STIGMERGY: The C4SS Blog
King John Might Envy President Obama

King John of England, who 800 years ago this week was forced at Runnymede to affix his Great Seal to Magna Carta — which at least in theory subordinated his power to law — might have envied President Obama.

Sure, Obama also pays lip service to idea that the executive is subject to law. But what happens when he acts like an autocrat? Nothing. King John had to contend with rebellious barons who resisted his taxes to finance losing wars and other impositions. Obama has no effective opposition to contend with. He is free to fight wars as he pleases, never worrying that he might be deprived of the revenues he needs to engage in his far-flung killing.

We like to believe we’ve come a long way in those 800 years, but in important respects we have not. We’ve regressed, not the least in the sense that people no longer show an interest in resisting tyranny even through nonviolent noncooperation.

Observe what Obama is up to in the Middle East.

Marissa Taylor and Jonathan Landay of McClatchy recently noted, “As U.S. military operations against the Islamic State approach the one-year mark, the White House has failed to give Congress and the public a comprehensive written analysis setting out the legal powers that President Barack Obama is using to put U.S. personnel in harm’s way in Iraq and Syria.”

That’s right. Obama has been at war with the Islamic State for a year, and his administration won’t even do us the courtesy of spelling out his legal authority in detail. Lately, Obama has been intensifying his intervention in the areas that were formerly part of Syria and Iraq. He’s setting up a new base in Iraq’s Anbar province, which the Islamic State largely holds, and he’s increased the number of so-called advisers and trainers. The force that we know of is up to about 3,500.

Obama has not been totally silent about his legal authority. “The only document the White House has provided to a few key lawmakers comprises four pages of what are essentially talking points, described by those who’ve read them as shallow and based on disputed assertions of presidential authority,” Taylor and Landay write (emphasis added). Note: “to a few key lawmakers” — not to the public. I suppose the administration doesn’t want us to worry our little heads over this.

Taylor and Landay speculate that “by not setting out its legal case in public documents, Obama may be trying to preserve his flexibility to authorize new operations against the Islamic State or other extremist groups elsewhere, unfettered by constraints that could be imposed by Congress.”

Yet again, Obama sinks beneath George W. Bush. At first Obama invoked the allegedly inherent war powers of the presidency, ignoring the Constitution’s delegation of the war power to Congress. (Important figures in early American history, notably John Quincy Adams, regretted that clause.) Then Obama claimed the 2001 and 2002 resolutions authorizing military force in Afghanistan (against those who carried out the 9/11 attacks) and Iraq as authority. But this has been ably rebutted by various people, who point out that the Islamic State is an enemy of, not associated with, al-Qaeda; had nothing to do with Iraq’s Saddam Hussein; and did not even emerge until long after those resolutions were passed.

To complicate things, while Obama asked for congressional affirmation, he claimed he could legally fight his war without it. Congress’s ineptitude in getting itself together on the question, with Democrats and Republicans having different reasons for not coalescing, suits Obama just fine.

Of course, what the country needs is not a declaration of war from Congress, but a demand that Obama stop fighting wars without it. Fat chance of that happening, though. Few members of Congress want the responsibility of blocking a war.

Obama’s rationalization for autocratic military action is a license for unchecked global war. And that’s what we’ve seen throughout his tenure in the White House. His administration brags that airstrikes recently killed terrorist leaders in Libya (maybe), where Obama helped overthrow a government four years ago, and Yemen, where Obama ordered even American citizens killed.

Where are the protests? Where are the organized tax strikes? King John would be green with envy.

The Weekly Libertarian Leftist Review 86

Eric Draister discusses whether the war in Syria has become a regional war.

Donald J. Bourdreaux discusses freedom’s instrinsic value.

Sheldon Richman discusses abolishing special ops.

Steven Horowitz discusses socialism as war and war as socialism.

Walter Olson discusses truancy laws.

Gregory A. Daddis discusses America’s addiction to war and fear of peace.

John Wight discusses bombing ISIS into existence.

Phyllis Bennis discusses Obama’s strategy in Iraq.

Sherle R. Schwenninger discusses Obama’s foreign policy.

Jim Powell discusses Murray Rothbard.

Richard Falk discusses the Libyan intervention.

Robert Fantina discusses Israel’s increasing isolation.

Jacob G. Hornberger discusses federal judicial deference to the national security state.

Louisa Lamb discusses UNRWA cuts to Palestinian refugee camps.

Veronique de Rugy discusses certificate of need laws.

Matthew Stevenson discusses the ISIS takeover of Palmyra.

Uri Avnery discusses Bibi and the BDS movement.

Stanton Peele discusses addiction.

Daniel Larison discusses the ignoring of the Saudi war on Yemen.

W.T. Whitney Jr. discusses the war in Colombia and why it continues.

Lawrence Reichard discusses Hilary, Jeb, and faulty intelligence.

Sheldon Richman discusses the Magna Carta.

Looking Back at Magna Carta

Monday is the 800th anniversary of the day in 1215 that rotten King John put his seal to the sheet of parchment called the Articles of the Barons — later to be known as Magna Carta — at Runnymede in England. It wasn’t the first charter issued by an English monarch pledging to subordinate his power to the law (custom), yet it has had a staying power like no other in the imagination of people worldwide. This is especially ironic when you consider that at John’s request, Pope Innocent III nullified the charter just 11 days later and excommunicated the rebellious barons who forced it on him. (Further ironies: the charter had been drafted by the learned archbishop of Canterbury, Stephen Langton, whom the Pope had selected over John’s objection, and the charter affirmed the autonomy of the church.)

With the nullification, the civil war resumed between king and landholders who had grown tired of his taxes for wars in France (which he lost along with vast properties) and other impositions. In the end, however, they more or less triumphed, as John’s successors, starting with his nine-year-old son, reissued the charter, albeit in revised editions. The principle that an English king was not a law unto himself would stand. While Magna Carta did not raise the curtain on a libertarian, or even classical liberal, future, it may be said to have gotten the ball rolling, even if that was no part of anyone’s intention.

As I’ve mentioned before, the story of Magna Carta is instructive precisely because of its unintended consequences. This has been long noted, for example, by John Millar (1735-1801), a student of Adam Smith, a figure of the Scottish Enlightenment in his own right, and author of the multivolume An Historical View of the English Government, From the Settlement of the Saxons in Britain to the Revolution in 1688 (1787). The judge and literary critic Francis Jeffrey wrote of Millar in 1804:

To some of our readers, perhaps, it may afford a clearer conception of his intellectual character, to say that it corresponded pretty nearly with the abstract idea that the learned of England entertain of a Scotish [sic] philosopher; a personage, that is, with little or no deference to the authority of great names, and not very apt to be startled at conclusions that seem to run counter to received opinions or existing institutions; acute, sagacious, and systematical; irreverent towards classical literature; rather indefatigable in argument, than patient in investigation; vigilant in the observation of facts, but not so strong in their number, as skillful in their application.

Jeffrey wrote that Millar’s “leading principle” was that institutions evolve “spontaneously from the situation of the society.” “Instead of gazing, therefore, with stupid amazement, on the singular and diversified appearances of human manners and institutions,” Jeffrey wrote, “Mr. Millar taught his pupils to refer them all to one simple principle, and to consider them as necessary links in the great chain which connects civilized with barbarous society.”

(I found Jeffrey’s quotes in Mark Salber Phillips’s introduction to Liberty Fund’s 2006 edition of Millar’s An Historical View of the English Government. Phillips notes that one of Millar’s objectives was “a rebuttal of what Millar took to be the royalist and authoritarian politics of Hume’s History [of England], though Millar salutes Hume as “the great historian of England, to whom the reader is indebted for the complete union of history with philosophy.”)

Regarding Magna Carta, in book 2, chapter 1 of his Historical View, Millar writes, “The character of John … is universally known, as a compound of cowardice, tyranny, sloth, and imprudence. This infatuated king was involved in three great struggles, from which it would have required the abilities of his father [Henry II], or of his great grandfather [Henry I, son of William the Conqueror], to extricate himself with honour; but which, under his management, could hardly fail to terminate in ruin and disgrace.”

The struggles were against the challengers to his land holdings in France, Pope Innocent III, and the rebellious barons. After his humiliating losses in France, John made peace with the pope — accepting Langton at Canterbury and, in Millar’s words, “surrendering his kingdom to the pope, and submitting to hold it as a feudatory of the church of Rome.”

But his troubles were only beginning. Millar writes:

The contempt which this abject submission of their sovereign could not fail to excite in the breast of his subjects, together with the indignation raised by various acts of tyranny and oppression of which he was guilty, produced at length a combination of his barons, who demanded a redress of grievances, and the restoration of their ancient laws. As this appeared the most favourable conjuncture which had occurred, since the Norman conquest, for limiting the encroachments of prerogative; the nobility and principal gentry were desirous of improving it to the utmost; and their measures were planned and conducted with equal moderation and firmness.

John would have none of it, and he moved to quash the rebellion of the barons. “He endeavoured by menaces to intimidate them; and, by delusive promises, to lull them asleep, in order to gain time for breaking their confederacy.” When that failed, “he made application to the pope as his liege lord; and called upon his holiness to protect the rights of his vassal.”

War broke out, and the king, “deserted by almost all his followers,” saw the ranks of the rebels grow.

All further opposition, therefore, became impracticable. At Runnemede, a large meadow between Windsor and Staines; a place which has been rendered immortal in the page of the historian and in the song of the poet; was held that famous conference, when the barons presented, in writing, the articles of agreement upon which they insisted; and the king gave an explicit consent to their demands. The articles were then reduced into the form of a charter; to which the king affixed his great seal; and which, though it was of the same nature with the charters obtained from the preceding monarchs, yet, as it was obtained with difficulties which created more attention, and as it is extended to a greater variety of particulars, has been called, by way of distinction, the great charter of our liberties.

Millar claims that “feudal superiority of the crown, over the nobles” had been the rule since William the Conqueror, so “it would probably have been a vain project to attempt the abolition of it.” Then what was the the point of the gathering Runnymede on June 15, 1215?

