Center for a Stateless Society » War on Drugs

In questo modo, l’Fbi ha dimostrato una volta di più che la guerra alla droga non ha niente a che vedere con quello che sostengono i suoi propagandisti. Se la criminalizzazione della droga è un problema di pubblica sicurezza (lotta al crimine violento e alle bande di strada, eliminazione del rischio di overdose e intossicazione) la chiusura di Silk Road è uno degli atti più stupidi che i federali possano commettere. Silk Road rappresentava un mercato sicuro e anonimo in cui acquirenti e venditori potevano fare affari senza incorrere in quei rischi associati al commercio che avviene per strada. Il sistema che permetteva di valutare la reputazione del venditore significava che le droghe vendute su Silk Road erano molto più pulite e sicure delle loro controparti della strada.

Questo vale anche per tutti gli altri punti di vendita nel mirino della guerra alla droga. Hillary Clinton, con uno dei commenti forse più stupidi mai fatti da un essere umano, dice che la legalizzazione dei narcotici è una cattiva idea “perché ci sono troppi soldi in gioco”, riferendosi, immagino, al lucroso traffico di droga e ai cartelli che ci fanno sopra la guerra.

Ma se ci sono così tanti soldi, e i cartelli si fanno la guerra per controllare il traffico, è solo perché le droghe sono illegali. Questo è ciò che accade quando si criminalizza la roba che la gente vorrebbe acquistare: si dà vita ad un mercato nero con prezzi molto più alti, mercato per il cui controllo le bande si fanno la guerra. Il proibizionismo degli alcolici, ad esempio, è alla base della cultura dei gangster degli anni venti, cultura che è rimasta. Quando fu abolito, la criminalità organizzata semplicemente passò alla guerra per la conquista di altri mercati illegali. Più le attività consensuali e non violente vengono bandite, e più è grande la parte dell’economia che si trasforma in mercato nero per la conquista del quale le bande combattono.

Notizia interessante, si dice che i cartelli della droga messicani guadagnino meno da quando l’erba è stata legalizzata o decriminalizzata in alcuni stati degli Stati Uniti. Chissà perché.

La battuta più divertente è forse dire che questa guerra serve a ridurre l’uso delle droghe. Non dubito che molti di quelli che sono coinvolti nella guerra alla droga ci credano davvero, ma la mano sinistra non sa cosa fa la destra. Il traffico di droga è un’enorme fonte di ricchezza per le bande che lo controllano. Ma sono i servizi segreti americani ad essere una delle più grosse bande di narcotraffico al mondo. Per loro il traffico mondiale di droga rappresenta un modo egregio per raccogliere denaro, usato poi per fare quelle cose ripugnanti per le quali il Congresso non dà fondi. Sono passati vent’anni da quando il giornalista Gary Webb rivelò le collusioni dell’ufficio di gabinetto di Reagan con i cartelli della cocaina negli Stati Uniti, al fine di raccogliere fondi da destinare alle squadracce di destra, i Contras, in Nicaragua. Per queste rivelazioni, servizi segreti e stampa tradizionale esercitarono sul giornalista una violenza psicologica tale da portarlo al suicidio.

Ora dicono che gli Stati Uniti stanno “perdendo la guerra alla droga in Afganistan”. È ovvio: è una guerra pensata per essere persa. Nell’autunno del 2001 fu così facile rovesciare il regime talebano perché stava già cercando di eliminare la coltivazione dell’oppio, e con un certo successo. Questo non stava bene alla popolazione afgana, che tradizionalmente guadagna coltivando il papavero. C’era però l’Alleanza del Nord, trasformata dagli Stati Uniti nel governo nazionale afgano, che era molto favorevole alla coltivazione del papavero nei suoi territori. Quando il regime talebano fu rovesciato, la coltivazione del papavero e la produzione di eroina ripresero ai livelli di prima. Incaricare gli Stati Uniti della “guerra alla droga in Afganistan” è come chiedere ad Al Capone di applicare le leggi proibizioniste.

Se si vuole davvero “vincere” la guerra alla droga bisogna eliminarla. E chi tra le forze dell’ordine americane vuole eliminare questa fonte di miliardi sotto forma di aiuti federali ed equipaggiamenti militari, squadre Swat militarizzate, un sistema di sorveglianza senza precedenti e il potere di confiscare i beni degli accusati? Questa è una guerra pensata per durare all’infinito, come la cosiddetta guerra al terrorismo.

Lo stato incentiva sempre il panico morale e le “guerre” contro questo o quello per tenerci nella paura e costringerci a cedere il potere sulla nostra vita. Non credete a queste bugie.

Traduzione di Enrico Sanna.

The Weekly Libertarian Leftist and Chess Review 57

Natasha Petrova — Mon, 24 Nov 2014 00:00:41 +0000

Laurence M. Vance discusses why he could never be elected to office.

Noam Chomsky discusses how the U.S. is the world’s leading terrorist state.

Ivan Eland discusses whether Obama is the worst president in American history.

John Glaser discusses a book on government led humanitarian action.

