Center for a Stateless Society » foreign policy

The late Chalmers Johnson, the great analyst of the American empire, warned that if Americans didn’t give up the empire, they would come to live under it.

We’ve had many reasons to take his warning seriously; indeed, several important thinkers have furnished sound theoretical and empirical evidence for the proposition. Now come two scholars who advance our understanding of how an interventionist foreign policy eventually comes home. If libertarians needed further grounds for acknowledging that a distinctive libertarian foreign policy exists, here it is.

Christopher Coyne, an economics professor at George Mason University, and Abigail Hall, a Ph.D. candidate in economics there, have an important paper in the Fall 2014 issue of the Independent Review: “Perfecting Tyranny: Foreign Intervention as Experimentation in State Control.”

Their thesis is at once bold and well-defended: “Coercive government actions that target another country often act like a boomerang, turning around and knocking down freedoms and liberties in the ‘throwing’ nation.” This happens when the size and scope of government increases as a result of foreign intervention.

Advocates of foreign intervention—whether conservative or progressive—seem to believe that foreign and domestic policies can be isolated from each other and that illiberal methods used in foreign lands, such as bombing and military occupation, need not disturb domestic policy. In other words, freedom at home is consistent with empire abroad.

Coyne and Hall demonstrate that this is no more than wishful thinking that is contradicted by experience, both past and present; they present theoretical and empirical grounds for their conclusion that foreign policy is likely to have malign effects on domestic policy. After presenting their theoretical justification, they examine two contemporary examples of how methods perfected during foreign interventions were later applied inside the United States: surveillance and the militarization of the police. Of course the result in both cases has been a diminution of Americans’ freedom. The imperial chickens came home to roost, as Johnson warned they would.

Domestically, a government may be constrained by the people’s tacit ideology and their consequent interpretation of the country’s constitution. That ideology and interpretation may prohibit politicians from exercising social control to the extent they might prefer. That government’s conduct abroad, however, may face far weaker constraints. Under the right conditions—conditions such as those the U.S. government now finds itself in—the government may be in a position to exercise severe control over a foreign society, engaging in surveillance and repression as the armed forces take on the functions of police while maintaining their military posture as well.

Criticism of intervention abroad is often aimed at what the policy inflicts on foreign populations. “Often overlooked, however, is that a government’s projection of power beyond its borders can also impose significant costs on domestic citizens due to changes in the character of government-produced social control at home,” Coyne and Hall write.

They identify four “channels” through which “advancements in state-produced social control abroad may boomerang back to the intervening country.” First, an interventionist foreign policy tends to build up power in the central government. To the extent that the dispersion of power—“federalism”—limits centralized authority and protects zones of freedom, centralization is obviously a danger for liberty. They quote Bruce Porter, who wrote that “a government at war is a juggernaut of centralization determined to crush any internal opposition that impedes the mobilization of militarily vital resources. This centralizing tendency of war has made the rise of the state throughout much of history a disaster for human liberty and rights.”

“As this shift occurs,” Coyne and Hall add, “one result is that the political periphery becomes dependent on and subservient to the political center, which weakens the checks created by dispersed political decision making.”

The second way the boomerang effect operates is to put a premium on the skills required for social control. The interventionist state, the authors write, will need people willing and able to “implement the directives of the intervening government on an often unwilling foreign populace and the willingness to use various suppression techniques—monitoring, curfews, segregation, bribery, censorship, suppression, imprisonment, violence, and so on—to control those who are resistant to either foreign governments or their goals.” People who lack those skills or the enthusiasm for exercising them will be weeded out. As a result, intervention “shapes the human capital of those involved in intervention.”

In the third, related, channel, people with skills appropriate to social control will come home to find prominent positions in both the government and private sectors. In either realm such people are apt to lobby for or help transform public policy in the direction of greater control. “Specialists in state-produced social control are able to suggest and implement new techniques and organizational forms of state social control on the domestic population based on their experiences of doing the same to distant populations,” Coyne and Hall write. Their skills complement the other forces driving the centralization of power and the transfer of social-control techniques from foreign societies to the domestic scene.