The chief aim of the nobility, therefore, in the present charter, was to prevent the sovereign from harassing and oppressing them by the undue exercise of those powers, the effects of their feudal subordination, with which he was understood to be fully invested….

The jurisdiction exercised by the king, as a feudal superior, was another source of oppression, for which a remedy was thought requisite; and several regulations were introduced, in order to facilitate the distribution of justice, to prevent the negligence, as well as to restrain the corruption, of judges: in particular, it was declared, that no count or baron should be fined unless by the judgment of his peers, and according to the quality of the offence.

Millar then makes an intriguing point about Magna Carta’s application beyond the barons.

While the barons were thus labouring to secure themselves against the usurpations of the prerogative, they could not decently refuse a similar security to their own vassals; and it was no less the interest of the king to insist upon limiting the arbitrary power of the nobles, than it was their interest to insist upon limiting that of the crown. The privileges inserted in this great transaction were, upon this account, rendered more extensive, and communicated to persons of a lower rank, than might otherwise have been expected. Thus it was provided that justice should not be sold, nor unreasonably delayed, to any person. That no freeman should be imprisoned, nor his goods be distrained, unless by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land; and that even a villein should not, by any fine, be deprived of his carts and implements of husbandry.

I think that king and barons were aware of the fact, articulated by Étienne de La Boétie, that since the few rule the many, the ruled have it in their power to overthrow their rulers. Therefore, “liberal” measures are sometimes necessary to pacify the many to keep them from having revolutionary thoughts or to keep particular groups (such as the rising merchant class) from shifting allegiance to another contender for power. More often than not, acts of political kindness are the result of such a motive.

Thus,

It is worthy of notice, however, that though this great charter was procured by the power and influence of the nobility and dignified clergy, who, it is natural to suppose, would be chiefly attentive to their own privileges; the interest of another class of people, much inferior in rank, was not entirely overlooked: I mean the inhabitants of the trading towns. It was declared, that no aid [tribute] should be imposed upon the city of London, unless with consent of the national council; and that the liberties and immunities of this, and of all the other cities and boroughs of the kingdom, should be maintained…. The insertion of such clauses must be considered as a proof that the mercantile people were beginning to have some attention paid to them; while the shortness of these articles, and the vague manner in which they are conceived, afford an evidence equally satisfactory, that this order of men had not yet risen to great importance.

With the Great Seal of the king affixed, copies of Magna Carta were distributed throughout the country. But, Millar writes, “nothing could be farther from [John’s] intentions, than to fulfill the conditions of the charter.’

No sooner had he obtained a bull from the pope annulling that deed, and prohibiting both the king and his subjects from paying any regard to it, than, having secretly procured a powerful supply of foreign troops, he took the field, and began without mercy to kill and destroy, and to carry devastation throughout the estates of all those who had any share in the confederacy. The barons, trusting to the promises of the king, had rashly disbanded their followers; and being in no condition to oppose the royal army, were driven to the desperate measure of applying to Lewis, the son of the French monarch, and making him an offer of the crown. The death of John, in a short time after, happened opportunely to quiet these disorders, by transmitting the sovereignty to his son Henry the third, who was then only nine years of age.

Under the prudent administration of the earl of Pembroke, the regent, the young king, in the first year of his reign, granted a new charter of liberties, at the same time that the confederated barons were promised a perpetual oblivion for the past, in case they should now return to their allegiance.

There is much more to this story, of course. Suffice it to say here that Millar draws three broad conclusions from his account.

First, he sees significance in the fact that Magna Carta was not the only charter issued by a king; as noted, others were issued before and afterward. “Taking those charters, therefore, in connexion with one another, they seem to declare, in a clear and unequivocal manner, the general and permanent sense of the nation, with respect to the rights of the crown; and they ascertain, by express and positive agreement between the king and his subjects, those terms of submission to the chief magistrate, which, in most other governments, are [not] otherwise explained than by long usage, and which have therefore remained in a state of uncertainty and fluctuation.

Second, contrary to “common opinion,” Millar writes, “from the Norman conquest [1066] to the time of Edward the first [reign, 1272-1307]; while the barons were exerting themselves with so much vigour, and with so much apparent success, in restraining the powers of the crown, those powers were, notwithstanding, continually advancing.”

The repeated concessions made by the sovereign, had no farther effect than to prevent his authority from increasing so rapidly as it might otherwise have done. For a proof of this we can appeal to no better authority than that of the charters themselves; from which, if examined according to their dates, it will appear, that the nobility were daily becoming more moderate in their claims; and that they submitted, in reality, to a gradual extension of the prerogative; though, by more numerous regulations, they endeavoured to avoid the wanton abuses of it. Thus, by the great charter of Henry the third, the powers of the crown are less limited than by the charter of king John; and by this last the crown vassals abandoned some important privileges with which they were invested by the charter of Henry the first.

It Magna Carta was a key moment in the West’s advancement toward liberalism, the trajectory was neither straight nor smooth.

Finally, we come to the law of unintended consequences. Millar says students of history “will easily see that the parties concerned in [the procurement “these great charters”] were not actuated by the most liberal principles; and that it was not so much their intention to secure the liberties of the people at large, as to establish the privileges of a few individuals.”

He sums up:

A great tyrant on the one side, and a set of petty tyrants on the other, seem to have divided the kingdom; and the great body of the people, disregarded and oppressed on all hands, were beholden for any privileges bestowed upon them, to the jealousy of their masters; who, by limiting the authority of each other over their dependants, produced a reciprocal diminution of their power. But though the freedom of the common people was not intended in those charters, it was eventually secured to them; for when the peasantry, and other persons of low rank, were afterwards enabled, by their industry, and by the progress of arts, to emerge from their inferior and servile condition, and to acquire opulence, they were gradually admitted to the exercise of the same privileges which had been claimed by men of independent fortunes; and found themselves entitled, of course, to the benefit of that free government which was already established. The limitations of arbitrary power, which had been calculated chiefly to promote the interest of the nobles, were thus, by a change of circumstances, rendered equally advantageous to the whole community as if they had originally proceeded from the most exalted spirit of patriotism.

The power of apparent precedent worked in the common people’s favor; a small measure of liberty was parlayed into a larger measure, despite the efforts of the privileged classes.

When the commons, in a later period, were disposed to make farther exertions, for securing their natural rights, and for extending the blessings of civil liberty, they found it a singular advantage to have an ancient written record, which had received the sanction of past ages, and to which they could appeal for ascertaining the boundaries of the prerogative. This gave weight and authority to their measures; afforded a clue to direct them in the mazes of political speculation; and encouraged them to proceed with boldness in completing a plan, the utility of which had already been put to the test of experience. The regulations, indeed, of this old canon, agreeable to the simplicity of the times, were often too vague and general to answer the purposes of regular government; but, as their aim and tendency were sufficiently apparent, it was not difficult, by a proper commentary, to bestow upon them such expansion and accommodation as might render them applicable to the circumstances of an opulent and polished nation.

Can we libertarians do something similar today?

Abolish Special Ops Forces

It’s time to disband the Navy’s SEAL Team 6 and all other secretive, unaccountable units of the U.S. imperial military. As is said about lawyers, if we didn’t have these units, we wouldn’t need them.

The New York Times reported recently:

While fighting grinding wars of attrition in Afghanistan and Iraq, Team 6 performed missions elsewhere that blurred the traditional lines between soldier and spy. The team’s sniper unit was remade to carry out clandestine intelligence operations, and the SEALs joined Central Intelligence Agency operatives in an initiative called the Omega Program, which offered greater latitude in hunting adversaries.

Team 6 has successfully carried out thousands of dangerous raids that military leaders credit with weakening militant networks, but its activities have also spurred recurring concerns about excessive killing and civilian deaths.

Afghan villagers and a British commander accused SEALs of indiscriminately killing men in one hamlet; in 2009, team members joined C.I.A. and Afghan paramilitary forces in a raid that left a group of youths dead and inflamed tensions between Afghan and NATO officials. Even an American hostage freed in a dramatic rescue has questioned why the SEALs killed all his captors.

We are expected to trust the government that those operations kill bad guys only. But why should we, when it has done so much to earn our distrust? It has long downplayed the civilian deaths inflicted by drones, bombers, and ground operations.

The Times writes,

When suspicions have been raised about misconduct, outside oversight has been limited. Joint Special Operations Command, which oversees SEAL Team 6 missions, conducted its own inquiries into more than a half-dozen episodes, but seldom referred them to Navy investigators. “JSOC investigates JSOC, and that’s part of the problem,” said one former senior military officer experienced in special operations, who like many others interviewed for this article spoke on the condition of anonymity because Team 6’s activities are classified.

Even the military’s civilian overseers do not regularly examine the unit’s operations. “This is an area where Congress notoriously doesn’t want to know too much,” said Harold Koh, the State Department’s former top legal adviser, who provided guidance to the Obama administration on clandestine war.

Here we have a super-secretive unit of killers that is protected from accountability by its own. William C. Banks, a Syracuse University expert on national-security law, told the Times, “If you’re unacknowledged on the battlefield, you’re not accountable.”

Members of Congress pretend to keep an eye on the military to prevent criminal behavior — but in fact they are integral to the corrupt system: with eyes turned away, they keep it going with large sums of money.

“Waves of money have sluiced through SEAL Team 6 since 2001,” the Times writes, “allowing it to significantly expand its ranks — reaching roughly 300 assault troops, called operators, and 1,500 support personnel — to meet new demands.”

And this is just one unit, though it is the most glamorized, having conducted the raid that reportedly killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in 2011.

The Times quotes James G. Stavridis, retired admiral and former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, who said, “If you want these forces to do things that occasionally bend the rules of international law, you certainly don’t want that out in public.” By “bend the rules,” Stavridis means, in the Times’ words, “going into undeclared war zones.”

So politicians need secretive military units to fight undeclared wars — which would seem to violate the Constitution.

The existence of secretive military units conducting private lethal operations should bother anyone who aspires to live in a free society. Their very nature offends common decency. Yet a propagandized population takes for granted that secrecy is legitimate and necessary for our safety in a terrorism-plagued world.