Justin Raimondo discusses electoral politics and foreign policy.

Ted Galen Carpenter and Christopher A. Preble discuss ending the War on Drugs in Afghanistan.

Deborah E. Lipstadt discusses the use of Nazi war criminals by the U.S. government.

Kathy Kelly discusses the situation in Afghanistan.

Tom Engelhardt discusses escalation.

Aaron Ross Powell discusses the immorality of voting.

Bruce Fein discusses the pyrrhic victory resulting from the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Michael Brenner discusses the CIA in Texas.

James M. Lindsay discusses 10 histories of the Cold War worth reading.

Louise Richardson discusses James Risen’s book, Pay Any Price.

James M. Lindsay discusses 10 memoirs of the Cold War worth reading.

Justin Raimondo discusses whether we have a foreign policy.

The Market Radical discusses the use of terror in politics.

Gary Leupp discusses Hagel’s Syria memo.

Joshua Sperber discusses the midterms.

Michael S. Rozeff discusses the War on Terror.

Kevin Carson discusses the Bundy Ranch standoff.

Dan Sanchez discusses civilization preceding the state.

Sheldon Richman discusses election 2014.

David S. D’Amato discusses monopoly privilege and individual rights.

Lucy Steigerwald discusses the midterms and foreign policy.

Laurence M. Vance discusses recent marijuana decriminalization successes..

Jacob G. Hornberger discusses Obama’s failed presidency.

Nicola Nasser discusses the endgame of U.S. strategy against ISIS.

Anand and Carlsen draw their first game of the World Chess Championship.

Carlsen beats Anand in the second game.

Belem: The Siege, the Drug War and the Police State

Leonardo Herbert — Tue, 18 Nov 2014 19:00:37 +0000

The night of November 4th in Belem, capital of Brazil’s Para state, was terrorizing. After the death of Corporal Figueiredo, from the Tactical Ops (Rotam) of the Military Police of the State of Para, at 7:30 PM, there was a violent retaliation, killing nine people, according to the official numbers, six of whom were undoubtedly executed. The victims appeared concurrent to the Rotam operation intended to arrest those responsible for the death of Corporal Figueiredo. Despite the official number of deaths, most people believe many more were killed during the night.

Rumors, audios, and videos were widely shared though WhatsApp and Facebook while the executions happened, showing what was happening on the outskirts of Belem. There was an unofficial curfew in several places on the periphery, given the expectation that there would be a violent retaliation to the death of the policeman and that the death squads that was wreaking havoc (presumably made up of military policemen) did not intend to take any prisoners. This group supposedly was covered by the official Rotam operation and they intended to kill any suspects.

It is important to highlight here that the deaths did not occur due to gunfights or resisting arrest. They were outright murders. The state government itself recognizes in an official statement that they were homicides, even though it does not conclude that the Military Police took part in them. Luiz Fernandes, Secretary of Public Security of Para, also admits that investigators are working on the hypothesis that death squads were acting there.

However, the sequence of events cannot be understood unless we comprehend their context: The local drug war dynamics.

In Belem, 66% of the population live in irregular buildings, favelas (slums) or the like, which, first, sprouted up near the center of the city (such as neighborhoods Guama, Jurunas, and Terra Firme — the last one being the stage of the murders) and, more recently, in the suburbs. They are very dense areas, with very little space between houses, allowing for the settlement of a large number of migrants from the state’s countryside and from the neighboring state Maranhao.

These areas, however, not unlike many others in Brazil, are marked by precarious access to basic utilities, like sewage disposal, and poor protection of the dwellers’ property rights (despite expropriations and evictions being uncommon in Belem). Moreover, as a result of drug prohibition, they end up under the rule of violent dealers.

Some time ago, it became known that the drug warlords were financing the militias. According to a report from the beginning of the year about the actions of militias in Guama and Terra Firme, these groups were formed by criminals and policemen (generally who are no longer formally affiliated with the Police) for the protection of drug dealers against other dealers and the police. They also regularly extort the local population. According to a Terra Firme dweller, who was quoted on the above report:

They ask people for money and kill whoever gets in their way. It is criminals killing criminals, but there are several honest citizens who are victims as well. When they are bothered by someone, they create a situation for a crime to happen.

The group which acts in the Guama neighborhood, made up mainly by retired police officers, is supposedly involved in the murder of young people, those “who walk around the streets at the wrong time, thieves and drug users,” as a local put it. Out of fear, silence prevails.

The story also tells that the police usually work on the hypothesis that these are hired gunmen, who are paid to enforce debts or murder the borrowers, denying the existence of militias and death squads that are financed by stolen money from the local populations. The events of the 4th seem to have changed that perception, since the government itself has admitted that death squads have been involved.

The general fear after the death of Corporal Figueiredo illustrates how real police, militia, and drug violence is in these areas. This fear has, for the first time, reached the richer areas of Belem, areas unfamiliar with the day to day uneasiness that the poor suffer through. Like never before, the night of November 4th made people, from very different social backgrounds, share the same fear.

