Eh bien, il était temps. Mais le problème avec la position d’Apple est qu’une plainte pour violation de brevets – ou un brevet en lui-même – qui ne soit pas triviale, ça n’existe pas.

Il est vrai que les litiges sur les brevets sont devenus de plus en plus absurdes ces dernières années, mais en tant qu’acteur majeur dans cette absurdité (ayant, entre autres idioties, déposé – et reçu ! – un brevet sur les appareils rectangulaires avec des coins arrondis), Apple n’est pas vraiment en position de se plaindre.

Leur produit vedette, la gamme Macintosh, a commencé par une copie, trait pour trait, de l’interface utilisateur aux périphériques (vous avez entendu parler des « souris » ?) du système 1981 Star de Xerox. Et ils ont rapidement poursuivi (avant de s’arranger avec) Amazon pour leurs « droits » sur le terme « app store ». Alors s’il vous plait, ne donnons pas trop de crédit aux inquiétudes d’Apple sur les « trolls de brevets ».

Même si les brevets remplissaient le rôle que l’on nous vend – « sécuriser pour un temps limité un droit exclusif pour les inventeurs sur leurs créations » comme écrit dans la constitution américaine – ils resteraient une très mauvaise idée. Que l’on puisse posséder un idée est absurde, et personne n’y accorderait la moindre crédibilité si ce n’était pas appliqué le flingue sur la tempe par l’état.

Mais le rôle théorique des brevets n’est pas celui qu’ils ont dans la réalité.

Leur utilité réelle est de restreindre la compétition et de limiter l’innovation afin de fournir un avantage économique – c’est à dire un monopole sur la fixation du prix – pour établir quelles firmes, grâce à leur capacité de payer (pardonnez mon manque de délicatesse ; je crois que le terme que je cherche est « lobbying ») des politiciens, bureaucrates et juges, peuvent alors s’offrir le plaisir d’éviter la compétition du marché sur le prix ou la qualité.

Il y a quelques dizaines d’années, je travaillais pour un constructeur de bateaux connu. Un été, j’ai passé plusieurs semaines à faire de la besogne – remorquer des bateaux pour maintenance et les ramener, ce genre de choses – pour le nouveau designer de bateaux que la compagnie avait recruté pour assembler un prototype « suffisamment différent » du dernier bateau qu’il avait conçu (pour une autre firme) afin d’éviter (tout du moins pouvoir facilement gagner) des procédures de « violations ». Je ne sais pas combien est-ce que cette « mise en conformité » (et tout litige futur) représente sur le cout de chaque nouveau bateau, mais il n’y a aucun doute que le prix de vente était affecté.

En d’autres termes, les brevets sont une taxe indirecte pour les consommateurs. Les monopolistes des brevets peuvent faire payer plus cher car le gouvernement se charge de leur supprimer toute concurrence. Et si ces concurrents arrivent à mettre des produits sur le marché, ces produits sont plus chers car il aura fallu dépenser plus pour les licences d’exploitation ou pour contourner les « violations », ou pour payer des assurances afin de se protéger contre le risque de litige sur les brevets.

La plainte d’Apple, au fond, est que les « trolls » de brevets se contentent d’acheter des « droits », puis cherchent des infractions sur lesquelles ils peuvent récupérer de l’argent, au lieu de s’embêter à créer de nouveaux produits. Mais pourquoi ne devraient-ils pas le faire ? Si, comme Apple voudrait nous le faire croire, les brevets sont un instrument de marché légitime, alors les « trolls » exploitent cet outil plus efficacementqu’Apple ne le fait, n’est-ce pas ?

Le problème n’est pas les « trolls de brevets », le problème est le concept de brevet.

Traduction de The Problem Isn’t “Patent Trolls.” The Problem Is Patents. par Thomas L. Knapp.