Beyond the obvious objections to secretive military units, there is also this: U.S. intervention in the Muslim world makes people want to kill Americans, as government officials widely acknowledge. Secretive military units allow the national-security elite to engage in actions that provoke violence against Americans confident that Team 6 and the Army’s Delta Force will neutralize any retaliatory threat.

For our own safety, we must disband these squads of killers.

The Weekly Libertarian Leftist Review 85

Dan Sanchez discusses how U/S. intervention helps Islamic fundamentalist groups in the Middle East.

Barbara Myers discusses the unknown whistleblower.

Michael Horton discusses the Saudi state’s Yemen strategy of divide and destroy.

Laurence M. Vance discusses free trade.

Sheldon Richman discusses letting the clock run out on the NSA.

Alex Kane discusses the booming business of war in Israel.

Joshua Frank discusses why Bernie Sanders is a dead end.

Adam Johnson discusses GOP chickenhawks.

Gene Healy discusses the question of whether war hawks learned anything from Iraq.

Corey Robin discusses corporate authoritarianism.

Ryan McMaken discusses how governments keep you and your money from leaving.

Ilan Pappe discusses Palestine.

Dan Sanchez discusses the U.S. support for Islamic fundamentalist terrorists.

Robert Parry discusses a possible war with Syria.

Walter Olson discusses truancy laws.

Bonnie Kristian discusses freedom of association and Patrick Stewart’s commentary.

Jacob G. Hornberger discusses Max Boot and lying.

Jeffrey A. Tucker discusses what Bastiat had to say about police abuse.

David Correia discusses police violence against native people.

Norman Pollack discusses the march toward global war.

Alfredo Lopez discusses the USA Freedom Act.

Kathy Kelly discusses fear and learning in Kabul.

Matt Welch discusses the eternal recurrence of Bush conservatism.

Make Amazon Fund the Revolution!

The Molinari Institute (the parent organization of the Center for a Stateless Society) has registered with Amazon.com for an Amazon Smile account. That means that if you sign up for Amazon’s Smile program and pick The Molinari Institute (EIN 20-3731375) as your preferred charity, from then on every time you make a purchase on Amazon (so long as you access Amazon through the Smile gateway), Amazon will donate — from their funds, not yours — 0.5% of the purchase price to us.

Thus for example if you make $100 worth of purchases from Amazon via Smile, we’ll get 50 cents — paid by Amazon, not by you.

Donations raised through the Smile program will then be split 50/50 between the Center for a Stateless Society and the Molinari Institute’s other projects (including our upcoming publishing line).

Power Thrives in Complexity

In a democracy citizens prevent the government from abusing them by staying informed and exercising their “rights” under the system. They monitor the politicians’ and bureaucrats’ conduct, and when citizens see what they consider misbehavior, they act to stop it either by communicating to their “representatives” or by voting for better people at the next election.

That’s the theory.

In reality it’s different. Citizens don’t monitor the politicians and bureaucrats, and therefore are not in a position to stop conduct they would find objectionable. Occasionally, something egregious comes to light thanks to a whistle-blower and an enterprising reporter, and that may lead to some kind of reform — all too often merely cosmetic. But that’s the exception; most of the time it’s business as usual. As a watchdogs, the mainstream media are virtually useless. For the most part, the people are left on their own, but they don’t make good watchdogs either.

The reasons things work this way aren’t hard to see. For one thing, people are busy. They have families to look after, jobs to work at, and the day is only so long. As consequential as government is, this is not a case of misplaced priorities. After all, a person’s actions will have direct and often decisive effects on family, job, and other personal associations. In contrast, one vote has virtually no effect on the political system. Why spend time and energy where they will make little or no difference, when that effort could be put to where it would make a difference? It’s a no-brainer. (See Bryan Caplan’s The Myth of the Rational Voter.)

But that’s not all. Even a person who might be willing to carve out time to keep an eye on the government will find that doing so is probably more than he can handle. Apart from the natural barriers mentioned above, government personnel have myriad ways to obscure what they do. Whether this is done innocently or deliberately, the effect is the same. To most people the costs of monitoring the state are raised to prohibitive levels. This lets politicians and bureaucrats get away with things they might not otherwise get away with.

The controversy over the USA Patriot Act and USA Freedom Act provides a good illustration of this problem. Before getting into that, however, let’s look at the theory a little more closely. Fortunately, we have an excellent book on the subject: economist Charlotte Twight’s Dependent on D.C.: The Rise of Federal Control over the Lives of Ordinary Americans (2002).

Twight’s thesis is that the people who run the government have a long list of ways to raise the “political transaction costs” that the taxpayers would have to overcome to keep the state in check. In economics, transaction costs are the money, effort, and time spent on seeing a transaction through to successful completion. If you mow your own lawn, you face no such costs. But if you hire someone, you do. The effort and resources devoted to finding the right person and making sure the job is done right constitute transactions costs.

The political arena has transactions costs also. As Twight puts it: “They are the costs to each of us of perceiving, and acting upon our assessment of, the net costs of particular governmental actions and authority.” Besides the inevitable and built-in transaction costs entailed by government, there are also “contrived” costs, that is, those “deliberately created by government officials to increase our costs of assessing and responding to government policies.” The array of devices to raise these costs ranges from needless complexity and secrecy to outright lying. These devices have one thing in common: they obscure the government’s activities, making it difficult to impossible to see what the state is up to. As a result, most people perceive that even trying to lift the government’s veil is essentially futile. (And even if it can be lifted occasionally, what could one person do?) Twight’s book contains several historical cases illustrating her theory, including stories about the origins of Social Security, Medicare, and government surveillance — which brings us to Patriot and Freedom Acts.

If you followed the congressional and public debate over whether parts of the Patriot should be permitted to expire and whether the Freedom Act would really limit government surveillance, you’d be understandably bewildered. The amount of reading was huge, and nearly everyone had a different take. Defenders of government spying wanted simply to extend the sections due to expire, but those who wanted either to abolish mass spying took different positions. Just attempting to thoroughly read up on whether the Freedom Act was a worthwhile step toward eliminating bulk phone-data collection or just a cosmetic change would have required giving up your job or your family or both.

You might think you could leave the hard work to the civil-liberties organizations you trust, but that path was not without its problems. The various groups disagreed over whether the bill was a net plus or a net minus. Respected authorities couldn’t be sure that bulk collection of phone metadata would really end with the bill’s passage. For example, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), said, “So the bulk collection of everybody’s phone records? As far as we can tell, this should end that” (emphasis added).

As far as they can tell? They spend all their time watching this stuff.

Likewise, the Freedom of the Press Foundation’s postmortem on Congress’s action stated:

The USA Freedom Act supposedly bans bulk collection of phone records or any other private records, and we certainly hope it actually does. But its provisions are vague and confusing, leading many legal experts to believe they could be re-interpreted in secret — by NSA lawyers with a history of warping the common definitions of ordinary words beyond recognition — and could lead the FISA court to continue to allow the NSA to collect large quantities of Americans’ data in secret. [Emphasis added.]

The foundation is no more certain that the EFF about the bill’s effect on bulk data collection. If these professional experts can’t really be sure of the bill’s effect, how can the rest of us?

Even the guy who blew the whistle on mass surveillance, Edward Snowden, in a New York Times op-ed celebrating the expiration of Section 215, warns:

Though we have come a long way, the right to privacy … remains under threat. Some of the world’s most popular online services have been enlisted as partners in the N.S.A.’s mass surveillance programs, and technology companies are being pressured by governments around the world to work against their customers rather than for them. Billions of cellphone location records are still being intercepted without regard for the guilt or innocence of those affected. We have learned that our government intentionally weakens the fundamental security of the Internet with “back doors” that transform private lives into open books. Metadata revealing the personal associations and interests of ordinary Internet users is still being intercepted and monitored on a scale unprecedented in history: As you read this online, the United States government makes a note.

So why the big to-do about the Freedom Act?

If you wanted to decide for yourself without experts, you could have read the text of the USA Freedom Act. It begins:

SEC. 101. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CALL DETAIL RECORDS.

(a) Application.—Section 501(b)(2) (50 U.S.C. 1861(b)(2)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (A)—

(A) in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking “a statement” and inserting “in the case of an application other than an application described in subparagraph (C) (including an application for the production of call detail records other than in the manner described in subparagraph (C)), a statement”; and…

Well, you get the idea. It goes on that way for a hundred pages.

Even when you think you may understand something, you still can’t be sure. For example:

SEC. 301. LIMITS ON USE OF UNLAWFULLY OBTAINED INFORMATION.

Section 702(i)(3) (50 U.S.C. 1881a(i)(3)) is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

“(D) LIMITATION ON USE OF INFORMATION.—

“(i) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in clause (ii), if the Court orders a correction of a deficiency in a certification or procedures under subparagraph (B), no information obtained or evidence derived pursuant to the part of the certification or procedures that has been identified by the Court as deficient concerning any United States person shall be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, and no information concerning any United States person acquired pursuant to such part of such certification or procedures shall subsequently be used or disclosed in any other manner by Federal officers or employees without the consent of the United States person, except with the approval of the Attorney General if the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person.

“(ii) EXCEPTION.—If the Government corrects any deficiency identified by the order of the Court under subparagraph (B), the Court may permit the use or disclosure of information obtained before the date of the correction under such minimization procedures as the Court may approve for purposes of this clause.”

You might do better with the official summary, but not much.

To complicate things, your interpretation of the text may differ radically from that of the secret FISA court or someone in the Justice Department. Remember, an appeals court ruled that the now-expired Section 215 of the Patriot Act did not authorize bulk-data collection — and the author of the bill agreed.

Surveillance is hardly the only part of government with high contrived political transaction costs. The budget is another. A few years ago I learned the hard way that calculating the effect of budget sequestration is a task that only policy wonks and masochists were likely to undertake.

What’s the moral here? Power thrives in complexity, just as roaches flourish in the dark. Complexity raises political transaction costs and thereby reduces public scrutiny and resistance. That’s just how the politicians and bureaucrats like it.

The National-Security State Lives

Sen. Rand Paul accomplished something worthwhile when, almost single-handedly, he saw to it that Section 215 of the Patriot Act expired. For that he deserves our heartfelt thanks.