In other cases, the skills acquired through coercive foreign interventions are implicit, meaning they shape the person’s view of government-produced social control.… [O]ne cannot help but be shaped by the organizational context within which one is embedded. In this scenario, activities that previously would have been thought of as unacceptable, extreme, or outright repugnant become normalized and natural. The way things were done abroad becomes standard operating procedure for how government activities are carried out. Domestic citizens begin to be treated as foreign populations were treated. Whether the skills accumulated through coercive foreign interventions are explicit or implicit, the result is that advances in state-produced social control developed abroad are imported back to the intervening country.

The last channel is the one through which physical capital, like social capital, changes under the influence of interventionist policies: “Technological innovations allow governments to utilize lower-cost methods of social control with a greater reach not only over foreign populations, but also over domestic citizens. Examples of such methods include but are not limited to surveillance and monitoring technologies, hardware and equipment for maintaining control of citizens, and weapons for killing enemies.”

Interventionist policies will require particular kinds of equipment and technologies, especially those that permit more efficient social control. Where there is (tax-financed) demand, there will be supply provided by the industrial side of the military-industrial complex.

In sum,

Together, the latter three channels cumulatively reinforce the initial centralization associated with coercive foreign intervention. The political center’s power is reinforced by the inflow of human and physical capital conducive to state-produced social control. The change in administrative dynamics leads to a shifting mentality whereby the expanded scope of activities undertaken by the center becomes standardized and normalized.

Coyne and Hall caution that none of these effects are automatic or instantaneous. Many factors can determine how and how fast the transformation of domestic policy may occur. Moreover, the changes are not necessarily irreversible, although they are likely to be costly and difficult to reverse. “The theory of the boomerang effect is one of stickiness and not necessarily of permanence,” Coyne and Hall write.

As I noted above, they apply these lessons to domestic surveillance, which they trace back to the U.S. occupation of the Philippines and the repression of the Filipino rebellion after the Spanish-American War, and the militarization of local police departments, which they trace back to the U.S. government’s conduct in World War II and the Vietnam War.

Coyne and Hall have performed a welcome service for all who value liberty and therefore distrust the state. Read their excellent work and deepen your knowledge of how foreign intervention threatens freedom at home.

The Weekly Libertarian And Chess Review 48

Natasha Petrova — Sun, 21 Sep 2014 23:00:02 +0000

Lee Fang discusses the funders of pro-war punditry.

Dan Sanchez discusses Tolkien, Plato, and the state.

Kevin Carson discusses the controversy over Burger King.

Darian Worden reviews a book about the Modern School movement.

Shamus Cooke discusses Progressive Democrats going to war.

Patrick Cockburn discusses fear of ISIS.

Laurence M. Vance discusses the legalization of heroin.

Richard M. Ebeling discusses the market.

Ivan Eland discusses the fight against ISIS and U.S. policy.

Arthur Silber discusses suicide and being a parent.

Arthur Silber discusses suicide and parenting.

Majorie Cohn discusses perpetual war under Obama.

Salon.com interviews Ted Rall.

Sheldon Richman discusses the clueless character of America’s foreign policy elite.

David R. Henderson discusses Richard Epstein’s case for intervention.

George Leef discusses a new book on libertarianism by Tom Palmer.

Lucy Steigerwald discusses ISIS and fixing the government.

Studies in Emergent Order discusses Anarchy and Legal Order.

Colin P. Elliot discusses how police militarization is a consequence of policing the world.

Gary Chariter discusses a new book on who rules America.

George H. Smith has released the eighth part of his series on social laws.

Sheldon Richman discusses the anti-militarist heritage of Herbert Spencer.

Robert C. Koehler discusses the God of war.

