Commentary
Against the Criminal Justice System, Pt. IV: Free All Prisoners
The last three posts of this series have been focused on the injustice of punishment and criminal law, and the justice of a tort-based pure restitution system. Even if punishment itself were legitimate, however, we would still have reason to reject the main form of punishment that exists today.Prisons– especially as they exist in the United States– can be attacked from several angles. For instance, their inherent tendency towards abuse, how they feed recidivism (freed prisoners’ relapse into criminal behavior), or the way they break up families. There are also the economic incentives they provide, both to prison guard unions and the owners of private prisons, to further lobby for increased criminalization.While these factors combined might warrant prison abolition on their own, it’s worth honing in on the most fundamentally immoral aspect of prison: To sentence someone to prison is to condemn one to slavery.

Since this is no small claim, it should be immediately clarified what’s meant by “prison.” Not all instances of forcibly confining someone seem to be instances of imprisonment, and surely some instances of defensively confining someone can be legitimate. By prisons, I refer to large compounds where people are involuntarily confined (typically with many other criminals) in response to their having committed a crime, without the right to voluntarily transfer to another location if that other location would confine them just as well, and where the administration has almost total control over those confined.

A given prison might not clearly and precisely fit all of these conditions exactly, but this at least gives us a general idea of what we’re talking about, and how it differs from confinement more generally. As for slavery, its distinguishing feature isn’t physical brutality– not only would that imply that a slave who’s never actually beaten is not a slave, it would also mean that all victims of brutal violence are slaves. Nor is it defined– contra Nozick– by the fact that the products of one’s labor are taken from them. This would make someone who is regularly mugged a slave, and it would mean that slaves whose owners allowed them to use most or all of what they produced weren’t really slaves.

What actually distinguishes slavery is the fact that the slaveholder claims a right to do with the slave as he or she wishes, without the slave’s consent. It is the relationship that allows slaveholders to take however much or little of the slave’s property as they wish, and to torture them for whatever reason they see fit. In short, slavery is when one person holds a property claim over another person.

In prison, the convict effectively becomes the property of the prison administration. If the administrators believe that they’ve been disobeyed, they reserve the right to swiftly punish the convict, sometimes with practices widely considered to be torture. If the administration disapproves of their convicts owning certain goods, they can declare those goods contraband. If the administration is getting tired of a hunger strike, they can force-feed convicts.

One objection to categorizing prisoners as slaves might be that prisoners still do retain some rights. Even if those rights are often ignored, this seems to mean the prisoners haven’t become property of the state.

Yet the fact that there are regulations on what you are legally allowed to do with something doesn’t mean it isn’t legally seen as your property. In fact, there were some things that even slaveholders were not legally allowed to do to chattel slaves in the United States. Of course, those laws were almost never enforced, but even if they had been, this would not have amounted to freedom.

Unfortunately, the slave status of prisoners is also apparent from their depiction in popular culture. Flippant jokes about prison rape are pervasive. Especially brutal treatment is met with indifference or even applause. The average person simply does not see the prisoner as a fellow human being.

Within the United States, there are a number of unsettling historical connections between chattel slavery and the development of the prison system. As Angela Davis chronicles in her short but powerful Are Prisons Obsolete?, the criminal justice system ensured that racial exploitation survived the abolition of chattel slavery. The first step came from the black codes, which made a whole host of things (from firearm ownership to neglecting one’s job) illegal specifically for blacks. The second came from the system of convict leasing, which allowed the penal system to sell rights to forced labor from its (overwhelmingly black) prisoner population. Looking at prisons we see today, which still exploit artificially cheap convict labor; and are still predominantly filled by people of color and sometimes literally built on former slave plantations, it is not difficult to come away with similar conclusions.

Yet, while critiques of the American prison system that focus on its history are important, they should also not be overemphasized. That prisons are a form of slavery goes beyond their history, and not specific to the United States.

Consider the words of Nils Öberg, director-general of Sweden’s prison and probation service. While explaining their emphasis on rehabilitation, he stated that his department’s “role is not to punish. The punishment is the prison sentence: they have been deprived of their freedom. The punishment is that they are with us.”