This theory is called left-wing market anarchism or laissez faire socialism. Its basic contention is that a truly freed market has never existed, and that capitalism is a statist system. There is also the conviction that genuinely freed markets would result in greater relative equality and more worker friendly conditions. The first thing to cover are the four big monopolies identified by the late individualist anarchist, Benjamin Tucker. They are described in his famous essay, State Socialism and Anarchism: How Far They Agree, And Wherein They Differ. They are the money monopoly, land monopoly, tariff monopoly, and the patent monopoly or intellectual property monopolies. Let us consider each in turn.

1) The money monopoly pertains to a government or state grant of privilege to select individuals or people possessing certain types of property. This privilege is the exclusive right to issue money. The effect of this is to keep interest rates artificially high or maintain them period. In a left-libertarian market anarchist society, anyone would be free to issue a currency. There would be a competitive whittling down of lending money to the labor cost of conducting banking business. Another positive effect identified by Tucker would be the absence of control mentioned below:

It is claimed that the holders of this privilege control the rate of interest, the rate of rent of houses and buildings, and the prices of goods,—the first directly, and the second and third indirectly.

Kevin Carson has quoted Alexander Cairncross to the effect that:

the American worker has at his disposal a larger stock of capital at home than in the factory where he is employed….

Said capital or property would serve as collateral or backing. This would increase the bargaining power of labor in relation to capital, because the laborers would be able to organize their own credit systems for conducting independent business apart from the capitalists. As Gary Elkin notes:

It’s important to note that because of Tucker’s proposal to increase the bargaining power of workers through access to mutual credit, his so-called Individualist anarchism is not only compatible with workers’ control but would in fact promote it. For if access to mutual credit were to increase the bargaining power of workers to the extent that Tucker claimed it would, they would then be able to (1) demand and get workplace democracy, and (2) pool their credit buy and own companies collectively.

2) The land monopoly consists of governments or states granting or protecting land titles not based on occupation and use. This is a critique of absentee landlordism and the rent following therefrom. This has the effect of shutting out land based work as a competitive factor with industry. It also destroyed the independence to be derived from occupying land or making use of a stateless commons.

3) The tariff monopoly pertains to the protection of the profits of domestic capitalist industry from foreign competition. This increases the price of goods and thus extracts more of the product of laborers from them. It also helps create oligopolies or monopolies, because there is no competitive whittling down of profit or size. It’s worth noting that Pierre-Joseph Proudhon thought the money monopoly had to be abolished before the tariff monopoly, because the people put out of work by foreign competition would need a market with a vast demand for labor to find different work.

4) The patent or intellectual property monopoly allows people to extract monopoly prices from things that could conceivably be competed over. A person is also denied the ability to use their property in a way they see fit through aggressive force. Two people can write the same book without stealing from each other. Patents are also pooled by corporations to prevent any competition and to control economic resources. This allows them to lock the third world into a dependence on them for technology. In addition to the above, Kevin Carson has noted:

A survey of U.S. firms found that 86% of inventions would have been developed without patents. In the case of automobiles, office equipment, rubber products, and textiles, the figure was 100%.

The one exception was drugs, in which 60% supposedly would not have been invented. I suspect disingenuousness on the part of the respondants, however. For one thing, drug companies get an unusually high portion of their R & D funding from the government, and many of their most lucrative products were developed entirely at government expense. And Scherer himself cited evidence to the contrary. The reputation advantage for being the first into a market is considerable. For example in the late 1970s, the structure of the industry and pricing behavior was found to be very similar between drugs with and those without patents. Being the first mover with a non-patented drug allowed a company to maintain a 30% market share and to charge premium prices.

In my next post, I will continue this introduction.

Stay tuned!

“Apple’s complaint, in its essentials, is that patent “trolls” just buy up patent “rights,” then search for infringement to cash in on, rather than going to the trouble of making real products. But why shouldn’t they do that? If, as Apple would have us believe, patents are a legitimate market instrument, then the “trolls” are just exploiting that instrument more efficiently than Apple cares to, right?

The problem isn’t “patent trolls.” The problem is patents.”

Era ora. Il problema della Apple, però, è che non esiste una causa relativa ad un brevetto… o un brevetto, se è per questo… che non sia frivola (“superficiale, vuoto, che dimostra scarsa serietà”).

