There’s a popular historical legend that goes like this: Once upon a time (for this is how stories of this kind should begin), back in the 19th century, the United States economy was almost completely unregulated and laissez-faire. But then there arose a movement to subject business to regulatory restraint in the interests of workers and consumers, a movement that culminated in the presidencies of Wilson and the two Roosevelts.
This story comes in both left-wing and right-wing versions, depending on whether the government is seen as heroically rescuing the poor and weak from the rapacious clutches of unrestrained corporate power, or as unfairly imposing burdensome socialistic fetters on peaceful and productive enterprise. But both versions agree on the central narrative: a century of laissez-faire, followed by a flurry of anti-business legislation.
Every part of this story is false. To begin with, there never was anything remotely like a period of laissez-faire in American history (at least not if “laissez-faire” means “let the market operate freely” as opposed to “let the rich and powerful help themselves to other people’s property”). The regulatory state was deeply involved from the start, particularly in the banking and currency industries and in the assignment of property titles to land. (Even such land as was not stolen from the natives was seldom appropriated in accordance with any sort of Lockean homesteading principle; instead, vast tracts of unimproved land were simply declared property by barbed wire or legislative fiat.)
The early republic’s two major political factions – to oversimplify a bit, call them the Jeffersonians (as represented by the Democrats) and the Hamiltonians (as represented successively by the Federalists, Whigs, and Republicans) – disagreed primarily about which forms of governmental interference to emphasise. To be sure, both side paid lip service (and sometimes more than lip service) to the “Principles of ’76,” i.e., the libertarian ideals enshrined in the Declaration of Independence; but each side quickly deviated from those principles when doing so served its economic interest. The Hamiltonians, whose chief base of support was in the urban financial centers of the northeast, called for mercantilist interventions such as subsidies, protectionist tariffs, and central banks; the Jeffersonians, whose chief base of support was rural, including the plantations and the frontier, called for state assistance in extracting labour from slaves and land from Native Americans. In each case the state ran roughshod over laissez-faire in the interests of a privileged elite.
To be sure, the Hamiltonians sometimes offered up good libertarian-sounding defenses of the rights of blacks and Indians, while the Jeffersonians offered up equally libertarian-sounding condemnations of mercantile privilege; but it’s relatively costless to take a stand against those violations of liberty of which your political opponents, rather than yourselves, are the primary beneficiaries.
But while 19th-century America was no free market, it was still too free-market for the corporate elite, who accordingly campaigned for government relief against “cut-throat competition.” As Adam Smith famously pointed out, “People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices”; hence the perpetual mercantile quest for monopoly privilege.
One especially useful service that the state can render the corporate elite is cartel enforcement. Price-fixing agreements are unstable on a free market, since while all parties to the agreement have a collective interest in seeing the agreement generally hold, each has an individual interest in breaking the agreement by underselling the other parties in order to win away their customers; and even if the cartel manages to maintain discipline over its own membership, the oligopolistic prices tend to attract new competitors into the market. Hence the advantage to business of state-enforced cartelisation. Often this is done directly, but there are indirect ways too, such as imposing uniform quality standards that relieve firms from having to compete in quality. (And when the quality standards are high, lower-quality but cheaper competitors are priced out of the market.)
The ability of colossal firms to exploit economies of scale is also limited in a free market, since beyond a certain point the benefits of size (e.g., reduced transaction costs) get outweighed by diseconomies of scale (e.g., calculational chaos stemming from absence of price feedback) – unless the state enables them to socialise these costs by immunising them from competition – e.g., by imposing fees, licensure requirements, capitalisation requirements, and other regulatory burdens that disproportionately impact newer, poorer entrants as opposed to richer, more established firms.
The vast regulatory apparatus that emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was thus specifically campaigned for by the business community. (This is documented for the “Progressive” era by James Weinstein’s Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, Gabriel Kolko’s Railroads and Regulation and Triumph of Conservatism, and Murray Rothbard and Ronald Radosh’s [PDF] New History of Leviathan; their findings are usefully summarised in Roy Childs’ article “Big Business and the Rise of American Statism.” Butler Shaffer’s In Restraint of Trade extends the analysis through the New Deal.) The supposedly pro-labour legislation that emerged from this area was also mostly bogus, a matter of co-opting labour leaders into a junior partnership with government and business in exchange for not rocking the boat.
That this should be so is not terribly surprising; wealthy, concentrated interests are inevitably going to have a greater impact on the political process than poorer and more dispersed ones. (Contrary to popular wisdom, which has the contrast going the other way, it is only on the market, where the price system aggregates the preferences of the poorer and more dispersed, that the latter can systematically trounce the influence of business power.) What is more surprising is that such blatantly and thoroughgoingly pro-business legislation should have been perceived as anti-business.
But in the end this is not really all that surprising either. Of course these pro-business “reforms” had to be packaged as anti-business in order for the politicians and their corporate cronies to get away with them. Moreover, many of the instigators appear to have sincerely believed, on ideological grounds, that control of the economy by a government-business partnership was in the best interests of the general populace; and thanks to such partnerships’ disproportionate control of the means of information (media and public education), the rest of society could be brought to take a similar view. In addition, because business and government each always want to be the dominant partner, there was inevitably some grumbling in the business community about the precise way in which, for example, FDR advanced their shared corporatist agenda, and this likewise contributed to the misperception of fundamental antagonism. But the historical research cited above indicates that big business has been the chief architect and cheerleader for the regulations that are supposedly designed to restrain its power. Liberals who advocate further such regulations in order to combat plutocracy, and libertarians who leap to the defense of the poor embattled corporation, are equally misguided.