Even when prisons are described in their most humane terms, there is a subtle admission that to send someone to prison is to make them a slave. Öberg assures us that his government has merely deprived inmates of their freedom, and that their possession of the convict is all the punishment they need.

Despite Öberg’s good intentions, it is not enough that a slaveholder is relatively kind to his slaves, or genuinely has the slave’s interests at heart. Slavery, in any form, is an absolute evil that requires abolition, not reform.

We are clearly a long way away from abolishing prisons, punishment, and criminal law, or instituting a purely tort-based system geared towards achieving restitution for victims. So, how should any of this influence the way we look at real world politics? To conclude this series, the next installment will give some possible answers to that question.

Stigmergy - C4SS Blog
Why So Many Re-posts?

You might have noticed a series of re-posts going up in the Commentary section over the past few weeks. No, we didn’t run out of content! Rather, with the Students For Liberty blog no longer archiving old posts, we got permission to republish here a handful of pieces by C4SS writers and fellows. 

So, in this collection you’ll find the work of Nathan Goodman, Jason Lee Byas, and Cory Massimino. While was originally published elsewhere, the pieces we’ve chosen to preserve are exemplary of the ideas, values, and debates at work in left wing market anarchist thinking. That’s why we’ve decided to republish them on a rolling basis rather than just adding them to the C4SS site archive. Those who prefer the more radical liberal end of the LWMA spectrum will find this series especially rewarding and I’m excited these pieces are getting a second life. 

And we’ve still got quite a few coming out soon. Enjoy!

Commentary
An Open Letter to Anti-Racists on Global Poverty

Dear Anti-racists, 

Cheers to the earth-shattering defeat of Donald Trump, in whose electoral demise you played no small part. Your jubilation as this nightmare of a presidency nears its apparent end is every bit warranted. Joe Biden’s presidency will be far from perfect, but we can reasonably expect it to be better than the (primary) alternative that was on offer.

But I write you on a largely unrelated note, on a matter that you vaguely appreciate but that a series of political and social obscurations have conspired to hide from your view. That matter is global poverty. Four years ago, as we (rightly) bemoaned Trump’s ascent, and (rightly?) immersed ourselves in Jojo’s romantic life on The Bachelorette, and suited up in our snazziest outfits to celebrate the Summer Olympics in nightclubs, UNICEF quietly estimated that more than 35 million children—largely children of color—would die of preventable ailments by 2030. Millions have died since then. Compounding that “background” horror, which UNICEF anticipated even before the intervention of a global pandemic, COVID-19 is projected to force at least 88 million additional people into extreme poverty by the end of this year. These millions—many people of color, these—will be forced to subsist on $1.89 a day or less. 

I am discussing this with you because you—more than others—are attuned to the suffering of people of color in a world largely apathetic to their plight. You astutely observe that American institutions, currently constituted, are morally deficient, tending to protect our country’s wealthy and well-connected (most of whom are white) at the expense of the poor. But this astute observation need not—and should not—take us only so far as America’s borders (whose moral significance many of you already tend to doubt). Just as our government so often turns a blind eye to the suffering here, it neglects the hungry and sick who languish overseas. And until our government changes on this score, it is morally incumbent on all of us—on those of us paying attention, that is—to reach into our wallets to relieve suffering ourselves. 

If you are unsure as to whether we can actually do any good with our money, take comfort in the fact that vetted groups like GiveDirectly—among the most effective social action organizations in the world—reliably and cost-effectively deliver donated funds to the world’s poorest people. Recipients, in turn, generally use the funds for groceries, housing, and other necessities. Testimonials from these participants suggest that their newfound ability to make such purchases is nothing short of life-changing. Strategically targeted donations can make a difference after all.

But even so, you may say, this is not your issue. For your issue is racism, and the fact that Global Northerners watch as Global Southerners go hungry is not “about” racism. But you—an anti-racist—know deep in your heart that this framing is wrong. You, an anti-racist, familiar with the history of unequal distributions of welfare benefits to brown and white families in the United States, know that our country’s elite would not tolerate 35 million children’s deaths if the children in question were white. It is because the anguished are largely black and brown that so many people—whether or not they wish to admit it—feel comfortable shrugging off the staggering numbers with which UNICEF presents us.