Peter Hart discusses the PBS left on airstrikes.

Joel Schlosberg discusses the conquest of the U.K. by Scotland.

Kevin Carson discusses online learning.

Elizabeth Nolan Brown discusses Ron Paul at LPAC.

Robby Soave discusses a case of zero tolerance school policies.

Viktor Korchnoi draws Edmar J. Mednis.

Mikhail Tal beats Mikhail Botvinnik in a world championship game.

Thinking Our Anger on Feed 44

James Tuttle — Fri, 19 Sep 2014 19:00:58 +0000

C4SS Feed 44 presents Roderick Long‘s “Thinking Our Anger” read and edited by Nick Ford.

“This disagreement between Lawrence and Seneca conceals an underlying agreement: both writers are assuming an opposition between reason and emotion. The idea of such a bifurcation is challenged by Aristotle. For Aristotle, emotions are part of reason; the rational part of the soul is further divided into the intellectual or commanding part, and the emotional or responsive part. Both parts are rational; and both parts are needed to give us a proper sensitivity to the moral nuances of the situations that confront us. Hence the wise person will be both intellectually rational and emotionally rational.

…

If Aristotle is right, then Seneca is wrong; emotional responses can facilitate our moral perceptions rather than either displacing or merely echoing them. But that does not mean that Lawrence is right; Aristotle is not advising us to place blind trust in our gut reactions. Emotions can be mistaken, just as intellect can; as Aristotle puts it, emotions are often like overeager servants, rushing off to carry out our orders without first making sure they’ve grasped them properly.

Feed 44:

Bitcoin tips welcome:

1N1pF6fLKAGg4nH7XuqYQbKYXNxCnHBWLB

The Weekly Libertarian Leftist And Chess Review 43

Natasha Petrova — Sun, 17 Aug 2014 23:00:24 +0000

George H. Smith’s series on social laws is now on its third part.

Patrick Cockburn discusses the end of Iraq.

Cesar Chelala discusses war crimes in Iraq and Syria.

John Marciano discusses Obama’s response to the torture scandal.

Doug Bandow discusses the recent U.S. military action in Iraq.

Jay Stephenson discusses how network television presents moderate pro-war people and extreme pro-war people.

John Grant discusses how to break the cycle of war.

Tyler Durden discusses the complete history of U.S. intervention in Iraq.

Jacob Sullum discusses the panic about stoned drivers and marijuana legalization.

A. Barton Hinkle discusses the export-import bank.

Wendy McElroy discusses the War on Drugs and private shippers.

Ivan Eland discusses a scandal worse than Watergate or Iran-Contra.

David S. D’Amato discusses left-wing individualism.

Jason Lee Byas discusses the renewed U.S. intervention in Iraq.

J.D. Tuccille discusses five areas where libertarians get it right.

Brian Nicholson discusses imperial surgery in Iraq.

Cory Massimino discusses state support on behalf of the rich.
rtarian
Cory Massimino reviews Markets Not Capitalism.

William Blum discusses the U.S. government’s longstanding use of torture.

Justin Raimondo discusses Hilary Clinton and foreign policy.

Bob Fitrakis and Harvey Wasserman discusses Nixon’s treasonous behavior related to Vietnam.

Kelly Vlahos discusses how the child migrant crossings are partially due to the War on Drugs.

Sheldon Richman discusses the recent U.S. intervention in Iraq.

William Blum discusses attempts to overthrow the Cuban government.

David Stockman discusses the new intervention in Iraq.

David D. S’Amato discusses American Coup: How a Terrified Government is Destroying the Constitution.

Joel Schlosberg discusses Paul Krugman’s recent attack on libertarianism.

David Swanson critiques the renewed bombing of Iraq.

Anand beats Carlsen.