È vero che le controversie legali sui brevetti sono diventate sempre più visibilmente sciocche negli ultimi anni, ma come protagonista principale in fatto di sciocchezze (che tra le altre idiozie ha chiesto – e ottenuto! – il brevetto per dispositivi rettangolari con spigoli arrotondati) la Apple non ha molte ragioni per lamentarsi. In questo articolo non c’è abbastanza spazio per esaminare tutte le stupidità in fatto di “proprietà intellettuale” della Apple, ma vediamone due:

Il famoso Macintosh cominciò come copia perfetta, dall’interfaccia alle periferiche (mai sentito parlare di un “mouse”?), del terminale Xerox Star del 1981. E poi: Per qualche tempo denunciò (prima di raggiungere un accordo) la Amazon riguardo il “diritto” ad usare le parole “app store”. Certo che è microscopica la lacrimuccia che merita l’indignazione della Apple per i “patent trolls”.

Anche quando i brevetti si limitano al loro fine dichiarato (come dice la costituzione americana, “assicurare agli inventori, per un periodo limitato, il diritto esclusivo alle loro scoperte”) sono comunque una pessima cosa. Dire che qualcuno può possedere un’idea è dichiaratamente sciocco. Nessuno ci farebbe caso se non ci fosse lo stato ad imporlo con la forza.

Ma il vero fine dei brevetti non è quello dichiarato.

Il vero fine è: restringere la concorrenza e limitare l’innovazione così da dare un vantaggio economico – un vero e proprio potere di monopolio sul prezzo – a quelle imprese che, grazie alla loro capacità di comprare politici, burocrati e giudici (scusate il mio linguaggio rozzo, forse il termine adatto è “fare lobby”), possono realizzare il desiderio di scansare la concorrenza del mercato in materia di prezzi o qualità.

Qualche decennio fa, lavorai per una nota fabbrica di imbarcazioni. Un’estate, passai diverse settimane come tuttofare – tirare in secca e rimettere in acqua le barche, quel genere di cose – per conto del nuovo designer della società, che stava assemblando un prototipo che fosse “abbastanza diverso” dall’ultimo modello che aveva progettato (per un’altra ditta) per evitare (o almeno contrastare efficacemente) una denuncia. Io non so quanto influisse questa roba del “rispetto dei brevetti” (e i conseguenti ricorsi) sul costo di ogni imbarcazione prodotta, ma non c’è dubbio che influiva sul prezzo finale.

In altre parole, i brevetti sono una tassa indiretta imposta ai consumatori. Chi ha il monopolio di un brevetto può fare prezzi più alti perché lo stato sopprime la concorrenza per lui. Ma anche quando la concorrenza riesce a portare sul mercato un prodotto, quel prodotto è più caro perché comprende il costo della licenza, o la ricerca di un brevetto alternativo, o ancora di un’assicurazione che protegga dai ricorsi.

La protesta della Apple, in sostanza, è che i “patent troll” si limitano a comprare “diritti” di brevetto per poi andare alla ricerca di infrazioni sulle quali incassare, invece che prendersi la briga di produrre qualcosa di reale. Dopotutto, perché dovrebbero farlo? Se, come vorrebbe far credere la Apple, i brevetti sono uno strumento legittimo di mercato, allora i “troll” stanno semplicemente sfruttando lo strumento in maniera più efficiente della Apple, no?

Per concludere, il problema non sono i “patent troll”. Il problema sono i brevetti.

Traduzione di Enrico Sanna.

Well, it’s about time. But the problem with Apple’s position is that there’s no such thing as a patent lawsuit … or for that matter, a patent … that isn’t frivolous (“not serious in content or attitude or behavior”).

It’s true that patent litigation has become more and more visibly silly over the last few years, but as a major player in the silliness (having, among other idiocies, applied for — and received! — a patent on rectangular devices with rounded corners) Apple doesn’t have much standing to complain about that. There’s not enough room in this column to really go into Apple’s other “intellectual property” howlers, but let’s name two:

Their flagship Macintosh line began as a lock, stock and barrel copy, from user interface to peripherals (ever heard of a “mouse?”), of Xerox’s 1981 Star terminal system. And they briefly sued (before settling with) Amazon over “rights” to the words “app store.” So please, let us break out the world’s smallest violin  for Apple’s angst over “patent trolls.”