If I am wrong, such that affluent Northerners wouldn’t lend a hand to the world’s poorest people even if these poor people were overwhelmingly white, then perhaps the world’s global poor are suffering, not from racism, but from poverty alone. But even if this distinction means something to those anti-racists who care about nothing but racism, why should it matter to you, a true friend of the marginalized? If your objective is to uplift black and brown people, then you should uplift them even if the problem that plagues them is not racist in origin.

Very well, you respond. But to donate money in the way I have described would be to turn yourself into an officious white (or Western) savior, a busybody presumptuously assuming the position of rescuer to assuage your guilt. This construal misses the mark, though. For if the problem with white and Western saviors is that they insert themselves into places where they are not wanted through activities that do not help much, then your donating funds to willing recipients who use the money for necessities does not make you a white or Western savior. Instead, it makes you—to use a word very much part of your lexicon—an “ally,” someone in a position of privilege lending a welcome hand to someone experiencing some social wrong.

Nor must—or should—your donation to the global poor emanate from a sense of guilt. There is, after all, no reason to feel guilty that you, through some twist of fate, ended up in the society of relative abundance that is the United States. To lend a hand, you need only feel a yearning for justice, for an economic arrangement that allows everyone in the world to eat comfortably before some live in opulence. 

Yes, that’s all well and good, but isn’t this approach to global poverty insufficiently revolutionary? Instead of quietly reaching into our pockets for money to give, you may insist, we should be out in the streets demanding the global adoption of democratic socialism and the gutting of those American institutions that immiserate the global poor. But you, a savvy strategist, know that no matter how hard we fight—and fight hard we must to effect change in the long run—neither democratic socialism, nor anarchism, nor any other radical “ism” is likely to materialize on a global scale by the new year. Thus, none of these “isms” will be adequate to uplift the tens of millions of people who will fall into destitution by 2021 if we do not write checks right now. 

Let none of this be taken as an indictment of your current and very important activism for a more just world. I wish only to invite you to augment your activism by taking a small but meaningful step for those whom much of the world has forgotten. If—as here—nothing less than justice is at stake, then we have no choice but to act.

Warm regards,

A Friend

Commentary
Should We Give to Morally Imperfect People?

Suppose that we endorse something like this moral principle:

The most moral way to live is to prevent as much suffering as possible. 

This principle is quite demanding, as it means (for example) that spending six dollars on an expensive cup of coffee—when those six dollars could more effectively relieve suffering in the hands of a hunger-fighting charity—necessarily falls short of the moral ideal. Indeed, to live up to the stated principle, we must forgo expensive drinks—not to mention fancy clothes, extravagant vacations, and big houses—insofar as these luxuries undermine our efforts to prevent as much suffering as possible. 

I leave it to others to provide a robust defense of the stated principle (in the event that it is correct). Mine is simply an attempt to answer one particular criticism of the principle. According to this criticism, the principle is self-defeating, as it advises us to help immoral people. The criticism takes off with this sort of example: suppose that I, moved by the force of the stated principle, decide to give $1000 to a person living right at the level of extreme poverty. If the recipient is himself complying with the principle, then he will take 900 of those $1000 to divide evenly among 9 other people who are living right at the level of extreme poverty. 

In the real world, however, desperately poor people who catch a “lucky break” in the form of $1000 might not redistribute any of their money to other poor people. In other words, they might not live up to the moral ideal propounded by the stated principle. Thus, those who seek to comply with the stated principle (it is alleged) are going to be aiding those who disregard the principle. This disjunction, it is further alleged, means that advocates of the stated principle believe, counterintuitively, that moral people must uplift morally flawed people.