But where does the expiration now leave us opponents of indiscriminate government spying on innocent people ? Not in such a great place. Shortly after 215 disappeared, the Senate passed the House’s watered-down USA Freedom Act, which perhaps puts some meaningful, though modest restrictions on the government’s access to our communications data, but about which the civil-liberties community properly has decidedly mixed feelings. With or without the so-called Freedom Act, however, the government’s ability to conduct mass surveillance, unrestrained by the “probable cause” standard in the Constitution, lives on. The NSA and kindred agencies have had many more arrows in their quiver than Section 215. An appeals court had already ruled that what the government was doing — collecting everyone’s “metadata” — exceeded what 215 appeared to permit. Yet the NSA proceeded anyway.

As privacy watchdog Julian Sanchez writes, “While ‘Sunset the Patriot Act’ makes for an appealing slogan, the fact remains that the vast majority of the Patriot Act is permanent — and includes an array of overlapping authorities that will limit the effect of an expiration.”

Shane Harris, writing at the Daily Beast, puts it this way: “The really big winner here is the NSA. Over at its headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland, intelligence officials are high-fiving, because they know things could have turned out much worse.” Harris quotes a “a former senior intelligence official” who said, “What no one wants to say out loud is that this is a big win for the NSA, and a huge nothing burger for the privacy community.”

Harris adds: “Here’s the dirty little secret that many spooks are loath to utter publicly, but have been admitting in private for the past two years: The program, which was exposed in documents leaked by Edward Snowden in 2013, is more trouble than it’s worth.”

While Sanchez doesn’t call the Freedom Act a “win” for the NSA, he told the Daily Beast, “I’d certainly agree it’s not a loss for NSA in any meaningful way. Indeed, there are some respects in which a shift to the carrier-centric model [with telecoms not the government holding the metadata] is likely to give them greater flexibility by allowing them to query on data the FISC [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court] order doesn’t permit them to collect.”

Peter Baker and David Sanger of the New York Times write that “in addition to new restrictions on domestic data sweeps, the [Freedom Act] plan would require more transparency and introduce ostensibly independent voices into secret intelligence court proceedings.” But then they quote a “recently departed senior intelligence official,” who said, “This is hardly major change.”

So where’s the gain for the right of privacy?

Baker and Sanger add, “The legislation would still leave an expansive surveillance apparatus capable of tracking vast quantities of data. Some of the most sweeping programs disclosed by Mr. Snowden, particularly those focused on international communications, would remain unaffected. The N.S.A. could continue efforts to break private encryption systems, and information about Americans could still be swept up if originating overseas.”

The more one reads about the “reforms,” the more one doubts that anything will change very much. It’s enough to make one think that the row in Congress was just a big distraction. But at least government’s bulk collection of phone metadata as we know it will apparently end. As the Electronic Frontier Foundation puts it, “The text of USA Freedom Act is tightening the definition of specific selection term in a way designed to ensure only specific individuals, accounts, and devices qualify as specific selection terms. So the bulk collection of everybody’s phone records? As far as we can tell, this should end that.” (Emphasis added.) As noted, the program was expensive and it didn’t prevent terrorism anyway — needles are tough to find in haystacks — which may be why the NSA is not mourning the loss.

If the state is less able to access our bulk phone data today than it was last week, then that’s a good thing. But let’s not fool ourselves: the national-security state lives.

The Weekly Libertarian Leftist Review 84

J. Patrice McSherry discusses Operation Condor.

Laurence M. Vance discusses the question of why conservatives don’t follow their own constitution.

Kelly Vlahos discusses the march of the imperial senators.

Ivan Eland discusses hard truths about Iraq.

Andrew Levine discusses how America broke the Middle East.

Jonathan Cook discusses Israel’s government of zealots.

John Grant discusses how antiwar vets are joining the conversation at the Vietnam Wall.

Andrew Stewart discusses how Bob Woodward is now one of the president’s men.

Uri Avnery discusses peacemaking in the Middle East.

Dan Sanchez discusses dispossession and the foundation of Israel.

Barry Lando discusses the Gulf Wars.

Richard M. Ebeling discusses why markets should set interest rates.

Michael T. Klare discusses a superpower in distress.

Sheldon Richman discusses letting the clock run out on the Patriot Act.

Sheldon Richman discusses government vs liberty.

Ted Snider discusses Stephen Harper’s unprincipled and inconsistent foreign policy.

Ray McGovern discusses resurgence of the ‘Surge’ myth.

Glenn Greenwald discusses NYT coverage of the war against ISIS.

Jacob G. Hornberger discusses the similar character of the Iranian criminal justice system and Gitmo.

Robert C. Koehler discusses nuclear realism.

Ron Paul discusses the Export-Import Bank.

Justin Logan discusses the practice of asking people if we should have invaded Iraq.

Paul R. Pillar discusses watering Israel’s image.

David S. D’Amato discusses policy research and the limits of statistical utilitarianism.

James C. Wilson discusses the Anarchist FAQ’s section on individualist anarchism.

Ryan Calhoun discusses the recent conviction and sentencing of the Silk Road founder.

Richard M. Ebeling discusses why Keyne’s ideas aren’t right for China.

Jacob G. Hornberger discusses the meaning of free trade.

Jeffrey A. Tucker discusses the end of marriage licenses in Alabama.

Jacob Sullum discusses assest forfeiture reform.

Media Coordinator Report, May 2015

Dear Supporters,

May has come and gone, and with it, we’ve got another Media Coordinator Report to deliver. Here are the numbers:

  • 15,529 submissions
  • 6 pickups

If you didn’t catch my mid-month update, I laid out the submission and pickup process there.

Now, last month I said I fully expected to be back up to snuff with our numbers. What I wasn’t anticipating was a relatively slow month for us here at the Center. From April 29th to May 30th, C4SS published 16 commentaries. Some of them were incredibly timely, others were concerning more evergreen topics.

One avenue I see around that (which I will be pitching the rest of C4SS on) is a proposal to submit feature articles and blog posts to magazines and other news websites.

Other than that, our dry spell does seem to be ending. We’ve already got a new Kevin Carson article that went up today, and James C Wilson’s love letter to The Pirate Bay is also in our June queue.

Open Submissions

If you know of a publication in your area that you think would either be receptive to or open for publishing op-eds, features or blogs from C4SS, shoot me an email at media@c4ss.org. I’ll add it to our submit lists and we’ll see if we can’t get anarchy published in your area!

Also, I’ve promised it for too long, but June is the month that our media guide will officially be ready to share with you all. It will have tips and tricks on how to craft that perfect first op-ed. Here’s an excerpt:

The first, most obvious item you’ll need for your op-ed-to-be is… something to write about. And not just any something — something newsworthy. One of my first-ever pieces for the Center was an article on post-Superstorm Sandy relief efforts in New York City. While it’s not a bad piece of writing (he says, two years later), it would not be fit for publication today. Why? Because Superstorm Sandy is not a news hook anymore. Writing about historical events is only commentary-worthy if you can connect them to events occurring in the present — something you’re undoubtedly already good at!

Another good rule of thumb to follow: write outside of your scope. This is the most daunting task for a new writer especially, but if you can write on international issues from an international perspective, you’ll already have a wanting niche cornered.

Now, this is not to say you can’t write about, for instance, your local municipal government exacting civil forfeiture on your fellow residents. That kind of story has a long reach as well. It’s a different reach, but it’s not any less valuable.

But none of this is possible without readers like you. We’re able to keep the lights on due to your support, so thank you for everything. I’ll see you next month.

Yours in solidarity,
Trevor Hultner
Media Coordinator
C4SS

The Choice is between Government and Liberty

An article by George H. Smith from a few years ago makes a distinction about freedom that seems worth pursuing. In “Jack and Jill and Two Kinds of Freedom” (also a podcast), Smith distinguishes between (as the title indicates) two kinds of freedom, or between freedom and liberty. He tells the story of Jack, who wants to climb a hill to fetch a pail of water and needs Jill’s help to bring the heavy pail back down. Being a “moral nihilist,” Jack is just as willing to force Jill to help him as he is to persuade her. It all depends on his cost-benefit calculation at the time. In Smith’s story, Jack chooses persuasion and succeeds, so he does not need to resort to Plan B, compulsion. Jill, by the way, does not know that Jack would have forced her.

Jill, on the other hand, is a libertarian who believes in rights and justice. Had the tables been turned and she needed Jack’s help, her only acceptable course would have been persuasion.

What are we to make of this? In both scenarios Jack and Jill are free, Smith writes, in the sense that neither was subjected to force. “Freedom in this sense depends on how others act in regard to me. And since actions are guided by value judgments, I can be free only to the extent that others value my freedom by refusing to aggress against me.” But, he adds, the quality of their freedom is not the same:

Jill’s freedom, since it depends on Jack’s pragmatic calculations, may be called pragmatic freedom. And Jack’s freedom, since it depends on Jill’s moral values, may be called moral freedom. This does not mean that Jack somehow has “more” freedom than Jill; the distinction here is qualitative, not quantitative. Jack has a better quality of freedom than Jill, because his is more secure.

For the purposes of his article, Smith calls pragmatic freedom simply freedom and moral freedom liberty, though he does not propose this for general usage. (He notes that liberty and freedom are typically used interchangeably.)

He goes on:

Freedom, as I shall now use the word, exists whenever a person is not subject to the compulsion or constraint of another person. This describes an objective state of affairs. In our previous scenarios, both Jack and Jill were objectively free vis-à-vis the other person, because neither was actually threatened with force. The fact that Jack was willing to use force, the fact that he was willing to resort to Plan B if Plan A had failed, is irrelevant in this context. Subjective intentions and values have no bearing on our description of the factual state of affairs, the objective relationship between Jack and Jill.

Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between the freedom of Jill vis-à-vis Jack and the freedom of Jack vis-à-vis Jill. Jill owes her freedom to a pragmatic decision by Jack, whereas Jack’s freedom is based on Jill’s moral values…. Liberty is principled freedom.

