Egypt’s military leadership, posing as a revolutionary government, has tried to co-opt the day by presenting the anniversary as a celebration without protest and rhetorically lifting the “emergency law” — with exceptions so vague that the move actually restricts the government very little.

While the SCAF has invited political parties to work with them in crafting a more permanent political order, the months since Mubarak’s fall have seen military detentions and brutal crackdowns against dissent continue. Tear gas from the United States, which many medics have said is of higher potency and health risk than usual, has been used extensively. While the top figure of the old regime is out of power and on trial, much of the regime that he headed remains intact.

The military leadership has presented a timetable for handing over power, but this does not solve the issue. Political pressure from the streets is probably needed just to hold them to the letter of their promises. It is unclear what kind of role the military leadership intends to play in managing the transition. And behind closed doors the Council will try to safeguard their political and economic privileges, which would keep Egypt’s economy serving the elite recipients of political favor at the expense of those who produce.

The experience of Egypt should drive home the fact that it could take more than a couple of weeks and a change at the top to make a substantial revolution that actually improves the lives of average people. This brings up the question of how a mass movement against the establishment can create the arrangements that replace it. Or is filling the gap left by the downfall even the movement’s role, or is it the role of smaller networks of affinity and interest to put the new society in place and work out differences? And how does one define who is in the establishment or draw the line between siding with the old regime and siding with the people?

A substantial revolution might see the rise of neighborhood and workplace assemblies, and alternative networks that displace the state by empowering cooperative individuals. This process is being worked out on the ground in Egypt with the growth of cooperatives, renewed grassroots labor organizing, and mutual aid in the face of government violence. Whether or not this activity is part of the same movement as mass rallies really depends on how “movement” and “the Revolution” are defined. Knowledge gained in the revolutionary experience can be put to use in the evolution of new social relations.

What the Egyptians are teaching us is that substantial political change will be a long process, but worth the trouble if we’re willing to see it through to the end.

The Egyptian revolution was not completed in February when Hosni Mubarak stepped down and left power in the hands of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. A cynic would describe this as a transfer of power from one wing of the armed forces to another. The SCAF is willing to share political power with politicians who are eager to share with them, but they appear unwilling to relinquish that power entirely.

But there is power in the street too. The government is unable to silence the people with deception or violence. The Muslim Brotherhood, whose leadership opposed renewed demonstrations in hopes of succeeding in upcoming parliamentary elections, has suffered from defections and internal opposition as some members have put the people before party loyalty and rejoined the revolution. It will be a hard struggle to take power from the hands of the military, and the people should not easily give up what they win.

The best result would be to keep power dispersed among the people: To develop the neighborhood and civil associations that people use to cooperatively fill each others’ needs, to topple the military leadership and put their arms under control of the people, to assemble revolutionary courts recognized by popular consensus and put those who have struck violently at revolutionaries on trial. While pursuing the necessary tearing down of the old regime, the crowd should not neglect building alternatives from the bottom up, or another authority will fill the gap left by their absence.

Fortunately, the process of organizing popular revolution provides foundations for institutions that can displace state control with consensual relations. Individual liberty can be best safeguarded, and material and social needs best realized, by voluntary organizations that operate for the benefit of participants and do not impose their will on peaceful people. Egypt does not have to be a centralized state, but can be a coalition of diverse popular networks peacefully cooperating on the basis of affinity.

Egyptians face the difficult decisions of how to proceed with a revolution that the current rulers and those who intend to share power with the current rulers are trying to hold back. This is a problem that might become more common globally as established powers continually fail to meet the expectations of people and make it clear that their power is based on acceptance of force. Whatever course is taken, liberty and the other needs of the people are best secured by building networks outside of the establishment power structures.