This challenge, though important and provocative, does not effectively dislodge the case for the stated principle. To see that this is so, return to the hypothetical in which I give $1000 to a desperately poor person who keeps the money for himself. At this point, the objection to the stated principle is supposed to be that, in complying with the stated principle, I end up helping a person who—because of his stinginess—is morally flawed. This criticism misses the mark, though. For if I give all $1000 to the morally flawed person, then I am not complying with the stated principle. After all, the principle requires me to minimize suffering as much as possible, and if I give $1000 dollars to one morally flawed desperately poor person (when I could be dividing the $1000 among 10 desperately poor people), then I am not minimizing suffering as much as possible. Thus, this hypothetical cannot possibly be adduced to show that the stated principle instructs those who comply with the principle to help those who do not comply with it. 

Perhaps we can clarify matters thus: suppose that I divide $1000 evenly among 10 desperately poor people. This is what I morally ought to do, seeing as there is no more effective way for that money to prevent suffering. Then, each of the 10 people keeps her $100 for herself, which is what she morally ought to do. I say “what she morally ought to do” because—again—there is no one who needs the money more than she. Thus, if the stated principle is correct, then it is true that, in dividing $1000 among 10 people who need—and keep—the money, I do what I should do and that each recipient does what she should do. There is no contradiction here.

It may now be responded that advocates of the stated principle necessarily (and counterintuitively) condone lending a hand only to (1) those who need the money most or (2) those relatively well-off people who, upon receiving the aid, will themselves redistribute it to those who need it most. But this response gets things wrong as well. The stated principle tells us only what the most moral course of action is. Thus, the principle is entirely compatible with a second principle:

Action A, even if not morally perfect, is more moral than Action B if Action A relieves more suffering than Action B does.

If this second principle is correct, then—assuming that the only alternative is to spend the money on a Christmas sweater for myself—it is advisable for me to give $1000 dollars to a desperately poor person. This donation is morally advisable, we should note, even if the poor person will keep all $1000 for himself. For although I am not relieving the most suffering possible, I am—by giving money to a person much poorer than I am—relieving more suffering than I would be in the alternative.  

All of which is to say that, although “merely” poor aid recipients are (ultra-minimally) morally deficient if they fail to give some of their aid to “super-poor” people, that failure does not make it wrong to give aid to people who are merely poor. Indeed, lending a hand to “merely” poor people is generally highly morally commendable, even if it is not morally perfect. In a world rife with selfishness and unmet needs, we ought to applaud actions that relieve tremendous suffering, no matter if the people suffering are less than saints themselves.

Russian, Stateless Embassies
На чьей стороне вы будете?

Kevin Carson. Оригинал: Which Side Are You On? Перевод: demetrious, Nm Realname, анархист Иванов, Knivy, S.ANCAP, aportnoj.

Движение «Захвати Уолл-стрит» попало под огонь критики со стороны некоторых либертариев, на том основании, что оно совершенно замалчивает роль центрального правительства и средств, которые оно использует для увеличения государственной интервенции.

Но это вполне понятно, что многие в движении «захватчиков» ставят себя в оппозицию к «свободному рынку», предпочитая ему государственное вмешательство. В конце концов, все эти люди с самого рождения слушали таких отвратительных кретинов, как Дик Арми и Том Дилэй, наряду с обычными околачивающимися на CNBC и WSJ редакционными сотрудниками, защищающими известный нам корпоративный капитализм и называющими его невероятные концентрации богатства и власти результатом «нашей системы свободного рынка».

Каждый раз, когда вы смотрите дебаты об экономической политике, либералы говорят, что свободный рынок не может быть предоставлен сам себе, потому что неизбежным результатом этого является поляризация богатства и корпоративная тирания. А консерваторы говорят, что корпоративная тирания и поляризация богатства – дело хорошее, и что правительство не должно этому препятствовать.

Всё, против чего по праву выступают «захватчики» – плутократическую олигархию и злоупотребления корпоративной власти – они обсуждают и критикуют в терминах «нашей системы свободного предпринимательства». Если б я думал, что «свободный рынок» это то, что имеет в виду Дик Арми, я бы тоже его возненавидел.

Это не их вина – что они никогда не слышали свободно-рыночной критики корпоративной власти, что они никогда не слышали, чтобы кто-то указывал на то, что крупный бизнес является главнейшим бенефициарием центрального правительства, и что они никогда не слышали о причине, по которой подлинная, свободно-рыночная конкуренция сработает как взрывчатка для фундамента корпоративной власти.