Smith provides a few historical examples in which the two freedoms were explicitly distinguished. He notes that radicals in colonial America were not satisfied when the British Parliament merely repealed import duties (except the duty on tea, which is reduced) because “Parliament also reaffirmed its sovereign right of taxation.” The British in effect said, “We could tax you if we wanted to, but right now we don’t want to.” Smith writes:

American radicals spurned this conciliatory gesture, because the freedom from taxation was granted to them by permission, not by right. This rolling back of taxes, though it increased the freedom of Americans, was widely seen as a threat to their liberty. Many Americans believed that if they voluntarily complied with the reduced tax on tea, they would implicitly acknowledge the principle of parliamentary sovereignty and would thereby lose the ideological war.

Smith concludes by explaining that the term negative freedom (freedom from aggression) doesn’t fully capture how libertarians understand freedom.

Although libertarians are (and should be) willing to argue for the pragmatic benefits of freedom, most libertarians also understand that a free society must ultimately rest on a moral foundation, a positive respect for the moral autonomy of individuals. In short, freedom has both negative and positive aspects.

Thus what libertarians mean by freedom can be phrased both negatively or positively. We may talk about freedom as freedom from aggression or, as Ayn Rand did (quoted by Smith), as “freedom to act on [one’s] own judgment, for [one’s] own goals, by [one’s] own voluntary, uncoerced choice.” These phrases mean the same thing; one cannot be thought of without the other.

What’s intriguing about Smith’s argument is that different people can have different kinds of freedom, and the same person can have different kinds of freedom with respect to different people. When I walk down the street some people abstain from aggression because they regard it as too costly, while others abstain because they respect me and my freedom. In any given case, how can I tell if I have liberty as well as freedom?

Recall Jack and Jill. Without any external difference, they are free in different ways with respect to each other: Jack might recalculate his costs and benefits and decide that force after all is a superior means to obtain Jill’s help. But Jill cannot do that (without abandoning her moral principles). We could say that Jack values Jill’s freedom only instrumentally — the benefits of respecting her freedom exceed the costs — today, but not necessarily tomorrow. But Jill values Jack’s freedom constitutively: his and other people’s freedom — moral autonomy — is a constituent of her well-being, not merely an external means to it in some circumstances. So violating other people’s freedom is not an option for Jill. That’s why Smith says Jack’s freedom is more secure than Jill’s freedom.

This leads me to wonder about the implications of this distinction for the debate between those who would limit government and those who would abolish it. In Smith’s framework a government that abstained from taxing and regulating people without renouncing the authority to do so would be respecting people’s freedom but not their liberty. But if it did renounce that authority, would that mean the government — or more precisely, the individuals who constitute it — respected people’s liberty? Would their freedom be more secure like Jack’s rather than less secure like Jill’s?

Maybe we need not answer that question because a government that truly renounced the authority to tax and regulate would cease to be a government at all. The power to tax is a defining characteristic of the state. What is government without it? That’s why Ayn Rand’s idea of monopoly government without taxation is incoherent. (She favored a government that obtained its revenue by selling court services like insurance; some Objectivists, such as Murray Franck, disagree that limited-government taxation is immoral.) How would Rand’s “government” maintain its monopoly if it could not compel nonaggressive individuals to surrender resources with which to prevent the emergence of market-based agencies that provided security and legal services?  If a purported government lacks the power to tax — or generally, to use force against nonaggressors — why call that group of people a government as opposed to other groups that provide similar services?

Thus as long as government exists, no matter how “limited” by a constitution, our liberty will be in jeopardy, our freedom insecure. A monopoly legislation-maker and legislation-enforcer is an intrinsic rights violator. Even if it lowered the tax rate to zero (because, say, it had accumulated a budget surplus), our freedom would be insecure because it might raise tax rates next week. The only way for it to truly respect our liberty would be to dismantle itself.

But couldn’t a constitution limit the government’s powers? Do we have an example of a constitution that consistently limited a government’s powers? The United States has had two constitutions — the Articles of Confederation did not include the power to tax anyone or regulate trade — but they were powerless to prevent the government from acquiring new powers (assuming that was their purpose). Constitutions can be rewritten. Moreover, constitutions are expressed in language, and language must always be interpreted — by interested human beings — as new circumstances arise. No “correct” interpretation can be hardwired into a political system. All constitutions are “living” constitutions.

In the end, government defines its own powers. Not exercising a power is not equivalent to lacking the authority to exercise it. The list of a government’s latent powers is endless. Even when many people dislike a particular proposed power, government personnel have a variety of ways eventually to obtain it: indoctrination through the “public schools”; a manufactured crisis; blowback; and their broad ability, with the help of the embedded mass media, to control a narrative in favor of power. (Think of the USA PATRIOT Act.) One way or another, politicians and bureaucrats can in time acquire powers that today may strike people as beyond the pale.

Abolishing government wouldn’t secure liberty completely because nonstate organizations and individuals could potentially violate our rights. But at least the most threatening apparatus of organized aggression — the greatest danger to liberty — would no longer plague us.

Let the Clock Run Out on the NSA

Regarding the feverish effort either to reauthorize, “reform,” or abolish the National Security Agency’s collection of our phone and email data, two things need to be said:

First, thank you, Edward Snowden.

Second, isn’t it great to see the ruling elite panicking?

Of course, the discussion about NSA collection of our “metadata” wouldn’t be happening had Snowden not told us about this spying. Recall that before Snowden’s revelations, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper lied before a Senate committee about mass surveillance of Americans. Later he explained, “I responded in what I thought was the most truthful, or least untruthful, manner by saying ‘no.’” These are the kind of people we’re dealing with.

Keep that lie in mind whenever an official assures us that the government respects our privacy and other liberties. As they say in the law, falsus in unum falsus in omnibus — false in one thing, false in all things.

They’re panicking in Washington because the section of the USA PATRIOT Act (215) that is used to justify collection of phone data expires midnight Monday. True, a federal appeals court has ruled that warrentless bulk data collection exceeds the authority granted by Section 215, but that simply does not matter to some people. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell wants to reauthorize that section and thereby (in his view) preserve NSA spying. Fortunately, enough senators, led by Sens. Rand Paul and Ron Wyden, have stopped him.

The House passed the USA FREEDOM Act (how about outlawing obnoxious acronyms as bill titles?), which may have started out as a sincere effort to limit the NSA but was amended, that is, watered down, into a form that kept some original backers from voting for it. Republican Reps. Justin Amash and Thomas Massie, who oppose unbridled government surveillance, voted no. That bill would prohibit the NSA itself from holding the phone data, but the agency could obtain the data from the telecom companies with approval of the rubber-stamp FISA court.

The Senate, however, couldn’t muster the votes to pass the House bill, which leaves us in our present favorable condition, namely: if nothing happens, the NSA program will die at midnight on Monday. Paul, Wyden, and their allies need only play stall-ball to prevail.

No doubt a last-ditch effort to save the spy program will take place Sunday night, when McConnell brings back the Senate. He is willing to extend Section 215 for just two days, but even this must not be allowed because it will give him more time to gather the votes for a permanent reauthorization of the odious provision. (It’s odious even if it does not actually authorize bulk data collection, which its author, Rep. James Sensenbrenner, says it does not.)

President Obama wants the Senate to pass the House bill, saying it is vital to keeping Americans safe. But no terrorist has been identified through the collection of bulk data. This is also the position of pro-civil-liberties senators who are in a position to know. (Also see this.) Meanwhile, Sen. Dianne Feinstein, a surveillance hawk, has her own bill, which she offers as a compromise, but which can only do mischief with our privacy. The differences between her bill and other possible contenders are over how long the transition should be from government to telecom data collection and storage. That is hardly worth going to the barricades over. And even if the telecoms held the data, how could we know the NSA wouldn’t be able to get it whenever it wants, with gag orders to keep the telecoms quiet. Will Clapper assure us otherwise?

If this all sounds confusing, that’s because it is. Civil-liberties organizations are divided over the House so-called reform package. The grab-bag bill may offer limits on government spying, but any such provisions are likely offset by other clauses that expand and entrench broad surveillance across a range of media. Who can say how it all nets out?

Power thrives in complexity because most people won’t pay attention.

The process is fraught with danger, and I suspect, knowing how Washington works, the Senate will pass the House bill as a compromise. Let’s hope Rand Paul et al. will run out the clock.

Informe del coordinador de medios hispanos, abril-mayo de 2015

Durante los meses de abril y mayo traduje al español “El alma del hombre bajo el capitalismo según Sowell” y “Si el mercado es libre, no hay que temer por las nuevas tecnologías”, ambos de Kevin Carson, “Rothbard pervierte las ideas de Marx” de Erick Vasconcelos, y “Baltimore al límite” de David S. D’Amato.

Escribir material original para C4SS, traducirlo y difundirlo requieren de una fuerte inversión de tiempo y energía, y las donaciones de nuestros lectores son nuestra única fuente de ingresos para compensar parte de ese tiempo y energía invertidos. Por eso te invito a hacer una donación de US$5 a C4SS. Con ella nos ayudarías a seguir con nuestro esfuerzo por reflexionar seriamente sobre la idea de una sociedad organizada en base a la cooperación voluntaria y cómo hacerla realidad.

¡Salud y Libertad!

Spanish Media Coordinator Report, April-May 2015

During April and May I translated into Spanish “The Sowell of Man Under Capitalism” and “Nothing to Fear from New Technologies if the Market is Free,” both by Kevin Carson, “Rothbard’s Perversion of Marx” by Erick Vasconcelos, and “Baltimoreans Pushed to Their Limits” by David S. D’Amato.

As always, I’m seizing this opportunity to invite you to donate $5 for C4SS: your contribution is what allows us to keep reflecting upon and promoting the idea of a society based on voluntary cooperation. Please donate $5 today!

¡Salud y libertad!

Comebacks Require Leaving

For as much as empire persists, it goes rather unmentioned by virtually anyone outside of Left opposition to it, which has (unfortunately) little weight in the US at all. Those who support US hegemony & keep it going have learned over time to use code words & feelgood lies to avoid having to actually discuss the intended outcomes they shoot for. Well, today Robert Kaplan of the Center for a New American Security (really) decided to ignore that memo, putting a piece at Foreign Policy titled “It’s time to bring imperialism back to the Middle East”.

