mobilizadas.

E assim o estado pesa a balança em favor dos grandes capitalistas de inúmeras formas. Do policiamento de declarações de propriedade adquiridas através de expropriação, ao tornar formas de auto-emprego ou empreendimentos cooperativos mais onerosos ou absolutamente ilegais, a subsídios para o transporte de infraestruturas para nomear apenas umas poucas, o estado tem constantemente intervido para simplificar o contexto em que corporações operam durante os séculos, como Kevin Carson já detalhou. Mas o importante é que tais intervenções não são algo que se faz uma só vez. O ponto é que você quer algum grau de flexibilidade e redundância no sistema, para que ele possa se adaptar. Não há uma configuração estática entre políticas e firmas que garantem o poder, ao invés, o ponto é sempre se adaptar em um mundo em constante mudança.

Uma virtude principal do capitalismo é que os capitalistas podem ser substituídos. Por mais que haja uma latitude considerável para capitalistas e firmas cometerem erros, se eles cometerem grandes erros o suficiente serão removidos e outros tomarão seu lugar. Tais processos autofágicos acontecem mais amplamente com indústrias. Tecnologias disruptivas podem operar fora do escopo regulatório do estado e superar não só indústrias já existentes como potencialmente ameaçar relações de poder mais amplas. Entretanto, aqueles que comercializam a tecnologia tem bons motivos para se integrarem com o estado para continuar a receber lucros enquanto outros tentam entender como utilizar a tecnologia e então naturalmente inclinados a informar o estado em como impor barreiras ao uso popular que de outra forma pode atrapalhar as estruturas de poder,

Processos de rotatividade similares acontecem em estados com processos democráticos funcionais que permitem a troca não violenta de líderes, partidos, e mesmo ideologias sem descer até o conflito civil aberto. O capitalismo liberal então distribui o problema do controle entre muito mais pessoas e também permite a rotatividade de tecnologias e elites muito mais eficientes que as sociedades anteriores. O resultado disso é que sociedades capitalistas são muito mais capazes de se adaptarem do que outras ordens sociais.

É essa capacidade para adaptação que permitiu ao capitalismo dominar o mundo. Certamente estados modernos são capazes de usar avanços tecnológicos e arranjos sociais para derrotar contrapartes mais conservadoras. Entretanto, implementar esses novos meios surgem com considerável interrupção interna. Ordens menos flexíveis encontram aqui um desafio e frequentemente tornam-se estáticas,colapsam ou passam por uma revolução.

(Admito, o modelo simples que apresentei de capitalistas diretamente se relacionando com um só estado é complicado pela geopolítica interna em que capitalistas se relacionam com elites políticas de múltiplos estados incitando cada um deles. Enquanto isso exige maior elaboração, não penso que invalide a relação simbiótica básica que apontei, entre o estado e o capital).

Mas mesmo com toda essa relativa flexibilidade macrossistemas de dominação, o capitalismo permanece estruturalmente conservador precisamente pois uma ordem social mais dinâmica e responsiva tornaria o tipo de controle do qual capitalistas lucram impossível. A primeira conclusão que podemos chegar com esta descrição do capitalismo é que nós tranquilamente podemos dizer que podemos fazer melhor. Existem vastas possibilidades técnicas e organizacionais latentes que poderiam existir e seriam significativamente melhores em qualquer métrica, de produtividade, a auto-atualização, a redução de externalidades. Isso pode parecer óbvio, mas dadas quão baixas são as aspirações da Esquerda no geral apresenta, é torná-la explícita.

Mas essa leitura do capitalismo não nos dá apenas a promessa de uma alternativa significativa. Você pode derivar uma estratégia geral para chegar lá. Enquanto poucos anarquistas articularam os problemas do capitalismo em tão alto nível, muitos estão parcialmente cientes dessas dinâmicas através de uma combinação de prática e conhecimento de outras tradições teóricas. Disso, as pessoas desenvolveram uma riqueza de formas para operar esses limites e pontos fracos.

Existem muitas formas que de se encarar estas abordagens, mas eu pessoalmente sou fã dos delineamentos estratégicos que William Gillis faz:

• Insurreição: Aumentar a resistência popular por meio da demonstração de ações eficazes que qualquer pessoa pode realizar.

• Exploração: Ataques de contexto específico que exigem conhecimentos específicos, habilidades e situação para se operar.

• Desenvolvimento: Investir em explorar meios técnicos alternativos e caminhos que têm sido ignorados ou suprimidos.

• Contestação: Aplicar pressão à instituições existentes para mudar o balanço a nosso favor..

• Prefiguração: Tester e popularizar novas práticas técnicas e sociais.

• Erosão: Tornar a economia e a sociedade mais descentralizada e responsiva.

O que todos estes têm em comum é que eles usam ou mantêm abertas a possibilidades que estruturas de poder nos negam, para que assim possam sobreviver. Tal abertura me leva ao que as pessoas há muito consideram uma distinção entre marxistas e anarquistas: nosso foco nas éticas que motivam e guiam a ação de indivíduos versus a ênfase marxista em canalizar a energia que surge em resposta a opressão estrutural.

Há uma suposição popular de que ética e estratégia estão em oposição. E essa não é uma intuição pouco razoável. Ética é comumente entendida como comando de não fazer certas coisas. E assim, ao limitar nossas opções você está em desvantagem contra alguém com menos escrúpulos, se todo o resto for igual.

Agora, no senso comum, isso está correto. Se você vai para um confronto direto com e se compromete em não fazer algumas das coisas que o adversário está tranquilamente disposto a fazer, e tudo mais sendo igual, ele tem mais chances de vencer. Mas se um conflito ou combate acontece no longo prazo em mais de um contexto aberto, ter clareza sobre seus valores e aspirações é uma vantagem. Se você está tentando mudar um sistema complexo, é bastante fácil agir de forma que pareça superficialmente eficaz mas que, no fim, é contraprodutiva. Para ter um progresso relevante você precisa traçar os fluxos emaranhados de causalidade para encontrar pontos de pressão que não sejam óbvios. Nitidez com relação a seus objetivos age como uma espécie de filtro para informações irrelevantes o que permite que você torne o espaço do problema legível, o que por sua vez te permite avaliar mais facilmente os possíveis caminhos adiante. Por mais que não seja algo perfeito, a intenção é melhorar até que você tome as oportunidades que de outro modo teriam passado despercebidas ou identificar armadilhas a se evitar.