John E Oberg is defeated by W Wenz

The Weekly Libertarian Leftist and Chess Review 40

Natasha Petrova — Sun, 27 Jul 2014 23:00:09 +0000

Musa al-Gharbi discusses Obama’s foreign policy.

Alice Slater discusses how drone assassinations violate the rule of law.

Bert Sacks discusses sectarian violence in Iraq.

Patrick Cockburn discusses the appeal of ISIS.

Shamus Cooke discusses regional war in the Middle East.

Kevin Carson reviews a new book by Rich Lowry.

William Rivers Pitt discusses the long arc of history.

Noam Chomsky discusses America’s real foreign policy.

Patrick Cockburn discusses government paralysis in Iraq.

Justin Raimondo discusses Japan’s constitutional revisionism.

Mahmoud Abu Rahma discusses the Israeli treatment of people in Palestine.

Pepe Escobar discusses ISIS.

Grant Mincy discusses American anarchism.

Uri Avnery discusses the watch on the Jordan.

Serge Halimi discusses when Obama got it right.

Richard Gamble reviews The Great and Holy War: How World War 1 Became a Religious Crusade

Karen Kwiatkowski discusses Lew Rockwell’s new book. I am not an ancap, but it has some good stuff relevant to libertarian leftists.

Thomas Dilorenzo discusses the American religion of violence. I am not in full agreement with it.

Binoy Kampmark discusses writing the imperial script.

Noam Chomsky discusses the sledgehammer worldview.

Lawrence B. Wilkerson discusses Dick Cheney.

Bill Quigley discusses the short shafting of veterans by the government.

Joe Boehem discusses the source and nature of rights.

Ivan Eland discusses World War 1 as key for today’s foreign policy.

Bonnie Kristian discusses how war is just one more big government program.

Sheldon Richman says let the immigrants stay.

Xavier Best discusses the U.S. role in child migration to the country.

Nozomi Hayase discusses Wikileaks and free speech.

Ludek Pachman loses to David Bronstein.

Alexander Petrov defeats F. Alexander Hoffmann.

I Frutti dell’Azione Diretta

Alan Smithee — Sat, 24 May 2014 11:00:05 +0000

Gli abitanti del villaggio di Kala/Balge, nello stato nord-nigeriano di Borno, si sono ribellati. Tra le incertezze dei politici e i tweet degli attivisti, gli abitanti di Kala/Balge hanno preso le armi e hanno messo in fuga il nemico con un’imboscata contro un convoglio di Boko Haram, che stava arrivando per assaltare il loro villaggio. Almeno quarantuno uomini di Boko Haram sono stati uccisi e dieci catturati nell’assalto a sorpresa contro due camion carichi di militanti. Armati di fucili, machete e archi, gli abitanti di Kala/Balge hanno coraggiosamente fatto quello che l’esercito nigeriano non ha potuto fare, e hanno messo in fuga Boko Haram.

Noi siamo stati portati a pensare che “attivismo” consista nel volere che qualcun altro faccia qualcosa. Imploriamo i politici eletti, i burocrati, spronandoli all’azione. Ma l’attivismo migliore, il più efficace, è quando prendiamo in mano la situazione e risolviamo i nostri problemi – o colpiamo i nostri nemici – da soli. Nello stato messicano di Michoacán, la popolazione si è ribellata contro il cartello del narcotraffico dei Cavalieri Templari, cacciandoli via con una forza tale che il governo messicano dispera di sopprimere i vigilantes e ora spera di corromperli, trasformandoli da una manifestazione spontanea della rabbia popolare in un altro braccio armato dello stato criminale. Speriamo che resistano.