Therefore, the murders were not a simple “isolated case,” but a perennial reality for the poor people of Belem, many of whom know or are related to someone who was murdered, were evicted from their homes by drug dealers, or just generally avoid staying out late (always!), afraid of what might happen to them.

These people, who suffer in every imaginable way, are denied the most basic and elementary way to reduce violent crime in Brazil: the end of the war on drugs. There is no reason, at all, that Brazilian cities should top the rankings for “most murders” in the world besides the failure of prohibition. Many cities are even more dangerous than Belem, but the causes of violence are similar. Most murders in Belem and elsewhere are related to drug feuds.

One of the main libertarian causes is the end of this abhorrent policy that takes away individual rights, puts behind bars many thousands of peaceful people and kills more than any substance addiction.

People who live in poor areas (and in other places, naturally) are sold the idea that only more repression will be able to solve the problem of public security. The drug user is the scapegoat and their frequent summary executions by the police are often welcomed.

Due legal process seems to be a burden to the police in Brazil, and its very existence seems to provide them with an even broader license to kill. We lose sight of the deep connections between the police, drug dealers and militias. The poor are the ones most exposed to the resulting police state, and the naive faith in the police as a guardian of order can only worsen their condition.

Belem shows vividly the monstrosity that the war on drugs is and its consequences to the urban dynamics in poor areas, marked by violence everywhere.

The main cause of all these deaths is not the lack of police repression or more executions, but the state itself and its criminalizing impetus, that enriches warlords and makes peripheral communities ever more vulnerable.

Translated by Erick Vasconcelos.

Surprise: The Drug War Isn’t About Drugs

Kevin Carson — Fri, 07 Nov 2014 19:00:37 +0000

On the morning of November 6 the US Federal Bureau of Investigation trumpeted its takedown of the Silk Road 2.0 website and the arrest of alleged operator Blake Benthall.

In so doing the FBI demonstrated, once again, that the War on Drugs has nothing to do with anything its propagandists claim it’s about. If drug criminalization is a public safety issue — about fighting violent crime and gangs, or preventing overdoses and poisoning — shutting down Silk Road is one of the dumbest things the feds can do. Silk Road was a secure, anonymous marketplace in which buyers and sellers could do business without the risk of violence associated with street trade. And the seller reputational system meant that drugs sold on Silk Road were far purer and safer than their street counterparts.

This is true of all the other selling points for the Drug War. Hillary Clinton, in possibly one of the stupidest remarks ever uttered by a human being, says legalizing narcotics is a bad idea “because there’s too much money in it” — referring, presumably, to the lucrative drug trade and the cartels fighting over it.

But there’s so much money in it, and the cartels fight to control it, only because it’s illegal. That’s what happens when you criminalize stuff people want to buy: You create black markets with much higher prices, which organized crime gangs fight to control. Alcohol prohibition created the gangster culture of the 1920s. It’s been with us ever since. When Prohibition was repealed, organized crime just shifted to fighting over other illegal markets. The more consensual, non-violent activities are made illegal, the larger the portion of the economy that’s turned into black markets for gangs to fight over.

In related news, the Mexican drug cartels are reportedly making less money since the legalization or decriminalization of pot in several American states. I wonder why.

Perhaps the biggest joke is that the War on Drugs is fought to reduce drug use. No doubt many people involved in the domestic enforcement side of the Drug War actually believe this, but the left hand doesn’t know what the right hand’s doing. The narcotics trade is an enormous source of money for the criminal gangs that control it, and guess what? The US intelligence community is one of the biggest criminal drug gangs in the world, and the global drug trade is a great way for it to raise money to do morally repugnant stuff it can’t get openly funded by Congress. It’s been twenty years since journalist Gary Webb revealed the Reagan cabinet’s collusion with drug cartels in marketing cocaine inside the United States, to raise money for the right-wing Contra death squads in Nicaragua — a revelation he was gaslighted and driven to suicide for by the US intelligence community and mainstream press.

Now we hear that the US is “losing the drug war in Afghanistan.” Well, obviously — it’s a war that’s designed to be lost. The Taliban were so easy to overthrown in the fall of 2001 because they really did try to stamp out opium poppy cultivation, and with a fair degree of success. This didn’t sit well with the Afghan populace, which traditionally makes a lot of money growing poppies. But the Northern Alliance — which the United States turned into the national government of Afghanistan — was quite friendly to poppy cultivation in its territory. When the Taliban was overthrown, poppy and heroin cultivation resumed normal levels. Putting the US in charge of a “war on drugs in Afghanistan” is like putting Al Capone in charge of alcohol prohibition.

Besides, actually “winning” the drug war would mean ending it. And who in US domestic law enforcement wants to cut off the source of billions in federal aid and military equipment, militarized SWAT teams and unprecedented surveillance and civil forfeiture powers? This is a war meant to go on forever, just like the so-called War on Terror.

The state always encourages moral panic and “wars” on one thing or another in order to keep us afraid, so we’ll give it more power over our lives. Don’t believe its lies.

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