Questões de valores sempre valem a pena serem exploradas pois a confiança em outros nos permite uma cooperação mais dinâmica com os outros. Se você confia que alguém compartilha seus objetivos, você pode confiar nela para buscar mais ações autônomas em relação aos seus objetivos. Isso é vital quando lidamos com uma paisagem de vastas possibilidades. As limitações informacionais das organizações centralizadas significa que elas não são capazes de efetivamente percorrer múltiplos caminhos. Um conjunto fluido de indivíduos que não precisam passar por um comitê central podem ser muito mais efetivos em busca múltiplos objetivos em uma paisagem em constante mudança de possibilidades abertas, desde que estejam realmente dispostos.

Agora, concordo com aqueles que leem uma ética implícita ao trabalho de Marx. Mas o motivo principal pela sua popularização entre socialistas tem a ver com a amoralidade explícita de seus argumentos. Partidos socialistas do século 19 foram atraídos por Marx pois ele oferecia uma solução para o problema da atomização da classe trabalhadora. A teoria de Marx garantia aos socialistas que estas divisões eventualmente acabariam graças às forças econômicas. Capitalismo, segundo ele, iria alienar o trabalho ao ponto que membros individuais da classe trabalhadora se tornarem intercambiáveis, se concentraria propriedade ao ponto de se tornar óbvio quem seria o inimigo e forçaria trabalhadores a organizações coletivas por sobrevivência, o que também os daria força para vencer uma revolução. A gama diversa de interesses que marcaram a classe trabalhadora seriam erodidos por simples fatores econômicos e tudo que restaria da esquerda seria um majoritário interesse proletário.

Nada disso aconteceu. A classe trabalhadora do século 19 permaneceu dividida por habilidades, região, e indústria. Nem a sociedade afundou em destituições – no fim do século 19 em países industrializados os trabalhadores estavam sendo melhor pagos e a classe média não encolheu à uma percentagem da população. Houve uma afinidade entre trabalhadores, mas nada como a ampla unidade de classe que Marx declarou que surgiria.

Entretanto, as falhas do marxismo vão além dos erros preditivos sobre o curso do capitalismo. Ele também não viu o surgimento de novas dinâmicas de poder dentro do próprio movimento socialista. Dentro de partidos socialistas e sindicatos se desenvolveu uma classe burocrática com seus próprios interesses. Isso surgiu dos já mencionados limites na comunicação. Apesar de dizerem operar no “interesse da classe trabalhadora”, no fim do século 19 os partidos socialistas estavam cada vez mais se afastando de formas de democracia direta, em direção a burocracia e a repressão para permitir a ação em escala. Eles deliberadamente se esforçaram para conter o radicalismo orgânico da classe trabalhadora para que pudessem construir uma organização que pudesse canalizar o descontentamento em formas de negociações que tornasse mais mapeáveis as negociações entre representantes de sindicatos e capitalistas.

Por certo, as mesmas limitações informacionais significaram que a habilidade desses oficiais de disciplinar trabalhadores fosse limitada. Novamente, uma das principais razões pelo surgimento do sindicalismo foi a frustração dos trabalhadores, pois impedidos por sindicatos e delegados oficiais do partido, passaram a se engajar em ação direta.

Além disso, o desejo de manter a legitimidade do partido (e suas posições dentro dele) significou que políticos socialistas se tornaram cada vez mais abertos à colaboração com seus respectivos estados. Isso chegou ao seu apogeu com a colaboração de partidos socialistas com seus respectivos governos durante a Primeira Guerra Mundial. Nas grandes potências industriais como França e Alemanha, foi necessário o consenso de políticos socialistas de dentro de seus próprios movimentos para aprovar o financiamento da guerra e para a repressão à resistência popular à guerra, apesar de seus discursos de comprometimento com o internacionalismo.

A tendência dos marxistas de serem surpreendidos por dinâmicas de classe emergentes dentro de seus próprios movimentos, que vem como consequência da centralização até hoje, significa que é bastante provável que mesmo em condições bem mais favoráveis a revolução ainda levaria ao ressurgimento das diferenças entre as classes.

Se olharmos para sociedade igualitárias sem estado,descobrimos que essas sociedades não são mantidas por uma autoridade central que é mantida na linha por contribuições democráticas. Invés disso, operam em um conjunto fractal de checagens e balanços. Idealmente, cada indivíduo tem a capacidade de impor sérios custos sobre os outros. Este sistema é bem mais resiliente a uma tomada de poder do que uma instituição centralizada.

Todos estes problemas partem dos limites básicos que descrevi anteriormente sobre tomadas de decisões algorítmicas e a incompatibilidade entre os valores de transferência de informação dentro das mentes e entre elas. A emergência de relações de poder que podem se metastizar em um estado exige não só reestruturação formal das normas da propriedade, mas uma ativa mudança técnica e cultural.

Essa é uma tarefa muito mais difícil do que a que o marxismo nos pede, pois não é uma consequência da resistência direta ao que existe. Sim, as pessoas vão combater a dominação, lutar pelas causas nas quais acreditam. Entretanto, a história dos movimentos sociais mostra que somente uma pequena minoria envolvida com estes conflitos amadurece de preocupações imediatas para uma oposição ampla a todo tipo de dominação.

Felizmente não precisamos mudar tudo de uma só vez.

As críticas marxistas à mudanças graduais geralmente focam na fragilidade das reformas socialistas, e a tendência das instituições da classe trabalhadora serem cooptadas. Dado a história de fracassos, muitos concluíram que mudanças radicais precisam acontecer imediatamente, caso contrário, o capitalismo retorna. Mas várias cooptação refletem não o alcance infinito e a adaptabilidade do capitalismo, mas sim a fragilidade dos meios empregados pelos socialistas.

Muitos problemas no socialismo vem da falha em reconhecer que mudanças potencialmente superficiais podem ser armadilhas que limitam o progresso futuro. O supracitado conservadorismo do Partido Social Democrata Alemão só emergiu após a revogação de leis anti-socialistas que tornou o partido ilegal. Com isso, o partido e oficiais dos sindicatos se tornaram profissionais que consideravam o partido como um fim em si, pois ele os deu uma carreira invés de ser um veículo para a mudança revolucionária.

Além disso, as mudanças trazidas foram frágeis pois dependiam de contínuo apoio eleitoral. Os socialistas nunca tiveram o monopólio sobre os votos da classe trabalhadora, seu alcance entre outros grupos sociais também era instável e dependiam de certas taxas de crescimento econômico para prover o bem estar social e políticas regulatórias. O resultado foi que conforme mudanças sociais e econômicas aconteciam, suas habilidades de ganhar votos e entregar benesses foram erodindo e perderam uma quantia significativa de votos conforme o século 20 avançava. Mas existem outras formas de criar mudanças que não dependem de manter o controle sobre uma instituição centralizada que é central para o funcionamento do capitalismo.