Kaplan starts off by noting the capture of Palmyra by Islamic State, and stating that the conditions of the region indicate the usefulness of the long departed Ottoman Empire. Because there’s no way that diverse peoples can live in the same area without an imperial caliphate imposing its will over them. Funny how easily he implies that self-determination & multiculturalism are poisonous…

(Wait, if he thinks that, then shouldn’t he like I.S.? They even have a declared caliph!)

Along with that burst of Brown People Are Naturally Nuts, he contradicts himself about what happened after the fall of that empire, in one part saying its collapse brought forth the ethnic & sectarian disputes and then in the next acknowledging that Europe divvied up the land as if loot from a successful bank robbery, drawing the lines that are effectively being erased to begin with. You can’t pin the fights on what you consider a power vacuum AND admit foreign parties rushed in to play with the ruins — unless Kaplan is saying They Were Asking For It. “How dare they temp the West by not having the military power to push them out after a huge global war??”

He continues:

[…]the demonstrably hands-off approach to these developments by President Barack Obama manifests the end of America’s great power role in organizing and stabilizing the region.

Because missiles fired at both Iraq & Syria as well as arms & aid to Syrian anti-Assad fighters don’t count. Even a Spec Ops raid inside Syrian territory doesn’t count! At this rate, neo-cons won’t count any actions in a war as war acts unless the president themself is on the ground gunning like Rambo.

Going on, Kaplan states, in lamenting their falls, that post-colonial strongmen (his term) like Saddam and Qaddafi held together their regimes with a secular identity, indeed had to due to those borders left behind. Yet more Brown People Are Nuts, while glossing over who got those regimes removed (George W. Bush & Barack Obama) and how (invasion under false pretenses & an undeclared air offensive on a side in someone elses civil war under false pretenses). He then notes a correlation between the relative stability of Morocco, Tunisia & Egypt (I guess you can call going from de facto military dictatorship to a Muslim Brotherhood regime to a coup & return to de facto military dictatorship in the span of four years “stability” on Planet Kaplan) with the locations of old Roman settlements.

“Why, if only Strom Thurmond had won the Romans had conquered more we wouldn’t have all these problems now!”

Returning to Libya, Syria & Iraq, Kaplan reiterates his view of dictatorship as the only glue that works. There’s a question raised here though: if this view is correct, then why bother? Of what value is attempting to hold together something so unstable? I’m not a believer in the intractability of ethnic & religious conflict, nor a separatist, but as one familiar with a strand of anti-regime nationalism at home (that is, black nationalism as embodied in parts of the black power movement) I’m also not one to blame an oppressed group for at the least shooting a side-eye at being ruled by outsiders. If they can’t trust each other, call the whole thing off, why not?

Iran is observed by Kaplan as stable due to its Persian cultural identity (read: these brown people are smarter than Those Damn Arabs), and as having inherited what the American empire left behind. This is like saying you inherited from your cousin leaving town the deer that he hunted & butchered & brought back for you to cook. Of course, Kaplan is among those that pushed for the war in Iraq (even having helped draft a government document advocating the invasion) only to later wring his hands over it. Gee, who could’ve known that obliterating a hostile neighbor to Iran would work to the benefit of Iran?

That said, the benefit to Iran as Kaplan sees it of current situations is far overblown. He portrays the nuclear program negotiations as a declining global power coming to terms with a rising regional power, never mind that the global power’s sanctions & constant threats over a non-issue — the fable of Iran seeking nuclear weapons, despite no evidence of such nor any clear incentive for their use if they did get them — are the only reason there’s anything to talk about. Oh, the poor downtrodden USA, having to make deals with people they hold at gunpoint, how sad.

To contain a post-accord Iran, the United States will need not only to bolster Saudi Arabia, but Egypt and Turkey as well. […] America requires a strong Egypt — democratic or not — as a regional anti-Iran ally to bolster Saudi Arabia.

Caring at all how the Saudi royals are fairing among all this, while they spread & largely practice the same kind of nuttery that when it’s I.S. doing it prompts BREAKING NEWS!! bulletins & heaping scoops of Be Afraid in the media. Man, that oil addiction has some power, doesn’t it?

Strong Arab dictatorships across the region were convenient to American interests, since they provided a single address in each country for America to go to in the event of regional crises. But now there is much less of that. In several countries, there is simply no one in charge to whom we can bring our concerns.

Why should they care about the US regime’s concerns?

And just when that wasn’t enough, he coughs up an outright falsehood with regard to the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980’s (emphasis mine):

That war, going on as long as it did, represented in part the deliberate decision of the Reagan administration not to intervene.

Reality: during the Iran-Iraq war, the US provided intelligence help & weapons to Iraq, including helping with the launch of chemical weapons, and funneled arms to Iran. That is, not only did the Reagan administration intervene, but they did so on both sides. Whatever contractors made those weapons is probably still spending money from ’88.

The challenge now is less to establish democracy than to reestablish order. For without order, there is no freedom for anyone.

Actually, “order” in the sense that the West sees it in that part of the world (that is, centralized authority that happens to play ball with their interests, populace be damned) is the problem. Seeking to impose that order is itself the chaos, as people like Robert Kaplan will never accept the alternative: a spontaneous order that finally writes the US out.

The Weekly Libertarian Leftist Review 83

Laurence M. Vance discusses dental regulations.

Ramona Wadi discusses the School of Americas and death squads.

Jacob G. Hornberger discusses Morsi’s death sentence in Egypt.

Michael D. Yates discusses honoring the Vietnamese rather than those who killed them.

Jacob G. Hornberger discusses the U.S. troops who died in Ramadi.

Jim Miles discusses Stephen Kinzer’s book on the Dulles Brothers.

Glenn Greenwald discusses the use of LGBT causes to further militarism and imperialism.

Dan Sanchez discusses Israel and the Palestinians.

Garry Leech discusses why Israel should not exist.

Laurence M. Vance discusses the GOP’s proposed budget for 2016.

Sheldon Richman discusses Marco Rubio as reactionary big government man.

David S. D’Amato discusses thomism and decentralism.

Lucy Steigerwald discusses Rand Paul and the tripartisan case for optimism.

Sheldon Richman discusses the Magna Carta and libertarian strategy.

Nathan Goodman discusses slavery’s incomplete end.

Andrew Levine discusses U.S. ties to Saudi Arabia.

Richard M. Ebeling discusses why government deficits and debts matter.

David S. D’Amato discusses wonkish libertarianism.

Glenn Greenwald discusses how the U.S. and U.K. hide their war crimes by invoking national security.

Ray McGovern discusses how to honor Memorial Day.

Adam Johnson discusses boots on the ground in Syria and the media reaction.

Bill Quigley discusses praying for peace while waging permanent war.

Peter Lee discusses the 1999 U.S bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.

Binoy Kampmark discusses the death sentence for Morsi.

Bionic Mosquito discusses centralization, war, and the Middle Ages.

William Norman Grigg discusses the state’s plundering parasites.

Eric Peters discusses cop immunity.

Magna Carta and Libertarian Strategy

The middle of next month will mark the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta. My knowledge of the “great charter” is modest, to be sure, but lately I have been reading about it and its legacy. (See the “Liberty Matters” discussion, in which I have a small editorial role, going on this month at Liberty Fund’s Online Library of Liberty. Also listen to Nicholas Vincent’s conversation with Russ Roberts on EconTalk. Vincent is the author of Magna Carta: A Very Short Introduction.)

Magna Carta was an agreement a group of rebellious barons forced on King John on June 15, 1215, at Runnymede, a meadow on the Thames in England, about midway between London and Windsor Castle. I won’t attempt to summarize the gripping story, but I’ll oversimplify by saying that the barons were fed up with the king’s demands for revenue to finance war in France and John felt compelled agree to their demands to rein in his power; in his estimation, refusal would have brought less-desirable consequences. The English branch of the Catholic church (this was pre-Reformation, of course) also had an interest in protecting itself from the king, and its concerns were addressed in the document, all 63 clauses of which were written in Latin on a single sheet of deer-skin parchment.

The charter is one of those things that virtually everyone across the political spectrum (however defined) has invoked in support of his or her cause. As the scholars point out in the “Liberty Matters” discussion, dissidents have held it up as a shield against tyrants, while kings have used it to defend the legitimacy of their rule. It’s been enlisted in a variety of missions. Advocates of slavery took refuge in Magna Carta, but so did the proto-libertarian Levellers.

It’s tempting to think of Magna Carta as a declaration of the limits of state power and therefore as an early charter of liberty. But the arguments against this perspective are persuasive. It contains little if any political philosophy. As Nicholas Vincent says, the barons would be appalled by modern conceptions of liberty. It’s also important to note that the barons, who appealed to tradition English, were not interested in everyone’s liberty but only the liberty of a small minority of free men. The language imposing limits on the king’s power was vague at best. Bringing the king under the rule of law sounds promising, but it leaves open the question of what the law should be. That was the king’s province. The much-lauded clause 39 in the 1215 Magna Carta (there were several versions) states:

No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any way, nor will we proceed with force against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land. [Emphasis added.]

The italicized words are hardly crystal clear. Trial by jury in criminal matters did not exist at that time. These words are followed by:

To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice.

Again, this sounds promising, but what is right or justice when the king owns his realm?

The principle “no taxation without baronial consent” also appears, though not in those exact words, of course. Nevertheless, the barons were not proto-libertarians. Defending the liberties of “free men” left a lot of people out of the class of beneficiaries. What the barons sought to minimize were John’s arbitrary diktats over themselves. They didn’t want it so “good to be the king.”

Regardless, neither side abided by the agreement, and war between king and barons ensued. King John appealed for help from Pope Innocent III, who excommunicated the barons and declared Magna Carta null and void because the king signed under duress. However, it was reissued by subsequent kings, albeit with important changes from the original, such as elimination of clause 61, which called for the creation of a council of barons that could sanction the king for wrongdoing. Why would any king reissue a charter that appeared to limit his power? Because having power doesn’t mean never having to bargain with those who would oppose you — bargaining may be the least costly way to maintain some power. (This point is made clear in the excellent British television series Monarchy.)