E ora la popolazione si sta sollevando in Nigeria. Mentre il resto del mondo ha risposto ai crimini odiosi di Boko Haram con hashtag e selfie, la popolazione di Kala/Balge ha risposto con proiettili e machete, prendendo in mano la propria vita e le proprie famiglie. Difendere se stessi significa imparare a confidare in se stessi; i corsi di autodifesa, oltre alle tecniche per sconfiggere l’assalitore, insegnano anche ad avere fiducia nella propria forza e nel proprio potere. Boko Haram ha reagito come da sempre reagiscono i bulli davanti ad una vittima che improvvisamente prende coraggio: hanno fatto dietrofront e sono scappati, lasciandosi alle spalle morti e feriti da quei codardi che sono sempre stati.

Anche in America, il centro dell’impero, dobbiamo imparare ad agire direttamente contro i bulli tra noi, contro le forze dell’impero. Non occorre che l’azione sia frontale e violenta, anche se chi decide di affrontare direttamente gli oppressori merita il nostro rispetto. All’interno del movimento contro la guerra di questi ultimi quattordici anni ci sono stati molti eventi buonisti diretti a risvegliare le coscienze e raccogliere fondi. Ma l’attivismo più efficace ha preso due forme: scoraggiare l’arruolamento nelle forze armate, e incoraggiare chi è arruolato ad uscirne. Entrambe rappresentano una sfida più efficace degli striscioni, allungano una mano verso i soldati ed offrono loro una buona alternativa alla vita militare, uno degli ultimi luoghi della nostra società in cui giovani capaci possono ottenere un lavoro sicuro con una buona paga e benefici. È importante il risultato ottenuto: togliere acqua dal mulino imperialista, obbligando i suoi padroni a impiegare più denaro e tempo a cercare di trattenere i soldati e meno ad uccidere e menomare.

Parlare di alternative all’arruolamento in un istituto superiore di borgata non ha la stessa drammaticità di un’imboscata ad un convoglio di Boko Haram nella giungla nigeriana nel cuore della notte, ma le due cose condividono un aspetto chiave: non devi implorare per ottenere pietà e pace. In entrambi i casi, prendi il nemico frontalmente, e affronti personalmente il meccanismo che causa oppressione e dolore. Se vogliamo salvarci, dobbiamo seguire l’esempio coraggioso della popolazione di Kala/Balge, e salvarci da soli.

Traduzione di Enrico Sanna.

Direct Action Gets Results

Alan Smithee — Sat, 17 May 2014 18:00:01 +0000

In the village of Kalabalge, in the northern Nigerian state of Borno, the people struck back. While politicians dithered and activists twittered, the people of Kalabalge armed themselves and took the fight to their enemies, ambushing a Boko Haram convoy en route to attack their village. At least forty-one Boko Haram militants were killed and ten were captured as the villagers surprised two trucks carrying militants. Armed with rifles, machetes and bows, the brave people of Kalabalge did what the Nigerian military could not and sent Boko Haram off howling.

We are conditioned to think of “activism” as getting someone else to do something. We plead with elected officials and bureaucrats, prodding them to take action. But the best and most effective activism is when we take matters into our own hands and solve our problems — or strike at our enemies — ourselves. In Mexico’s Michoacan province, the people rose against the Knights Templar cartel, driving them off with such alacrity that the Mexican government has given up attempts to suppress the vigilantes and now hopes to suborn them, turning them from a natural manifestation of the people’s wrath into another arm of the criminal state. We pray they resist the attempt.

And now in Nigeria, the people are rising. While the rest of the world responded to Boko Haram’s vicious crimes with hashtags and selfies, the people of Kalabalge responded with bullets and machetes, taking their lives and their families into their own hands. To defend oneself is to learn to rely on oneself; in self-defense courses, we learn confidence in our own strength and power as much as we learn specific techniques for defeating assailants. Boko Haram reacted the way bullies have reacted from time immemorial to suddenly emboldened victims — they turned tail and ran, leaving their dead and wounded behind like the cowards they always were.