Uma forma mais proveitosa de analisar a durabilidade de mudanças graduais, não é através da contagens de participantes de uma organização ou a contagem de votos de um candidato socialista, mas sim quão custoso é reverter estas reformas. De novo, existem consideráveis eficiências prováveis e/ou capacidades que atualmente são restritas. Se elas se proliferarem e se tornarem parte de uma infraestrutura maior, elas se tornam difíceis de se desfazerem simplesmente por conta do alto custo de se arrancarem partes críticas do mundo.

Tais custos podem ser amplificados por fatores sociais que encarecem o retrocesso. As vezes isso pode se parecer com uma boa aceitação social ou a adoção de normas ou inovações específicas, de forma que qualquer tentativa de se livrar delas seria incrivelmente custoso em termos de recursos necessários e/ou de perda de legitimidade. Mas também pode envolver mobilizar uma minoria suficientemente motivada que resista abertamente ao retrocesso, infligindo custos significativos a quem tente mudar a situação.

É por isso que o sucesso às vezes pode se parecer com estruturas que já existem cooptando nossos avanços. Certamente, há uma história de cooptação reforçando o poder ou neutralizando movimentos. Mas existem muitos exemplos onde vitórias parciais foram mantidas precisamente pois foram parcialmente cooptadas (vários sucessos feministas e desenvolvimentos como criptografia forte, são exemplos evidentes).

Além disso, o nível de agência na sociedade é algo que podemos medir com algum nível de precisão. Portanto, nós podemos dizer que certas configurações sociais são mais próximas que outras. Uma abordagem gradual também é necessária pelo desafio de se chegar a qualquer consenso popular com relação a motivações. Mobilizar as pessoas para lutar por algo específico e concreto como a derrubada de um governo, ou lutar contra uma indústria destrutiva ou exploratória já é bastante complexo, mas é muito mais fácil do que lutar por um ethos.

É por este motivo que basicamente toda revolução e movimento social na história torna-se estagnado ou é revertido após seu sucesso. Você pode reunir pessoas para lutar contra um óbvio opressor, mas uma vez que o movimento tenha sido bem sucedido, ninguém é capaz de concordar qual deve ser o próximo passo. Os moderados concluem que as coisas já foram longe o suficiente e se aliam com quaisquer forças conservadoras que ainda existirem, enquanto radicais não conseguem concordar o próximo passo e suas energias diminuem. Disso, um novo equilíbrio emerge, mas uma capacidade de expansão geral ainda é possível mesmo diante das contenções. Tanto a noção anarquista de poder quanto os erros teóricos nos apresentam um forte caso de moderado otimismo sobre nossas projeções, pois muito provavelmente há consideráveis vantagens que ainda não foram exploradas.

Ao mesmo tempo, nós também veremos derrotas.Os próprios limites algorítmicos que limitam a dominação também limitam nossa capacidade de modelar o futuro e assim tentativas de mudança que podem trazer novos arranjos simplesmente são inerentemente arriscadas. Ironicamente, a própria imprevisibilidade, que é nossa maior força, também significa que superar o capitalismo vai ser um processo intenso que provavelmente vai levar gerações.

Conclusão

Este é apenas um breve rascunho de uma concepção anarquista do capitalismo, criado apenas para destacar as principais diferenças entre nós e os marxistas. É possível e necessário ir além, mas isso deve ser o suficiente para chegar às nossas diferenças fundamentais. Eu também quero deixar explícito que este não é meramente um debate acadêmico sobre semântica ou discordâncias mínimas. O anarquismo e o marxismo enfatizam vulnerabilidades dramaticamente diferentes no capitalismo, o que por sua vez implica em diferentes orientações estratégicas para com o mundo.

Se economias brutas de escala são fator decisivo na luta, então mudanças sociais relevantes só podem surgir do levante de proletários ou movimentos de tamanho suficiente. Assim, qualquer coisa que não seja construir instituições da classe trabalhadora e/ou d’O Partido é perda de tempo. Mas o capitalismo está repleto de ineficiências e potenciais pontos fracos, então ser ativamente capaz de transitar entre eles para encontrar pontos críticos é bem mais efetivo pois permite multiplicadores de força e vetores de ataque que podem te dar a mesma capacidade, senão mais, do que movimentos de massa.

Entretanto, tal abordagem exige que nós sinceramente nos importamos. Ativamente transitando pelo espaço das possibilidades, considerar potenciais caminhos à seguir, e então agir toma bastante tempo e é potencialmente bastante perigoso. Pessoas que não se importam dificilmente vão se incomodar em fazer qualquer esforço. Portanto, um número menor de pessoas que estejam sinceramente alinhadas em seus objetivos pode ser muito mais eficazes em aproveitar esses pontos fracos do que uma organização de massa que está constantemente gastando energia para orientar indivíduos desmotivados.

Especialmente por esta abordagem não excluir a possibilidade dos movimentos de massa. Eles vão acontecer de qualquer forma e nós podemos melhor apoiá-los desenvolvendo e difundindo ferramentas, ideias, e práticas desde as bases, invés de lutar para ocupar posições de influência numa tentativa de dirigi-la de cima para baixo.

Há o caso de muitos anarquistas e marxistas que não se enquadram perfeitamente em nenhuma categoria quando se trata de teoria ou prática. Mas acredito que convém que as pessoas se tornem mais coerentes sobre ambos aspectos. Se você fala sério em combater o capitalismo de uma forma remotamente racional você vai investir uma considerável parte do seu tempo, energia, segurança, etc para avançar este fim.

Uma vítima imediata dessa divergência é a noção de alguma “Esquerda” coerente definida por sua oposição ao capitalismo (ou qualquer outro inimigo). Ainda que eu considere haver valor na “Esquerda” como conceito, este é um fenômeno sociológico/subcultural recente, e não um bloco político que potencialmente poderia se “unificar” ao redor de um conjunto de valores e aspirações.

Agora, ser explícito sobre a rejeição da “esquerda” como algo com o qual eu acho que os anarquistas deveriam se identificar positivamente não significa que não haja possibilidade de cooperação e diálogo entre os membros das várias tradições que compõem a “Esquerda”. De fato, uma consciência popular das diferenças deve potencializar cooperação e diálogos mais produtivos, pois nós não vamos resolver diferenças essenciais através de apelo à tradição ou através do dano que a desunião oferece. Anarquistas e marxistas não concordam sobre o capitalismo e esse fato deveria há muito ser reconhecido.