Даже те многочисленные либертарии, которые регулярно выступают с осуждением корпоративизма, склонны занимать оборонительную позицию, когда они видят как те, кого президент Никсон окрестил «грязными мерзкими хиппи», критикуют крупный бизнес.

Так, например, популярный интернет-мем – графический файл, где к широкоугольной фотографии демонстрантов движения «Захвати Уолл-стрит» приписаны теги «фотокамера от Canon», «телефон от Apple» и т.д. Это всего лишь очередная итерация давно забытого мема, каждый раз с ухмылкой выставляемого на витрину, как если бы это были какие-то оригинальные или остроумные наблюдения – несмотря на то, что этот мем уже затаскан всеми, даже вконец тормознутыми репортерами CNN.

Это правозеркальное отображение популярного либерального «аргумента»: «А кто же при анархии будет строить дороги?!?» Обращать внимание на технологическую продукцию, которая была создана при корпоративно-этатистской экономике, и называть лицемером любого, кто использует эту продукцию и критикует при этом корпоративный этатизм – это такая же непробиваемая тупость, как и доводы Элизабет Уоррен в пользу некоего «общественного договора», где все обязаны отдавать «свою справедливую часть», потому что они полагаются на спонсируемые налогами дороги или полицию.

Можно было бы точно также взять фото с площади Тяньаньмэнь, или из Москвы в последние дни Советского Союза, и приаттачить теги в стиле «Бокситы из Министерства цветной металлургии», «Камеры от Министерства бытовой электроники» и т.д.

Как пишет Чарльз Джонсон, член консультативного совета Центра за безгосударственное общество: «…Если ваша цель – используя визуальную риторику для критики движения «Захвати Уолл-стрит», творить картинки, из которых можно сделать вывод, что «деятельность мегакорпораций неизбежно проникает в абсолютно любой аспект повседневной жизни»… то вполне возможно, что ваша критика не так уж результативна, как вы думаете.»

Нет ничего лицемерного в том, чтобы сделать наилучший выбор из ограниченного числа альтернатив, несмотря на сопутствующую ренту компаниям, в интересах которых было ограничено число имеющихся альтернатив, и одновременно критиковать несправедливость включения этих же компаний в систему государственной принудительной монополии. Именно по той же самой причине нет никакого лицемерия в использовании государственных дорог или почтовых отделений, как единственной возможности из-за ограниченной альтернативы, в то же время по-прежнему критикуя государство.

Люди, занимающие Уолл-стрит, правильно идентифицируют главное зло в нашей экономической системе, независимо от не всегда ясных представлений о причинах и следствиях и ошибочных предложений по их устранению: нечестивый союз крупного бизнеса с государством и плутократия, обогатившаяся за гранью человеческого понимания посредством сбора ренты со всех нас.

Есть такие либертарии, которые сходят с ума, когда видят как «грёбанные грязные хиппи критикуют большой бизнес», но есть и такие либертарии, которые сходят с ума, видя как некие «либертарии» крупный бизнес защищают. Станет ли либертарианство движением, отвечающим требованиям времени, или нет – зависит от того, какое из этих двух мировоззрений победит в этих либертарианских душах.

Stigmergy - C4SS Blog
Agoric Cafe: Interview With Kelly Dean Jolley

In episode no. 11 of Agoric Cafe, Roderick Long chats with philosopher Kelly Jolley about Jane Austen and J. L. Austin, the veil of perception, Ohio land swindles, the tyranny of nouns, screwball comedies, anti-psychologism, apophatic theology, the arctic perils of SUNY Oswego, the philosophic uses of poetry, Wittgenstein vs. Augustine, 18th-century literary nanotechnology, real love in the spy life, Howard Hawks as an Aristotelean ethicist, the problem of other minds, the Typic of practical reason, Frege’s three principles, religious language and the ineffability of logic, feeling William James’s ‘but’, and Lewis White Beck philosophising with a hammer. Watch it here or below.

Anarchy and Democracy
Fighting Fascism
Markets Not Capitalism
The Anatomy of Escape
Organization Theory