In America, the imperial center, we too must learn to act directly against the bullies in our midst, against the forces of the empire. These actions need not be direct, violent confrontation — although those who do choose to engage their oppressors directly deserve our respect. In the anti-war movement over the last fourteen years, many consciousness-raising, fund-raising and feel-good events have been held, but the most effective activism I’ve seen has taken two forms — discouraging enlistment, known as “counter-recruiting,” and encouraging soldiers currently in the military to get out. Both are much more challenging than holding a sign at a rally, requiring us to get to know the people we are trying to reach and to offer them a good alternative to the military, which is one of the last places left in our society where any able-bodied young person can get a secure job with good pay and benefits. But both get results that matter, denying grist to the imperial mill, forcing the managers of the imperial state to spend more time and money on finding and retaining soldiers and less on killing and maiming others.

Talking to a classroom in an inner city high school about alternatives to the military is not as dramatic as ambushing a Boko Haram convoy in Nigerian jungle in the middle of the night, but both actions share one key aspect — neither involves begging power for mercy and comfort. Rather, both take on the enemy directly, confronting personally the mechanisms of oppression and violence. If we are going to be saved, we must follow the bold example of the people of Kalabalge, and save ourselves.

Translations for this article:

Italian, I Frutti dell’Azione Diretta.

Boko Haram e l’Imperativo dell’Autodifesa

Alan Smithee — Thu, 15 May 2014 11:00:25 +0000

In Nigeria, il gruppo islamico radicale Boko Haram ha compiuto una serie di orribili attacchi, culminati nel recente rapimento di 234 ragazze da un collegio della città di Chibok. L’intenzione, secondo le dichiarazioni, sarebbe di venderle come schiave. Il governo nigeriano chiede la loro liberazione, ma secondo notizie avrebbe fatto ben poco se non aspettare che arrivino aiuti dall’estero.

L’offerta di sicurezza è una delle giustificazioni più basilari dell’esistenza dello stato. Si immagina che lo stato protegga la popolazione dai predatori, sia interni che esterni. Ma in Nigeria lo stato non ha la capacità di adempiere questa funzione. E forti dubbi esistono anche riguardo la volontà: secondo notizie poi confermate da Amnesty International l’esercito nigeriano era venuto a conoscenza con quattro ore di anticipo del fatto che una colonna armata di militanti di Boko Haram si stava dirigendo verso Chibok: quattro ore durante le quali l’esercito non ha fatto assolutamente nulla.

Ora, visto che il governo nigeriano non può o non vuole proteggere i nigeriani, forse questi potrebbero prendere esempio dai messicani, che si sono armati per difendere se stessi dall’aggressività sia dei cartelli della droga che dello stato. Ovviamente il governo nigeriano cerca di favorire la dipendenza della popolazione dallo stato vietando il possesso di armi semiautomatiche e fucili di qualunque genere; divieto che, pateticamente, non riesce ad applicare ai gruppi di Boko Haram ma che i custodi del collegio di Chibok disgraziatamente rispettano fin troppo.

L’autodifesa armata contro il terrorismo è uno di quei territori che nel corso del secolo appena iniziato sono stati esplorati ampiamente. Il punto di svolta dell’occupazione americana in Iraq non è stato, come si crede comunemente, un prodotto delle tattiche americane, ma piuttosto il risultato degli sforzi di gruppi armati di autodifesa, organizzati dagli stessi iracheni in barba al loro governo fantoccio. Anche se questi gruppi venivano finanziati dai militari americani, la decisione di agire è nata all’interno delle comunità tribali irachene. L’esempio iracheno, così come quello fornito dalla popolazione dello stato messicano di Michoacán, può costituire un modello efficace di difesa da Boko Haram per il popolo nigeriano.

Cosa possiamo fare noi occidentali per aiutare il popolo nigeriano? La cosa più ovvia è ovviamente illegale: se un americano dona armi ai nigeriani o va a combattere contro Boko Haram finisce in galera per molti anni. Un caso che illustra l’assurdità di queste leggi è quello di Eric Harroun, un veterano americano che è andato in Siria a combattere il governo di Assad. Harroun rischia il carcere per aver aiutato gli stessi ribelli siriani che l’amministrazione Obama sta cercando di aiutare. Date queste leggi, c’è poco che l’occidente possa fare legalmente, se non fare donazioni alle istituzioni di carità nigeriane e fare pressione sul governo nigeriano.