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โดย เควิน คาร์สัน
เควิน คาร์สัน. บทความต้นฉบับ. Rational Ignorance, Cognitive Distortion, and Anarchism. 24 พฤษภาคม 2025. แปลเป็นภาษาไทยโดย Kin

ในทฤษฎีการเลือกสาธารณะ (public choice theory) แนวคิดเรื่อง “ความเขลาอย่างมีเหตุมีผล” (rational ignorance) หมายถึงการเลือกที่จะไม่หาความรู้ให้กับตัวเองในบางประเด็น เมื่อต้นทุนของการแสวงหาความรู้สูงกว่าผลประโยชน์ที่คาดว่าจะได้รับ โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งเมื่อมันสูงกว่าความน่าจะเป็นที่คะแนนเสียงของตนจะส่งผลต่อผลของการเลือกตั้ง หรือสูงกว่าความน่าจะเป็นที่อิทธิพลทางการเมืองของตนจะเปลี่ยนแปลงการตัดสินใจของนักการเมืองได้ แนวคิดนี้ยังสอดคล้องกับข้อจำกัดของเวลาและพลังงานของมนุษย์ โดยธรรมชาติแล้ว ผู้คนย่อมมีแนวโน้มที่จะทุ่มเททรัพยากรเหล่านั้นให้กับครอบครัว งาน เพื่อน และเพื่อนบ้าน มากกว่าที่จะใส่ใจกับนโยบายสาธารณะ

โชคร้ายที่การเลือกไม่หาความรู้เกี่ยวกับเรื่องบางเรื่อง ไม่ได้หมายความว่าคนเราจะไม่มีความเห็นใดๆ เกี่ยวกับเรื่องนั้นๆ เมื่อไรที่เรามีแนวโน้มที่เข้าใจได้ในการจำกัดความพยายามของตัวเองในการศึกษาหาความรู้เกี่ยวกับประเด็นทางสังคมหรือนโยบายสาธารณะ เราก็มักมีความเห็นที่รุนแรงเกี่ยวกับประเด็นระดับชาติบนฐานของข้อมูลที่มีอยู่อย่างค่อนข้างจำกัดนั้นตามไปด้วย ด้วยเหตุฉะนี้ คนมากมายจึงมีความเห็นรุนแรงเชิงลบ หรือพูดอีกอย่างหนึ่งคือมีอคติ ต่อกลุ่ม LGBT คนผิวสี และผู้อพยพ

ผมนึกถึงเรื่องนี้ขึ้นมาวันนี้หลังจากส่งข้อความพูดคุยกับเพื่อนคนหนึ่งเกี่ยวกับเจ้านายของเธอ เธอเล่าว่า

“เขาเป็นคนที่มีข้อเสียเต็มไปหมด เราสองคนมีความเชื่อที่ตรงข้ามกันอย่างสิ้นเชิง แต่เราต่างไม่พูดถึงเรื่องนั้นกัน เขาทำดีกับฉันอยู่บ่อยๆ เพื่อตอบแทนเขา ฉันเลยคอยเตือนเขาเป็นระยะๆ ให้ดื่มน้ำตลอดทั้งวัน นี่คือสิ่งที่ดีที่สุดแล้วที่ฉันสามารถทำให้ MAGA สกปรกๆ คนหนึ่งได้”

ผมให้ความหวัง บอกไปว่าข้อเท็จจริงที่ว่าคนบางคนดีได้กว่าสิ่งที่พวกเขาเชื่ออาจเป็นอีกเหตุผลหนึ่งให้มีความหวัง เธอตอบกลับมาว่า

“ฉันไม่เข้าใจจิตวิทยาเบื้องหลังเรื่องนี้สักนิด…คนพวกนี้จะช่วยใครก็ได้จริงๆ ตอนเกิดอุทกภัยครั้งใหญ่ พวกเขาจะขับกระบะยกสูง รถจี๊ป เรือ อะไรต่อมิอะไรมาให้ความช่วยเหลือ แต่พอวิกฤตผ่านพ้นไป วงจรของความเกลียดชังก็กลับมาอีก”

น่าประหลาดใจที่บ่อยครั้ง เมื่อต้องมีปฏิสัมพันธ์โดยตรงกับคนชายขอบ ผู้คนมักมีท่าทีตอบสนองในลักษณะที่ขัดแย้งอย่างสิ้นเชิงกับความเชื่อนามธรรมที่พวกเขามีต่อคนกลุ่มนั้น ซึ่งหล่อหลอมขึ้นจากอุดมการณ์ทางการเมืองหรือจุดยืนที่พวกเขายึดถือในวาทกรรมทางการเมือง

ลองนึกถึงตัวอย่างของผู้ที่เคยกระตือรือร้นลงคะแนนเสียงให้ทรัมป์เพราะคำมั่นสัญญาในการเนรเทศผู้อพยพผิดกฎหมายจำนวนมาก แต่เมื่อได้เห็นใบหน้าของมนุษย์จริงๆ ที่ตกเป็นเหยื่อของนโยบายนี้แล้วกลับรู้สึกตกใจระคนผิดหวัง

หรืออีกตัวอย่างคือ สมาชิกสภานิติบัญญัติรัฐมอนแทนา 29 คนจากพรรครีพับลิกัน ที่เปลี่ยนใจลงมติคัดค้านร่างกฎหมายต่อต้านคนข้ามเพศ หลังจากได้ฟังสุนทรพจน์สะเทือนใจจากสมาชิกสภาผู้แทนสองคนที่เป็นคนข้ามเพศ ผมจำไม่ได้ชัดๆ ว่าเคยอ่านเรื่องนี้ที่ไหน แต่มีชายชราคนหนึ่งที่เดินทางมาเพื่อให้การสนับสนุนร่างกฎหมายนี้ในตอนแรก ทว่าในที่สุดกลับกล่าวคำขอโทษและประกาศว่าเขาเปลี่ยนใจแล้ว และไม่เห็นด้วยกับร่างกฎหมายดังกล่าวอีกต่อไป อันเป็นผลจากการพูดคุยและปฏิสัมพันธ์กับผู้คนในบริเวณพื้นที่รอเข้าให้การ มีคนไม่น้อยที่แสดงความชิงชังรังเกียจต่อคนอื่นแม้เมื่อได้พบปะกันตัวต่อตัว แต่ก็มีอีกหลายคนที่แม้จะมีความเชื่อที่ชิงชังรังเกียจต่อคนบางกลุ่มแบบเหมารวม แต่กลับปฏิบัติต่อมนุษย์ที่ปฏิสัมพันธ์ด้วยในชีวิตด้วยด้วยจิตใจที่ดีงาม