Even if patents actually accomplished their advertised purpose — “securing for limited Times to … Inventors the exclusive Right to their … Discoveries,” as the US Constitution puts it — they’d be a very bad idea. The claim that one can own an idea is silly on its face, and not a claim that anyone would pay the slightest mind to were it not enforced at gunpoint by the state.

But the advertised purpose of patents is not their actual purpose.

Their actual purpose is to restrain competition and limit innovation so as to provide economic advantage — monopoly pricing power, in fact — to established firms who, by virtue of their ability to pay off (pardon my indelicate language; I believe the word I’m looking for is “lobby”) politicians, bureaucrats and judges, can thereby indulge their desire avoid market competition on price or quality.

Decades ago, I worked for a well-known boat manufacturer. One summer, I spent several weeks as the “menial tasks” guy — hauling boats and trailers back and forth for modifications, that kind of thing — for the company’s newly hired boat designer as he worked to assemble a prototype “different enough” from the last boat he’d designed (for another firm) to avoid (or at least successfully fight) “infringement” claims. I don’t know how much this “patent compliance” runaround (and any ensuing litigation) added to the cost of each unit of the new boat, but there’s no doubt that it did affect the retail price.

In other words, patents are indirect taxes on consumers. Patent monopolists can charge higher prices because government suppresses their would-be competitors for them. And if those competitors do manage to bring products to market, those products are also more expensive because they’ve had to spend money on patent licensing, or on patent research to avoid “infringement,” or on insurance to protect themselves against patent litigation.

Apple’s complaint, in its essentials, is that patent “trolls” just buy up patent “rights,” then search for infringement to cash in on, rather than going to the trouble of making real products. But why shouldn’t they do that? If, as Apple would have us believe, patents are a legitimate market instrument, then the “trolls” are just exploiting that instrument more efficiently than Apple cares to, right?

The problem isn’t “patent trolls.” The problem is patents.

Translations for this article:

• Italian, Il Problema non sono i Patent Troll. Il Problema Sono i Brevetti.
• French, Les « trolls de brevets » ne sont pas le problème. Les brevets sont le problème.

I won’t try to recap the whole case here, but I do want to answer a question that will occur to many advocates of liberty: How can someone who supports property rights in physical objects deny property rights in intellectual products, such as the useful application of scientific principles or patterns of words, musical tones, or colors? Suffice it here to quote from “Patent Nonsense”:

There is a distinction between physical objects and ideas that is crucial to the property question. Two or more people cannot use the same pair of socks at the same time and in the same respect, but they can use the same idea — or if not the same idea, ideas with the same content. That tangible objects are scarce and finite accounts for the emergence of property rights in civilization. Considering the nature of human beings and the physical world they inhabit, if individuals are to flourish in society they need rules regarding thine and mine. But “ideal objects” are not bound by the same restrictions. Ideas can be multiplied infinitely and almost costlessly; they can be used nonrivalrously.

If I articulate an idea in front of other people, each now has his own “copy.” Yet I retain mine. However the others use their copies, it is hard to see how they have committed an injustice.

Practices respectful of private property in physical objects and land emerged spontaneously over millennia, embedded in customs that served to avert conflict in order to create space within which social beings could flourish. (See John Hasnas’s “Toward a Theory of Empirical Natural Rights” [PDF].)

In contrast, “rights” in ideas — patents and copyrights — were government monopoly grants having nothing in common with the notion of property at the heart of libertarianism. In fact, such artificial rights undermine genuine property by authorizing IP holders to enlist government power to stop other people from using their justly acquired resources and ideas. For example, if Jones (having committed no trespass) observes Smith’s invention or artistic creation, Jones could be legally stopped from using his own physical property in conjunction with ideas obtained through that observation. That sure looks as though IP bestows on Smith purported rights over Jones’s tangible property and even Jones himself. One might ask, Isn’t the idea Smith’s? But I can’t see how an idea in Jones’s mind can possibly be Smith’s, even if Smith had it first  — unless Smith owns Jones, an unlibertarian notion indeed.