As Magna Carta scholars point out, the interpretation (mythology) and impact of the charter over the last eight centuries are as important as — maybe more important than — the document and the authors’ intentions themselves. Even if it wasn’t actually a charter of liberty, it is regarded as such — by people, as I’ve already noted, who have widely differing views on liberty.

This has implications for libertarian strategy today.

That genuine liberty — in the sense of what Roderick Long calls “equality of authority” — can grow out of efforts intended to achieve something less is worth keeping in mind. I claim no profound insights in the matter of strategy, but I do know that social processes, like the people who actuate them, are complex, and therefore unintended consequences — good and bad — are ubiquitous and to be expected. This makes devising a strategy for social change complicated and more likely impossible. There’s no algorithm for changing a society from unlibertarian to libertarian. We have no script. That’s an argument for the “let a thousand flowers bloom” strategy. (An earlier “Liberty Matters” examined the “spread of liberal ideas” through history.)

If troublesome barons in the 13th century helped to promote future general liberty without its being part of their intention, the case for libertarian optimism may be buoyed. Things may look bleak on a variety of fronts, but we can never know what might turn the tide. Magna Carta is not the only example of such unintended consequences. In Lust for Liberty: The Politics of Social Revolt in Medieval Europe, 1200-1425, Samuel K. Cohn Jr. describes many peaceful and violent acts of resistance against local tyranny, some of which won significant concessions from rulers. It is unlikely the rebels carried a treatise on political philosophy under their arms or a theory of rights in their heads. They didn’t gather in the village square to hear a political philosopher read from his latest treatise. The rebels simply reacted against particular burdens that had become intolerable; they did not set out to make a libertarian society. Yet they created facts on the ground, not always permanent, and set precedents for their descendents.

It’s more than likely that theorists developed their ideas after studying local revolts. In those days, theory and history weren’t compartmentalized. So it’s a mistake to think that libertarian theory must precede libertarian social action or that inchoate resistance unguided by “pure” libertarianism can’t make real progress toward liberty. Couldn’t a thinker spin out a theory of individual rights without prompting from history? It’s possible, but it seems more likely that historical episodes will jump-start the intellectual process and that theory and action (history) will mutually determine each other.

If you want a more modern example to go with Cohn’s, I recommend Thaddeus Russell’s A Renegade History of the United States, which chronicles how liberty was won in the streets through the misbehavior of riffraff who probably never read Locke or Paine or even Jefferson.

There is no one right strategy. If anything proves successful, it will be a loose web of complementary strategies (perhaps too loose to call a “web”), with a good measure of improvisation. Theories will prompt action; and action will prompt theories. Some approaches will consist in what will be labeled “compromise.” (Oh horror!) That is, individuals and organizations will advance liberty through partial measures to reduce state power. Savvy libertarians will capitalize on such measures to push for more progress toward liberty. (“If you liked Measure X, you’ll love Measure Y.”) They won’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good. In truth, no compromise is involved if an incremental step is regarded as such and not as an end in itself.

I need not point out  — or need I? — that merely because one incremental measure meets the libertarian standard as a genuine short-run step toward liberty, not all measures represented as such must do so. Each proposal is to be judged on its own merits, and good-faith disagreements are to be expected. That’s the nature of the endeavor. I see no reason for libertarians, in the name of purity, to withhold support for steps that make real progress toward liberty and pave the way for more.

The libertarian movement needs individuals and organization that devote their efforts to sound incrementalism, just as it needs those who do nothing more than teach pure libertarian philosophy. These approaches need not be at odds. In fact, they are complementary. One without the other is unlikely to succeed because society is unlikely to turn libertarian or dismantle the state all at once. Incrementalism without a guiding philosophy probably won’t get us all the way to where we want to go, while merely issuing declarations about libertarianism is unlikely to bring about change. How do we get from here to there if it won’t happen in a single bound?

It’s important not to conflate philosophy and strategy. An uncompromising market anarchist can coherently embrace incrementalism, understanding that because of most people’s conservatism, the state will not be abolished overnight. Murray Rothbard used to say that libertarians should take any rollback of state power they can get. In today’s environment, we won’t be setting the priorities.

What strikes me as futile is a “strategy” that consists in little more than boldly announcing that — if one could — one would push a button to (make most of the) government go away. That approach tells the uninitiated something about the speaker, but it says little about why a free society is worth achieving and why the state is our enemy. That requires something more than moralizing shock therapy.

Marco Rubio: Reactionary Big-Government Man

Republican presidential aspirant and U.S. Sen. Marco Rubio gave a major foreign-policy speech recently, and the best that can be said is that he did not claim to favor small government and free markets. What he wants in a foreign policy couldn’t possibly be reconciled with any desire to limit government power. Rubio is for big government no matter he might say on the campaign trail.

He acknowledged this when he said, correctly, “Foreign policy is domestic policy.”

Rubio set out a doctrine with three pillars, none of which which should comfort anyone who understands, as the great libertarian writer Albert Jay Nock noted, that political power displaces social power. The three pillars are: “American Strength,” “protection of the American economy,” and “moral clarity regarding America’s core values.” All three display a hubris typical of a big-government advocate, including those of the conservative variety.

Regarding strength, Rubio wants you to believe that America’s ability and eagerness to project global power prevents war, while “weakness” promotes it: “the world is safest when America is at its strongest.”

Where has he been this century? Does he not know that U.S. power knocked out Shiite Iran’s chief regional adversary (Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-dominated regime in Iraq), in turn giving rise to a more-virulent form of al-Qaeda (ISIS), which controls large parts of Iraq and Syria while extending its influence to Africa and elsewhere? Contrary to Rubio, violent disorder has been the direct outcome of George W. Bush’s post-9/11 invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and Barack Obama’s 2011 declaration of open season on Bashar al-Assad in Syria and bombing of Libya. (Al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks of course followed decades of U.S. intervention on behalf of, among others, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel.)

It’s not that the U.S. government should have sided with Saddam, Assad, and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, all secular rulers. Rather, the point is that the exercise of American power is most likely to muck things up. If government can’t manage health care (as Rubio believes), how can it manage regime changes in foreign societies? Why don’t conservatives ever ask themselves this?

Rubio thinks Obama, who’s hardly a dove, hasn’t war-mongered enough. The Republican wants even more confrontation — with Russia, China, Cuba, and North Korea. What he calls strength is just recklessness. Rubio’s speech demonstrates his unfitness for office (assuming anyone is fit for office).

He says he wants to spread freedom and other values, but he must realize that what American drones, bombers, and special ops spread are death and social upheaval. Again, where has Rubio been?

“America did not intend to become the world’s indispensable power,” Rubio said, adding, “America is the first power in history motivated by a desire to expand freedom rather than its own territory.” Here he adds historical demagoguery to political recklessness. From the start, many American rulers, who embraced empire, intended to make America the continental, hemispheric, and even world hegemon. War was an option, and no one — not the Indians, Spanish, English, French, or Russians — would thwart destiny. Rubio’s glorification of American “strength” is reactionary.

His second pillar, protection of the American economy, also shows his attraction to government power. Although he invokes “free trade,” Rubio embraces “trade’s role as a tool of statecraft that can bolster our relationships with partners and create millions of jobs.” So much for the free market. Again, Rubio is a reactionary. Most American presidents believed that trade was not a matter for free enterprise but a government program designed for politically objectives, including the benefit of special interests. (The military-industrial complex must be licking its chops.)

Rubio says he will promote, as his third pillar, moral clarity regarding America’s core values. Are those the same core values promoted by America’s embrace of dictators and monarchs in the Middle East (and elsewhere) and Israel’s decades-long oppression of the Palestinians, which Rubio supports? Note well that Rubio’s values do not include privacy. He wants to protect the NSA’s PATRIOT Act bulk-data-collection program.

Rubio seeks to “restore America’s status as a nation that shapes global events rather than one that is shaped by them.” We can’t afford another ruler with such hubris.

Media Coordinator Mid-Month Update, May 2015

Dear C4SS Supporters,

This is a new feature designed to keep you up-to-date with what we’re up to here at C4SS. This report will not be as in-depth as the monthly report, but it will feature some key numbers such as: number of pickups, and number of submissions to date. It’ll also function as sort of a digest of what we’ve published lately.

So far in May, we’ve made 12299 submissions to over 2150 newspapers worldwide. If that number seems low right now, it’s because we’ve only published 10 op-eds so far this month, and not all of them got a worldwide distribution. As of this writing, I’ve recorded four pickups for our articles, with more on the way.

Now, earlier this week I got a Facebook message from someone who was curious to know what my “process” for submitting articles is. Given that I’m still trying to figure out what that answer is myself, I figure it would be edifying to share this with y’all.

The Mailing List

This is where it all starts. I inherited this list from Tom Knapp, who had built it up from basically nothing over the space of about five years. It’s divided up over various regions: The US, Canada, Latin America, the Middle East and Israel, Europe, Asia, Africa, the UK, Australia and then two short lists for foreign policy and left media. Altogether, we’ve got a “list” of about 2150 various newspapers and media outlets who might be amenable to publishing our work.

During my first month on the job, the biggest headscratcher for me was figuring out how to actually send articles out to 2150 unique email addresses. Eventually, after struggling with manually sending bulk emails out, I settled on using Mailchimp to do the job. It’s one heck of a lot easier to manage.

But while having an email list is great, and while having an email list manager is even better, it’s all useless if I don’t have anything to send. Which is where our op-ed commentaries come in.

The Commentaries

Like I said, as of this writing we’ve published 10 op-eds this month. Before they’re published, they go through a vetting process in our internal workgroup, where each of the other fellows here at C4SS can read an article and see if it fits two important criteria:

  1. is it written clearly and succinctly?
  2. is it anarchist enough?

Sometimes this process can take a while. If an op-ed is time sensitive, that process may be abridged. After that, it’s cleaned up and scheduled for publication. Once the piece is published, it’s ready to be sent off to the mailing list.