ทำไมถึงเป็นเช่นนั้น ผมไม่คิดว่ามนุษย์เราในฐานะสิ่งมีชีวิตตระกูลวานรที่วิวัฒนาการมาในสภาพแวดล้อมที่ปฏิสัมพันธ์และการตัดสินใจส่วนใหญ่ของเราเกี่ยวข้องกับกลุ่มขนาดเล็กที่มีคนอยู่ไม่กี่สิบคน มีความพร้อมที่จะรับมืออย่างเป็นเหตุเป็นผลกับประเด็นระดับทวีปหรือระดับโลกปริมาณมหาศาล บนฐานของความเป็นจริงที่ระบบการติดต่อสื่อสารระดับโลกถ่ายทอดต่อมาให้เราในรูปสัญลักษณ์ (symbolically-mediated) มนุษย์มีแนวโน้มที่จะมีความบิดเบือนและมืดบอดทางความคิด อาการนี้จะร้ายแรงยิ่งขึ้นเมื่อเราถูกแยกออกจากประสบการณ์ตรง เมื่อการรับรู้ของเราเกี่ยวกับคนอื่นโดยมากแล้วถูกกำกับด้วยชุดอุดมการณ์นามธรรมที่เราได้รับต่อมาจากกลไกทางวัฒนธรรม เช่น OANN หรือ Radio Rwanda หาใช่มาจากประสบการณ์ตรงจากการปฏิสัมพันธ์กับพวกเขาตั้งแต่เกิดจนเติบโตขึ้นเรื่อยมา ผลที่ได้ก็มักจะเป็นพิษเป็นภัยเสียเป็นส่วนมาก นี่คือเหตุผลว่าทำไมเราจึงมักพบความแตกต่างอย่างรุนแรงระหว่างวิธีที่ผู้คนปฏิบัติต่อกันในบริบทของปฏิสัมพันธ์ระหว่างมนุษย์กับมนุษย์โดยตรง กับวิธีที่พวกเขาเสนอให้ปฏิบัติต่อผู้อื่นในฐานะสมาชิกของกลุ่มนามธรรม

เหตุผลอีกส่วนหนึ่งอาจมาจากต้นทุนทางสังคมและจิตวิทยาที่ค่อนข้างต่ำเมื่อเราต้องรับมือกับกลุ่มคนนามธรรมที่อยู่ห่างไกลออกไปซึ่งเรารับรู้ผ่านระบบสัญลักษณ์ อย่างไรก็ดี เมื่อเราเจอกันตัวต่อตัวกับสมาชิกของกลุ่มที่ตนไม่ได้สังกัด (outgroup) ต้นทุนดังกล่าวก็จะยิ่งเด่นชัดสะดุดตา

นี่คือเหตุผลหนึ่งว่าทำไม ในฐานะนักอนาธิปไตย ผมจึงเชื่อว่าเราจำเป็นต้องถ่ายโอนกลไกและการตัดสินใจที่กระทบต่อชีวิตเราให้กับหน่วยงานในระดับท้องถิ่นให้มากที่สุดเท่าที่จะเป็นไปได้ หน่วยงานเหล่านี้ควรเป็นหน่วยที่เราได้มีปฏิสัมพันธ์โดยตรงในชีวิตประจำวัน เช่น สถานที่ทำงานที่บริหารจัดการด้วยตนเอง และบริการสาธารณะต่างๆ ทั้งนี้ โดยควรมีกลไกประชาธิปไตยทางตรงให้มากที่สุดเท่าที่จำเป็นในกรณีที่ต้องอาศัยฉันทามติร่วมกัน ส่วนกลไกการทำงานขนาดใหญ่ใดๆ ที่ยังคงต้องมีอยู่เพื่อรองรับพื้นที่ที่กว้างขวางเกินกว่าที่จะบริหารจัดการในระดับท้องถิ่นได้ กลไกเหล่านั้นก็ควรจัดการผ่านโครงสร้างถาวรที่มีลักษณะเป็นระบบแพลตฟอร์ม (standing platforms) ซึ่งดำเนินการในเชิงบริหารจัดการโดยอัตโนมัติให้มากที่สุด มากกว่าที่จะเป็นกระบวนการทางการเมือง ดังที่แซงต์-ซิมงเคยกล่าวไว้ “แทนที่การปกครองของบุคคล ด้วยการบริหารจัดการของสรรพสิ่ง”

แน่นอน ทั้งหมดนี้ไม่ได้หมายความว่าความคิดเชิงนามธรรมหรือเชิงสัญญะเป็นสิ่งไม่ดี หากปราศจากความคิดเหล่านี้ไป วรรณกรรม ดนตรี ศิลปะ วิทยาศาสตร์ ประวัติศาสตร์ และปรัชญาก็ไม่อาจเกิดขึ้นได้ ปัญหาอยู่ที่การเรียกร้องให้มีการตัดสินใจอย่างมีประสิทธิภาพในพื้นที่ที่ประสบการณ์ตรงถูกแทนที่โดยความเป็นจริงที่เรารับรู้มาอีกทอดหนึ่งผ่านระบบสัญญะล้วนๆ ปัญหายังปรากฏชัดยิ่งขึ้นเมื่อต้องตัดสินว่าเราจะปฏิบัติต่อมนุษย์จริงๆ ที่อยู่ตรงหน้าเราอย่างไร โดยอิงจากหมวดหมู่อุดมการณ์มือสองซึ่งมองพวกเขาในฐานะตัวแทนของกลุ่มนามธรรมเหล่านั้น และมองข้ามความเป็นมนุษย์ของเขาไปอย่างสิ้นเชิง

เรามักเห็นผู้คนใช้เวลายาวนานและในบางกรณีก็สายเกินไปกว่าจะเรียนรู้ว่า ผู้คนที่พวกเขาเคยมองเห็นเป็นเพียงตัวละครไร้วิญญาณที่ชื่อว่า “ผู้อพยพผิดกฎหมาย” (illegal alien) หรือภายใต้หมวดหมู่ของ “อุดมการณ์ทางเพศ” (gender ideology) เป็นมนุษย์คนหนึ่งเช่นเดียวกัน มันไม่ควรเป็นแบบนี้เลย เราควรเห็นมนุษย์เป็นสิ่งแรก.

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Joseph Heath. Filthy Lucre: Economics For People Who Hate Capitalism (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2009).

Heath states his goal at the outset:

I’m not interested in selling anyone on the virtues of private enterprise. This is primarily because I share the unease that most people feel with the capitalist system. And I would like to see us come up with something better than what we have now.

However, I also think that economics is important — as important for critics of capitalism as it is for its cheerleaders…. Marx clearly understood the “mainstream economics of his day, yet, in part due to his influence, very few left-wing or “radical” theorists can say the same.

Unfortunately what he means by “economics” equates to uniformly, and apparently largely unexamined, managerial-centrist assumptions that underlie most of the arguments in this book. In the Introduction he blames the “economic illiteracy of the left” for the amount of time wasted on advocacy for “schemes and policies that have no reasonable chance of success….” In particular, he chides Naomi Klein for her glowing treatment of the self-managed recuperated enterprises of Argentina in The Take, in what he calls an “intellectual vacuum” regarding “basic features of how these cooperatives are structured and financed, much less how an economy organized this way is supposed to function.”