This entry was posted September 18th, 2008.



You say that it's pretty costless to take a stand against those violations of liberty of which your political opponents, rather than yourselves, are the primary beneficiaries. Would you say there's a difference between working class complaints with cutthroat competition and privileged opposition to "cutthroat competition?" Or is having a feeling that one is being beaten down by the religion of competitiveness just another way of being misguided?
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Well, cutthroat competition among employers means higher wages for employees, and cutthroat competition among companies means lower prices for consumers.
My thoughts? Varies from person to person. I have listened to the dialogue "The Individualist and the Communist". To pre-empt, I am aware that Voltairine de Cleyre changed her mind and became a communist anarchist herself-on the basis that material conditions had changed and that Tucker's remedies would not be practical. It wasn't out of any sudden change in her outlook; nor did her respect for Tucker ever really diminish.
But, anyway, the dialog. That was about as fair a discussion as I can expect between an individualist anarchist and a communist anarchist, each representing the sharper contrasts within anarchism. Despite being a committed individualist, I am actually not dismissive the communist's objections.
I have come a long way since my Objectivist days. My heart is not made of stone.
He isn't wrong. But neither is the Individualist. The cutthroat competition you object to is the competition between workers for the master class's jobs. Competition here, by and large, is free. Cutthroat is no exaggeration. That is certainly good for the masters. Despite their public pretensions to being our noble "job-creators", labor is a cost to them; it eats into their profits. The lower cost of hands and brains -and that is all we are to them-, the better they are.
Do they compete among themselves though? Not in any appreciable way. Directorships between companies is pretty interlocked; only a few companies control media outlets of any consequence; independent publishing houses are now mere subsidiaries of larger entities. For them to have to compete in any meaningful way would be disastrous. Nor do they bear their costs.
This does not answer your objection. The Individualist's arguments did not either. Nor was that the purpose; clarification, not conversion, is the purpose. Yours is a moral argument that cooperative behavior is superior, largely on moral grounds, and on the grounds that you can't compete. Indeed, that is the Communist's objection: what of those who cannot compete? As much as free access to unused land, gratuitous credit, the absence of patents, the repository of information that is the internet, cheaper prices, etc would enable more to compete-what of those who still can't? It is a larger number than one may realize.
My own thoughts: It is easy to make a fetish of competition in the abstract. Ideas in the abstract easily transform into what Striner aptly called "fixed ideas". Only in the concrete, in context, can any conclusions about the merits of competition-or, for that matter, cooperation-be drawn. You can see what I am getting at. As of this particular moment (and things could change), I think you are haunted by another thing Stirner criticized: a spook. I grant, based on my scant moments of reading your blog, that it is grounded in your experience. I still think you are mistaken, in that I do not see any concrete manifestation of the "religion of competitiveness".
Sometimes, cooperation is not a good thing. Consider the hard sciences. Ideally it is a pressure cooker; one can't just put out any fool theory and expect "cooperation" or respect for it. No, other scientists would immediately be searching for any flaw or error, and then jump down the upstart's throat over them (no matter how minor); in fact, they are duty-bound. What's more, others are seeking to offer their own competing theories-and it is clear there can only be one victor. Why this ruthlessness? Why do scientists (ideally) treat each other cruelly? Simple: because if they give anyone a break or a pass, errors will propagate at a higher rate than if they didn't. They share their data with one another, of course. But the competition doesn't disappear. A broad picture, but here ruthless competition is essential if the fields are to be at their best. You mention you are a hacker? Do you give a free pass to shoddy code? Does competition play no role?
It's apparent that capitalists sing praises of it. Self-proclaimed Christians sing the praises of Christ too. That either group actually practices what they preach is another matter.
So, there is a difference between an opposition to competition by workers and those same complaints made by those of a more privileged background. Workers compete among themselves for opportunities monopolized by a comparative few. When a rich person complains of "excessive competition", you can be sure that it is a contrivance to raise prices and lower wages. Or it could be an aristocratic disdain for it, or a managerial New Class whine about it. They certainly do not practice a "religion of competitiveness"!
In regards to your second question: again, it depends on the context, the class in question, etc.
Remember, under capitalism-as system of privilege backed by the State-things that are innocuous (even good) are twisted to its ends. This is so for cooperation as much as competition.
At any rate, liberty is the thing. To compete or cooperate is a decision each must make.
The aforementioned was a long brain fart.
I think we do Voltarine de Cleyre a disservice by footnoting her under either the individualist or communist traditions. She was an anarchist completely, yet never simply. She will critique both traditions from any and all positions available or possible.
"Towards the end of her life she began to work closely with the libertarian communists, but refused to commit herself to their ideas, preferring to call herself an "anarchist without adjectives" and adopting a pluralist view of any future "free society." Indeed, Paul Avrich shows conclusively that, despite claims by Rudolf Rocker and Emma Goldman, she did not embrace communism." — S.E. Parker, Voltairine de Cleyre
"I am not now, and have never been at any time, a communist." — Voltairine de Cleyre
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Interesting. I'm not sure if I agree/disagree with the conclusions, or whether I've already moved beyond them.