For details, I urge readers to pursue the links referred to above. Those articles and books address all the relevant issues, including how IP stifles rather than stimulates innovation, and the dead-weight loss of the IP legal process. (Contemplate the inventions and works of art that were produced over millennia without patents or copyrights.) Here I simply want to call attention to the latest article in opposition to intellectual property for what it says about two aspects of the subject that aren’t emphasized nearly enough.

I refer to Butler Shaffer’s “A Libertarian Critique of Intellectual Property.” In his essay, Shaffer writes,

Creativity — like learning in general — is fostered by cross-fertilization and synthesis. We ought to have learned from fundamental principles of biology that reproduction through single-cell division produces little genetic variation. When the life process developed sexual reproduction, the resulting genetic diversity allowed for the proliferation of numerous species as well as intra-special traits that enhanced adaptive capabilities.

Patents and copyrights inhibit the creative process by discouraging the exchange of information relating to a particular line of research or exploration. If one scientist has been issued a patent for his invention of a widget, another scientist would likely be discouraged from continuing his own work on a similar product, or from making modifications or variations on the patented item. The interplay in which individual insights and proposals are communicated to one another in a group, and then subjected to collaborative processes of brainstorming, are far more productive of creative ends than is the work of individuals in isolation. Likewise, the cross-fertilization of ideas, techniques, and other influences, among communities of artists and scientists, have greatly enhanced the creative process. On the other hand, when driven by the rewards of patents, scientists and inventors are known to maintain secrecy in their laboratories and research, lest a competitor gain insights that might advance their own work. The proposition that knowledge and ideas can be made the exclusive property of one who discovers or expresses what was previously unknown, is contrary to the nature of the intelligent mind, whose content is assembled from a mixture of the experiences of others and oneself. Even the language with which one formulates and communicates his or her understanding to others, has been provided by predecessors.

As one can see, IP strikes at the very heart of the social-intellectual process that makes all aspects of progress possible. Government impediments to the free flow of information undermine the very dynamic of an advancing civilization.

The other notable point in Shaffer’s essay concerns how IP tends to concentrate wealth in large business firms. He writes,

There are many other costs associated with IP that rarely get attention in cost-benefit analyses of the topic. One has to do with the fact that the patenting process, as with government regulation generally, is an expensive and time-consuming undertaking that tends to increase industrial concentration. Large firms can more readily incur the costs of both acquiring and defending a patent than can an individual or a small firm, nor is there any assurance that, once either course of action is undertaken, a successful outcome will be assured. Thus, individuals with inventive products may be more inclined to sell their creations to larger firms. With regard to many potential products, various governmental agencies (e.g., the EPA, FDA, OSHA) may have their own expensive testing and approval requirements before new products can be marketed, a practice that, once again, favors the larger and more established firms.

Increased concentration also contributes to the debilitating and destructive influences associated with organizational size. In addressing what he calls “the size theory of social misery,” Leopold Kohr observes that “wherever something is wrong, something is too big,” a dynamic as applicable to social systems as in the rest of nature. The transformation of individuals into “overconcentrated social units” contributes to the problems associated with mass size. One sees this tendency within business organizations, with increased bureaucratization, ossification, and reduced resiliency to competition often accompanying increased size. Nor do the expected benefits of economies of scale for larger firms overcome the tendencies for the decline of earnings and rates of return on investments, as well as the maintenance of market shares following mergers. The current political mantra, “too big to fail,” is a product of the dysfunctional nature of size when an organization faces energized competition to which it must adapt if it is to survive.