You would never know, watching the film, that there is an extensive economic literature on the subject of cooperatives — written by socialists and nonsocialists alike — dating back over a century, that raises serious doubts about the possibility of structuring an economy along these lines.

Heath assumes the state is the only possible mechanism for overcoming the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Free Rider problems, etc. 

So we need to have a state…. What is required — and what self-interest cannot provide — is an honest enforcement agency to impose Hume’s three “fundamental laws”: to protect private property, to ensure the voluntariness of exchange, and to enforce contracts.  

He’s apparently unaware of the body of literature — by Elinor Ostrom in particular — on the commons as an alternative to both the state and the cash nexus. 

He also takes the fact that most people, most of the time, do not defect from cooperative behavior as somehow disproving the assumption that people are motivated by “rational self-interest.” His conception of “rational self-interest” seems to reflect an “economic man” assumption, in which the individual’s “self-interest” equates to a vulgar and simplistic maximization of one value — namely cash income — rather than maximizing a set of subjective values unique to the individual. 

Heath also argues for the necessity of the state based on the dependence of private property rights on state record-keeping and enforcement. Just managing property records, nationwide, cost $203 million, and the cost of protecting and enforcing then was considerably more. But his treatment of the existing model as the only, inevitable one, and failure to consider possible alternatives, is revealed in the fact that what he describes are the costs of tracking and enforcing a set of capitalist private property rights, legible from above to a territorial state, to land as an absentee-owned, marketable commodity. Medieval villages seemed to do an adequate job of tracking who had possessory rights to which furling strips in which fields, or pastured what amounts of livestock on the common, on their own. And in a society without absentee title, or the buying and selling of land by people in locations far removed from the land in question, it needn’t be a great deal more complicated than that. Heath himself noted that “possession is nine-tenths of the law” in large part because of the prohibitive expense of tracking title. And a non-capitalist, non-state property rights system would be largely based on possession.

Although he does so in the course of arguing against right-libertarians, Heath takes at face value the right-libertarian framing of the 19th century United States as characterized by a “minimal state.” He responds that the economy of the late 19th century, in which the state mostly just enforced property rights and contracts, spent as much time in recession as in expansion. But by pretending that this was a “laissez-faire” or “minimal state” era, he neglects not only the massive role of the state in setting up capitalism and the wage system in the first place — like right-libertarians, Heath ignores the role of the state in creating what he calls “private property rights” — but in creating the structure of the Gilded Age economy after the Civil War. 

The Progressive Era regulatory agenda was not, in fact, an entrance by the state into a regulatory vacuum; it was a secondary intervention by the state to correct and limit the destabilizing consequences of the previous, primary interventions by which it had created Gilded Age corporate capitalism in the first place. The US government does, indeed, render a large number of “services… to ensure the smooth functioning of the capitalist economy.” But it does so because the capitalist economy, which has existed in symbiosis with the state from the beginning, has always been prone to destabilizing crises.

Although Heath groups the myths he debunks, in equal numbers, under left-wing and right-wing headings, at times it’s difficult to understand why a particular myth was classed one way or another. Consider, for example, his reason for preferring the term “comparative advantage” to “competitive advantage,” ostensibly a right-wing myth, namely

how much this rhetoric feeds into the left-wing critique of globalization. Saying that trade creates both winners and losers is just another way of saying that trade is exploitative, which gives aid and comfort to the old-fashioned Marxist view that there is extraction of “surplus value” in these exchange relations.

For starters, “trade” as such is almost meaningless — it includes all international exchange that takes place, regardless of the property rules, subsidies, and other institutional context within which it takes place. And a great deal — if not most — international trade under neoliberal corporate globalization is in fact exploitative, and does in fact involve the extraction of a surplus by one party at the expense of another. The centerpiece of the so-called “free trade” treaties Heath celebrates is not the reduction or elimination of tariffs — i.e. actual trade barriers — but their maximalist intellectual property provisions. These IP accords play the same protectionist role in global corporate capitalism that tariffs did in the national industrial capitalism of a century ago. It’s only because of draconian international IP law that transnational corporations have been able to largely outsource all actual production to nominally independent contractors in the Global South, while retaining a legal monopoly on the right to dispose of the product. So most of what’s called “international trade” is not actually the production of goods by “Chinese companies” for export to the United States, or vice versa, but a 21st century version of the putting out system in which nominally “independent” contractors are in fact vertically integrated within the legal walls of Western capital. These IP accords, along with other provisions of the neoliberal or Washington Consensus economic order, together amount to a continuation of the same economic relations that prevailed before the postwar dissolution of European colonial empires: an extractive relationship in which countries of the Global South provide cheap labor and natural resources.

Likewise, so-called “comparative advantage” — a concept which does a lot of heavy lifting for Heath — is virtually meaningless in the present global economic order. Most “comparative advantage” exists because, thanks to the legal and institutional framework discussed in the previous paragraph, and the fact that international shipping is subsidized, it is artificially profitable to export capital.

Heath sets up this illustration as a prelude to debunking what he calls the “pauper labor fallacy” — or more commonly, the race to the bottom: 

Imagine two bakeries, across the street from one another. One of them is on the rich side of the street, and so pays its workers $10 per hour. The other is on the poor side of the street, and so pays its workers $1 per hour. All other expenses are the same, and both bakeries have access to the same equipment and technology. Workers are not allowed to cross the street, but customers are. So how can the “rich-side” bakery possibly compete with the “poor-side” bakery?

He answers by bringing in Ricardian comparative advantage. He hypothesizes that one bakery is better at making tarts and one at making bagels, and they therefore specialize in them respectively. The poor-side bakery sells its tarts to people from the rich-side, and uses the proceeds to import bagels from the rich-side bakery. The problem with this is that — for all the reasons discussed above — the model of two “sides,” each with its own independent bakery, is obsolete under corporate globalization. It’s entirely understandable that Heath’s readers might find it convincing, since most people still think of “international trade” in archaic terms like “American companies,” “Chinese companies,” “Mexican companies,” etc., all producing goods and exporting them to other countries. The general public has no idea of the extent to which so-called “international trade” actually consists of internal transfers within the de facto integrated logistical chains of global capital. For Heath’s illustration to work, the owner of the rich-side bakery would have to also own the poor-side bakery, or own the patents and trademarks on the tarts and outsource their production to the poor-side bakery.

Closely related is Heath’s resort, in defense of sweatshop labor, to the right-wing “best available alternative” talking point — ignoring the question of who set the alternatives in the first place.

Further, one need not believe in any variant of the labor theory of value to understand that there is a great deal of unequal exchange and rent extraction under a capitalist economy — arguably enough to constitute the bulk of capitalist profit. The capitalist wage system was founded on robbery (i.e., the nullification of the great majority of the population’s customary rights of possession in the land), and the resultant transformation of both labor and land into what Polanyi called “fictitious commodities.” Subtract the economic rents on these and other fictitious commodities, like intellectual property and the right to issue credit, from total profits, and there’s not a lot left.