Un consiglio al popolo della Nigeria: Il vostro governo non ha né il potere né la volontà di proteggervi. Gli aiuti da parte dei governi occidentali potrebbero risolvere questa dolorosa crisi nel breve, ma non sono una soluzione di lungo termine. Invece di aspettare che i burocrati di Abuja vengano a salvarvi, prendete misure adesso per proteggere voi stessi e i vostri figli. Armatevi, se potete. Organizzate servizi di vigilanza. E se il vostro governo vi chiede di fermarvi, chiedetegli dove era il quattordici aprile, quando le vostre figlie sono state rapite.

Traduzione di Enrico Sanna.

Boko Haram and the Imperative of Self-Defense

Alan Smithee — Sun, 11 May 2014 18:00:03 +0000

In Nigeria, radical Islamic group Boko Haram has carried out a series of horrific attacks, culminating in the recent abduction of 234 girls from a boarding school in the city of Chibok. The group allegedly intends to sell the girls into slavery. The Nigerian government pledges to free them, but thus far reports on the ground indicate little has been done while the government awaits foreign assistance.

Provision of security is the most basic justification given for the existence of the state. The state is supposed to protect the population from predators, both foreign and domestic. However, in Nigeria, the state is clearly incapable of fulfilling this function. Indeed, serious questions exist as to whether or not it even wants to; reports confirmed by Amnesty International indicate that the Nigerian army had four hours’ notice that an armed column of Boko Haram militants was en route to Chibok — four hours during which the army did absolutely nothing.

Since the Nigerian government is either unwilling or unable to protect the Nigerian people, perhaps Nigerians should look to the example of the Mexican people, who have armed themselves in self-defense against both predatory cartels and predatory government forces. Of course, the Nigerian government strives to foster dependence on itself among the people, forbidding them to own semi-automatic rifles or handguns of any type — a prohibition it is pathetically unable to enforce on Boko Haram, but one which the guardians of the schoolgirls of Chibok sadly obeyed all too well.

Armed self-defense against terrorism is well-trodden territory this century. The turning point of the American occupation of Iraq was not, as is commonly believed, a product of American tactics, but rather the result of the efforts of armed self-defense groups established by the Iraqis themselves, outside the American-backed government. While these groups were funded by the American military, the initiative to act arose within the traditional tribal groups of the Iraqi people. This model, as well as the example of the people of Mexico’s Michoacan province, can serve as a template for successful self-defense against Boko Haram by the Nigerian people.

What can we do in the West to aid the Nigerian people? The most obvious way to help is of course completely illegal — any Americans who donate weapons to the Nigerians or who go to fight Boko Haram themselves face stiff prison sentences. The recent case of Eric Harroun, a U.S. Army veteran who traveled to Syria to fight against the Assad government, illustrates the absurdity of these laws. Mr. Harroun may go to prison for aiding the same Syrian rebels the Obama administration is trying to aid. Given the laws as they are, there is little within those laws we can do in the West, aside from donating to Nigerian charities and helping bring more pressure on the Nigerian government.

To the people of Nigeria: Your government cannot and will not protect you. Aid from Western governments might address this immediate and painful crisis, but will not be a long-term solution. Rather than waiting for the bureaucrats in Abuja to save you, take steps now to protect yourselves and your children. Arm yourselves, if you can. Organize watches. And when your government asks you to stop, ask them where they were on 14 April, when your daughters were stolen.

Translations for this article:

Italian, Boko Haram e l’Imperativo dell’Autodifesa.
Spanish, Boko Haram y el imperativo de la autodefensa