I don’t automatically send every piece to every email or region on the list, as a rule. Take Billy Christmas’s latest article on the Tory victory in the United Kingdom, for example. While this article arguably is of interest to everyone who would normally read C4SS (and you should go read it), that isn’t how newspaper editors judge what to publish. Whether it’s a local or national outlet, what is of prime importance to an editor is whether or not a piece is relevant to their readers. US-based newspapers are drastically less likely to publish articles on the Tory victory than papers based in the UK or even in the “commonwealth” of Canada and Australia.

Likewise, an article about a US politician doing something that is only going to affect US citizens may not necessarily be relevant to readers in, say, China, Spain or Latvia. So for each article that gets published here, I have to determine the target audience. Once that’s done, it’s a simple assembly line process of crafting the email and sending it out. All in all, the whole process usually takes about 10 to 30 minutes per article.

Of course, none of this would be possible without your support.

Check back in at the end of the month for a more in-depth look at our numbers!

Yours in solidarity,
Trevor Hultner
English Language Media Coordinator
Center for a Stateless Society

The Weekly Libertarian Leftist Review 82

Jacob G. Hornberger discusses the hypothetical scenario of assassinating drug users.

Lucy Steigerwald discusses Jackson State and forgotten history.

Johnny Barber discusses the never-ending Nakba.

Sheldon Richman discusses the lies of empire and the Osama Bin Laden killing.

Jared Labell discusses libertarians and political violence.

Laurence M. Vance discusses what we should be saying to veterans.

Robert Fantina discusses Christian and Islamic fundamentalism.

Michael S. Rozeff discusses why Osama Bin Laden was killed.

Douglas Valentine discusses the Phoenix Program and torture.

Richard M. Ebeling discusses why spending and redistribution are not the answers to slow growth.

Amira Hass discusses Israeli colonialism.

John Feffer discusses celebrating destruction.

Ramzy Baroud discusses the Nabka and refugees.

Uri Avnery discusses the second Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

Jonathan Cook discusses humanitarian double standards in Israel.

Dave Lindorff discusses the potential jailing of a person captured at age 15.

Linn Washington Jr. discusses the bombing of MOVE.

Chris Floyd discusses the use of U.S. provided cluster bombs in Yemen.

Bo Filter discusses nuclear war.

Carol Miller discusses special ops training and the response of progressives.

Lawrence Samuels discusses the importance of chaology to liberty.

Cory Massimino discusses non-aggression, self-defense, and the death penalty.

David S. D’Amato discusses a new lexicon of liberty.

Billy Christmas discusses the Tory victory.

Kevin Carson discusses how wealth is already being redistributed by heavy taxation.

Erick Vasconcelos discusses Rothbard’s perversion of Marx.

Donald Devine discusses how to fight the bureaucratic state.

Dr. T.P. Wilkinson discusses the legacy of the Vietnam War.

Marc Victor discusses the increasingly libertarian world we live in.

Sara Mayeux discusses the dark side of police reform.

Disillusion and Dispossession: An Expansion

Anarchists usually don’t get too hot and bothered about general elections. While a change of command can no doubt mitigate some of the harms inflicted by particular governments, it makes no meaningful step towards the better world that anarchists want to see. We don’t feel any great victory if and when the lesser of two evils gets elected, but we might feel a sense of relief that particular injustices might be put on pause for a few years. On the other hand, when the greater of two evils gets elected, we might take solace in the hope that the current system could become so awful that it hastens its own demise. (I am reminded here of when American Leftists say they wish McCain had been elected over Obama — though their administrations would have been nearly identical, Obama’s pretty face is enough to prevent the revolution that McCain might have otherwise provoked.)

As an anarchist, I avoid doing anything that expresses consent to being governed, or an endorsement of any government; I am therefore a principled ballot-spoiler. However, there are two reasons why I was rooting for a Labour victory (or at least a Conservative defeat).

As someone who started thinking about politics around the time Tony Blair decided to send British Armed Forces into Iraq, I have always loathed New Labour. The British Left’s endorsement of new Labour on the basis that, whatever their faults, they kept the Tories out, is probably a major contributing factor to my disdain for the mainstream British Left to this day. In the lead up to this election, I was hearing more and more pro-Labour sanctimony; that they’re not perfect by any means, but they are our only hope. This snowballed into outright worship of Ed Milliband at a shockingly fast rate. All I could think about is how stupid these supposed Leftists would feel if Labour had gotten elected, and continued the overarching agenda of neo-liberalism at home, and economic and military imperialism abroad. Maybe after placing so much hope into the possibilities of meaningful change through the electoral system, they might start seeing why the problems society faces to day are nothing to do with the personnel at the top, but rather, the existence of a “top” at all. In other words I hoped that the election of the main party on the mainstream Left, and their ultimate disappointment, would hasten the end of the Left’s support for the Labour party, and perhaps the state altogether.

The other reason I had for hoping that Labour would win (or that the Tories would lose) was of other kind: I hoped that one particular harm that the Coalition was perpetuating might be mitigated by a change of government.

The Conservative Chancellor has been sustaining and inflating the housing bubble, particularly in London. The intimate and fragile ties between the housing market and financial products being traded in the City has meant that in order to protect GDP, the value of housing has been inflated through artificially cheap mortgages for landlords and more recently direct subsidies for first time buyers. This added on top of a layer of state interventions that give certain developers privileged access to land, and all the cronyism that dictates urban zoning rules. The increasing number of flats being built in London get bought as investments by people who live overseas and will often keep them unoccupied. The ever-increasing value of land in central urban areas has meant not only that there is a continual exodus of the poorest to cheaper areas out of town, but that developers look upon inner city council housing with pounds signs in their eyes. From the perspective of the government and their cronies, the opportunity cost of permitting poor people to take up urban space is just too high. Since the whole point of council houses is that they are not for sale (at least, not to people who don’t live in them), developers have to lobby the government to kick the residents out in some way. Of course, a straightforward eviction of council tenants and subsequent private development of the land would be too inhuman for most people to tolerate. But when corporations and the state get together, it’s a case of “where there’s a will, there’s a way.”

Many London borough councils have gone into partnership with private developers, such as Berkeley Homes, to “solve” the housing crisis by building more houses. Council estates are handed over to such developers for them to redevelop with vague promises in return that some proportion of them will be “affordable”, and that council tenants will be rehoused in the new development. Unsurprisingly, the developers usually find reasons to back up on their promises. Council tenants often end up being rehoused somewhere where their taking up space doesn’t have such an opportunity cost to the accumulation of capital (Wales, the North of England, etc.). Small businesses in the old developments are promised access to the new developments, only to be left on the outside looking in.

One does not have to dig very far in the mainstream left-wing media outlets to find countless incidents of these kinds of tales of gentrification through developers failing to deliver on the promises that putatively legitimised their redevelopments in the first place. But what is often brushed over, is that many of the people being forced out of their homes actually purchased their homes (or inherited them from those who bought them) under the “right-to-buy” scheme.

During his flirtation with the New Left, Murray Rothbard argued that the state’s control of any property is illegitimate and criminal, as such it should be considered the private property of its actual users and occupiers. For this reason I think that council homes should be considered the natural property of their residents (individually, or collectively as homeowners’ associations); however, even for those who don’t share this view (and one need not share this view to be concerned about the forcible relocation of people) and think that governments has some right to make “hard choices” about how to allocate housing, there is still cause for alarm. Even those who bought their homes under the “right-to-buy” scheme are being forced out. Developers “offer” homeowners a certain price (way under market value) for their property, and promise them that they will be able to afford to move back into a new unit once the redevelopment is finished (even though the whole purpose of redevelopment is to increase the value and hence the price of the property). Unfortunately homeowners don’t have the right to turn this offer down. There is too much money to be made by redeveloping inner city space; so the borough councils and the developers they are in bed with can hardly let a few holdouts get in their way.

The seizure of land belonging to the poor, for the benefit of the wealthy elite, at the behest of the state, is not a new phenomenon. Karl Marx called it “primitive accumulation”: it was a necessary condition for the creation of capitalism in England, and went on throughout the early modern period (and continues overseas today). If someone owns their own land, which, before the industrial revolution, meant their own home and their own means of production, there is no way to exploit them. No framework for exploitation means no income for the classes who deem themselves too highborn for real wealth-creating work. Workers owning their own land is therefore a stumbling block for economic exploitation, one that, as history has shown, can only be removed forcefully through the state. Modern capitalism gets its legitimacy from the notion that, while perhaps unfair or ugly in many ways, it does not depend upon theft or fraud in any way. The fresh round of primitive accumulation going on in London should be a reminder to everyone that this is a fiction: in order for economic exploitation to continue, the poor must be continually plundered, pushed around, and denied any degree of autonomy by the state. The robbery of the working class is not an inevitability or a “natural” economic force; it is something that can be brought to an end. If there were no state through which to violently impose the will of corporate developers, they would have to find other more honest ways of earning their money. As Franz Oppenheimer said, there are two ways to make a living: one can create wealth (the “economic means”), or one can take wealth from those who create it (the “political means”). Without help from the state (which Oppenheimer called “the organization of the political means”), housing developers would have a far harder time making a living.

The Conservative Party’s insistence on inflating the value of property, thus driving the forces of primitive accumulation forward along with Labour’s rejection of the various “help-to-buy” schemes that contribute toward this, led me to think that for all the harm a Labour government would continue to inflict, perhaps this, most naked form of injustice, might be mitigated or even stopped. Perhaps it was naïve to think that anything could stop it at this point, just as there is such opportunity cost for developers not to get the government to give them control of all this urban space, there was also too much of an opportunity cost to those same interests for allowing Labour to get elected. Then again, it was probably naïve to think that if Labour had gotten in, they would have had the desire or the political wherewithal to get in the way of such primitive accumulation. Maybe we all get a bit naïve around election time. But now that the Tories are safely back in power, let us not be naïve anymore. If every time an election comes around, our best (and in reality, vain) hope is that a party will get elected that will achieve some small reduction in the suffering caused by the ongoing global system of economic exchange rigged to benefit a certain class, then we really need to do better at looking beyond the ballot box for achieving change.

Anarchy and Democracy
Fighting Fascism
Markets Not Capitalism
The Anatomy of Escape
Organization Theory