Heath’s managerial-centrist affinity for the status quo can also be seen in his attack on the alleged left-wing fallacy of the “just price,” which he appears to conflate with any structural critique of how prices are set. There are two possible approaches, he writes, to the problem that necessities of life are unaffordable to significant segments of the population. One is to argue that the prices are too high; the other is to argue that those particular people don’t have enough money. The obvious choice is the second option: to leave all the institutional structures of corporate capitalism in place, fictitious commodities, unearned economic rents, and all, and then help out the disadvantaged with a robust welfare state. 

This perfectly illustrates the role of the welfare state under capitalism: cleaning up negative externalities like poverty. Of course, enabling people to afford subsistence goods while leaving artificial scarcities and monopolies in place has a perverse outcome; we need look only to Henry George’s account of how unearned land rents rise with the public’s purchasing power, or how health insurance premiums skyrocketed after the ACA subsidies were put in place.

The problem lies with Heath’s failure to understand that there is no such thing as immaculate “market pricing”; a market-clearing price mechanism is compatible with any number of possible institutional and property rights systems, with widely varying distributions in each. He is entirely correct that price controls have distorting effects. But the proper approach is neither to impose price controls against the background of the existing capitalist economic structure, or rely on redistribution after the fact to enable people to buy goods at the monopoly price. It is to structure property rules and institutions at the outset to avoid the distortions and irrationalities of capitalism — eliminating economic rents as much as possible, and internalizing as many consequences as possible of the decisions of economic actors — and then letting the market mechanism distribute income in the first place so as to minimize the need for welfare and other corrective actions.

His attempt at refuting the left-wing fallacy that capitalism is doomed from its crisis tendencies is limited mostly to demonstrating that the alleged problem of overproduction/underconsumption is owing entirely to liquidity preference, and can be easily remedied by Keynesian monetary and fiscal policy. This is comparable to Lincoln’s anecdote of the Jesuit who, accused of murdering ten men and a dog, triumphantly produced the dog in court. He fails to address any of the other sources of long-term crisis, like the distortion of the economy toward excessively capital-intensive forms of production as a consequence of state policy, and the resulting chronic tendency toward idle capacity and the growing share of state activity which is geared toward utilizing this capacity. He also ignores the role of economic inequality not only in diverting excess amounts of income into savings, but in the increasing investment of those savings in speculative bubbles, asset-stripping, and enshittification. And while he is entirely correct that work as such is something to be reduced and the progressive emphasis on “job-creation” is wrong-headed, he still misses the point: technological progress fails to reduce working hours because the gains are enclosed, rather than distributed, thanks to intellectual property and other monopolies. So, despite Heath’s denial, we have an economy in which increasing amounts of waste and irrationality are required to keep money circulating and capacity utilized, and the system is reaching the limits of its capacity to increase them. 

To add to the incoherence of his denial, toward the end of the chapter he stresses that “none of this threatens the market as a mechanism for coordinating economic activity. There are many problems with modern capitalism, but there are no existential threats.” News flash: markets coordinated economic activity to some extent for thousands of years before the rise of capitalism, and will likely continue to serve an important coordinating function long after its demise.   

At times, his normalcy bias, and his failure to distinguish contingent, accidental aspects of the system from its essence, result in missing the point to a spectacular degree. For example, this howler:

[The increasing cost of services relative to goods] is also why we tend to throw things away rather than get them repaired. It’s not because of some general ailment called “consumerism” — it’s because getting something repaired is incredibly expensive. One day my stove beeped loudly and the nifty digital display started blinking “Error 5.” I looked it up in the manual, which told me to call for immediate servicing…. Two days later, a guy in coveralls showed up at my door during breakfast time. He opened up the oven, yanked something out, tore open a bag, stuck something new in, mumbled something about a “broken sensor,” then handed me a bill for $169. He was in my house for less than 10 minutes. The sensor cost $70; the rest of the bill was labor and taxes. Imagine how much it would have cost if the stove itself had been broken (as opposed to just the system designed to tell me when the stove is broken).

Where to even begin? The repairman didn’t get anywhere near all of that labor charge. A sizeable chunk of it was a monopoly rent to the company, resulting from proprietary diagnostic software that only the company could read and interact with. We see the same thing with the proprietary diagnostic software in automobiles, which has a lot to do with the skyrocketing prices at dealership garages. The same phenomenon is behind an ongoing war between John Deere and the farmers who buy their equipment. And although the monopoly on diagnostic software also has a lot to do with the cost of repairing the physical mechanism, it goes way beyond that. Embedded intellectual property rents are a large portion of the material components, as well. Thanks to the role of patents in suppressing the competitive manufacture of interoperable replacement parts, and the resulting lack of incentives to design appliances for easy repair and long life, it is far more complicated and expensive to repair them than it would otherwise be, and the replacement parts themselves are marked up enormously. Planned obsolescence is a deliberate design strategy, facilitated in large part by intellectual property.

His conceptual limitation to the status quo-adjacent is also seen in his defense of rentier income, on the grounds that savings are the source of investment funds, and returns on savings are necessary in order to persuade people to save. The only alternative he can imagine is “some form of mandatory collective savings orchestrated by the state.” But “capital investment,” in material terms, is nothing but one group of workers producing physical means of production from natural resources, and providing them to another group of workers. The “savings” are simply an imaginary ownership chit enabling some third party to allocate those material resources. Any number of other institutional arrangements for accounting and coordination are possible.  

To be fair to Heath, this review has focused almost entirely on areas in which an anarchist or libertarian socialist would find fault with his arguments. He has also demolished a good number of right-libertarian and state-socialist talking points, albeit from the most centrist and status-quoist of center-left perspectives.

His best performance is his attack the right-wing obsession with “personal responsibility” and moral hazard, and conventional economists onetime (?) hostility toward “common property arrangements” on such grounds (think of all those Thanksgiving op-eds on how private property saved the Pilgrims from starvation). He responds with an explanation of insurance and risk pooling — going all the way back to hunter-gatherer societies — that to me sounds surprisingly communistic. Of course, as he acknowledges, moral hazard is a matter of degree, and risk-pooling or mutual aid arrangements may create perverse incentives for reduced vigilance or effort in areas over which one has some degree of control. The solution, he suggests, is an ad hoc approach of pooling risks in cases where the social cost of not providing aid exceeds the cost of moral hazard.  