Indeed, as Kevin Carson documents in Organization Theory: A Libertarian Perspective (PDF), patents were one of the critical elements permitting the unnatural growth of key firms and the concentration of political-economic power during the second half of the nineteenth century. (Tariffs [“the mother of trusts”], banking regulation, land policy, and transportation subsidies were other key factors.) Carson writes,

Without the combined influence of tariffs, patents, and railroad subsidies in creating the centralized corporate economy, there would not have been any large corporations even to attempt trusts in the first place. The corporate transformation of the economy in the late 19th century — made possible by the government’s role in railroad subsidies, protectionism, and patents — was a necessary precondition for the full-blown state capitalism of the 20th century.

The technological revolution has been dramatically lowering the price of capital goods, making competitive, small-scale, nonhierarchical enterprises by independent individuals and peer groups more feasible than ever. This is truly a new industrial revolution. Yet we know that entrenched business interests, fearing the loss of market share and profits, will use state power through IP law to crush this potential for widespread economic secession from the corporate state.

Support for freedom and independence, then, requires opposition to intellectual property.

Em seu discurso acerca do Estado da União de 2013 o Presidente dos Estados Unidos Barack Obama afirma que os Estados Unidos ajudarão a acabar com a pobreza extrema “mediante protegerem as crianças do mundo de mortes evitáveis, e materializarem a promessa de uma geração sem AIDS, coisas que estão ao nosso alcance.” Soa bonito, não é? Infelizmente, o presidente contradisse diretamente essas metas de seu discurso ao empenhar-se para a Parceria TransPacífico (TPP).

A TPP é sistematicamente apresentada como acordo de  “livre comércio,” mas há um tipo de barreira comercial que ela se propõe fortalecer: “Propriedade intelectual.” Patentes e outras formas de “propriedade intelectual” restringem o comércio mediante concederem o monopólio de uma ideia ou do fabrico de um produto. A “propriedade intelectual” torna ilegal usar a própria propriedade pessoal para fabricar um produto e vendê-lo no mercado uma vez o estado tenha definido a própria ideia desse produto como “propriedade” de outrem.

A “propriedade intelectual” prejudica os consumidores porque faz os preços subirem. Para alguns bens ela representa simplesmente custo econômico. Quando porém se trata de medicamentos, os aumentos de preços associados a patentes farmacêuticas custam vidas. Como diz Judit Rius Sanjuan, da Médicos Sem Fronteiras, “Políticas que restringem a competição frustram nossa capacidade de melhorar a vida de milhões de pessoas por meio de tratamentos acessíveis salvadores de vidas.”  Ou, nas palavras  do integrante de alto nível do Centro por uma Sociedade sem Estado Charles Johnson, “Patentes matam pessoas.”

E não apenas algumas poucas pessoas. Fogo no Sangue, documentário exibido pela primeira vez este ano no Sundance Film Festival, revela como as patentes têm matado milhões de pessoas. Como explica Amy Goodman, “grandes empresas farmacêuticas, incluindo Pfizer e GlaxoSmithKline, bem como os Estados Unidos, impediram que milhões de pessoas do mundo em desenvolvimento recebessem medicamentos genéricos contra AIDS a preços acessíveis. Em decorrência, milhões de pessoas morreram.”

A Parceria TransPacífico expandiria esses já letais monopólios de patentes, restringindo ainda mais o acesso a medicamentos salvadores de vidas. Tido von Schoen-Angerer, da Médicos Sem Fronteiras, escreveuem 2011 que ”documentos vazados revelam diversos objetivos dos Estados Unidos: tornar impossível questionar uma patente antes de ela ser concedida; rebaixar o nível necessário a obtenção de patente (de tal modo que mesmo drogas que sejam meramente novas formas de medicamentos existentes, e não representem avanço terapêutico, possam ser protegidas por meio de monopólio); e pressionar no sentido de novas formas de fazer cumprir propriedade intelectual que deem às autoridades alfandegárias poderes excessivos para apreenderem medicamentos genéricos suspeitos de violar a propriedade intelectual – IP.”  Cada uma dessas disposições contaria com a força do governo a impedir acesso de pessoas pobres ao medicamento.

É claro que robustecer monopólios de patente contradiz as metas declaradas de Obama de “proteger as crianças do mundo de mortes evitáveis” e “materializar a promessa de uma geração sem AIDS.” Essa contradição entre a TPP e o compromisso declarado do governo dos Estados Unidos com a saúde pública já vem sendo tornada visível há algum tempo. Já em 2011 Sophie DeLaunay, diretora executiva da Médicos Sem Fronteiras, disse que a TPP criaria “contradição fundamental entre a política de comércio dos Estados Unidos e os compromissos dos Estados Unidos com a saúde internacional.”

Contradições como essa não são nada de novo para o estado. Embora os políticos prometam repetidamente proteger a saúde pública, de há muito eles usam poder coercitivo para aumentar os custos médicos, sacrificando a saúde pública em benefício de lucros privados. O estado de há muito justifica seu poder com a linguagem do “bem público,” ao mesmo tempo em que brande esse poder para proteger o privilégio.

Se realmente nos importamos com ”proteger as crianças do mundo de mortes evitáveis” e “materializar a promessa de uma geração sem AIDS,” temos de pôr fim a esse conluio assassino entre o estado e o poder corporativo. Temos de esmagar o estado e suas contradições letais.

Artigo original afixado por Nathan Goodman em 17 de fevereiro de 2013.

Traduzido do inglês por Murilo Otávio Rodrigues Paes Leme.

The TPP is typically presented as a “free trade” agreement, but there’s one type of trade barrier it proposes to strengthen: “Intellectual property.” Patents and other forms of “intellectual property” restrict trade by granting monopolies on the sharing of an idea or the manufacture of a product. “Intellectual property” makes it illegal to use your own personal property to manufacture a product and sell it on the market once the state has defined the very idea of that product as someone else’s “property.”

“Intellectual property” harms consumers by raising prices. For some goods this is just an economic cost. But when it comes to medicine, the price increases associated with pharmaceutical patents cost lives. As Judit Rius Sanjuan of Doctors Without Borders says, “Policies that restrict competition thwart our ability to improve the lives of millions with affordable, lifesaving treatments.”  Or, as Center for a Stateless Society senior fellow Charles Johnson puts it, “Patents kill people.”

And not just a few people. Fire in the Blood, a documentary that premiered this year at the Sundance Film Festival, reveals how patents have killed millions. As Amy Goodman explains, “major pharmaceutical companies, including Pfizer and GlaxoSmithKline, as well as the United States, prevented tens of millions of people in the developing world from receiving affordable generic AIDS drugs. Millions died as a result.”

The Trans-Pacific Partnership would expand these already deadly patent monopolies, further restricting access to lifesaving medicines. Tido von Schoen-Angerer of Doctors Without Borders wrote in 2011 that “leaked papers reveal a number of U.S. objectives: to make it impossible to challenge a patent before it is granted; to lower the bar required to get a patent (so that even drugs that are merely new forms of existing medicines, and don’t show a therapeutic improvement, can be protected by monopolies); and to push for new forms of intellectual property enforcement that give customs officials excessive powers to impound generic medicines suspected of breaching IP.”  Each of these provisions would use government force to prevent poor people from accessing medicine.

It’s clear that entrenching patent monopolies contradicts Obama’s stated goals of “saving the world’s children from preventable deaths” and “realizing the promise of an AIDS-free generation.” This contradiction between the TPP and the U.S. government’s stated commitment to public health has been apparent for a while. Back in 2011, Doctors Without Borders executive director Sophie DeLaunay said that the TPP would create “a fundamental contradiction between U.S. trade policy and U.S. commitments to global health.”

Contradictions like this are nothing new for the state. While politicians repeatedly promise to protect public health, they have long used coercive power to raise medical costs, sacrificing public health for private profits. The state has long  justified its power with the language of “the public good,” all while wielding that power to protect privilege.

If we really care about “saving the world’s children from preventable deaths” and “realizing the promise of an AIDS-free generation,” we must end this murderous collusion between state and corporate power. We must smash the state and its deadly contradictions.

Translations for this article:

• Portuguese, Contradições Letais: Privilégios de Patente versus “Salvar Vidas”.