A defining and underpinning characteristic of the international financial system in the 21st century is the apparent necessity of access to, usage of and infrastructure needed for sovereign debt (or comparable instruments), credit markets and capital markets more broadly. Typically, states across the globe rely on access to and usage of such markets to borrow or raise funds for a range of purposes (whether that be through issuance of sovereign debt, receiving loans, alternative debt instruments or otherwise) including but not limited to funding day-to-day operations, maintenance, projects and programmes, investments, paying or covering liabilities and obligations, contingency and much more. The comparable activities of the vast majority of individuals, households, firms and/or institutions tend to look relatively meagre in scale and complexity to those of present-day states. The International Monetary Fund’s 2024 ‘Global Debt Monitor’ stated that “Global debt (public plus private debt) amounted to almost USD 250 trillion in 2023. … The world’s public debt inched up by 2 percentage points to 94 percent of GDP in [2023, or USD 98 trillion…].” Within the global financial system, there’s a growing, parallel system of Islamic finance with the global Sukuk market size having reached USD 1.21 trillion in 2024.

The range of factors you [the reader(s)] or I (the author) may rely upon for accessing such funds and with which lenders and financiers evaluate our creditworthiness — whether that be current, past or expected income, pre-existing commitments, (net) asset positions, history of using credit and financial instruments responsibly, type of employment etc. — are not entirely dissimilar to the range of factors relied upon and evaluated for lending to states although are also distinctly different in important areas. From the perspective of numerous political philosophies and theories, states often assume (or otherwise impose) the right to extract resources (monetary, natural, physical, psychological and more) from the populations and territories they are deemed to be responsible for, usually within some framework or spectrum of ‘property rights’. This extraction, whether past, present or future, is therefore perceived as a credible, foundational source of creditworthiness, thereby assuring lenders these states will be able to afford their debt obligations.

Debt is a dominant feature of the global macroeconomy, upon which much else is currently underpinned or reliant. Even so, when examined, one might reasonably conjecture that significant swathes of this presuppose inherently undemocratic assumptions and the continuity of state-controlled, extraction-predicated public finance. When considering that duration of short-, medium- and long-term horizons can be variable in definition, it is worth noting that the length (or maturity) of sovereign debt issued, in terms of duration over which payments are due, can be as short as a few months or under a year, while running up to multiple years and even several decades. As such, in any given democratic state, while those elected may have a mandate to occupy their offices for up to, say, five or six years, with term limits on re-election or otherwise, the debt issued in that time (and periods preceding it) may be payable for up to 10, 20, 30 years or even more. Research published by S&P Global from 2024 states that “The estimated average share of short-term debt in the global stock of sovereign debt was 14.8% in 2023, significantly higher than the 9.5% recorded in 2019.” Maturity composition of sovereign bonds issued by OECD countries according to this ‘Global Debt Report 2025’ published by the OECD (Panel C of Figure 1.4, page 24) indicates sovereign debt with maturity of five years or more seems to account for roughly half of sovereign bonds issued by OECD countries.

Populations across the world continue to elect public servants to offices, governments and more, through a range of usually flawed and/or problematic voting systems, and there appears to be an implicit acceptance that this somehow (partially) legitimises the continued extraction of resources from those same populations by the various apparatuses of the state. Nevertheless, even when accepting this, it is arguably undemocratic to presuppose continuity of such arrangements and modes of social structures given that long(er)-dated sovereign debt is not, in and of itself, a necessary condition for functioning democracy.

One could contend that long(er)-dated debt is required to achieve optimal value in the context of the state’s overall portfolio of liabilities arising from sovereign debt obligations (i.e. optimising the state’s future expected payments with the right mix of debt); however, this is not the same as it being strictly necessary for a fully functional democracy except indirectly from the standpoint of demonstrating and making use of a specific, contextually-extrapolated interpretation of what it means to have sound public finances. That is, there is an assumption when issuing sovereign debt beyond any elected entity’s (often governments that are elected either directly or indirectly) duration for which it was elected (‘the elected term length’) that the population has implicitly consented to the sustained extraction of resources beyond that elected term length. It is not clear why a population would explicitly consent to this except for the fact that it may be assumed by the population to be an inevitable eventuality (which, many would contend, is not the same as meaningful consent). Put even more simply, it’s one thing for someone to lend to an individual for a 15-, 20-, 30- or 40-year mortgage on the basis of their expected lifetime income, net of all deductions such as the aforementioned resource-extraction by the state and other entities, but quite another thing for an entity’s entire creditworthiness to be predicated upon the perpetuation of societal structures and systems that presupposes such rights to impose resource-extraction upon the constituent elements of its population and territories. This is not necessarily problematic for authoritarian regimes, dictatorships, theocracies, autocracies and totalitarian states but it is a systemically flawed and potentially even unethical mode of operation for supposed democracies. 

Critically, the sheer volume of sovereign debt outstanding, the interest paid on it, the expected duration etc. has a considerable impact on the structure and activities of the global economy.  For example, if lending to states is seen as ‘less risky’ or ‘more reliable’ and the closest thing to a ‘risk free’ asset when compared to lending to firms or individuals then this will subsequently influence allocation of debt and funds across a macroeconomy; similarly, if some states are seen as ‘less risky’ or ‘more reliable’ to lend to than other states, this will affect capital flows and debt allocation across the international economy. This, in turn, determines what everyone can spend on, invest in, buy, sell, finance, global trade (im)balances, entire industrial structures and more. I would describe it not so much as a ripple effect — though that is definitely there — but, to extend the metaphor, something that determines the shape, depth, boundaries, compositions and very life of the oceans of economies, capital and credit markets. 

It’s difficult to definitively predict (be completely sure of) what may happen in the absence of such debt but I’ll attempt to conjecture and/or hypothesise. The greater demand for debt dated below the duration of the elected term, in the absence of long(er)-dated debt, may actually have an effect in the direction of reducing interest payable on such short(er)-duration debt and therefore work to suppress the heightened (perceived) need for resource extraction from the population. This could mean those with otherwise lendable funds look for other opportunities such as increased lending to households, firms, other institutions (all at potentially lower rates than currently done) using other financial instruments and more, thereby changing capital and debt allocation structures both within and across economies. Indeed, if there is an overall reduction in the amount of sovereign debt available to purchase and with many countries’ sovereign debt being perceived to be ‘less risky’ or the closest thing to a ‘risk free’ asset compared to alternatives, there may be increasing incentives for closer evaluation, risk assessment and more of other investable, lendable or otherwise fundable opportunities. The impact on the availability of credit and funds globally, including for demographics, geographies and peoples often underserved or underrepresented, may well be profound when considered against the status quo.

Importantly, long(er)-dated sovereign debt — more precisely, anything with a maturity beyond the elected term length of governments in those democratic states — presupposes the perpetuation of resource extraction by states and their apparatuses thereafter, including the socioeconomic structures necessary for this, thereby contributing to its purported legitimation through implicit, undemocratic assumptions.